Judicial Independence as Catalyst to Effective Judicial Review in Nigeria

The complexity of the Nigerian society makes it eminent that judicial roles catch up with society's changes to make the law more relevant to the Nigerian people in its present democratic dispensation. The reality of the present democratic dispensation in Nigeria, and many other countries worldwide, creates such scenarios that generate a gulf between society and the law. This gulf puts judges in dilemmas of protecting the competing interests of the society, law, and the government, as judges are accountable to the established law they uphold, and then to the justice system they represent. Therefore, judicial review remains a weapon to compel obedience to the law and ensure that those holding governmental positions are acting within the limits of the laws. Thus, the objective of this paper are to: (i) examine the theoretical underpinnings of judicial review of executive actions; (ii) to analyse judicial willingness or otherwise in adjudicating on matters of executive actions; (iii) to assess the impacts of judicial review on Nigeria’s democracy; (iv) to analyse challenges to the effectiveness of judicial review of executive actions; and (v) to proffer practicable measures of enhancing judicial performances in the exercise of its power of judicial review. This paper adopted a doctrinal research method, which focused on content analysis of judicial independence as prerequisite for effective judicial review in Nigeria. Thus, primary and secondary sources of law were relied upon. The primary source includes the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as altered), judicial decisions and other enabling statutes. The secondary sources include journal articles, books, and conference papers. The findings of the seminar paper were that: a. The mode of appointment of judges where the executive has a fundamental role to play is hindering the independence of judiciary thereby whittling down the power of judicial review of the courts; b. The process of budget presentation and allocating funds to the judiciary in a piecemeal manner constitutes stumbling block to judicial independence and achieving effective judicial review; c. Improper influence on judges such as bribes, accepting gifts, accepting personal invitations and personal relationship are direct material threats to judicial independence and thus weakening the judicial powers of the courts; and d. The dependence of judges on the executive for career progression incentives exposes them to manipulative strategies that compromise their ability to be independent. The paper concluded that preserving judicial independence is vital for maintaining the integrity of the judicial review process and ensuring the judiciary remains a potent check on the exercise of power. The paper therefore recommended that to uphold the rule of law, the appointment and selection processes of judges should be based solely on merit, individual qualifications, experience, and skills rather than personal connections, nepotism, or family ties.

complexity , Nigerian society , Judicial , Independence

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