Review of Related Literature on Africa’s Regional Integration Mechanisms

Review of Related Literature on Africa’s Regional Integration Mechanisms

^1,2Thomas Kaydor, Jr

¹Assistant Professor, IBB Graduate School of International Studies University of Liberia

²Adjunct Professor AME University Graduate School of International Development Stella Maris Graduate School of International Relations and Global Security

DOI: https://doi.org/10.51244/IJRSI.2025.12040054

Received: 21 March 2025; Accepted: 01 April 2025; Published: 08 May 2025

ABSTRACT

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was transformed into a new continental regional body called the African Union (AU). The AU was announced in the Sirte Declaration in Sirte, Libya, on 9 September 1999, calling for the establishment of the AU. The regional bloc was launched on 9 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa. The AU progressed beyond a political union and is taking some steps to fully operationalize an economic regional integration body on the continent building on the view of the 1991 Abuja Treaty that endorsed the African Economic Community. This research is mainly focused on review some related literature on the extent to which the AU progressing on deepening economic integration on the continent to reconceptualize Africa’s regional integration for Peace and Sustainable Development on the continent, and what could be done to further entrench same for economic prosperity of Africa. Economic prosperity is a result of economic growth and economic growth provides the needed resources for economic development. However, economic growth and economic development cannot obtain in the absence of peace and security. Hence, this Article delves into how Africa might achieve its desire goals for sustainable development by ensuring peace and security on the continent.

Keywords: Regionalism; Economic Development; Regional Cooperation; African Union

INTRODUCTION

The is Article originates from the second chapter of the researcher’s PhD dissertation. It provides the additional theoretical perspectives for this research. It evaluates exiting literature relevant to regional integration. The literature review is an addition to previous research already discussed in chapter one. Chapter two discusses what other authors and scholars have written and published about regional integration in other parts of the world and on the African continent.  It is the gap in these previous scholarly works reviewed that this research attempts to bridge. The methods used in this chapter are historical, exploratory, explanatory, and evaluative. The chapter contains an overview of regional integration theory, some controversies about regional integration; and an overview of regional integration process in Africa focusing on the OAU and its transition to the African Union.[1]

The PhD dissertation topic is “reconceptualizing Africa’s regional integration for peace and sustainable development”. It provided the researcher an opportunity to examine regional integration as an international relations theory. The researcher defined and discussed theoretical aspects of regional integration as a process or an event and examined whether the process or event impacts peace and sustainable development in Africa or elsewhere. Also, this topic permitted the researcher to analyze the benefits and challenges of regional integration in Africa. The researcher assessed and evaluated Africa’s regional integration processes using the African Union (AU) as a case study, and the AU member states as the unit of analysis to find out whether the continent’s integration processes have enhanced or hindered poverty alleviation and promoted sustainable development on the continent. The research concludes that the AU does not enhance peace and economic regional integration in Africa. For instance, Somalia has defiled all peaceful solutions thus far. Other African states are caught in circular conflicts.

An overview of regional integration theory

Regional integration theory explains the establishment and development of regional inter-governmental organizations (IGOs). Key questions that regional integration revolves around are why and under what conditions do states transfer political authority to regional organizations? How do regional organizations expand their scope and functions, competencies, and memberships? What impact do regional institutions have on states and societies under their domains? This latter question is more relevant to this research because the study is centered around the impact of regional integration in Africa and the reduction of extreme poverty on the continent. It also analyzes how the AU might be an agent to ensure sustainable development in Africa.

Regional integration theory began as a broad comparative regional and organizational scope in the 1950s and 1960s, and it was focused on European integration and the European Union.^[2] However, this research is focused on regional integration in Africa using the African Union as a case. Integration theories were formulated to explain European integration processes.

They commenced in Europe by the early 1950s with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 as a unit of analysis. Ernest Haas theorized this experience in The Uniting of Europe^[3]. One key theoretical contribution made by Hass is the concept of ‘spill over’. Few years later, Lindberg utilized the spill over concept to study the early years of the European Economic Community (EEC) that commenced in 1958^[4].

Neo-functionalist theory of integration

These early theories are usually referred to as neo-functionalist theories[5]. Neo-functionalism is “a theory of regional integration that places major emphasis on the role of non-state actors”.[6] This especially, the “secretariat” of the regional organization involved and those interest associations and social movements that form at the level of the region – in providing the dynamic for further integration. Member states remain important actors in the process. They set the terms of the initial agreement, but they do not exclusively determine the direction and extent of subsequent change.

Rather, regional bureaucrats in league with a shifting set of self-organized interests and passions seek to exploit the inevitable ‘spill overs and unintended consequences’ that occur when states agree to assign some degree of supra-national responsibility for accomplishing a limited task and then discover that satisfying that function has external effects upon other parties of their interdependent activities.

According to this theory, regional integration is an intrinsically sporadic and conflictual process, but one in which, under conditions of democracy and pluralistic representation, national governments will find themselves increasingly entangled in regional pressures and end up resolving their conflicts by conceding a wider scope and devolving more authority to the regional organizations they have created. Eventually, their citizens will begin shifting more and more of their expectations to the region and satisfying them will increase the likelihood that economic-social integration will ‘spill-over’ into political integration.”^[7]There have been efforts to apply the neo-functionalist theories to integration in other parts of the world, especially in Africa and Latin America^[8].

In the mid-1960s European integration process witnessed some crisis, when General de Gaulle instructed his ministers not to take part in meetings of the EEC Council^[9]. In the Luxembourg compromise in January 1966 the then six members of the European Communities (EC) agreed to disagree.^[10] However, the French insisted that decisions by a qualified majority vote (QMV) could not take place when a Member State opposed a decision because of fundamental national interests^[11]. In view of these experiences, it has been difficult to assume that neo-functionalism can be the universally accepted principle of regional integration.

Therefore, some neo-functionalists endeavored to modify the theory considering the events in Europe in the mid-60s. This included Lindberg and Scheingold in Europe’s Would-Be Polity (1970). However, several students of European integration focused on the ‘logic of diversity’ and the more intergovernmental aspects of the EC^[12]. This might have later, in the 1990s, led Andrew Moravcsik to develop ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’ to explain the process of integration in Europe, suggesting “the combination of a liberal theory to explain national preference formation and an intergovernmental theory of interstate bargaining to explain substantive outcomes^[13]. In his ‘The Choice for Europe’, Moravcsik added a third stage, institutional choice, where pooling and delegation of sovereignty was seen to create ‘credible commitments’^[14].

During the 1990s, in parallel with the International Relations debate concerning rationalist approaches versus social constructivist approaches, it was argued that there was a need for social constructivist approach to understand integration, especially integration in Europe and elsewhere^[15]. In the evolutionary epoch of integration theories, attention was focused on the definition of the concept. Equally was the argument whether to consider integration as an end or a process^[16]. Hence, integration was defined as a process that leads to a certain situation. Karl Deutsch, for instance, defined integration as “the attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population.”^[17]

When a group of people or states have been integrated this way, they constitute a “security community.” ‘Amalgamation’, on the other hand, was used by Deutsch and his collaborators referred to “the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government”^[18]. In the early stages of regional integration studies, more emphasis was placed on the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC). Ernst Haas did a classical study of the ECSC where, in ‘the Uniting of Europe’, he defined integration as:

“the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectation and political activities to a new center whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states”^[19].  For his part, Leon Lindberg defined integration without reference to an end point. He indicated that:

“political integration is (1) the process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs; and (2) the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new center.”^[20]

Lindberg considered his own concept of integration more cautious than that of Haas. He further defined integration as “the development of devices and processes for arriving at collective decisions by means other than autonomous action by national governments”^[21]. One lingering question in regional integration theory is what explains changes in functional scope and institutional capacity of regional integration efforts? This is the central question in integration theory that Ernst Haas’s concept of spill-over provides answers for. Lindberg borrowed from Haas arguing that ‘spill-over refers to “a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn creates a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth”^[22].

Haas saw the EEC as spill-over from the ECSC. He wrote about “the expansive logic of sector integration” predicting that the process would continue in the EEC. Liberalization of trade within the customs union would lead to harmonization of general economic policies and eventually spill-over into political areas and lead to the creation of political community^[23]. Hass’ analysis has come true for European integration. However, in Africa, the integration process did not proceed in this manner. Independent States opted for political integration prior to discussing economic integration.

When the European integration process experienced a crisis in the mid-1960s, many scholars concluded that Haas’ early theory was too deterministic. This included Haas himself, who then admitted that he had not foreseen “a rebirth of nationalism and anti-functional high politics.” A revised theory would have to take account of “dramatic-political” aims of statesmen such as General de Gaulle^[24]. In a much-quoted article, Stanley Hoffmann argued that the national situations and role perceptions were still rather diverse within the EC. In general, he argued “Every international system owes its inner logic and its unfolding to the diversity of domestic determinants, geo-historical situations, and outside aims among its units”^[25].

So, Hoffmann contrasted the logic of integration with a logic of diversity. The latter sets limits to the degree to which the ‘spill-over’ process can operate. “It restricts the domain in which the logic of functional integration operates to the area of welfare.” He, therefore, advanced the suggestion that “in areas of key importance to the national interest, nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty” of integration.^[26] This is one of the key issues that integration is confronted with in Africa, whereby the very states that created the integration bodies are unprepared to relinquish certain decision-making powers or authority over to the central authorities like the African Union Commission. Individual Sovereign states would rather claim and defend state sovereignty over integration bodies’ centralized decisions and mandates. Such anomaly undermines the central authority of the African Union.

The feeling that early theory had seen the process as too automatic led to various efforts to reformulate integration theory. The effort by Lindberg and Scheingold in the book ‘Europe’s Would-Be Polity’ deserves special mentioning.^[27] Lindberg and Scheingold studied the EC as a political system, where inputs in the form of demands, support and leadership are transformed into outputs in the form of policies and decisions.^[28] They added three integration mechanisms to that of spill-over already developed by Haas, namely:

“(a) log-rolling and side-payments, i.e. bargaining exchanges designed to ‘gain assent of more political actors to a particular proposal or package of proposals,’ (b) actor socialization, i.e. the process whereby the ‘participants in the policy-making process, from interest groups to bureaucrats and statesmen, begin to develop new perspectives, loyalties, and identifications as a result of their mutual interactions, and (c) feedback that refers to the impact of outputs on the attitudes and behavior of the public at large. If the public finds the output from the system good and relevant, support for the system is expected to increase”.^[29]

For Lindberg and Scheingold, integration was seen as a political process. On the demand side, various domestic groups have expectations and lobby the governments for certain outcomes. On the supply side, coalition formation and leadership are seen as central aspects of the process. To get decisions through the system, one must have the support of various groups and individual decision-makers. This is where the role of the independent Commission was seen as important in the EC.

The Commission actively built coalitions to overcome national resistance to new policies and decisions, i.e., and to exercise supranational leadership.^[30] The African Union has adopted similar pattern of a centralized African Union Commission to drive the integration processes on the continent, but it does not enjoy the level of autonomy that the European Commission enjoys in terms of decision making.

Simply put, neofunctionalism disputes that governments can control the integration process. Transnational corporations and interest groups as well as supranational actors are empowered by the integration process and shape it in their own interest.^[31] In addition, integration creates a variety of “spill overs” and path-dependencies that push integration beyond the intergovernmental bargain. In the context of Africa, the neofunctionalism perspective has not gained roots because there are not many endogenous continental transnational cooperations and interest groups as well as supranational actors empowered to shape the integration processes on the continent. Therefore, this research considers African regional integration process to be an intergovernmental process in which states abide by decisions when their national interest dictate.

More recently, post functionalism has enriched and challenged the theoretical debates on regional integration. In contrast to neofunctionalism, post functionalism assumes a backlash mechanism of integration. As regional integration progresses and undermines national sovereignty and community, it creates economic and cultural losers who are mobilized by integration-skeptic parties. Identity-based and populist mass politicization constrains regional integration and may even cause disintegration. In Africa, the integration process has not reached the post functionalism level, although, there are possibilities that such nationalist parties might emerge sometime in the future due to national interests of states and competing national preferences amongst state and non-state actors.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism has become an important reference point for most recent studies of integration, especially the big decisions he refers to as grand bargains.^[32] The framework includes three phases: national preference formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice^[33]. The main theories explaining the development of European integration—rather than decision making and policy making in the EU—are intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, and post functionalism. The key debates in regional integration theory have taken place between variants of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism.

However, what appears to be common across continents is that approval of regional integration as an intergovernmental process. An exception is the EU that has progressed to a supranational body, the European Union Commission. Intergovernmentalism assumes national governments to be the key actors in regional integration.

Governments use regional integration to maximize their national security and economic interests in the context of regional interdependence.^[34] Integration outcomes result from intergovernmental bargaining and reflect the regional preference and power constellations. Governments delegate authority to regional organizations to secure their bargaining outcomes but remain in control of regional organizations and the integration process. The regional integration mechanisms in Africa are deeply rooted in intergovernmentalism. Perhaps this is one reason why the question of peace and security in all states still illude the regional body.

Whether or not the continent will reach and pass through the epoch of neofunctionalism prior to its eventual attainment of post-functionalism is something to ponder about. However, there is no guarantee that all regional bodies will pass thru all these stages in a systematized chronological order. Regional integration theories have closely followed and adapted themselves to the development of European integration. They cover the establishment and progress of supranational policies and institutions but also the recent crisis of the EU regarding the withdrawal of the UK from the regional body leaves more to ponder about. An exemplary review of their explanations of major development in European integration shows that they are more complementary than competing.

Some controversies of regional integration in Africa

One of the first definitions of the concept of integration in regional integration theory and one that has been widely used in the literature is the concept of security community of Deutsch et al. In their groundbreaking work on ‘Political Community and the North Atlantic Area’. According to them, “regional integration is the attainment of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among the integrated population”.^[35]

This definition suits the emergence of African regional integration process under the Organization of African Unity. However, one might wonder how strong and effective this regional institution has been, and how has it brought a long-term peaceful change amongst African states some of which are experiencing wars and other crises since independence?

For his part, Haas defines integration as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre- existing national states”.^[36] The African integration process can be best fit within this context whereby African leaders have shifted their loyalties and expectations to the African Union at the center. However, to what extent does the AU have control on its members states remains an unanswered question. Hass, Deutsch, et al. view integration as a political process.

In the African context, the Organization of African Unity was a political union that embarked on a process of unity to help decolonize other African states that were still under the yoke of European colonizers. As such, the integration process of Africa was purely about how Africa would be a free continent that would contain separate independent states with sovereignty. This was not the context in which European integration originated. This means that integration in regions comes about due to the unique conditionalities demanding unity.

The process of independence from colonial rule has ended. The new process that African Union is involved with is the maintenance of peace, security, and the promotion of sustainable development of the continent through its regional agenda “the Africa we want (Agenda 2063)”.^[37] This lends credence to Bela Balassa’s definition. Balassa focuses his definition of regional integration on economic integration, which he defines as “the abolition of discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states”.^[38] Balassa sets forth five categories ranging from a free trade area to total economic integration. The researcher considers total economic integration as the lynchpin for Africa’s inclusive progress towards ending widespread extreme poverty on the continent and initiating sustainable development in the region.

Balassa lists five categories and the types of suppression of discrimination among members states in a region if they desire economic integration. These categories include free trade area, customs union, common market, economic union, and total economic integration.^[39] The table below shows the five categories and the types of suppression of discrimination among members in a regional integration body as enunciated by Balassa.^[40] In the context of Africa, economic regional integration is being talked about more and documented through various instruments rather than being practiced on the continent. A case in point is the speedy ratification of the AfCFTA whose domestication and operationalization are stalled in some AU member states. This is delved into later more substantively.

Table 1: The Case of AfCFTA

	No tariff or quotas	Common external tariff	Free flow of factors	Harmonization of economic policies	Unification of policies and political institutions
Free trade area	X
Customs union	X	X
Common market	X	X	X
Economic union	X	X	X	X
Total economic integration	X	X	X	X	X

Source: (Nye, 1968, p.860)

Overview of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

The Organization of African Unity that lasted from 1963 to 2002 was an alliance of independent African nations working to enhance partnership and cooperation between then newly decolonized African governments. The alliance had its origins in the Pan-African philosophy encouraging the unity of all peoples of African ancestry, but it was also inspired by the political independence struggles that those African nations went through to free themselves from European colonialists in the early late 1950s and 1960s.^[41]

President William V.S. Tubman of Liberia attended the Accra All African Peoples Conference in the capital city of then newly independent Ghana, formerly the Gold Coast in 1958. He represented Liberia, the first independent Republic on the African continent. Liberia got its independence on 26^th July 1847. The Conference in Accra was the first ever Conference of African Heads of State and Government hosted hosted by Ghana’s Prime Minister, Kwame Nkrumah. President Tubman was accompanied to Accra, Ghana, by Secretary of State, J. Rudolph Grimes, and the Under-Secretary of State for Africa and Asia, T. Ernest Eastman.

Immediately after the Accra Summit, Grimes and Eastman organized the Sanniquellie Conference in 1959. This conference was held in the capital of then Central Province, currently Nimba County, Liberia. Three heads of state and government attended. They were President Tubman of Liberia, Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana, and Guinean President Sekou Touré. This groundbreaking summit laid the foundation of a new regional organization that began and fostered the promotion of Africa’s integration and continental solidarity. This continental body became the Organization of African Unity.

Table 2. picture of the 3 heads of state who set up the OAU

Photo source/credit: Joseph Tellewoyan.

The picture above shows President Touré, President Tubman and Prime Minister Nkrumah taking a walk between sessions in Sanniquellie, Liberia in 1959. After four days of the talks in Sanniquellie, the three leaders released a joint communique proclaiming their resolve and determination to commit their resources to making all African countries independent. The leaders at that summit also pledged to work together for the formation of a ‘Community of Independent African States’.^[42]

To this end, they resolved that a special conference would be convened in 1960 after Nigeria, Togoland, and the Cameroons had attained independence.^[43] Particularly, the three leaders at the Sanniquellie Summit agreed on the following principles to be presented at the conference as the fundamental discussion points. Accordingly, the principles stated inter alia that:

“a) Africans, like all other peoples, had an inherent right to independence and self-determination; b) the name of the proposed organization should be the “Community of Independent African States; c) each state or federation which became a member of the Community should maintain its own national identity and constitutional structure; d) each member should accept the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of any other-member; e) the acts of states or federations members of the Community should be determined in relation to the essential objectives of freedom, independence, and unity of the African personality; f) the policy of the Community should be to build up a prosperous African unity for the benefit of the peoples of Africa and of the world, and in the interests of international peace and security; g) a main objective should be to help accelerate the independence of African territories subjected to domination; h) the Community should set up an economic council, a cultural council, and a scientific and research council; i) membership should be open to all independent African states and federations and to non-independent countries upon their attainment of independence; j) the Community should have a flag and an anthem, to be decided upon at a later date; and k) the motto of the Community should be Independence and Unity.”^[44]

Graph 1. OAU Symbol in Sanniquellie, Nimba County, Liberia

Sanniquellie plaque reminds visitors of the city’s historic role in the founding of the OAU. Photo Credit: www.alamy.com

Given the motto of the OAU, ‘independence and unity’, one can conclude that the major objective of the newly established union was to ensure the political independence of all African countries under colonial rule and their unity as freed African states. After this Summit, some ideological leanings sprang up. For instance, the Monrovia Group, sometimes known as the Monrovia bloc, was organized. This was a group of independent African States with a shared vision of the future of Africa and of Pan-Africanism in the early 1960s.

Its members “believed that Africa’s independent states should co-operate and exist in harmony, but without political federation and deep integration as supported by its main rival, the Casablanca Group”.^[45] The alliance first met from 8–12 May 1961 in Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, its leading state.^[46] Other members states of this bloc included Nigeria and most of Francophone Africa, including Senegal and Cameroon.

Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Prime Ministers Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon and Milton Margai of Sierra Leone, Presidents Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal and Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria were among those who constituted the Monrovia group. Liberia’s President Tubman was the unofficial head while President Azikiwe was its unofficial spokesman. This group was a pro-western constituency that subscribed to peaceful coexistence, cooperation, and non-interference in the affairs of individual states.

The approach of these states to Africa’s integration was quite moderate and less radical compared to its rival, the Casablanca Group.^[47] Its leaders stressed the importance of Africa’s newly independent states, and that the states should retain their autonomy and strengthen their own bureaucracies, militaries, and economies. They promoted nationalism, the creed that each nation of Africa should be self-governing, over Pan-Africanism’ they shared the belief that the whole continent should seek ever closer union and integration of their politics, society, and economy.

The Casablanca Group was formed in 1961. This group was a pro-Soviet bloc with the orientation and an agenda of continental political federation, a United States of Africa. This group was headed by President Nkrumah and included President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Modibo Keita of Mali, Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, and King Hassan II of Morocco. Given the ideological divide, one question arose. Was it possible for the newly independent African States to commit to a central government?

This question remains part of the Afro-centric scholarly debates up to present. This debate was the point of contention between the two groups. Therefore, the Monrovia Group had its second summit meeting in Lagos Nigeria in 1962. That summit brought together twenty-two heads of state, while the Casablanca Group’s meeting the same year in Cairo, Egypt, drew only six. The struggle between the Monrovia and Casablanca groups are fully discussed below in this chapter.

In the face of a dangerous ideological split, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and his Foreign Minister Ketema Yifru brought the two groups together for a summit meeting in Addis Ababa. Specifically, on 25^th May 1963, the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie invited the heads of the 32 independent African nations to convene at his country’s capital, Addis Ababa. The result of this conference was the formation of the OAU, which would grow in membership to include today’s 55 African states as members.  Morocco was the only state that declined membership then.

The OAU’s basic principles included the promotion of solidarity among African states, improved quality of life for Africans, a promise to defend the sovereignty of African states, and eradication of colonialism in all its forms. Given the approval of such principles by the newly formed OAU, one can argue that the Monrovia Group’s ideas ultimately prevailed. Hence, the OAU Charter placed the principles of independent statehood, non-interference, and national sovereignty at its heart. There and then, the OAU’s pursuit of deep integration was minimal and its opposition to continental political and economic federation unequivocal.

The OAU opted to achieve its integration goals through cooperation and peaceful negotiation between its members. Diplomacy and international cooperation became the modus operandi of the OAU. In September 1999, the OAU issued the Sirte Declaration, calling for a new body to take its place.  As a result, on July 9, 2002, this proposal was fulfilled with the creation of the African Union, which continues to this day to uphold many of the founding principles of the OAU. The AU’s values of diplomacy and international cooperation remain the same today as those of the OAU.

Graph 2: Africa Hall, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Site of the 1st OAU Meeting, 1963

Fair use Image: Africa Hall, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Site of the First OAU Meeting, 1963.

The OAU established various working groups, including the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. This Commission was authorized to support and ensure the peaceful settlement of disputes between members.  Also, the OAU helped to finance independence movements in those nations that were still under European colonial rule, thus playing an instrumental role in independence for such states as Zimbabwe in 1980. The OAU was further committed to battling apartheid and white minority rule in states such as South Africa. The Republic of South Africa joined the organization in 1994 after its liberation from the deadly claws of apartheid.

Ideological differences between the member states often made agreement on a single course of action difficult.  The absence of an armed force like the United Nations’ peacekeeping contingents left the organization with no means to enforce its peace making and peace keeping mandate.  And its unwillingness to intervene in the internal affairs of member nations often meant it would not confront brutal dictatorships such as Idi Amin‘s regime in Uganda or domestic crises such as the Rwandan Genocide. This made some observers and proponents of regional integration criticize the OAU as a forum for rhetoric rather than action. Owing to this constraint, the African Union, the successor of the OAU, now has the African Standby Force (ASF)[48].

Pan Africanism and the formation of the OAU

The OAU was one of the outcomes of the Pan Africanist movement, which originated in the USA during the late 19th century. In the US, thousands of Black people, with African origins, found it intolerable to bear the agonising experience of racial discrimination and alienation. Some of their prominent leaders including, but not limited to W E B DuBois (1868-1963) and Marcus Garvey (1885-1940) raised a flag of revolt against the prevailing injustice of the time and chose to speak for the entire Black race that was going through an inhumane existence.

These Pan Africanists subordinated the immediate problems of American Black people to a grand and all-encompassing vision of Pan Africanism, which stood for the unity and dignity of the black race. DuBois fought for the rights of the Black people on the intellectual lane. With the support of white liberals, he established the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People in 1908 and edited the association’s journal called Crisis. His memorable writings such as The Souls of Black Folk and Dark Water unravelled, effectively, some of the deep-rooted feelings of the Black people.

In contrast to DuBois, Marcus Garvey, with his tremendous oratorial abilities to spellbind the masses, chose to educate the masses. It was the support of the masses from Harlem that prompted him to establish the Universal Negro Improvement Association as well as African Orthodox Church. He went to the extent of establishing the Black House, as against the White House, and declared himself as the president of the United States of Africa. Black star line shipping company, founded by Garvey, during the short span of its existence, transported American Black people from the US to West Africa. The Black people in the US, profoundly anguished by their lifestyles, romanticised Africa, and entertained dreams of returning to ‘Mother Africa’.^[49] After its initiation in the US, the Pan African movement grew acquiring different forms and nuances with changing times.

A series of Pan African conferences were held in Europe during inter-war period. The Pan African movement was formally launched from the African soil with the conference of independent African states held in Accra in 1958. One of the most significant rallying points behind this movement, throughout its history, has been symbolized in two-fold and immensely sensitive perception of the racial question. On the one hand the Pan African movement fiercely protested all the manifestations of racism and on the other hand it provided the Black races a platform to assert the distinctness of their culture and identity.

To put it tersely, the exploitation and humiliation of Black people in the US, condemnation of Black natives as barbaric by European colonialists and brutal treatment given to the Black people by the white power in South Africa generated anti-racist movements during the different stages of Pan African movements. However, launching protest movements has always been much easier than establishing a praiseworthy identity in a world dominated by colonialist/imperialist ideologies. The European colonialists, especially, had propounded a series of derogatory myths about Africa’s past. Such myths, in a way, provided rational justifications for the continuation of European rule in Africa.

The European rulers had conveniently inflicted an inferiority complex on the Black natives and distorted their psyche. Frantz Fanon’s celebrated writings, ‘The Wretched of the Earth and Black Skins and White Masks’, have sensitively portrayed some of the complex nuances of violently imposed inferiority complex in a colonial situation. In response to such a situation, the anti- colonial and anti-imperialist strand grew prominently within the Pan African movement.

To rectify the damage done by the European rulers, the Black peoples have ceaselessly longed for a kind of psycho-cultural renaissance. That is why, African intellectuals and distinguished literary figures have been at pains to resurrect and glorify the African civilizations of pre-colonial times.^[50] There has also been a lyrical refusal on the part of the Africans to get assimilated in European modes of being. Especially the Negritude Movement, started during inter-war period by poets and thinkers like Senghor and Aime Cesaire, vividly high- lighted the spiritual and humane qualities of Black races to surge forward under a catchy banner: ‘Black Is Beautiful’.^[51]

The support to Negritude movement from progressive and eminent European intellectuals including Jean Paul Sartre, Andre Gide, and Albert Camus, indeed, renewed the Euro-African dialogue on a racially egalitarian footing. The historical and cultural complexities that constituted the ‘racial dimension’ of the movement, quite often, inhibited the Black Africans from categorically associating themselves with international ideologies like capitalism or communism. One of the extreme examples of such non-acceptance was abundantly evident in George Padmore’s famous work titled ‘Pan Africanism or Communism’. Padmore, an erstwhile communist and controversial theoretician of Pan Africanism, enjoyed the distinction of being an advisor on African affairs to Ghana’s newly formed government under Kwame Nkrumah.

The basic ideological structure of his thoughts was shaped by his training in Marxism.^[52] By linking nationalism with socialism he propounded an anti-imperialist ideology which, however, appeared sympathetic to organizations like the British Commonwealth. While Padmore was at pains to emphasize the distinctness of being a black he had, simplistically, associated communism with a form of white racism. His analysis, overall, was critical of communist movements. After posing the dilemma of clashing options, i e, Pan Africanism, or communism, before the emerging African states, he had resolved it in favour of the former.^[53]

Apart from his grandiose plans, along with Nkrumah of Ghana, of building United States of Africa, the racial dimension continued to pulsate in his schema of Pan Africanism. Notwithstanding the racial dimension, which almost cemented the bond of unity within the Pan African movement, the divisive forces began to surface with the emergence of independent African states during the early 1960s. Formal political independence led Africans towards the normal trap of forming states and running them by emulating western state institutions.^[54]

Paradoxically, the apparent retreat of the western powers from the African scene had signified their defeat and yet, western powers recorded their triumph by locking the emerging states in the competitive game of inter-state politics. To date, debates amongst African scholars abound regarding the total independence of Africa. However, the key question is whether African states or any other state within the global comity of states can survive independent of other states? In the view of this researcher, states must engage in interstate relations through diplomacy and international cooperation to maximize the gains for their individual governments and peoples.

Competing ideological differences of newly independent African States

As earlier stated, the inter-state politics in Africa prior to the birth of OAU was characterized by growing rivalry between the Casablanca group and Monrovia group of states. The former group was led by Pan-Africanist visionaries such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sekou Toure of Guinea, and Modibo Keita of Mali. The Casablanca group vehemently opposed colonialism, racism, and neo-colonialism. It opposed the Katanga secessionist movement, extended support to Patrice Lumumba’s efforts to oust the Belgians from Congo, demanded French withdrawal from Algeria and condemned the apartheid system in South Africa.

The Association of African States with the European Economic Community (EEC) was viewed by this group as a neo-colonial trap to pauperise the non- industrialized states and perpetuate colonial privileges in Africa.^[55] Apart from being critical of French nuclear testing in the Sahara, the Casablanca group was apprehensive of neo-colonial ties between France and its former colonies. Ghana and Guinea went to the extent of supporting anti-west parties including the Sawaba Party in Niger and Parti Africain de independence in Senegal, which attempted to topple pro-French regimes in Francophone Africa.^[56]

The non-aligned posture of some of the members from this group appeared sympathetic towards the Soviet Union because their views attracted concrete Soviet support to their activities. By mobilizing the support of radical forces from within and outside Africa the members of Casablanca group aimed at building a United States of Africa. The establishment of Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union was a step in the same direction.

In contrast to the Casablanca group, the Monrovia group was constituted by the Brazzaville group which included most of the moderate Francophone states such as the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta, Mauritania, etc. In addition, it had members like Nigeria, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Liberia that were neutral towards rivalry between Casablanca and Brazzaville group. The Monrovia group stood for the protection of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of all African states.

The Monrovia group stoutly defended the principle of mutual non-interference in inter-state relations and welcomed inter-state technical and economic co-operation. Instead of snapping the ties with the west, the Monrovia states sought western co-operation in the process of promoting economic development. This group adopted a moderate position on Congo and Algeria by urging the concerned parties to sort out their differences on the negotiating table.^[57]

Bridging the divide between these two rival groups was feasible because both groups were moving in the same direction (the liberation of Africa from colonial rule). First, like states within the Monrovia group, the states in the Casablanca group also were getting absorbed in the world capitalist economy despite their sporadic tirade against neo-colonialism and imperialism. The penetration of western finance capital in the extractive sectors of Guinean economy and Ghana’s continued association with the sterling zone as well as membership of British Commonwealth demonstrated this proposition. Second, both groups were keen to regulate and promote inter-state co-operation in Africa. Third, both groups in their own ways, aimed at liquidating colonialism and racism on the continent^[58].

Eventually, it was this urge to co-operate on the issues of common concern coupled with mediatory efforts of ‘neutral’ states like Liberia and Ethiopia that brought about the OAU into being in 1963. The charter of the OAU was an outcome of a compromise between the two groups. On the one hand, the OAU pledged to oppose colonialism, racism, and neo- colonialism and satisfied Casablanca powers and on the other hand and it comforted Monrovia group by upholding the principle of non-interference and defence of territorial sovereignty in inter-state affairs. Apart from bringing about a reconciliation between the two distinct approaches to African unity, the OAU charter, to a certain extent, had to own up Africa’s colonial past^[59].

For waging a rhetorical war on colonialism appeared much easier than undoing the mayhem committed by colonial powers. To perpetuate inter-state harmony, the founding fathers of the OAU charter legitimised the inter-state frontiers drawn by colonial powers, primarily, during the Berlin conference of 1885^[60]. While drawing these frontiers, the European powers, obviously, had paid scant respect to the aspirations of diverse ethnic nationalities that were, in the process, arbitrarily divided and placed under administrative units run by different colonial powers.

By accepting the status quo on the issue of state frontiers the OAU charter left the gate for outbursts of ethnic and secessionist movements wide open. It had also sown one of the important seeds of inter-state tensions. The emergence of post-colonial states and groundwork done by the OAU to regulate their relations has had a two-fold impact on the Pan-African movement.

On the one hand, before the birth of independent African states, Pan African sentiments could be stirred to rally African subjects against European rulers. However, with the withdrawal of colonial powers, the Africans were left to settle their scores with each other. On the other, as a corollary, the compelling logic of inter-state relations inevitably pushed OAU member states to look at every issue with reference to their perceived national interest. To a certain extent, this process steadily eroded the erstwhile grand visions of Pan Africanism as the individual states began to project their own versions of Pan Africanism. Amidst the diverse foreign policy orientations of its member states, the OAU had to gain momentum because of consensus to resolve certain pressing problems as discussed below.

OUA and external international influences

Decolonization, like colonization, is a long-drawn-out historical process. Most of the African territories were initiated into it when they achieved formal independent statehood, through peaceful-negotiatory settlements, even before the birth of the OAU. The Liberation Committee set up under OAU offered moral and material assistance to anti- colonial struggles. Its support to liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau legitimised guerrilla armed struggles as a mode of overthrowing colonial regimes. Although there seemed to be a general agreement over decolonization, the OAU member states, at times, nursed severe differences over the kind of regimes that should be baptized as the formal members of the organization.

It is worthy to note that the states with socialist orientation found it difficult to enter the ranks and portals of OAU. Angola and Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) are cases in point. In the Angolan civil war, the Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) captured power, in a protracted civil war, with Soviet-Cuban support. The US, along with South Africa and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was supporting the two pro-West movements, namely Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA), in the civil war. To date, former colonial masters of African states still have enormous influence on the continent. However, the influences of these colonial powers is not the focus of this dissertation.

The Russo-American rivalry was reflected on a regional scale when the OAU debated over the admission of the MPLA regime led by Augustino Neto. The organization was evenly divided during 1976 between the states sympathetic to Cuban-Soviet intervention and states opposing it. Eventually, the US retreat from the Angolan civil war accompanied by increasing Soviet- Cuban support to Angola added to the viability of Neto regime and facilitated its admission in the OAU.

Like Angola the question of the admission of SADR, established during 1976, has been a source of bristling inter-state tensions. It had almost brought the OAU on the brink of disintegration. After the departure of Spanish colonialists, the SADR, to defy Morocco’s irredentist claims over its territorial integrity, sought de jure recognition from the community of nations. With the support of the Soviet Union and its allies, namely Algeria, Libya, Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique, it knocked the doors of OAU for admission.^[61]

Morocco, in turn, mobilized the support for withholding SADR’s admission among the conservative anti-Soviet regimes like those of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Gabon, etc. Further, the US also threw its weight behind Morocco with the objective of countering the Soviet influence from the strategically important region of northwest Africa. Once again, the inter-state tensions, which subsumed super- power rivalries, were mirrored in the OAU indicating that the East and West power rivalry was alive on the African continent.

When the SADR was admitted as an OAU member, Morocco walked out of the organization to pursue its objectives from outside. The OAU could not counter the aggressive designs of Morocco, till recently, when Morocco rejoined the African Union, the successor organization of the OAU. Also, there is no provision in the OAU charter to adopt comprehensive mandatory sanctions against a member state which obstinately flouts the majority consensus.^[62] The talk of applying such sanctions, however, has certainly gained currency while confronting racism practiced by a non-member state such as South Africa.

The OAU resolutions have ritually condemned racism in general as well as the system of apartheid which has institutionalized racism in South Africa and Namibia in particular. The racial question and its complex dimensions must be viewed in the light of a long-term historical perspective. Physical departure of European administrative and military personnel from Africa could not have wiped out the ugly memories of racial injustices from African minds altogether. Indeed, European powers in their relationship with post- colonial states in Africa could ill afford to adopt overtly racist attitudes. For, the post Second War world has accepted and institutionalized norms which abhor racism in any form. Notwithstanding such acceptance, the undercurrents of racism continue to prevail, quite often, in inter-personal interactions between the races. Apartheid, the phantom of racism in South Africa, became another converging point of all the racist forces.

 The phenomenon of racism has been an integral part of the evolution of state capitalism in South Africa, particularly, after the formal inauguration of the policy of apartheid. Consequently, in a crude sense, there was a striking convergence of race and class in South Africa. Certain dominant sections among white races, representing the military-industrial complex, have had the privilege of commanding the state apparatuses in the process of siphoning off the surplus generated by proletarianized Black races. Furthermore, as an integral part of western capitalism, South African capitalism was bolstered through western co-operation. That is how, covertly, the western powers upheld racism in that country. Black African states inevitably perceived racism in the reformist attitudes adopted by western powers towards white power in South Africa.

The OAU condemned the US policy of ‘constructive engagement’ in southern Africa on the grounds that such policy offered chances for the system of apartheid to recuperate. In its bid to annihilate the system of apartheid, the OAU employed a two- pronged attack. First, it supported the anti-racist movements such as the African National Congress (ANC) and Southwest Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) that were trying to wreck the system from within and second, it courageously defended the application of social and economic sanctions against South Africa to isolate the racist regime from the outside world.

Despite ‘the talk of sanctions, however, a few member states of the OAU maintained surreptitious trade links with South Africa. For instance, Malawi went to the extent of establishing formal diplomatic relations with the pariah regime. The magnitude of dependence of southern African states upon South Africa in terms of market, infrastructural facilities and trade reinforced South Africa’s preponderant position in southern African affairs. At this juncture, even the collective strength of economically poor and militarily weak OAU members was incapable of posing a serious challenge to the formidable power of the racist regime[63].

South Africa’s past dismal record of ‘human rights’ needs not absolve the then independent African states from their unsatisfactory protection of human rights. Thousands of innocent people in Nigeria were victims of communal violence during the Biafran civil war (1967-70). The phenomenon of communal violence persisted in strife-torn Sudan. Barbaric regimes led by brutal dictators such as Idi Amin of Uganda, Bokassa of the CAR and Macias Nguma of Equatorial Guinea witnessed dastardly massacres of innocent citizens as well as children. The OAU watched these ghastly spectacles by using principle of ‘non- interference’ as a convenient excuse. For, most of the insecure African rulers were concerned with ‘stability’ and ‘order’ in their respective regimes. That is why Idi Amin had the audacity to host the annual OAU summit in Kampala during 1975.

With the adoption of human rights charter by African heads of the state during the annual summit of the OAU at Nairobi in 1981[64], a possibility of the proliferation of ritual declarations, mingled with ineffective mediatory efforts on the part of the OAU, to protect human rights became wide open. This made it difficult for the OAU to bring down a regime that flagrantly violated human rights. Moreover, violation of human rights by brutal regimes, in the past, stimulated a flow of refugees across frontiers and caused inter-state disputes as exemplified in case of Idi Amin’s Uganda and Tanzania. In the absence of OAU support, the Tanzanian forces had to intervene to overthrow the Amin regime. The tensions between Tanzania and Uganda were a specific manifestation of inter and intra state disputes in post-colonial Africa which constitute a phenomenon in themselves.

OAU confronted with Inter-state and intra-state crises

The inter- and intra-state disputes became chronic features of the landscape of African politics. One of the central causes of such disputes can be safely traced to arbitrarily defined state frontiers by colonial powers and their legitimization by the OAU. As a result, powerful states like Morocco opted to redefine their frontiers by waging wars on neighboring states. Outbursts of ethnic movements within and across state frontiers also fuelled inter- state disputes. Somalia’s dream of integrating people of Somali origins, inhabiting in neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya, aggravated the tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia which led to Ogaden war of 1977.

Except for the Algero-Moroccan dispute of 1963-64, which the OAU resolved through the mediatory efforts of President Modibo Keita of Mali and Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, the OAU was a poor instrument of resolving the inter-state disputes. This can be partly explained by the fact that the commission on mediation, conciliation and arbitration set up under the OAU during 1964 had no mandatory authority. Also, most of these disputes acquired such a highly politicized character that their resolution within an existing legal framework became almost impossible.

Unlike the inter-state disputes, a firm handling and resolution of intra-state disputes was feasible because the latter disputes fell well within the realm and ambit of politico-legal authority of respective sovereign states. Occasionally, the intra-state disputes culminated into potent secessionist movements and added to the turmoil of the domestic political situation. However, ruthless suppression of secessionist movements as witnessed in the cases of Biafra in Nigeria, Eritrea in Ethiopia and Shaba in Zaire by central authorities prevented the formation of new states.^[65]

The OAU arrested the process of disintegration of African states by either invoking the principle of inviolability of frontiers or by upholding the rights of existing central authorities to handle such upheavals within the domestic jurisdiction. In situations where central authorities are weak, the OAU’s failure to take command of the situation was abundantly exposed. For example, strife torn Chad was ravaged by a civil war between its southern and northern regions.

Hissene Habre and Goukuni Ouddei, leaders from the south and north respectively, struggled to capture the central government. In the process, Chad was partitioned on the 16th parallel.^[66] To meet the threats of aggression from Goukouni Ouddei’s forces, supported by Libya with Soviet weapons, Hissene Habre had to depend upon French military intervention during February 1986. Irreconcilable differences between the OAU member-states in their external policies impeded the formation of Pan African force to meet the demands of crisis ridden states.^[67] That is why, despite the hackneyed slogans like ‘Africa for Africans’ the entry of foreign powers, with neo-colonial and imperial designs was unavoidable under the aegis of the OAU.^[68]

Among the foreign powers the steady growth of French neo-colonial influence in Africa could hardly be underestimated. France successfully institutionalized a network of neo-colonial ties with its former colonies through comprehensive economic, military, political and cultural accords. Deployment of French troops in strategic areas, e g, Djibouti, Chad, and French military interventions in Goban, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad and Western Sahara only gave an overt warning about the magnitude of French stakes in Africa. France has been widening its spheres of activities through ever expanding trade ties, investments, and aid programmes.

The annual Franco-African summit held in Burundi, in 1984, was attended by thirty- seven states. The so-called radical states like Zimbabwe and Mozambique were among the seventeen states who attended the summit as observers. This vertical Franco- African link, operating through such conferences, undoubtedly undermined the independence and the strength of the OAU vis-a-vis the outside world. Also, the association of African states with the EEC has promoted a network of dependency between the advanced European nations and developing African states.

The OAU and the influence of East-West rivalry

Apart from continued dominance of Europe over Africa, the growing involvement as well as rivalry between the superpowers in strategically sensitive areas such as Southern Africa, the horn of Africa and northwest Africa transformed the continent into a battle ground between the West and East. Due to apprehensions about the destabilizing pressures exerted by Soviet- Cuban backed regimes (Angola, Mozambique, Algeria, Libya) and movements (ANC, SWAPO) the pro-west states (the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Senegal, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and Liberia) inevitably gravitated towards the imperialist camp led by the US.

Mounting external pressures from the superpowers to a certain extent, set the process of polarization within OAU in motion which, in turn, affected the decision-making process of the OAU. At the same time, any clear-cut categorization of African states as pro-west moderates or pro-east radicals would be analytically too simplistic to serve any explanatory purposes. Admittedly, African states used foreign policies, primarily if not solely, as vehicles to ensure their economic advancement. Particularly, now, the destiny of most African states was profoundly shaped by the unmanageable economic calamities inflicted by drought and debts.

To surmount these economic crises the heads of the states of OAU in their weeklong session in Addis Ababa, during March 1984 Summit, deliberated over economic problems that stemmed from mounting oil prices, constant fall in agricultural output and stagnant economic growth. The development efforts of the OAU had only marginal impact in improving the deteriorating economic conditions. The Lagos plan of action which aimed at coordinated economic development throughout Africa could not make much headway in those days of East-West rivalry. In short, the East-West rivalry strategically affected regional integration on the continent. This further testifies that no state or region is isolated from others globally.

In a word, the dream of Pan-Africanist visionaries, like Nkrumah and Padmore, to set up an economic organization on a continental scale was still quite distant. Only regional economic organizations with limited purposes sprouted through western assistance.^[69] The record of such organizations in improving economic conditions has been far from enviable. In general, the worsening economic conditions of African states contributed to their growing dependence on western capitalism as well as international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) that have been dominated by western powers.^[70] This has precipitated the process of incorporation of Africa into the world capitalist economy.

Sporadic Soviet military assistance to the so-called radical states might have served the Soviet global strategy of countering Western capitalism. However, it did not strengthen the muscles of Soviet ‘clients’ to a point that could set the stage for liquidation of western dominance. From the stand- point of ‘radical’ states, disentanglement of the ties with western capitalism could have been desirable but the objective conditions, at this conjuncture, were incapable of making it possible. Hence, after condemning various manifestations of imperialism, at the official level, they too stood in a queue to acquire financial assistance from the capitalist west.

There has been a century old historical current of Pan African movement that was concretized, at the organizational level, with the birth of OAU on May 25, 1963. When the newly born states ventured to translate Pan African dreams into realities, the very concept of Pan Africanism as also the likely direction of Pan African movement fell victim the subjective interpretations of new states. The OAU, in a bid to harmonise the divergent perspectives, provided a forum to its members to air their differences and move based on majority consensus. In fact, upon its birth, the OAU was vulnerable to powerful, endogenous as well as exogenous, divisive forces.

The endogenous forces primarily stemmed from several factors including diverse foreign policy orientations of the member states, ambiguously defined frontiers leading towards border disputes and constant puzzles posed by ethnic nationalities. The problem of ethnic secessionists movements frequently damaged the process of attiring social cohesion within the states and disturbed the prospects of inter-state harmony as well. To a considerable extent, the crisis ridden situation within the states, and disharmony between the states provided a fresh impetus to the intrusion of exogenous forces.

The neo-colonial manoeuvrings of the erstwhile colonial powers and the ongoing Russo-American rivalry for influence were conspicuous manifestations of the activities of exogenous forces. During such a fluctuating political climate, generated by a combination of regional and global divisive forces, ensuring the sheer survival of a regional organization like the OAU was a hazardous task. However, the OAU succeeded in in the decolonization of African states and the ending of Apartheid in South Africa in 1994. In view of this success, African leaders saw the need to transform the continental organization into the African Union that opts to end extreme poverty and achieve sustainable development on the content through the African Agenda 2063.^[71]

In summary, regional integration in Africa started with the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Sanniquellie, Nimba County, Liberia.  This means that the continent’s regional integration process began as a political one. The Republic of Liberia is the oldest African Republic that became independent on July 26, 1947.  From its inception, the OAU was vulnerable to powerful divisive forces, both endogenous and exogenous. The endogenous forces primarily stemmed from diverse foreign policy orientations of the member states, border disputes, ethnic and nationality problems. Ethnic secessionist movements damaged internal cohesion within states and inter-state relations as well. The involvement of exogenous forces such as the neo-colonial maneuvering of erstwhile colonial powers and superpower rivalry further divided the member states. In this crisis-ridden situation, the OAU did survive, demonstrating a commendable regional commitment of African states. The political amalgamation now needs to be crowned as an economic regional reality to help transform the lives of the African people.

The African Union and the African Stand by Force

The OAU was transformed into a new continental regional body called the African Union. The African Union progressed beyond a political union and is taking some steps to fully operationalize an economic regional integration body on the continent building on the view of the 1991 Abuja Treaty that endorsed the African Economic Community. This research is mainly focused on examining the extent to which the African Union is progressing on deepening economic integration on the continent to curb or drastically reduce widespread extreme poverty on the continent, and what could be done to further entrench same for economic prosperity of Africa. Economic prosperity is a result of economic growth and economic growth provides the needed resources for economic development. However, economic growth and economic development cannot obtain in the absence of peace and security. Hence, this dissertation also delves into how Africa might achieve its desire goals for sustainable development by ensuring peace and security of the continent.

The AU has had serious concerns about peace and security on the continent. Therefore, the regional body formulated the African Stand Force. The ASF originated in 2003 as a multidisciplinary standby mechanism comprising soldiers, civilians, and police in their countries of origin. It is coordinated by the five regional economic communities with the aim of being ready for rapid deployment at short notice. The intention is to help the AU Peace and Security Council discharge its responsibilities relating to peace support missions.^[72] After more than a decade of investment and development, the AU declared the ASF ready for rapid deployment in 2016. But the force has never seen any action. Instead, ad hoc troop coalitions have become the norm in Africa.

Several obstacles stand in the ASF’s way. For much of its existence, the force has faced a seemingly competing initiative by volunteer countries – the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC). ACIRC was set up in 2013 as a temporary rapid intervention force until the ASF was ready. In the end, ACIRC too, was never deployed. After lengthy discussions about African peace support operations, the AU decided in 2019 to integrate ACIRC into the ASF framework.

Political problems also prevent the ASF from getting off the ground. Countries have not committed to the necessary resources, and there is little coordination between the AU and its regional economic communities in terms of making the ASF fully functional. The latter was acknowledged in a 2017 independent expert report commissioned by the AU. It found that the ‘absence of an agreed and harmonized mandating process and legal instruments may impact the rapid and timely deployment of ASF pledged capabilities across regions when the need arises.’^[73]

Moreover, violent extremism and other complex security threats aren’t addressed in the ASF’s framework. Some security pundits and analysts attribute this problem to the power that regional blocs have over peace and security decisions due to a lack of clarity on the subsidiarity principle between regions and the AU. This ambiguity of roles and responsibilities enables countries to opt for ad hoc security arrangements over the ASF. Some regional and international critics believe these ad hoc security coalitions complement the ASF and are best suited to tackling Africa’s deadliest transnational armed groups. The coalitions are seen as filling a gap in the AU’s peace and security arsenal by providing immediate responses to violent extremism and other complex threats – which the ASF’s framework doesn’t address.

This highlights big and deeper problems in the AU’s ability to deal with violent conflict, something that undermines the continent’s progress towards sustainable development. At its 2022 February summit, AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat said the narrow reading of subsidiarity and the question of state sovereignty were behind the malaise in the AU’s response to crises. Some states reject AU interventions by invoking the principle of sovereignty in domestic affairs. Mahamat stressed the need “for a realistic approach, which should scrutinize the African Union’s peace and security architecture and its correlation with the new destabilizing factors like terrorism and unconstitutional government changes on the continent”.^[74]

CONCLUSION

It is hoped that this literature review has address and has done justice to the research on Africa’s regional peace and sustainable development. Admittedly, the region formulated the African Agenda 2063 in 2013 before the SDGs were crafted in 2015 and officially launched in 2016 to replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Agenda 2063 has 7 aspirations with 20 goals. The major intent of this research is to energize Africa into action to pursue peace and sustainable Development on the continent under its regional integration mechanisms. However, the African continent is not represented on the UNSC, which coordinates global peace at the United Nations.

In view of this reality and many others, the researcher strongly believes that if Africa must have peace for economic growth and development, reduce hunger, create wealth, and attain sustainable development, the continent under the aegis of the African Union Commission needs to emphasize and invest in accessible and quality education, infrastructure, and sustainable agriculture. Africa’s future prosperity and progress lie in deeper regional economic integration and these sectors combined. Therefore, the researcher recommends the following to the AUC and all other interested parties that stand for the attainment of regional peace and sustainable development on the continent.

1. Africa should become a member of the United Nations Security Council because a continent of about 1.4 billion people must be represented on the peace table of the globe. The African Union Commission should strive to represent the continent on the UNSC.
2. The 1991 Abuja Treaty needs to be fully implemented because it calls for Africa’s economic integration. The continent achieved politically integration but needs to economically integrate for regional peace and sustainable development.
3. Arm, fully equip and effectively support the African Standby Force to make peace and keep peace in all member states on the continent so that the continent can have its own homegrown peacekeeping force.
4. To have a rising and sustainable Africa, a “United States of Africa” under one army, one government, one passport, one foreign policy, one recognized language and one currency, is desired focus on continental sovereignty. This United States of African will have the responsibility to cater to the wellbeing of all Africans as a single state.
5. The AU needs to make it a continental policy that 80 percent of ODA in African states must go towards infrastructural development and investment. This regulation could compel African states to investment addressing the infrastructural deficit within African states specifically, and the continent at large.
6. Set up an African Union sovereign fund to which all Africans or African descents or their states, on behalf of each citizen, should contribute a dollar for infrastructural development of the continent. For instance, to fund intra Africa infrastructure across the continent like the fast train between Addis and Djibouti etc.
7. Appropriately manage the environment on the continent to ensure that environmental degradation is minimized. Ensuring environmental integrity will protect the environment and interest of future generations.
8. Focus on agricultural productivity, value addition and provision of safe drinking water to address extreme hunger, malnutrition, water problem and poverty on the continent. The 1.4 billion population of the continent will grow annually; therefore, the continent needs to provide adequate food, clean water, sanitation environment etc. for all.
9. If Africa must achieve the Agenda 2063 aspiration for “A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development” (as enshrined in Aspiration 1) as well as all other aspirations of the continent needs to invest in modern agriculture for increased proactivity and production as well as exploit the vast potential of Africa’s blue economy. In addition, action needs to be taken to address climate change issues and other environmental factors that pose a great risk to the agricultural sector.
10. Merge modern health science on the continent with acceptable, good, or transformed traditional African health systems to cure diseases on the continent because African traditional medicines are mostly ignored in the mainline health sector in many African Sates; good health for African children, youth and women means a wealthy continent. and
11. Harmonise Africa’s educational system to allow mobility of teachers, professors, and students to focus on integrated research on Africa’s Development priorities in the continent.

To conclude, “the researcher considers total economic integration as the lynchpin for Africa’s inclusive progress towards ending widespread extreme poverty on the continent and that initiating sustainable development in the region is paramount to peace in Africa”.[75] Further empirical research is encouraged in the areas of the impact of regional integration on peace in Africa; the relationship between regional integration and economic growth and development in Africa; and the for researchers in the development sector, the relationship or nexus between regionalism and development on the African continent could be an interesting terrain for further research.

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Articles in journals

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8. Huwart, J.Y.,Verdier, L. (2013). Economic Globalization: Origins and Consequences. OECD Insights, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264111899-en.
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10. Kaydor, T. (2023). The effects of poor infrastructure on poverty reduction in post conflict Liberia; International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS) ISSN No. 2454-6186 | DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS |Volume VII & Issue I January 2023; https://www.rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/Digital-Library/volume-7-issue-1/55-62.pdf;
11. Kaydor, T. (2022). The Role of the International Criminal Court in Liberia’s Peace and Stability; International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS) | Volume VI, Issue VII, July 2022 | ISSN 2454–6186URL: https://www.rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/Digital-Library/volume-6-issue-7/562-575.pdf.
12. Kaydor, T. (2022). International Cooperation: Fulcrum for Sustainable Development; in W. Leal Filho et al. (eds.), Handbook of Sustainability Science in the Future, Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022, https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-030-68074-9_2-1#DOI.
13. Kaydor T. (2021) Cash Transfer: A Strategic Determinant for Poverty Reduction. In: Leal Filho W., Azul A.M., Brandli L., Lange Salvia A., Özuyar P.G., Wall T. (eds) No Poverty. Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69625-6_107-1.
14. Kaydor, T. (2014). ‘What might Africa-China bilateral relationship be in 2030’, in A.S Patel, J.S.G Teo, & S.W Dempsey (eds), Global Perspectives on International Affairs: Collection of Essays, Forum for Global Affairs, ANU, Canberra, Australia, pp. 107-125.
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17. Raustiala, K. (2002): The architecture of international cooperation: trans governmental networks and the future of international law, in: Virginia Journal of International Law 43 (1), 1–92.
18. Schäferhoff, M., Campe, S., Kaan, C. (2009). Transnational public-private partnerships in international relations: making sense of concepts, research frameworks, and results, in: International Studies Review, Vol. 11, Issue 3, September, 451–474.
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Book Chapters/encyclopedia, et al.:

1. Afadameh-Adeyemi, A., Kalula, E. (2011). SADC at 30: Re-examining the Legal and Institutional Anatomy of the Southern African Development Community, in: Bösl, A. et al. (eds.), Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa, Yearbook Vol. 10 – 2010. Stellenbosch: Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa.
2. Beisheim, M., Campe, M., Schäferhoff. (2010): Global governance through public-private-partnerships, in: Enderlein, H. / S. Wälti / M. Zürn (eds.): Handbook on multi-level governance, Edward Elgar Publishing, 370–382.
3. Collier, P. (2000). Africa’s comparative advantage; in Jalilian, H., Tribe, M. & Weiss, J. (eds.), Industrial Development and Policy in Africa – Issues of De-Industrialization and Development Strategy. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
4. Grunberg, I., Stem, M. (1999): Defining global public goods, in: Kaul, I. / I. Grunberg / M. Stern (eds.): Global public goods: international cooperation in the 21st century, New York: Oxford University Press.
5. Hass, E.B. (1971). ’The Study of Regional Integration’, in Regional Integration; Theory and Research, Lindberg, L., and Scheingold, S.A., (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
6. Kaydor T 2021, Cash Transfer: A Strategic Determinant for Poverty Reduction. In: Leal Filho W., Azul A.M., Brandli L., Lange Salvia A., Özuyar P.G., Wall T. (eds) No Poverty. Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69625-6_107-1.
7. Laursen, F. (2008). Theory and Practice of Regional Integration; Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 8 No. 3; February 2008, Miami-Florida European Union Center of Excellence, Miami University, USA.
8. Leal Filho W., de Sousa L.O., Pretorius R. (2021). Prospects of Sustainable Development in Africa. In: Leal Filho W., Pretorius R., de Sousa L.O. (eds) Sustainable Development in Africa. World Sustainability Series. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74693-3_40.
9. McCarthy, C. (2007). Is African economic integration in need of a paradigm change? Thinking out of the box on African integration. In: Bösl, A. et al. (eds.), Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa, Yearbook Vol. 6 – 2007. Stellenbosch: Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa.
10. McCord, G., Sachs, J.D., Wing, T.W. (2005). Understanding African Poverty: Beyond the Washington Consensus to the Millennium Development Goals Approach. In Teunissen, J.J. & Akkerman, A. (eds.), Africa in the World Economy – The National, Regional and International Challenges. The Hague: FONDAD.
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FOOTNOTES

[1] OAU Charter, 1963. This Charter explains why the Union was organized.

[2] Schimmelfennig, 2018.

[3] Hass, 1958.

[4] Lindberg, 1963.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Schmitter, 2002, p.2-3. E-source

[8] Haas, 1961; Haas and Schmitter, 1964; Haas, 1967.

[9] Laursen, 2008.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] See Hoffmann, 1965, P. Taylor, 1983.

[13] Moravcsik, 1991, 1993.

[14] Moravcsik, 1998.

[15] See Checkel, 1999; Marcussen et al., 1999 for deeper insights on this debate.

[16] Laursen, 2008.

[17] Karl W. Deutsch et al., 1957: 5-6.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Haas, 1958, 9.16.

[20] Lindberg, 1963, p.6.

[21] Ibid, p.5.

[22] Lindberg, 1963, p.10.

[23] Haas, 1958, p. 311.

[24] Haas, 1967.

[25] Hoffmann, 1966, p.864.

[26] Ibid, p. 882.

[27] Lindberg and Scheingold, p. 1970.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Laursen, 2008.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Moravcsik, 1993

[33] Moravcsik, 1993 and 1998.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Karl Deutsch et al. 1957, p.2.

[36] Haas, 1958, p.6.

[37] Agenda 2063, 2015. This is the African Union regional development agenda that espouses African countries desired for sustainable development on the continent.

[38] Balassa, 1961, p.1.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Nye, 1968, p.860.

[41]  Beverton, 2009.

[42] Africa Digest, 1959, p.68. First West African Summit Conference, Held at Sanniquellie, Central Province, Liberian Hinterland, July 15–19, 1959, Liberian Information Service, Monrovia, Africa

Digest, 11 1959 (Vol. 7, No. 2), p. 68; also reported in Africa Special Report, 08 1959 (Vol. 4, No. 7), p. 3–4, and the New York Times, July 26, 1959; and Afrique Nouvelle, July 24, 1959.

[43] International Organization, 1962.

[44] Africa Special Report, August 1959, p. 3–4.

[45]See  Pierre Englebert & Kevin C. Dunn (2013), Inside African Politics, London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 320–321.

[46]see Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein (1961). Africa: The Politics of Independence and Unity. U of Nebraska Press. p. 53. ISBN 9780803298569

[47] See Pierre Englebert & Kevin C. Dunn (2013), Inside African Politics, London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 320–321.

[48] AU Constitutive Act, 2000.

[49] Decraene, 1976, pp 16-17. .

[50] Heinnemann, 1972. Senghor’s poems tend to contrast the wisdom of the sages of Africa with the materialist morality of Europe. See L S Senghor, Nocturnes (Heinemann, London, 1972).

[51] Ibid.

[52]  See George Padmore, Africa, and World Peace (Frank Cass, London 1972).

[53] Dobson, 1956. George Padmore, Pan Africanism, or Communism.

[54] Economic and Political Weekly, February 20, 1988, p. 373.

[55]Nkrumah, 1963, p 187. Specific details on the issue of the Casablanca Group is in Nkrumanh’s Africa Must United.

[56] Ibid.

[57] For more details about the rivalries between the two groups, see Rajen Harshe, Pervasive Entente France and Ivory Coast in African Affairs (Arnold Heinemann, New Delhi, 1984), pp 94-106.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] The Berlin Conference, 1884-1885. E-source: https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/berlin-conference#:~:text=The%20Berlin%20Conference%20spanned%20almost,as%20we%20know%20them%20today.

[61] Economic and Political Weekly February 20, 1988.

[62] Macmillan, 1985, pp. 133-150. For details see Amadu Sesay and Orbola Fasehum ‘Possible Futures for the OAU in the World System’ in Timothy Shaw and Olajde Aluko (eds), Africa Projected Macmillan, London, 1985, pp 133-150.

[63] Ibid.

[64] African Human Rights Charter, 1981

[65] Economic and Political Weekly, Feb.ruary 20, 1988.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Prominent among them were Council of Entente and Organization Common African Malagache et Mauricienne (OCAMM).

[70] Economic and Political Weekly February 20, 1988. See a report on aid to drought affected states in Keesings Contemporary Archieves, February 1985, pp 33380-86.

[71] (Agenda 2063, 2022). E-source: https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36204-doc-agenda2063_popular_version_en.pdf.

[72] Institute of Security Studies, 2022. E-source: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-the-african-standby-force-match-up-to-current-security-threats

[73](AU Iindependent Expert Report, 2017. E-source.

[74] Moussa Faki Mahamat, 2022. Office opening statement of the AU Commission Chairperson at the 2022 Summit.

[75] Balassa, 1961.