Ethiopia and Somaliland Ties and MOU-Related Concerns

Ethiopia and Somaliland Ties and MOU-Related Concerns

Mustafe Mahamoud Abdillahi. PhD (c)

Kampala International University, School of Humanities and Social Science, Management Science in Public Management

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2024.8110002

Received: 26 September 2024; Accepted: 09 October 2024; Published: 26 November 2024

ABSTRACT

On January 1, 2024, Somaliland’s president, Musa Bihi Abdi, and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia executed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). whereby Somaliland agreed to lease 20 kilometers of its coastline to Ethiopia for 50 years in exchange for Ethiopia formally recognizing Somaliland’s independence. The agreement was made in Hargeisa. Ethiopia would then be the first nation to acknowledge Somaliland’s independence. After signing an agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia known as a memorandum of understanding, which grants landlocked Ethiopia sea access in return for the recognition of Somaliland’s breakaway territory as a sovereign state, political tensions are high around the Horn of Africa. The potential recognition of Somaliland caused a diplomatic crisis between Ethiopia and Somalia. After the Republic of Somalia’s civil conflicts and the rule of Siyad Bare, this study examined the historical connection between Somaliland and Ethiopia. The second section examined the responses from Somalia, other countries, and intergovernmental organizations. This report examined the many diplomatic measures that Somaliland and Egypt implemented, to name just a few.

Key Word: Somaliland, Ethiopia, Somalia, Egypt and MOU

INTRODUCTION

Somaliland’s Republic has transitioned from a customary tribe in Somalia’s system of government to a democratic representative since gaining independence in 1991. A transitional charter was accepted by the tribes of Somaliland during a conference in Borama in 1993. A temporary constitution was developed in 1997 during another convention. In 2001, 97 percent of votes cast in a referendum including all of Somaliland endorsed both the country’s independence and its temporary constitution. In December 2002, Somaliland held its inaugural round of municipal elections. and then its first presidential election in 2003. Notably, the opposition first raised a complaint when the 2003 presidential winner was determined by barely eighty-two votes. Once its appeals were exhausted, it conceded the outcome. Somaliland held its first elections to the legislature in 2005. After much delay, the second presidential election in Somaliland was held. in June 2010. (USAID Frontlines 2010). Judged “free and fair” by foreign election monitors, (Somaliland Press 2010), the opposition candidate, Ahmed Mohammed Silanyo, beat incumbent President Dahir Rayale Kahin. On July 27, 2010, Kahin and Silanyo amicably handed over power, becoming Somaliland the fourth African State to see such a peaceful handover of authority from an outgoing president to a winning challenger. William Wallis, (2010).

On November 13, 2017, Somaliland held its third straight direct presidential election since 2003. On March 27, 2017, Somaliland was supposed to hold general elections to choose representatives for the House of Representatives and the President, Maruf, Harun (2017) but was first delayed by six months as a result of the local drought. On November 13, separate elections were ultimately held to choose the President and Vice President. Michael Walls (2018). The leader of the Peace, Unity, and Development Party (Kulmiye), Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud, did not seek reelection. The Washington Post, 2017. With 55% of the vote, the ruling Kulumiye party candidate, Muse Bihi Abdi, was victorious.

A political maelstrom has erupted in the Horn of Africa due to a surprising agreement between the authorities of Ethiopia, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and those in the neighbouring self-declared state of Somaliland. After taking office in 2018, Abiy received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 due to his part in mediating a cease-fire with neighbouring Eritrea. He has gained notoriety as a maverick with plans to reorganize Ethiopia and the surrounding area in more recent years. He and Muse Bihi Abdi, the president of Somaliland, signed a memorandum of agreement on January 1, 2024, which, in general, permits Ethiopia to lease a 20-kilometer stretch of coastline in the breakaway Somali territory for 50 years and to develop a naval port there. In return, Ethiopia would legally recognize Somaliland’s sovereignty, making it the first nation in Africa to do so. Authorities in Mogadishu, the federal capital of Somalia, which asserts control over the disputed area, have responded angrily to the memorandum. Methodical Comments (2024).

METHODS OF RESEARCH

The theoretical conceptualizations established in the literature served as the foundation for this study’s methodology. Since regaining its independence, Somaliland has been creating post-conflict legislation, which has led to a total collapse of institutional public services. These organizations are the ones that made the effort to bring the MOU with Ethiopia and recognition for Somaliland.

Relations between Somaliland and Ethiopia

The area that makes up Somaliland was once part of the British Protectorate in 1960. After gaining independence from the United Kingdom, it lasted for five days until merging with the old UN Trusteeship, which was run by Italy, to become the United Somali Republic. But because of General Siad Barre’s oppressive rule, the rebel factions initially surfaced in northern Somalia, where they started their conflict with the country’s government. The most significant of these was the Somali National Movement (SNM), It eventually turned into known as the main political force in Somaliland. At the Grand Conference of Northern Nations (Shirweynaha Beelaha Waqooyi) in Burco on May 18, 1991, in reaction to what was happening in southern Somalia, the SNM officials unilaterally proclaimed Somaliland to be independent. where fighting broke out Between clan divisions following Siad Barre’s removal from office. Huliaras A. (2002).

Since announcing its independence in 1991, Somaliland and Ethiopia have enjoyed cordial ties. Owing to the 1980s competition between the authorities in Somalia and Ethiopia, Ethiopia provided assistance and a haven for Somali insurgent organizations operating in northern Somalia, including SNM. Furthermore, Ethiopia was a destination country for refugees from northern Somalia in the Barre’s retaliations against that region during the civil conflict in Somalia in 1988–1991, which included, among other things, the shelling of Hargeisa. Duale M.A., Ahmed S.M. (2014)

Through the Foreign Affairs Ministry and unauthorized embassies dispersed around the world, Somaliland is attempting to build relationships with nations and international organizations to be recognized on a global scale. In addition to promoting commerce and foreign investments, these offices also seek worldwide recognition and grant visas. However, the Vienna Declaration on Diplomatic Conventions does not recognize them as formal embassies. Owtram, F. (2011). Djibouti recognized Somaliland as a de facto state in 1997., even though it is still not recognized as a sovereign entity by any member of the global society. In June 2007, during the 9th African Union meeting in Accra, Ghana, Ethiopia became the first nation to formally recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state, and her president as the Head of State. Government of Somaliland (2013)

Ethiopia was the pioneer. nation to build a diplomatic post in Hargeisa, while Somaliland built its mission in Addis Ababa. It was originally established as a quasi-embassy and in 2006 promoted to Consular General. It engages in a broad spectrum of commercial and political endeavors. In addition to serving consular duties. Somaliland maintains unofficial diplomatic posts in the United States, Canada, Sweden, Kenya, Norway, Belgium, Djibouti, South Sudan, and Great Britain in addition to Addis Ababa. In addition, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and South Korea accept passports from Somaliland. (Clapham Ch. et al 2011). Additionally, Turkey is beginning to strengthen its ties with Somaliland, as evidenced by the announcement made by the Turkish ambassador on November 23, 2013, that a Turkish consulate post will be opened in Hargeisa. (Turkey to Open a Consulate Office in Somaliland 2013)

Additionally, Somaliland welcomes foreign delegations, and delegates from the country attended the ministerial conference at the World Bank. Additionally, senior Somaliland officials frequently visit other nations for formal business. For instance, in 2000, at the request of Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, a team from Somaliland led by President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal and included eight ministers paid a visit to Ethiopia and inked agreements with the Ethiopian government about commerce and communications development. The team from Somaliland proposed to their Ethiopian counterparts to use the Berbera port for Ethiopian import and export as well as oil storage, which served as the primary economic incentive for the visit. Africa News Service (2000).

President Daahir Ryaale Kaahin visited Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia as part of a longer trip to East Africa in 2006. Farley B. R. (2010). Similarly, Ethiopian delegates made many trips to Somaliland. For instance, in April 2001, President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal of Somaliland and a group led by the deputy foreign minister discussed commerce, bilateral connections, and the potential for the establishment of an Ethiopian trade bank office in Hargeisa. Agency Press France (2001). In November 2014, A delegation of top Ethiopian officials, comprising ministries and deputy ministers, visited Somaliland. The Ethiopian team conferred with their colleagues from Somaliland on commerce, investments, infrastructure cooperation, and potential avenues for future expansion. The negotiations came to a close with Somaliland and Ethiopia signing a Memorandum of Understanding and forming a joint “Ministerial Commission” consisting of fourteen members.

The Ethiopian delegation was pleased with Somaliland’s progress, particularly in the area of security. Speaking at a state banquet, Somaliland’s president, Ahmed Mohamed Mahmud (Silanyo), said, “Ethiopia and Somaliland have always been close friends. This friendship will continue.” Somaliland Sun, (2014). This implies that Somaliland’s political representation views Ethiopia as a vital regional partner and that Somaliland is prepared to uphold positive partnerships with Ethiopia to collaborate on security, the economy, and international trade in addition to pursuing international recognition.

Ethiopia and Somaliland have inked several bilateral agreements. For instance, in 2006, they agreed to share utilizing the port of Berbera on the coast of Somaliland. Additional contracts included the establishment of customs offices lining the shared border. Farley, Benjamin R. (2010). The second-best significant export and import center for Ethiopia, a landlocked country, is the port of Berbera, behind Djibouti. Ethiopia’s inability to use the Eritrean port of Asmara as a result of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict underscored its significance for Ethiopia. The “Berbera corridor,” which travels through Tog Wajaale and on to Ethiopia, is used to carry imports from the port of Berbera. Hoehne M. V, (2015). Since the Berbera port was given to be utilized exclusively for Ethiopian export and import in 2000, the undertaking to construct and maintain the Berbera-Addis Ababa Road has been suggested. This corridor is thought to be a crucial route connecting landlocked Ethiopia to the coast of Somaliland. Duale, M. A., & Ahmed, S. M. (2018).

Nonetheless, the main economic stream for the Somaliland government is the transit route that runs between Ethiopia’s Dire Dawa and the port of Berbera in Somaliland. Baldo S. (2006), Ethiopia recently chose to build connections to Mombasa Port in Kenya, Port Sudan, and Berbera Port in Somaliland to lessen its reliance on the Port of Djibouti. Since five to ten percent of Ethiopia’s imports are expected to pass via this port, the Ethiopian team visited the Berbera’s harbor and fuel depots during their visit to Somaliland in November 2014. Somaliland Press, (2015). Ethiopia and Somaliland are also connected by air travel. Ethiopian Airlines has been providing direct, regularly regular flights from Addis Ababa to Somaliland’s Hargeisa and Berbera since the year 2000.

Ethiopia collaborates border security, as well as overall security, with Somaliland in addition to the economy and international trade. Somaliland had many terrorist strikes by al-Shabaab despite attempts to stabilize its borders. CNN, (2008). Throughout the initial 10 years of the millennium, piracy was another security issue in the Horn of Africa, in addition to terrorism. In October 2010, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a deal to strengthen their collaboration on security and establish counterterrorism and anti-piracy measures to combat pirates more effectively. Lansford T. (ed.) (2015). In February 2015 in reaction to the attempted ambush of armed men in the border region of Awdal, Somaliland and Ethiopia decided to improve cooperation in the sphere of both border and general security. Nonetheless, border protection was previously considered by both governments’ political participation, particularly concerning measures to stop Islamist terrorist organizations from invading Ethiopian and Somaliland territory.

As previously stated, Somaliland developed extensive informal political and economic ties with Ethiopia. Regarding efforts to maintain the unity of African states’ territories, particularly concerning a sizable Somali community within its territory, in the Ogaden area, the Ethiopian government is hesitant to recognize Somaliland. Ethiopia, like Kenya, is concerned that the irredentist Somali community in the area may step up its activities if Somaliland is recognized. Huliaras A. (2000).

The statement made by Brigadier General Berhe Tesfaye, the Ethiopian Consul General in Somaliland, may serve as a good example of Ethiopia’s ambivalent stance on the question of Somaliland’s international recognition: “Regarding Somaliland’s statehood, my administration and I think that the relevant parties should resolve the internal matter through domestic, peaceful channels.” […]. In the interim, I think that Somaliland’s people and administration need more international assistance and support since they are making significant contributions to enhancing the stability and peace of this unstable region of the Horn of Africa. Somaliland Sun, (21 December 2014). In this interview, the consul general emphasised that the Ethiopian government is working to persuade the world community that Somaliland needs financial support regardless of where it is in the international order.

Finally, a thirty-year concession to manage the Berbera Port was granted to Dubai Ports World (DPW), one of the biggest port operators in the world, by President Ahmed Mohammed Mohamoud, also referred to as Silanyo. According to the deal, Somaliland would own 35% of the property and the DP would possess 65% of it. The UAE committed to spending $250 million to renovate Berbera’s Russian-built airport and construct a roadway connecting Berbera with Ethiopia. (The Messenger 3.4.2017). Following the agreements, DP World started work on the port’s infrastructure in March 2017; the port’s container terminal construction was the first stage of expansion, and it was officially opened on June 24, 2021. Meanwhile, on February 12, 2017, the UAE created a military facility in the Port of Berbera as part of the Yemeni war effort. Likewise, the UAE was granted a 30-year concession by Eritrea over the Port of Assab.

Ethiopia has asked for a trilateral evaluation of the situation involving Somaliland, Ethiopia, and the DP World to successfully influence DP’s arrival to further its interests. Ethiopia made a formal proposal to share 30% of the Berbera Port’s administration during the discussions (The Messenger 3.4.2017). A formal agreement was struck in March 2018 between the governments of Ethiopia, Somaliland, and DP World. The three parties would hold 30%, 51%, and 19% of the Port of Berbera, respectively.

Ethiopia is eager to use the Berbera Port, but Djibouti is one nation that want to see the DP World stay away from its activities. “Port hegemony” is the policy that Djibouti follows. It’s crucial to keep in mind that Abdurahiman Boreh, a Djiboutian dissident, helped DP secure these concessions. Somaliland Monitor. (2017). After the Djiboutian government ended its 30-year concession and gave DP World 33% ownership rights to construct and operate the Doraleh Container Terminal (DCT) in 2018, Somaliland Nation News (2016), DP World volunteered to administer the Berbera Port. The use of the Port of Berbera was seen by Djibouti as directly undermining its interests and giving Ethiopia the ability to avoid using its ports. Naturally, senior authorities there said Ethiopia’s quest for alternatives made sense. Somaliland Monitor (2017). According to Somaliland Nation News (2016), Ethiopia asserts that it “would use alternate ports without compromising advantages of different ports.” Therefore, Djibouti is against Ethiopia-Somaliland talks, at least tacitly, which reduces Somaliland’s negotiating leverage. (Somaliland Nation News 2016).

Together with the Port of Berbera, the government of Somaliland and Dubai’s DP World company have opened the new Berbera Economic Zone (BEZ) and intends to turn the region into a significant trading hub in the Horn of Africa, especially Ethiopia. His Excellency Muse Bihi Abdi, President of Somaliland, and Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, Group Chairman and CEO of DP World, formally opened the first phase of the BEZ during a special event that was attended by guests and several hundred government officials, including Munir Haji Abdillahi (Abusita), Somaliland’s Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates who contributed a lot of effort for finalization of Barbara Economic Zone (BEZ), DP World’s investment partner in the port and zone, British International Investment (BII), as well as the UK’s Development Finance Institution (DFI), were among them. The Maritime Standard (2023)

Ethiopia’s ongoing competition with Egypt, which is against Somaliland’s attempts to attain independence and suggests a Somali unitary state that would act as a counterbalance to Ethiopia, has an impact on Ethiopia’s geopolitical interests in the Horn of Africa. However, because of their shared economic interests, Ethiopia is unwilling to provoke other Arab League members. Dimitrios L, (2011).

Somaliland will receive official recognition and Ethiopia will receive 20 km of coastline as part of the most recent Memorandum of Understanding. Both Somaliland’s Bihi and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy have hailed the agreement as a significant victory for their respective countries—for Somaliland, obtaining international recognition, and for Ethiopia, regaining sea access. Despite significant international criticism from other nations and intergovernmental organizations, the agreement still stands and both Ethiopia and Somaliland are prepared to sign the treaty. Strategic comments (2024)

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which covers several areas of Ethiopia and Somaliland’s bilateral cooperation, is not available to the public. Security cooperation is one of the main sectors. The naval facility that Ethiopia intends to construct in Somaliland was the topic of a meeting between the army commanders of Ethiopia and Somaliland on January 9 in the Ethiopian capital. The sides discussed ways to strengthen military and commercial cooperation at the discussion, such as constructing ports and naval bases in the Awdal area between Saylac and Luqhaye that are owned by Ethiopia. Somaliland Sun (2017) Somalia’s response as well as those of other countries and international organizations

The statement enraged Somalia, which summoned its envoy to Ethiopia and promptly proclaimed blocking the pact a national priority. President Mohamud signed a legislative measure on January 6th, calling the agreement “null and invalid,” but this was primarily symbolic. Public opposition to the agreement gained traction rapidly, and on January 11, government representatives took part in a protest march in the capital of Somalia. Six days later, Mogadishu made its most aggressive step to date when it refused to allow an Ethiopian Airlines flight bringing a high-ranking delegation from Ethiopia to visit Hargeisa for consultations over the memorandum to get air traffic clearance. (Mogadishu maintains control of the skies but has very little influence on internal affairs in Somaliland.)

Greater than just the possibility that Ethiopia will acknowledge Somaliland’s independence is driving Somalia’s ire. First, it charges Addis Ababa with interfering in its domestic affairs by starting talks with Hargeisa regarding a state matter without even informing Mogadishu beforehand. (Ethiopia claims to have told Somalia that negotiations will take place; but, Addis did not give all the information, according to Somali officials.) Second, although Somali authorities claim they have nothing against Ethiopia using the Gulf of Aden coast for economic reasons, namely at Berbera or any other port along the Somali coast, At a military installation in Ethiopia, they draw a red line. situated regarding what they regard to be Somali territory. Thirdly, and connected to the previous point, the program confirms long-standing Somali fears that Ethiopia is pursuing land inhabited by Somalis. The fact that Mogadishu is unsure of the memorandum’s contents due to divergent accounts only serves to reinforce the aforementioned view. Group Crisis (2024).

Mogadishu’s main goal has been to mobilize foreign organizations and supporters to support Ethiopia’s renunciation of the January agreement. Despite the deluge of denunciatory remarks, the Somali government has so far behaved sensibly towards Ethiopia. It has refrained from commencing military manoeuvres or cutting diplomatic or business ties with Addis. Its strategy most likely mirrors the uneven nature of in all-in-all ties With Ethiopia, having committed thousands of soldiers to battle Al-Shabaab as a separate force and inside the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Rather than focus on this, Mogadishu has concentrated on mobilizing its international groups and friends to assist in convincing Ethiopia to back out of the memo from January. It’s been successful in calling emergency summits and gatherings of the UN Security Council, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States, and the AU. (Somaliland is not allowed into any of these groups due to its lack of external recognition.)

Somalia’s claim that the agreement violates the values of maintaining territorial integrity, sovereignty, and non-interference in domestic matters has received strong support from the international community. Abiy’s demand for sea access has caused unease among its neighbours, Eritrea and Djibouti, who appear to have sided with Mogadishu. President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea welcomed President Mohamud of Somalia to Asmara, despite the government of Eritrea remaining silent about the agreement. “Profound conversations” were held “with abstaining from a reactive stance to different provocative agendas,” according to Mohamud’s press office. Djibouti has vehemently objected to the January memorandum, even though it is friends with Somaliland despite being in direct trade competition with it. Assuming that a substantial amount of traffic will continue to pass through, Djibouti has taken on a substantial amount of Chinese debt to upgrade a road that connects its port to Ethiopia. If the agreement remains, Djibouti would lose a considerable amount of money from port fees. Furthermore, and perhaps as an insult, Bihi signed the pact just after Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh attempted to arbitrate amid Somalia and Somaliland. Crisis Group (2024).

Beyond its borders, Egypt has perhaps been the most aggressive in leveraging the conflict, presumably as a result of Cairo and Addis Ababa’s long-standing animosity. President Mohamud was invited to Cairo on January 20 by Egyptian President Abdelfattah al-Sisi, who also promised to protect Somalia if necessary. Conventional allies like the United States and the European Union. have offered Somalia their full assistance. Although they probably want to maintain a balance in their ties with the area, other nations that are closer to the Horn of Africa, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE, have openly supported Mogadishu. With a controlling ownership in Berbera Port, a solid security alliance with Mogadishu, and cordial ties with Addis Ababa, the UAE seems to be in a particularly tricky situation. Given the proximity of Emirati leaders to Abiy, Somali officials discreetly lament that they perceive the Emirates as having a hand in the transaction, but international diplomats are less confident.

To yet, Mogadishu has declined to engage in bilateral negotiations with Addis. The African Union’s high envoy to the Horn of Africa, President Olusegun Obasanjo, has been requested to promote communication between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. However, early signs suggest that Somalia is unwilling to support Obasanjo and that he is having difficulty making progress. Up until now, Mogadishu has declined to hold bilateral negotiations with Addis. Abiy is said to have attempted to contact President Mohamud, but Mogadishu demanded that Addis withdraw from the pact prior to the two leaders having an encounter in person.

Expectations that the two presidents would speak during the annual African Union meeting in Addis Ababa on February 17–18 swiftly faded. Mohamud stated that he was attempted to be prevented by Ethiopian officials from driving from his accommodation to the headquarters of the AU. Ethiopia attributed the attack to the delegation from Somalia, claiming that it disregarded the AU-mandated Ethiopian security unit that was sent towards it. Officials further said that without warning, Somali security guards attempted to enter the AU facility with guns.
Kenya looks should be taking the initiative to mediate within the regional group IGAD. On February 28 and 29, respectively, Abiy and Mohamud had separate meetings with Kenyan President William Ruto in Nairobi. Despite some rumours suggesting a tacit agreement to de-escalate, no major progress was made. In a joint declaration, Kenya and Ethiopia promised to uphold the “states’ geographical integrity and sovereignty,” but they omitted Somalia from the list. Crisis Group (2024).

Egypt and Somaliland’s MOU with Ethiopia is in conflict

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia has been criticized by Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. The remarks were made at a joint news conference with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan of Turkey, during which Abdelatty reiterated Egypt’s stance on the “sacrosanctity of Somalia’s unity and territorial integrity” and denounced the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement. The Government of the Republic of Somaliland has strongly condemned these remarks. Cairo’s objection to the pact was highlighted by the Egyptian Foreign Minister, who said, “We restate our entire rejection of the MoU.” Horn Observer (2024).

The government of Somaliland responded by calling Abdelatty’s statements “inaccurate and deceptive” and accusing him of disobeying the people of Somaliland’s sovereign rights. The Somaliland administration emphasized the importance of the MoU for regional stability and economic cooperation while restating its steadfast commitment to Ethiopia. According to Somaliland’s statement, “This accord demonstrates the common interests and mutual respect between our two nations.” “We see this collaboration as essential to both economic cooperation and stability in the area.” Horn Observer (2024). “It is vital to stress that Somaliland is not, and has never been, part of the Mogadishu administration,” the statement said, further elaborating on Somaliland’s status as an autonomous republic distinct from Somalia. We are a unique, sovereign country with a vibrant past, vibrant present, and democratic institutions.”

Somaliland also urged Egypt to uphold its sovereignty and concentrate on regional problems. The statement encouraged the Egyptian authorities to respect the Republic of Somaliland’s sovereignty as well as the integrity of the territory. “We are urging the Egyptian government to concentrate its diplomatic and political energies on the issues in Palestine, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, and other areas on its borders.” Declaring that it “would not be discouraged by baseless assertions or intervention in our internal Affairs,” Somaliland promised to continue steadfastly pursuing full international recognition. Somaliland’s resolute reaction highlights its determination to safeguard its sovereignty and seek global acknowledgment, even in the face of resistance from significant regional stakeholders such as Egypt. Horn Observer (2024).

On September 11, 2024, Somaliland took its final diplomatic move against Egypt. At a press conference held at the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation headquarters, Minister Dr. Essa Kayd Mohamud declared that the government of Somaliland has chosen to close the Egyptian Cultural Library, which is situated in Hargeisa, and that all of the center’s employees must depart the country within 72 hours. This action will raise more concerns with the MoU.

23, September 2024. Port and military authorities in Somalia said on Monday that an Egyptian cruiser had sent a second significant cache of weapons, including artillery and anti-aircraft guns. The action is expected to increase tensions between Ethiopia and the two nations. Egypt and Somalia inked a bilateral security agreement in August, and since then, their suspicion of Ethiopia has intensified, leading Cairo to transfer multiple planeloads of weapons to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. Reuters (2024)

Major General Samir Farag, the army chief of staff for Egypt, told Al-Arab that his nation “is committed to supporting the Somali armed forces” to bolster “its national security through a country that dominates the Gulf of Aden and is close to the Bab al-Mandab Strait in the southern Red Sea,” an area that is crucial for the Suez Canal. Adds Farag, “Egypt will not allow terrorist groups to threaten the national security of a country with which it has a military agreement. It will not enter into a confrontation or clash with another country on behalf of others. Egypt does not send messages to anyone or threaten anyone.” Margarita Arredondas (2024). This argument, however, is untrue; instead, what everyone wants to know is why the Egyptian government helped Somalia before the controversy over the Memorandum of Understanding and why Egypt continued to work with or assist Somalia when Mogadishu was severely threatened by Al-Shabaab and piracy, the Egyptian government is investigating matters of national concern. These inquiries will enable other researchers to do research.

The Government of the Republic of Somaliland expresses profound concern over the recent supply of heavy weapons to the Mogadishu administration by Egypt, which jeopardizes the security of a region already facing complex security challenges, according to a statement released by the Somaliland Foreign Ministry on September 23, 2024. The government of Somaliland (2024)
“The Government of Somaliland is profoundly disturbed by the transfer of these weapons since the Mogadishu administration cannot now efficiently handle or control such a huge stockpile of military equipment,” the Somaliland government claimed in a continuation of their press release. Unrestrained armaments proliferation in an already precarious climate increases the likelihood of an arms race, with competing groups vying for control of their arsenals to protect their interests. The Somaliland government is especially worried that these weapons would end up in the hands of radical organizations like Al-Shabaab and other active clan militias, escalating the already dire situation of violence and instability in the area. The government of Somaliland (2024).

CONCLUSIONS

Last but not least, this paper focused on how Somaliland and Egypt relate now or after the MOU. The area of Somaliland in 1960 corresponds to the previous British Protectorate. After gaining independence from Britain, it had five days of autonomy until the United Somali Republic was founded and amalgamated with the old UN Trusteeship, which was run by Italy. This paper also discussed the historical background of Ethiopia and Somaliland relations, the reactions of Somalia other nations and IGOs in the MOU between Ethiopia and Somaliland.

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