Personal Rule: The Bane of Democratic Survival in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic

International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS) | Volume II, Issue V, May 2018 | ISSN 2454-6186

Personal Rule: The Bane of Democratic Survival in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic

Yahaya Yakubu

 Department of Political Science & Int’l Relations, Nile University of Nigeria

Abstract: – Contrary to expectations, democratic advancements and establishment of modern institutions of liberal cum regularization of periodic elections in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has not brought an end to personal. Rather prebendalistic perception of public office, alongside the twin incidence of neopatrimonialism and political clientelism has fostered the prevalence of personal rule. Upon examining the theoretical precepts of prebendalism the study claims; while personal rule negates the probability of democratization, individual networks wills of statesmen amongst other ethnic, political and social elites arguably remains the panacea of democratic survival. Consequently, as opposed to focusing on the negative effects of personal rule, the study propagates the need to take into account certain non-political determinants of political outcomes in the practice of democracy. Conclusively it posits, the need for the contextualization of governance in line with prevailing norms, ethics and values.

Keywords: Personal Rule, Prebendalism, Neopatrimonialism, Political Clientelism and Informal Institutions.

I. INTRODUCTION

Contrary to the expectations of modern democratic development, the establishment of liberal institutions of democracy cum regularization of competitive elections in Nigeria’s Fourth republic has not, brought about the demise of personal rule in Nigeria’s political landscape. Rather the underlying informal institutions of neopatrimonialism and political clientelism have adapted and co-existed alongside liberal democratic institutions and contributed to the persistence of personal rule. Nigeria arguably combines the formal architecture of modern bureaucratic states, constrained in theory by laws– with the informal reality of a highly unitary, centralized, personalized and unaccountable power. Although substantial empirical evidence is not readily available due to the clandestine nature of personal rule, probabilities are somewhat strong enough for political scientist to accept the materiality of such practices.

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