“Beyond the Bench: Examining the Limits of Judicial Discretion and the Scope for Abuse in India’s Higher Judiciary”

Authors

Dr. Shreshth Bhatnagar

Assistant Professor at St. Joseph’s College of Law, Bengaluru (India)

Article Information

DOI: 10.51244/IJRSI.2025.12110114

Subject Category: Law

Volume/Issue: 12/11 | Page No: 1282-1292

Publication Timeline

Submitted: 2025-12-05

Accepted: 2025-12-12

Published: 2025-12-18

Abstract

The Indian judiciary, revered as the guardian of constitutional values, often exercises wide discretionary powers, particularly within the higher judiciary. While judicial discretion is essential for interpreting statutes and delivering equitable justice, its unchecked use poses significant risks. This paper explores the nuanced boundaries of judicial discretion in India's higher judiciary and investigates the potential for its abuse. Drawing from landmark judgments, constitutional provisions, and recent instances of perceived overreach, the study critically analyzes the balance between judicial independence and accountability. It highlights how subjective interpretations, selective activism, and lack of institutional oversight can sometimes lead to inconsistent or biased rulings. Moreover, the research delves into the implications of such discretion on democratic processes, public trust, and separation of powers. By comparing judicial frameworks in other democracies and examining recommendations from legal scholars and commissions, this paper proposes the need for structured guidelines to ensure responsible exercise of discretion. Ultimately, the paper argues for a reimagined judicial accountability mechanism that maintains the integrity of the bench while curbing excesses. In doing so, it seeks to contribute to the ongoing discourse on legal reform, transparency, and the evolving role of the judiciary in India’s democratic fabric.

Keywords

Judicial discretion, Judicial accountability, Higher judiciary, Judicial overreach, Separation of powers

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