The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: An Apparatus for Russia’s National Interest Maximization.

International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS) | Volume VI, Issue III, March 2022 | ISSN 2454–6186

The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: An Apparatus for Russia’s National Interest Maximization.

Abu Rushd Mohammad Saikh
University of Dhaka, Bangaldesh

Abstract: The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict constitutes an ideal case study for addressing the difficulty of national interest in foreign policy formulation. Nagorno-Karabakh occupied by Armenia is recognized by the international community as a part of Azerbaijan. Unresolved for a few years, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has verified a true Gordian knot. This article examines the role of external actors, specifically role of Russia in this conflict. Russia is widely thought of to be the foremost relevant and anxious regional power. Russia’s ambition to retain the Soviet era influence in its strategic backyards, the geopolitical importance of Nagorno-Karabakh and its relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan made itself a crucial regional actor in this conflict. Russia possesses authority to escalate and deescalate through military assistance and mediation. This article demonstrates that Russia utilizes the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to maximize its national interest in the south Caucasian region.

Key Words: Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, National Interest, Foreign Policy.

Introduction

The Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020 has drawn the attention and much speculation of a corona affected world. While the whole world was fighting against an invisible enemy–(SARS-CoV-2) virus—armies of Azerbaijan and Armenia were fighting against each other. The main parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh (also called higher Karabakh or mountainous Karabakh) conflict are Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic. The Nagorno-Karabakh crisis began in 1988 even three years before the independence of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic. For the last thirty years, this crisis has remained unresolved. Nevertheless, regional countries such as Russia, Turkey, Iran as well as non-regional countries i.e., the United States and Israel are deeply involved in this Caucasian conflict zone.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is an outcome of overlapping territorial claims of Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Historically this region was an integral part of Azerbaijan. However, the majority of the inhabitants were ethnically Armenians. After the Bolshevik revolution, both Armenia and Azerbaijan became parts of the Soviet Republic. The Soviet government created an autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh region during the 1920s (CFR, 1920). Disagreement and animosity between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh were kept under check and balance by the Soviet government. It is only during the last days of the USSR when the rivalry turned into enmity between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Armenia and Azerbaijan engaged in a full-fledged war that ended in 1994 with Armenia being the victorious party. Armenia occupied Nagorno-Karabakh and also gained additional Azerbaijani territory. Russia brokered peace between these two conflicting parties. With some minor border clashes, the region was peaceful until 2016. A four days intense conflict emerged in 2016 and Russia again settled the issue as a negotiator (Jarosiewicz and Falkowski, 2016). The Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020 is also ended in a peace deal by Russian mediation.

Hence, this article argues that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a tool for Russia to maximize its national interest in the region. The Caucasian region has been a sphere of influence for Moscow since the Soviet days. Although the Soviet Union considered the conflict as an internal issue, for Russia it is a matter of extending national influence outside its own territory. After the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia started developing a clear interest in instrumentalizing the conflict for political and economic gains. Although its policy remained chaotic in the first years of the Yeltsin era, Russia quickly commenced seeing the conflict as an opportunity to exert control over the region and as a lever against the two parties involved. This tendency continued under Putin, who has given even further prominence to the return-to-a-great-power-status rhetoric. Since his first presidential term, Russia has undoubtedly become more confident and assertive in its policy towards its ‘near abroad’ and respectively, the conflict (Daskalova, 2015).

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