Politics and Terrorism in Northern Nigeria, 2009-2025

Since Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999, the country has experienced a steady escalation of violent conflicts that have undermined national stability, weakened governance structures, and eroded public trust in state institutions. Among these security challenges, the Boko Haram insurgency, which intensified from 2009, has remained one of the most severe manifestations of terrorism in Nigeria. This study examined the relationship between politics and terrorism in Nigeria, with specific focus on Boko Haram insurgency between 2009 and 2025. The study was anchored on the State Failure Theory, which explained terrorism as a consequence of weak governance, loss of legitimacy, and institutional decay. The descriptive survey research design was adopted. The population of the study comprised 12.27 million people drawn from Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States, using Taro Yamane’s formula, a sample size of 400 was determined. Primary data were collected using 4-point likert scale structured questionnaire, while secondary data were obtained from academic literature, government reports, and international publications. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and Pearson’s product moment correlation. The instrument for data collection was validated via expert review while reliability was confirmed at a coefficient range of 0.82 to 0.86 using the Cronbach’s Alpha. Findings revealed that political interference significantly contributed to the persistence of Boko Haram insurgency, institutional weaknesses reduced the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations, socio-economic deprivation facilitated recruitment and expansion of insurgent networks, and human rights violations negatively affected public trust and community cooperation in security efforts. The study concluded that Boko Haram insurgency was fundamentally rooted in governance failures, institutional fragility, and socio-economic inequalities rather than purely ideological or religious motivations. The study recommends that the Nigerian government should ensure that security matters are treated as national priorities rather than being used as ready weapons for political maneuvering. Policies and strategies for counterterrorism should be consistent, coordinated, and free from political interference. This will enhance national unity and improve the effectiveness of security operations.

Politics, Boko Haram, Terrorism, Government, Nigeria

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