International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS) |Volume VI, Issue X, October 2022|ISSN 2454-6186
Darfur Conflict and Hybrid Operation: Challenges of a Pioneer Hybrid Peacekeeping Operation Model.
Daniel Adekera PhD
Chief, Strategic Communication and Public Information/Spokesperson, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), Sudan, Nigeria
Abstract: The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) established on 31 July 2007 as the first truly joint peacekeeping mission was a very ambitious adventure in collective security management. For the first time in its 27 years of peacekeeping, the United Nations would be sharing command and control of a peacekeeping mission with a regional organization. It was an experiment whose success or otherwise would determine the way the United Nations, the body responsible for global peace and security, was going to do business. This article conducted a critical assessment of the mission using content analysis of UN Security Council Resolutions, Code Cables and Note Verbales as well as relevant African Union documents and in-depth interviews The data collected was critically examined using the qualitative method. It found that the mission was confronted with numerous logistical and security constraints as it operated in a complex and hostile political environment. It also found that several structural and functional issues were not very clearly defined, giving rise to operational challenges. The study recommends that, given the perceived influence the hybrid operation appears to have on future UN peacekeeping operations, issues bordering on command and control and mandates should be clearly defined to avoid gaps and or overlaps that were experienced in the Darfur operation.
Keywords: Darfur conflict, Peacekeeping, Hybrid operation, African Union, United Nations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was established by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 on July 31, 2007, to operate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The mission, with its headquarters in El Fasher, had the protection of civilians as its core mandate. Other mandated tasks included contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying the implementation of peace agreements, and assisting an inclusive political process. The hybrid mission was also tasked to contribute to the promotion of human rights and rule of law, and to monitor and report on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). (S/RES/1769, 2007). In terms of its structure, Resolution 1769 provided for a unified command and control while also allowing for command-and-control structures and backstopping to be provided by the United Nations. This essentially meant that the African Union would run the day-to-day operations while the UN would have the overall control of the mission. The mission’s force would, as far as possible, be sourced from African countries. Consequently, the mission’s command structure reflected a strong African presence, namely Mr. Rodophe Adada from the Republic of Congo as Joint Special Representative; Major Henry Anyidoho (rtd.) from Ghana as Deputy Joint Special Representative, General Martin Luther Agwai from Nigeria as Force Commander; and Michael Fryer from South Africa as Police Commissioner. According to Ban Ki Moon, the hybrid experiment represented the continuous efforts by the UN to reform peacekeeping operations to make it more rapid in response to conflicts, ease the UN of obvious challenges and fill the gap between demand and supply in peacekeeping operations based on comparative advantage. (Ki Moon:2007)