General Equilibrium and Market Incompleteness: A Conceptual Re-Evaluation for Frontier Economies

Authors

Okutoyi Purity

Maseno University (Kenya)

Ghabon Yasin

Maseno University (Kenya)

Article Information

DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS.2025.91100306

Subject Category: Microbiology

Volume/Issue: 9/11 | Page No: 3967-3976

Publication Timeline

Submitted: 2025-11-24

Accepted: 2025-12-28

Published: 2025-12-09

Abstract

General Equilibrium (GE) theory provides a foundational framework for understanding how decentralized markets coordinate resource allocation. Yet the classical Arrow-Debreu model and its associated welfare theorems rely on assumptions of complete markets, perfect information, and strong institutions that rarely hold in frontier economies. This paper re-examines GE theory through the lens of market incompleteness and institutional fragility, showing that the predictive and normative power of GE becomes significantly weakened under frontier market conditions. Drawing on literature from incomplete markets theory, sequential equilibria, and institutional economics, the paper demonstrates that missing financial markets, contracting failures, and information asymmetries generate constrained inefficiencies and fragile equilibria that deviate markedly from Walrasian predictions

Keywords

General Equilibrium Theory; Market Incompleteness; Frontier Economies

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References

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