Monitoring and Evaluating the Independence of Anti-Corruption Agencies: Political Interference and Institutional Capture in Third World States — Malawi, Nigeria and kenya

This comparative research work investigated the issues of independence, political interference and institutional capture on anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in Malawi, Nigeria and Kenya using a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework. Though the enabling legislation is strong in all the three ACAs, the results indicate that their practical autonomy is highly disenfranchised by structural, political and resource-related shortcomings. The Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) in Malawi has a strong investigative law enforcement mandate that still relies on the Director of Public Prosecutions to conduct a prosecution, which presents a standing susceptibility of being subject to political pressure. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in Nigeria has the broadest legal jurisdiction, including the ability to conduct internal investigations and prosecute, but is severely limited by the executive branch which dictates who gets leadership positions, which cases to prosecute and the severity of the prosecution. An advantage of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission of Kenya (EACC) is that the country has a strong legal system; however, it is evident that the force and its agencies are spread across a chain of command which is disjointed making it slow and open to bargaining with politics. Political interference is found to be a characteristic drawback in all three nations and impacts case proceedings, investigation resolution and political stability. These are manifested in different ways-procedural interference in Malawi, overt executive influence in Nigeria and decentralised political pressure in Kenya, but the effects are the same weakened impartiality, selective enforcement and stalled high-profile cases. Political settlements, elite networks and bureaucratic fragmentation also give rise to institutional capture of each ACA. These dynamics have a significant adverse effect on performance in enforcing the functions and on trust by the population. The research finds that the legal systems are not sufficient as assurance of ACA autonomy. The performance against corruption requires the political insulation, stable budgets, simplified mandate and greater prosecutorial independence. The results are relevant to comparative studies of anti-corruption practices because they show that political and institutional environment affects ACA performance of states in the Third World.

The anti-corruption agencies, Independence, political interference, institutional capture, monitoring and evaluation, Malawi, Nigeria, Kenya.

1. Camacho, G., & Jenkins, M. (2022). Malawi: Overview of Corruption and Anti Corruption Efforts. U4 Anti Corruption Helpdesk. https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/helpdesk/overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-efforts-in-malawi [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

2. Nawaz, F. (2012). Overview of Corruption and Anti Corruption in Malawi. U4 Expert Answer 329. (Earlier U4 Briefing Later Summarized in U4 Helpdesk Material.) [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

3. Chinsakaso, F. K. (2019). Detection, Investigation, Prosecution and Adjudication of High Profile Corruption in Malawi. In UNAFEI Resource Material Series No. 110. United Nations Asia and Far East Institute. https://www.unafei.or.jp/publications/pdf/RS_No110/No110_26_No22UNCAC_IP_Malawi.pdf [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

4. Global Integrity Anti Corruption Evidence (GI ACE). (2024). African Anti Corruption Agencies and the Problem of Independence. https://giace.org/independence/ [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

5. Strasser, P. G. (2016). An Anti Corruption Bureau’s Inexorable Endeavor: A Study of Malawi’s Cashgate Scandal. Washington & Lee University Law Review Online, 73. https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol73/iss1/11/ [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

6. Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. Hechler, H., & Parkes, B. (2010). Annual Review of DFID/RNE Malawi’s Anti Corruption Bureau Support Programme. NORAD. https://www.norad.no/contentassets/1fb0dcf9ae9349188165ae76263a5cef/annual-review-of-dfidrne-malawis-anticorruption-bureau-support-programme.pdf [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

7. Anti Corruption Bureau, Malawi. (2019). Strategic Plan 2020–2024 [Final Plan Issued Dec 2019]. https://acbmw.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/FINAL-ACB-SP-1-2-DEC-2019-for-printing.pdf [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

8. Open Government Partnership. (2017). Malawi Commitment Page Including Analysis of ACB Independence, Funding, and Oversight. https://www.opengovpartnership.org/members/malawi/commitments/MW0003/ [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

9. Mtuwa, S., & Chiweza, A. L. (2023). Implications of Corruption on Public Administration in Malawi. Journal of Humanities, 91, 31–? [CC BY 4.0]. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/374884448_Implications_of_Corruption_on_Public_Administration_in_Malawi [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

10. Dionne, K. Y., & Dulani, B. (2025). Resisting Executive Power Grabs: Lessons From Malawi. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 712(1), 182–194. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/390084669_Resisting_Executive_Power_Grabs_Lessons_from_Malawi [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

11. Bello, M. F., & Adaran, O. O. (2022). The Role of Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) in Combating Corruption in Nigeria. Musamus Journal of Public Administration, 5(1). https://ssrn.com/abstract=4242894 [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

12. Agu, J. C., Nkwo, F. N., & Eneiga, R. U. (2024). Governance and Anti Corruption Measures in Nigeria: Strategies for Enhancing Transparency, Accountability and Public Trust. International Journal of Economics and Public Policy, 8(1), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.12576796 [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

13. Odeke, D. O. (2024). Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Financial Accountability and Transparency in Nigeria. African Journal of Management and Business Research, 17(1), 218–234. https://doi.org/10.62154/ajmbr.2024.017.010505 [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

14. Udegbunam, C. U., Osuchukwu, C. N., & Odita, A. O. (2025). Corruption and Financial Crimes in Nigeria: An Examination of Activities of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), 2015–2023. International Journal of Social Science and Management Research (IJSSMR), 11(6), 333–350. https://www.iiardjournals.org/abstract.php?id=60605&j=IJSSMR&pn=Corruption+and+Financial+Crimes+in+Nigeria%3A+An+Examination+of+Activities+of+the+Economic+and+Financial+Crimes+Commission+%28EFCC%29%2C+2015-2023#:~:text=Nov%2013%2C%202025%0A%0A%0A%0AVolume%0A%0A%0A%0AVOL,6%202025%0A%0A%0A%0AIssue%0A%0A%0A%0ABACK [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

15. Adenigbagbe, K., Egbon Charles, C., Adenigbagbe, I., & Gambo, N. (2025). Anti Corruption Strategies and Corruption Reduction in Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). International Journal of Business and Management Review, 13(2), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.37745/ijbmr.2013/vol13n2115 [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

16. Center for Fiscal Transparency and Public Integrity. (2024). Civil Society Report on Implementation of UNCAC Chapters II and V in Nigeria. UNCAC Coalition. https://uncaccoalition.org/uncacparallelreportnigeria/ [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

17. Hoffmann, L. K. (2025). Corruption in Nigeria [Explainer]. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/08/corruption-nigeria#:~:text=Published%2028%20August%202025%0A%0A%0A%0AUpdated%203,Hoffmann%20Associate%20Fellow%2C%20Africa%20Programme [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

18. Eboh, C. (2024, April 15). Nigeria’s Anti Corruption Agency Recovers Nearly $30 Mln in Corruption Probe. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigerias-anti-graft-agency-recovers-nearly-30-mln-corruption-probe-2024-04-15/#:~:text=By%20Camillus%20Eboh%0A%0A%0A%0AApril%2015%2C%202024,tackling%20poverty%2C%20a%20spokesperson%20said [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

19. Ben Ezeamalu. (2025, March 10). Nigeria’s Anti Graft Agency Recovers Nearly $500 Million in One Year. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigerias-anti-graft-agency-recovers-nearly-500-mln-one-year-2025-03-10/#:~:text=LAGOS%2C%20March%2010%20%28Reuters%29%20,was%20reinvested%20in%20government%20projects [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

20. Nkemdilim, N. H., & Iyoha, A. E. (2024). An Assessment of the Role of Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) in the Eradication of Corruption in Nigeria Politics: A Study of Edo State. Journal of Arts and Sociological Research, 3(6), 75–94. https://afropolitanjournals.com/index.php/ajmbr/article/view/505#:~:text=Nkemdilim%2C%20N,35.%20https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.34257%2FGJHSSAVOL21IS6PG22 [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

21. Daud, Y. M. (2024). A Review of Effectiveness of Anti Corruption Strategies and Institutions in Kenya. African Journal of Commercial Studies, 4(4). https://ijcsacademia.com/index.php/journal/article/view/80 [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

22. Notes for Verification: Author Listed as Yussuf M. Daud. The Article Explicitly Notes Political Interference and Resource Constraints as Hindrances to Institutional Independence. [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

23. Walter, K. K., & Ghabon, Y. K. (2025). Effectiveness of Institutional Anti Corruption Strategies on Prosecution of Corruption Cases in Public Sector in Kenya. International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, 9(7), 584–597. https://rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/articles/effectiveness-of-institutional-anti-corruption-strategies-on-prosecution-of-corruption-cases-in-public-sector-in-kenya/ [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

24. Wasike, J. N., & Mbirithi, D. M. (2025). Anti Corruption Policy Measure and its Effect on Service Delivery in Trans Nzoia County Government, Kenya. International Academic Journal of Arts and Humanities, 1(5), 296–313. https://www.iajournals.org/articles/iajah_v1_i5_296_313.pdf [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

25. Nabwoba, P. W. (2025). From Paper Tigers to Iron Teeth: Transforming Kenya’s Anti Corruption Framework Into Effective Governance. SSRN. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5278440 [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

26. Matiti, P. M., Odondo, A. J., & Nyakwara, S. (2025). Effect of Anti Corruption Strategies on Governance of the Kenya National Police Service in Meru County, Kenya. East African Journal of Arts and Social Sciences, 8(4), 313–328. https://journals.eanso.org/index.php/eajass/article/download/4003/4497/ [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

27. Malalo, H. (2024, July 30). Kenya Charges Ex State Firm Head Over Edible Oil Import Graft. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/kenya-charges-ex-state-firm-head-over-edible-oil-import-graft-2024-07-30/ [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

28. Transparency International Kenya; Global Civil Society Coalition for the UNCAC. (2025, November 7). Kenya: Civil Society Report to UNCAC – Executive Summary. https://uncaccoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/Global-Civil-Society-Coalition-for-the-UNCAC-CoSP11-Submission-%E2%80%93-Kenya-Civil-Society-Parallel-Report-%E2%80%93-Executive-Summary.pdf [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

29. Africa Centre for Open Governance (AfriCOG). (2024). Wrong Direction: Corruption in Kenya 2022–2024. https://www.scribd.com/document/903913233/Wrong-Direction-Corruption-in-Kenya-2022-2024-AfriCOG-9th-December-2024-1 [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

30. Institute of Public Finance (IPF). (2025). Kenya Shadow Governance Diagnostic Report. https://ipfglobal.or.ke/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/KENYA-SHADOW-GOVERNANCE-DIAGNOSTIC-REPORT.pdf [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

31. Ethics and Anti Corruption Commission (EACC). (2023). National Ethics and Corruption Survey 2022. EACC Research Report No. 14. https://eacc.go.ke/en/default/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/National-Ethics-and-Corruption-Survey-2022.pdf [Google Scholar] [Crossref]

• Developmental Evaluation in Complex Governance Systems: Learning and Adaptation in Policy Implementation
• Innovations in Monitoring and Evaluation Systems for Project Tracking: Applying Global Best Practices in Nairobi
• AI-Driven Monitoring and Evaluation: The Future of Transparent and Accountable Governance in Public Project Implementation
• Big Data and Citizen Feedback Analytics in Monitoring Public Service Performance
• Institutional factors influencing performance of M&E systems in government projects: a case of the Honey Project at Kongwa District, Tanzania.