Determinants of the Republic of Qatar-Federal Republic of Somalia Development Aid Relations Since 2014
- Khalid Abdi Yusuf
- Otieno Isaiah Oduor
- 64-72
- Jan 29, 2025
- International Relations
Determinants of the Republic of Qatar-Federal Republic of Somalia Development Aid Relations Since 2014
Khalid Abdi Yusuf, Otieno Isaiah Oduor
Department of Security, Diplomacy and Peace Studies, Kenyatta University, December, 2024
DOI: https://doi.org/10.51244/IJRSI.2025.12010006
Received: 24 December 2024; Accepted: 28 December 2024; Published: 29 January 2025
ABSTRACT
This article examined the determinants of the Republic of Qatar-Federal Republic of Somalia development aid relations. The study was guided by a double contribution of two theoretical perspective realisms and dependency and underdevelopment theories. The realist perspective assisted in evaluating to the political self- interest in the interactions. On the other hand, dependency and underdevelopment theory assessed the actual beneficiary in Somalia- Qatar partnership. This study employed the exploratory research design. A total of 120 respondents were selected for field interviews. Structure questionnaires and interview schedules were used as the main tools of data collection. This study employed both quantitative and qualitative methods of data analysis and interpretation. This study established that, ideological orientation, Somalia foreign policy and regional geo-political interests influenced development aid relations between the Federal republic of Somalia and its international partners. It was also noted that state strategic interests, religion and culture influence the Republic of Qatar-Federal Republic development aid to the Federal Republic of Somalia.
INTRODUCTION
Qatar has emerged as one of the leading influential states in the reconstruction of war tone Somalia. Beginning 2011, Qatar has been in the forefront in helping the TNG of Somalia in reconciling the various warring factions in Somalia in the reconstruction of Somalia. Qatar has also emerged as one of the most visible non-profit making player in Somalia dealing with humanitarian issues such as famine relief. Somalia and Qatar established diplomatic ties in 1970. The two nations are members of the Arab League.
Qatar and Somalia enjoy exemplary and strong relations in many areas that revolve around economic, investment, and development cooperation. The diplomatic ties between Qatar and Somalia have become stronger since the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2014. These relations have seen a significant development in the two nations’ desire to promote and advance their bilateral relations in a way that meets their shared goals, aspirations, and interests. Guided by the desire to strengthen bilateral ties, leaders of the two nations have met numerous times to explore methods to promote and grow their relations.
The interstate system’s ability to function and the traditional conferral of state legitimacy both depend on diplomacy and recognition. In 1979, Somalia and Qatar established diplomatic ties. Nonetheless, the breakup of the Somali state in 1991 caused years of disruption in the relationship, despite Qatar actively contributing to the restoration of peace and stability in the war-torn nation. With the founding of the TNG of Somalia in 2006, diplomatic ties between the two nations were restored.
Since then, the Qatari government has officially used the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD) to deliver development contributions to Somalia. QFFD is a public development organization dedicated to carrying out projects and foreign aid on behalf of the state of Qatar. The major objective of the Qatar Fund for Development is to promote inclusive and sustainable development through the priority areas of economic empowerment, health, and education. QFFD has given assistance to a number of nations worldwide in order to fulfill the Qatar National Vision 2030’s objectives for international collaboration. QFFD has in many occasions partnered with USAID and UNICEF in Somalia in development aid relations. This study examines the determinants of the Republic of Qatar-Federal Republic of Somalia development aid relations since 2014.
Statement of the Problem
The establishment of the interim Federal Republic of Somalia necessitated implementation of various developmental policies, plans and programs. These efforts needed development aid and support from the donor countries. Consequently the Federal Republic of Somalia entered into development partnership with donor countries. This development assistance targeted political, economic, security, health, education, and technology and infrastructural development. The scholarly works on the terms, rules, and principles guiding infrastructural development aid relations between Somalia and Qatar remain under explored.
In the 21st Century Qatar adopted a proactive dynamic diplomacy in the HOA through branding, mediation and investment. The Arab uprising beginning 2011 drastically changed Qatar’s foreign policy and aid trajectory with a goal to maximize gains at the expense of its Gulf neighbors in the turbulent political environment. Most studies on development assistance have revolved around development aid from the west. This has left a knowledge gap the prospects on development aid relations between the Republic of Qatar and the Federal Republic of Somalia since 2014. The study has attempted to examine perspectives on the Republic of Qatar development aid to the Federal Republic of Somalia since 2014.
Specific Objective of the Study
This study examined determinants of the Republic of Qatar-Federal Republic of Somalia development aid relations.
LITERATURE REVIEW
According to GCO (2020), the primary guideline for Qatar’s foreign aid and development partner strategies is engrained in its foreign policy. The Government Communications Office (GCO) of Qatar states that its top foreign policy goals are to support initiatives to lessen humanitarian needs, strengthen humanitarian assistance in conflict areas, and mediate disputes between disputing parties. The two most relevant to this study and an important pillar of Qatar’s foreign policy are encouraging sustainable development and taking advantage of foreign aid.
Since the late 1990s, Qatar’s primary tool for pursuing its foreign policy has been its overseas aid. Additionally, Qatar has employed public diplomacy, positioning itself as a venue for international conferences, a mediator in conflicts, and the site of important athletic events (Antwi-Boateng, 2013). Furthermore, the Middle East and emerging nations in Asia and Africa, including Palestine, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, and others, are receiving financial support from Qatar. Qatar was among the new Arab contributors in this sense (Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD), 2018). Qatar’s abundant natural gas and oil resources have played a significant role in shaping its new foreign policy, making it a vital nation for international forces seeking stability and security. The Arab Spring (2011–2013) strengthened the State of Qatar’s new standing as a significant and positive actor.
Alesina & Dollar (2000), McGillivray (2003) in their assessment of allocation patterns of development aid, concluded that political alliance and colonial past have been used as parameters for development aid assistance. Donor countries give aid to those countries that they have a political alliance with intentions to enhance their foreign trade (Hannemann & Schneider, 1988). Donor countries foreign policy and political relationships with their former colonies are strong factors in development aid assistance. As argued by post-colonial scholars, donors countries tend to give reasonable aid to their former colonies in order to continue to maintain some political control over them. In the case of Qatar and Somalia no colonial past exist; however there seems to be some form of a political alliance which forms the basis of this research.
Numan (2021), documents of a noticeable shift in the Horn of Africa’s involvement in international politics. Accordingly, the region, which is made up of Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, is known for both internal rivalry and outside influence. The area has increasingly become integrated into Middle East regional politics, serving as a battleground for rival regional powers including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Turkey. This study found it worthwhile to articulate how Qatar formulates its foreign policy to make gains in the HOA at the expense of its regional competitors through development aid to Somalia.
Dahir (2022) examines the implications of the June 2017 breaking of diplomatic ties between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt and the subsequent imposition of a blockade on Qatar. The author notes that these events led to a fierce competition to woe allies especially in North Africa and the HOA. Dahir concludes that the stand-off scaled back the strategic interests of Gulf States in areas such as security, anti-piracy, and counter-terrorism operations in the HOA. It was important to explore the implications of the Gulf spat on Qatar- Somalia development aid relations.
Gueraiche (2022) examines the main drivers of increased UAE development aid to Africa. The study identifies three factors that triggered a heightened international aid from UAE to Africa namely; trade and investment, security and a new approach to diplomatic engagements cooperation. The author notes of a direct correlation between trade and development aid arguing that the most ideal way of analyzing bilateral relations between the UAE and African states is to put emphasis on the depth of the relations. This study noted of the increased bilateral relations between Qatar and Somalia on trade and security. The implication of these on development aid relations was assessed.
Himish (2021) investigated the Horn of Africa’s assistance politics. The study focuses on Turkey’s humanitarian relief efforts in Somalia following the Mogadishu famine in 2021. The author comes to the conclusion that Turkey’s participation in Somalia prevented a humanitarian catastrophe while also reintroducing Somalia as a priority on the global agenda. Additionally, the involvement raised Turkey’s profile internationally. The study also discovered that Turkey was able to facilitate political discussions in Somalia while also establishing the tone for talks to come. Based on the aforementioned, this study aimed to investigate the part Qatar’s realist inclinations played in its development relations with Somalia.
Bashir (2022) examines Muslim donors’ foreign aid practices in reaction to the coronavirus pandemic both locally and internationally, with a particular emphasis on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states which include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. The study it investigates the trends in foreign aid for these states. This study demonstrates how GCC donors successfully used their resources to combat the pandemic while upholding their political and national ideals. Additionally, the study offers a critical perspective on the GCC’s response to the pandemic in terms of internal aid coordination and policy. The study by Bashir that sheds light on Gulf States foreign aid practices and trends was instrumental in understanding the determinants of Qatar- Somalia development aid relations.
The efficiency of development aid and the degree to which it spurs economic growth in recipient nations have been widely contested. According to Radelet (2006) development aid, is meant to support productive sectors like mining, agriculture, and construction of infrastructure, strengthen critical sectors like political, health, and educational systems, support subsistence consumption of food and other necessities, especially during relief operations and humanitarian crises and ) help stabilize an economy after economic shocks.
Arshad and Ayaz (2007) argue that foreign aid always results in positive economic growth because it both supplements and complements domestic resources and adds finances to help improve a state’s political and economic environment. Boon Tang and Bundhoo (2017) on the other hand, note that foreign aid could eventually replace domestic savings and increase dependency on it, preventing the growth of the economy and investment. Sollenberg (2019) contend that while foreign aid helps recipient countries, it makes them more dependent.
Foreign aid also gives the ruling class in recipient nations a way to further solidify their control over both the political and economic spheres. Bakare (2011) emphasizes on the benefits of foreign development aid. The author argues that foreign aid is expected to stimulate economic development in order to achieve the objective of uplifting the welfare of the citizens through the improvement in health, education, and food. These scholars are influenced by the modernization theorists’ views. They insist that state institutional reforms are necessary for effective aid performance. Whether foreign development aid has impacting economic growth generally in Africa remains the big question. It was enriching to interrogate existing intellectual discourse and narrative on the benefits and crises of foreign development aid. Generally, the motive of development aid is to alleviate poverty by promoting economic development in third-world countries. However, this flow of resources from industrialized to third world is always attached to economic and political conditions.
Ilorah (2008) and Kabonga (2017) posit that development aid variance as an instrument by the donors to subordinate the beneficiary countries at various, with self-serving interests. Similarly, Stiglitz (2002) argues that the manner development aid is given creates obstacles to transition as a result of various conditionalities that may not necessarily stimulate development. From the sentiments above it can be noted that the IMF and the WB have been used by donor countries to impose loand with conditionalities. The imposed policies are more of a hindrance than a help to the developing countries. The conditions or policies rather increase the poverty in developing countries than reducing it. Whether development aid has always achieved intended objectives of uplifting living standards in third world countries remains a big debate. The percieved realtionship between development aid assistance and actual economic development should be questioned.. Although various reasons were given for providing development aid by the donors, only a little of the aid is directly linked to economic development.
Development aid has been used by donor countries to camouflage power politics and pursues geo-political interests of economically powerful countries (Hattori, 2001; Aruko and Arowolo 2020). Escobar (1995) argues that development aid has been used as an instrument by the donors to perpetuate the domination and subordination of the receiving countries, both politically and economically. Although Qatar is not among the western capitalist states it has in the past decade stamped its dominace in the politics of the middle east and the Islamic dominated states of North Africa. Its interest in the rebuilding of the Federal republic of Somali remains a critical area of inquiry.
Varying opinions have emerged on the role of foreign aid in development in the third world. (Ogundipe, Ojeaga and Ogundipe 2014). According to some scholars, development assistance has boosted economic growth in third-world nations with robust and well-defined trade and fiscal policies, but not in those with less defined policies. Kosack (2003) argues that aid can be effective at increasing growth and quality of life if the political environment is conducive. Riddle (2007) added that development aid works best if given to countries and governments with perfect commitment and capacities to use it well and more.
Although intended to spur economic growth this has not been always the case. However, there is no definitive link between growth and development assistance. While some nations that have benefited greatly from foreign aid have had tremendous economic growth, others have experienced negative or slow growth. However, some nations that have gotten relatively little development assistance have prospered, while others have not. Some view the lack of a definitive correlation between development aid and growth as evidence that the program has failed to meet its objectives.
Theoretical Framework
This study was anchored on two theoretical perspectives namely realisms and dependency and underdevelopment. The core concept of realism is that the international system is governed by anarchy which prompts states to prioritize self-preservation by pursuing self-interest. The realist perspective helped in evaluating to the political self- interest in the interactions. It was argued that both Qatar and Somalia are guided by state self interest in their development aid relations.
The core argument of the depenency and underdevelopment theory is that Third World countries will remain underdeveloped as long as they are part of the global economy where they continue to be exploited by industrialized nations. Dependency and underdevelopment theory explained how development aid relations between Qatar and Somalia created a relationship of dependency and underdevelopment.
Analysis, Interpretation and Presentation of Findings
Research Methodology
This study took the form of an exploratory research design employing the use of both primary and secondary sources. A total of 120 respondents were interviewed. This included 100 randomly selected Somalia citizens residing in Kenya and 10 purposively selected members of the diplomatic corps, 5 each from Somalia and Qatar. Ten (10) experts in development aid relations were also include in the sample size. This is presented in Table 1.1 below;
Category of Respondent | Number | |
1 | Somalia Citizens | 100 |
2 | Somali Diplomats | 5 |
3 | Qatar Diplomats | 5 |
4 | Experts | 10 |
Total | 120 |
The main research instruments for this study comprised structured questionnaires and interviews schedules with open ended questions. Structure questionnaires generated quantitative data that was analyzed quantitatively and presented as percentages. Interview schedules on the other hand generated qualitative that was analyzed qualitatively through documentary review and content analysis and presented as themes. Out of the 120 questionnaires administered, 100 responded indicating an 80% response rate. This study realized a 100% response rate for Somali diplomats, Qatar diplomats and Experts.
Determinants of Republic of Qatar-Federal Republic of Somalia Development Aid Relations
To addressthe determinants of Republic of Qatar-Federal Republic of Somalia development aid relations, the researcher posed five questions as follows.
Out of the 80 respondents interviewed 50 representing 62.5% strongly agreed that Qatar development aid to Somalia is pegged on ideological orientation of both countries while 10 representing 12.5% slightly agreed. 15 respondents representing 18.75% strongly disagree that Is Qatar development aid to Somalia pegged on ideological orientation while 5 representing 6.25% disagreed. Cumulatively 60 respondents 75% were of the agreement that Qatar development aid to Somalia is pegged on ideological orientation while 20 representing 25% were of contrary opinion.
When asked whether there are political and economic considerations in the disbursement of development aid; the following were the responses. 48 representing 60% strongly agreed while 10 representing 12.5% slightly agreed. 17 representing 21.25% strongly disagreed while 5 representing 6.25 % slightly disagreed. Cumulatively 58 representing 72.5% were in agreement that there are political and economic considerations in the disbursement of development aid. 22 representing 27.5% were of the contrary opinion.
The researcher asked respondents on their opinion as to whether Qatar- Somalia development aid relations are motivated by state strategic interests. The following were the responses. 44 representing 55% strongly agreed while 12 representing 15% slightly agreed. 18 representing 22.5% strongly disagreed while 6 representing 7.5% slightly disagreed. Cumulatively 56 representing 70% were of the agreement that Qatar- Somalia development aid relations are motivated by sate strategic interests while 24 representing 30% were of contrary opinion.
The researcher further posed the question as to whether religion and culture influences development aid relations between Qatar and Somalia. Out of the 80 respondents interviewed 44 representing 55 % strongly agreed that religion and culture influences development aid relations between Qatar and Somalia while 10 representing 12.5% slightly agreed. 18 respondents representing 22.5% strongly disagreed while 8 representing 10% slightly disagreed. In total 54 representing 67.5% concurred that that religion and culture influences development aid relations between Qatar and Somalia.
Lastly respondents were asked whether Qatar politics and economy has affected her development aid relations with Somalia. The following were the responses. 48 representing 60% strongly agreed while 10 representing 12.5% slightly agreed. 17 representing 21.25% strongly disagreed while 5 representing 6.25 % slightly disagreed. Cumulatively 58 representing 72.5% were in agreement that Qatar politics and economy has affected her development aid relations with Somalia. 22 representing 27.5% were of the contrary opinion. The results are presented in table 1.2 and gragh 1.1 below.
Table 1.2 Determinants of Republic of Qatar-Federal Republic of Somalia development aid relations
Determinants of Republic of Qatar-Federal Republic of Somalia Development Aid Relations | ||||||
Question | Strongly Agree | Agree | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Total | Cumulative Total |
Ideological Orientation | 62.5% | 12.5% | 18.75% | 6.25% | 100% | 100% |
Political and Economic considerations | 60% | 12.5% | 21.25% | 6.25% | 100% | 100% |
State strategic interests | 60% | 12.5% | 21.25% | 6.25% | 100% | 100% |
Religion and culture | 55% | 12.5% | 22.5% | 10% | 100% | 100% |
Qatar Politics and Economy | 60% | 12.5% | 21.25% | 6.25% | 100% | 100% |
Graph 1.1 Determinants of Republic of Qatar-Federal Republic of Somalia development aid relations
Despite some political stability brought about by the establishment of Somalia’s transitional federal government in 2014, the majority of the country still faces security issues, which occasionally result in humanitarian catastrophes. The military onslaught against Al-Shabaab has escalated, worsening the situation and having serious humanitarian effects, such as increased displacement and retaliatory attacks. This has hampered development and reconstruction of the Federal State of Somalia. Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD) has been very instrumental in providing relief food to people affected by drought in Somalia. March 2022 when Somalia faced one of the worst droughts QFFD along with Qatar Charity group donated 45 tons of food aid to more than 200,000 people affected in five states in the country. The urgent food aid came in handy in addressing the drought and greatly contributed to improving livelihoods and easing people’s economic burdens.
In June of the same year, Qatar Charity launched an urgent response appeal to confront the wave of drought which had triggered many thousands of people to flee their homes to displacement camps. The drought had seriously affected Beledweyne city, the capital of Hiran region in the Hirshabelle state of Somalia. This action saved thousands who were on the brink of starvation. The food aid came in handy in improving livelihoods, easing people’s economic burdens and alleviating food insecurity. The aid was undertaken within the framework of the State of Qatar’s endeavors and its continued commitment to support the people of Somalia and ensure food security after the drought.
On December 2nd, 2020, the Ministry of Education of the Federal Republic of Somalia signed an agreement with the QFFD in collaboration with the Education Agreements (EAA). These agreements concentrated on ways to give millions of youngsters who had been deprived of an education because of political unrest access to high-quality education. The goal of the “educate a child project” was to give over 1.6 million people access to education. The project’s main objectives were to improve classroom and school facilities, create educational curriculum, and impart learning abilities. The project also aimed to provide adequate sanitation in schools and meet the livelihood needs of children by providing them with water and wholesome food. The project also aimed to provide adequate sanitation in schools and meet the livelihood needs of children by providing them with water and wholesome food. The project, which was carried out in collaboration with prominent members of the community and the local government, also highlighted the value of education and the need to address the issues of child labor and school dropouts.
Qatar Charity has also been in the forefront in providing financial support to post-graduate students from the federal republic of Somalia. Through a partnership with the University for Peace of the United Nations (UPEACE), Qatar Charity provided financial assistance to Somali PhD students. One hundred Somali researchers received PhD study funding as a result of the agreement. The deal was signed by Professor Samuel Kali, UPEACE’s regional director for Africa, and Abdel Fattah Adam Muallem, head of QC’s office in Somalia. The signing of the agreement was also attended by Qatar’s ambassador to Somalia, Ishaq Mahmoud Mursal, the deputy minister of foreign affairs, and Farah Sheikh Abdul Qadir, Somalia’s minister of education, culture, and higher education.
The educational cooperation agreement with Qatar Charity helps to invest in Somali intellectuals with the goal of promoting the nation’s sustainable development through a package of disciplines that support the security and peace process while equipping students with the skills necessary for studies and research,. Qatar Charity focused particularly on Somalia’s educational system and worked to help create a better future for Somali generations. For many years, Qatar Charity has supported the education sector in Somalia by constructing and remodeling schools, offering scholarships to Somali students, funding teacher training initiatives, and supplying educational supplies and materials.
The Qatar Fund for Development views healthcare as one of the most important component of the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly the third target to guarantee everyone’s health and well-being, Low-income or lower-middle-income economies make up over 70% of the nations and territories that report having NTDs. The goal of Qatar’s infrastructure development initiatives in Somalia is to enhance the quality of life for Somali citizens. The local economy has benefited immensely from these projects. The Mogadishu-Jawhar road and the Mogadishu-Afgoye road projects, which connect the capital with several cities, are two examples. Qatar also contributed to the construction of the Mogadishu Municipality, the Ministry of Planning and Investment’s headquarters, and other projects.
The primary mandate for Qatar’s foreign aid and development partner policies is its foreign policy. The Government Communications Office (GCO) of Qatar stated that its foreign policy priorities were to support efforts to lessen humanitarian needs, increase humanitarian assistance in the contested areas, and mediate disputes between disputing parties. However, one of the most important pillars of Qatar’s foreign policy and the most relevant to this study is to provide foreign aid and promote sustainable development (GCO, 2020).
According to Mohammadzadeh (2018), Qatar’s independent foreign relations can be credited to the Emir Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifah al-Thani, who formed the frameworks of Qatar’s foreign policy. Sheik Hamad succeeded in establishing a novel foreign policy for Qatar in his seventeenth year in administration, which in the 1970s transformed his father’s foreign policy into a Saudi hegemony. Furthermore, Sheikh Hamad shifted Qatar foreign policy from the traditional approach in order to focus more on an international, leading, and moderate approach. Qatar’s foreign policy has been successful in avoiding Saudi Arabian and Iranian hegemony. As the new foreign policy went forward, Qatar remained committed to preserving regional stability and supporting the central strategy of Arab unity (Ibid, 2018).
However, because of its most recent and unique foreign policy approach, the Republic of Qatar has been at odds with its Gulf neighbors both regionally and internationally. Qatar’s massive natural resources of oil and gas, which have made it crucial to international forces for peace and security, are a fundamental factor in the country’s new foreign policy. The emergence of the Arab Spring (2011–2013) has strengthened the State of Qatar’s new standing as a significant and beneficial actor. With this new approach, Qatar for instance contributed to the overthrow of the Gaddafi government in Libya. It also supported international efforts to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s administration in Syria. Furthermore, Qatar was among the few Arab nations that supported the 2012 revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia.
Since the late 1990s, Qatar’s international aid has been a key component of its foreign policy tools. Additionally, it employed public diplomacy by positioning itself as a venue for international conferences and a conflict resolution and big athletic event mediator (Antwi-Boateng, 2013). Furthermore, emerging nations in Asia and Africa, including Palestine, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, and others, as well as Middle Eastern nations, are receiving Qatari cash. In this way, Qatar was among the Arab World’s new donors (QFFD, 2018).
Africa and Qatar’s relationship dates back to the 1970s, when the continent’s nations backed the Arabs in their conflict with Israel. According to Hunter (1984), the Arab search for diplomatic support in their war against Israel has inspired Qatar, along with other oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, to provide financial support to the African countries. Interestingly, from the 1970s through the 1990s, Qatar’s foreign policy was exactly the same as that of the Gulf States that it borders. In short, through bilateral agreements, Qatar gave foreign aid to African nations in a number of areas, including economic growth, health care, and education. As previously noted, when Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifah Al-Thani came to power in 1995, Qatar adopted a new foreign policy approach and began interacting with Africa in a different way.
CONCLUSION
The Qatari government, it was noted has officially used the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD) to deliver development contributions to Somalia. QFFD is a public development organization dedicated to carrying out projects and foreign aid on behalf of the state of Qatar. The major objective of the Qatar Fund for Development is to promote inclusive and sustainable development through the priority areas of economic empowerment, health, and education. A number of political and economic considerations in the disbursement of Qatar development aid to Somalia. There was a general agreement among respondents that Qatar- Somalia development aid relations are motivated by strategic reasons. The Islamic religion that is predominant in both countries was found to have a strong influence on development aid relations between Qatar and Somalia. Qatar politics and economy was found to have strong influence on her development aid relations with Somalia.
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