International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS) |Volume VI, Issue XI, November 2022|ISSN 2454-6186
O. Celestine Jombo, PhD
Department of Public Administration, Adekunle Ajasin University
Akungba Akoko, Ondo State, Nigeria
Abstract: This paper examines the seemingly intractable tensions and frictions between the executive and legislative branches in Nigeria. Specifically, it interrogates the intricate political and personality issues that surrounded the recurring tension and open confrontation between the presidency and the 8th National Assembly between 2015 and 2019. Using a combination of both descriptive and analytical methods and through a review of the extant literature, the paper reaffirmed and established the primacy of the legislature as an institution of accountability under the Nigeria’s presidential system. The paper discovered that persistent conflicts and contradictions between the executive and legislative actors in Nigeria have made effective budget formulation and implementation a difficult task with far-reaching political and socio-economic consequences for the nation’s body politic. The rifts breed suspicion and hostility between the two branches of government, creates division in the legislature, brings distraction to the governance process and, ultimately, propels the resort to the culture of impunity and total disregard to the rule of law by the governing elites. The paper concludes that the constitutional provisions defining the interface between the executive and legislative branches are adequate to engender stable and accountable government. Nevertheless, the political actors across the executive-legislative divide must be ready to embrace the dictates of separation of powers as enshrined in the 1999 constitution, abide by the rules of democratic game, and collaborate to work for the interests of the Nigerian people.
Keywords: Accountability, Executive-legislative Conflicts, Oversight Powers, Presidentialism.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Nigeria, the return to democratic rule in May 1999 necessitated the establishment of representative legislatures at all levels of government. The provisions of the 1999 Constitution, which positioned the legislature as a watch-dog to the executive branch, institutionalized a new ethos of constitutionalism in the country. This followed a prolonged rein of military dictatorship characterised by executive unilateralism and dominance (Oyewo, 2007). In essence, 1999 Constitution recognizes the principle of separation of powers as one of the crucial features for ensuring the operation of presidential democracy in Nigeria (Nwabueze, 2004; Jombo, 2019).
The hallmark of presidentialism is the safeguard against dictatorship and arbitrariness in government. For this purpose