Auditors’ Switching Decisions and Corporate Governance Outcomes: Evidence on Accountability and Transparency from Nigeria’s Listed Oil and Gas Sector

This study examines the effect of auditor switching decisions on the accountability and transparency of listed oil and gas firms in Nigeria, and whether these governance effects differ between voluntary and regulatory-driven switching episodes. Anchored on Signaling Theory, the paper addresses a critical gap in which auditor switching has largely been treated as a dependent variable rather than an independent driver of governance outcomes. Using a balanced panel of seven listed oil and gas firms on the Nigerian Exchange covering 2012–2024 (91 firm-year observations), fixed-effects regression models reveal that auditor switching has no statistically significant effect on accountability (β = 0.022, p = 0.602) or transparency (β = −0.032, p = 0.310). No significant differential effect is detected between voluntary and regulatory-driven switches. The findings indicate that, in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector, auditor switching does not function as an effective governance signal. The study recommends an integrated governance approach rather than reliance on switching as a standalone mechanism.

Auditor switching, Accountability, Transparency, Corporate governance, Nigeria

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