A Conceptual Synthesis of China's Peaceful Policy, Tolerance, and the Logic of Non-Provocative Defence

This conceptual synthesis analyses the interplay between China's declared policy of peaceful development, the notion of strategic tolerance, and the pragmatic rationale of non-provocative defence. Utilising defensive realism, security dilemma theory, deterrence theory, and just war traditions, the analysis assesses a series of propositions derived from a practitioner-oriented defence document. The synthesis contends that China's stance (prioritizing non-intervention, mutual respect, and the prevention of nuclear escalation) does not exclude but rather necessitates credible, low-cost territorial defence mechanisms. Three fundamental assertions are integrated: firstly, that China's peaceful policy fulfils both normative and strategic roles in a multipolar context; secondly, that tolerance, when accurately interpreted, represents a calculated restraint aimed at averting catastrophic conflict rather than indicating weakness; thirdly, that essential, geographically tailored defence measures (including natural barriers, water obstacles, missile interception systems, and minimal submarine-based deterrence) can deter potential aggressors without instigating arms races. The analysis reveals substantial deficiencies: the lack of empirical validation, insufficient operational specifics concerning "low-cost" defence architectures, unresolved conflicts between tolerance and effective deterrence, and the scarcity of quantitative data. The synthesis concludes by delineating a research agenda for defensive realism amid escalating great-power competition.

China peaceful policy, strategic tolerance

1. Buzar, S. (2020). The principle of double effect and just war theory. Philosophia, 48(4), 1299-1312. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

2. Colby, E. A. (2021). The strategy of denial: American defense in an age of great power conflict. Yale University Press. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

3. Connor, G. (2025). A Sword for Peace and Liberty Volume 1: Force de Frappe-The French Nuclear Strike Force and the First Cold War 1945-1990. Air Power History, 72(2), 144-144. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

4. Godwin, P. H. (2022). Potential Chinese Responses to US Ballistic Missile Defense. Stimson Center. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

5. Hagstrom, L., & Bremberg, N. (2022). Aikido and world politics: a practice theory for transcending the security dilemma. European Journal of International Relations, 28(2), 263-286. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

6. Juneau, T. (2020). The Obama administration, defensive realism, and American foreign policy in the Middle East. Comparative Strategy, 39(4), 385-400. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

7. Lai, C. J. (2019). Rhetorical traps and China’s peaceful rise: Malaysia and the Philippines in the South China Sea territorial disputes. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 19(1), 117-146. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

8. Kim, T., Ishiyama, J., & Breuning, M. (2026). Madness as Strategy? Leader Reputation and the Logic of Elite Purges in Autocracies. Social Science Quarterly, 107(2), e70135. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

9. Kuo, K. M., Talley, P. C., & Huang, C. H. (2020). A meta-analysis of the deterrence theory in security-compliant and security-risk behaviors. Computers & Security, 96, 101928. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

10. O’driscoll, C., Brown, C., Hutchings, K., Finlay, C. J., Whyte, J., & Gregory, T. (2021). How and why to do just war theory. Contemporary Political Theory, 20(4), 858-889. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

11. Paszak, P. (2020). The security strategy of the People’s Republic of China in light of the 2019 Defence White Paper. The Bellona Quarterly, 700(1), 49-64. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

12. Prepotenska, M., Smyrnova, T., Rasskazova, O., Cherednyk, L., & Doichyk, M. (2022). Tolerance as a communicative and socio-cultural strategy of social agreements. Postmodern Openings, (13), 291-312. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

13. State Council Information Office (2019). China's National Defense in the New Era White Paper. Retrieved at https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-07/24/content_5414325.htm. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

14. Stein, J. G. (2023). Escalation Management in Ukraine:" Learning by Doing" in Response to the" Threat that Leaves Something to Chance". Texas National Security Review, 6(3), 29-50. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

15. Tabak, M. (2025). Varieties of defensive realism. In Realism in international relations: The making of a disarrayed tradition (pp. 195-221). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

16. Xie, W., Yang, M., & Gong, J. (2020). Underwater Attack–Defense Confrontation System and Its Future Development. Strategic Study of Chinese Academy of Engineering, 21(6), 71-79. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

17. Zubair, B. (2023). From ‘rise of China’ to ‘peaceful development’: an analysis of competing discourses. In Chinese Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in the United States (pp. 41-68). Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

• Fragility in Motion: Comparative Conflict Systems and External Pressures in the Horn of Africa
• Power as Harm Capacity: A Unified Mathematical Framework for Understanding Social Domination
• Religion and Democratic Governance in Nigeria: Issues and Prospects. (2011-2023)
• Reinterpreting Guy Martin’s African Political Thought in the Contemporary Frame “A Critical Review and Reassessment of Case Studies in Ghana, Tanzania, Senegal, Guinea, and South Africa”
• Hybrid Governance and Civilian Survival: Rethinking State Legitimacy in Cameroon’s Anglophone Conflict, 2017-2025