International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS) |Volume VI, Issue XI, November 2022|ISSN 2454-6186
Francis Evan L. Manayan
University of Mindanao, Philippines
Abstract: Like other laws and regulations, enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Law does not happen without the compulsion from government authorities accompanied by work-site inspection and penalties. Becker and Stigler (1974) confirms that the aim of enforcement is to attain that desired degree of compliance with the rule of prescribed behavior, and the critical reason that prevents an entity from enforcing full compliance is that enforcement is costly. This study extends the classroom game conducted by Anderson and Stafford (2006) wherein it highlighted the business unit’s responses to changes in monitoring probability relative to changes in enforcement severity. The game was put into an actual setting of analyzing the dynamics of enforcement strategies in the context of banana plantations. This study confirmed that all business units that have been caught in the past will be inspected each day, and for those that never been caught will be selected at random for inspection. Also, it confirmed that having been caught as non-compliant generally does not result in more compliance unless past violations increase future fine or punishment. Though there was no significant increase in fines, the banana farms exhibited an increased level of compliance. This performance is suspected to be due to the banana plantations’ natural response to the successive results of inspections because of the recurring non-compliance.
Keywords: economics of enforcement, OSH standard, banana plantations, Personal Protective Equipment
I. INTRODUCTION
Background
This study was conducted to come-up with an enforcement strategy that may improve the level of compliance of the banana plantations with the OSH Standard or the Department Order No. 198. It focused on the major question: What is the optimal enforcement regime that significantly influences compliance with OSH Standard?
Specifically, this study asked the following:
• Does the level of compliance increase as the expected fine increase?
• Do the low probability of inspection and higher fine combinations induce more compliance than the high-probability and low fine combination?
• Is there a significant relationship between level of compliance with OSH standard and its factors?