The Designation of Constitutional Judges in Cameroon: Between Constitutional Legality and a Lack of Independence

The Designation of constitutional judges is a major determinant of the independence of constitutional adjudication, although it does not, by itself, exhaust the guarantees required for such independence. This article offers a renewed reading of the Cameroonian system by moving beyond an analysis focused exclusively on presidential influence. It combines legal, historical-institutional, and comparative methods to examine, first, the historical and political factors that shaped the institutional architecture introduced in 1996 and, second, the lessons offered by four reference models: Benin, South Africa, France, and Germany. The study shows that the pluralistic selection framework provided by Article 51 of the Cameroonian Constitution remains limited by three cumulative factors: the intervention of the President of the Republic in the formal act appointing all members, the institutional dependence of the selecting bodies, and the persistence of a political culture of centralisation. The delay of more than twenty years between the constitutional establishment of the Council in 1996 and its effective installation in 2018 further demonstrates that independence depends not only on constitutional formulas, but also on the political will to make them effective. The comparative analysis highlights several techniques capable of mitigating the risks of institutional capture: constitutionally specified professional criteria, internal election of the head of the court, independent shortlisting, public hearings, parliamentary scrutiny, and qualified majorities. The article does not advocate the mechanical transplantation of such models. Rather, it argues for a contextualised reform: reducing presidential control over the final stage of the Designation process, strengthening the autonomy of the Higher Judicial Council, publicising candidacies, imposing stricter incompatibility rules, and ensuring the consensual selection of the President of the Constitutional Council. The independence of constitutional justice thus appears as the product of convergent legal arrangements, political practice, and institutional culture.

Constitutional Judge; Constitutional Council; Cameroon; Selection and Designation; Judicial Independence; Comparative Constitutional Law; Presidentialism; Rule of Law.

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