“Political Parties” and “Parties System ” in Bangladesh: Themes and Research Perspectives

“Political Parties” and “Parties System ” in Bangladesh: Themes and Research Perspectives

Muhammad Al Amin^1*, Hasibul Haider Nishat^2
1Departmentof International Relation, SichuanUniversity,Sichuan610017,China;
²Department of Public Administration, Sichuan University, Sichuan 610017, China;

Received: 07 February 2023; Revised: 01 March 2023; Accepted: 09 March 2023; Published: 12 April 2023

ABSTRACT

Bangladesh got independence in 1971, and after that, the country had to set up effective political institutions. Now Bangladesh has lots of political parties but there are three major parties those are Bangladesh Awami League (BAL), Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD). In this paper, authors tried to find the history of those political parties in Bangladesh. and have focused on some salient aspects of political parties and problems like internal disagreements, people leaving the party, institutional breakdown, and decline within political parties in Bangladesh. This research also explains how and why Bengali has become a barrier to ethnicity, language, culture, and secularism in modern Bangladeshi political strategy and revolution. And also have talked about the primary topics that have caused political conflict in Bangladesh and how the country’s national identity and political discourse have evolved over time.

Keywords: Political parties, party systems, Bangladesh, themes

INTRODUCTION

An instant rebranding followed Bangladesh independence from Pakistan in 1971. Pakistan’s have Muslim, Hindu, and tribal histories, which span more than 3000 years but are poorly recorded, are crucial throughout the history of universalism (BBS, 2012). Many people in the modern world see the history of peaceful languages as the outward sign of a system that helps both religious and secular states grow. The Islamic community has grown and gained a lot of power in the area more than ten years ago. Secession in 1971 was not the result of a planned cultural or political uprising. Instead, it was the “expected result” of efforts by elites to win over the state and set up their constitution in the face of entrenched, multifaceted, and generational opposition (Stern and Fritz, 1997). So, whether a dictatorship or a democracy runs Bangladesh, the structure of the state is now chaotic, oppressive, and exploitative. Things are looking up now. Many institutions, including conflicting judiciaries, have been utilized in the national interests of those who have succeeded in seizing state authority in their nations due to media intrusion and sicurgeville with the impunity of governmental actors. In 1971, it became clear that the conflict was not a zero-sum game. The state takes a political leader for the benefit of the people and another for the benefit of the elite (Kochanek and Stanley A. 1998) to keep their power structure going in the political and social realms. As demonstrated by that research, the polarization and polarization of Pakistani and Bangladeshi society and administration are reflected in the date counting since independence in 1971. The Hoteling-Downs principle of democracy would have Bangladesh establish a stable political system, but instead, the country’s society and polity have become polarized (Hosein and Mainul, 2005). Even though Hosein and Mainul (2005), have looked into Muslim-majority republic that borders India, cannot survive as a sovereign entity without becoming an independent nation. This article looks at how the topic has changed over time, how it will affect politics in Bangladesh in the future, and why the country needs a democratic government if it wants to keep its social and political stability. The paper is explicitly organized according country’s national identity and political discourse have to this outline. In the next part, I’ll talk about the primary topics that have caused political conflict in Bangladesh and how the evolved over time. This paper explains how and why Bengali has become a barrier to ethnicity, language, culture, and secularism in modern Bangladeshi political strategy and revolution. And also I will talk about the primary topics that have caused political conflict in Bangladesh and how the country’s national identity and political discourse have evolved over time.

METHODOLOGY

This study’s data are shown through secondary sources. And Secondary data are collected from literature like articles and reports.,

Bangladesh Political Parties

Bangladeshi Political Parties has polarized and almost vertically divided into national identity and political philosophy rather than establishing a stable political system in accordance with the Hoteling-Downs principle of democracy, resulting in prolonged political instability and uncertainty (Hosein and Mainul, 2005). As a result, it has been more difficult for people to come together and form a unified national identity based on commonalities such as race, language, culture, religion,race, language, culture, religion, geography, or politics. It is commonly held that Bangladesh, a Muslim-majority country bordering India, can only survive as a sovereign entity by forming an independent state. Notwithstanding previous analyses of these and related challenges by Hosein and Mainul (2005).It is still crucial for developing nations to have functional political institutions. Political organizations give credibility to political power and keep things stable in a country’s political process by voicing interests, bringing people together, making decisions, putting plans into action, and passing laws. Emerging nations face a big challenge when they try to set up stable political and socioeconomic systems. Some developing countries’ current political systems are either a direct gift from their former colonial masters or a copy of the liberal democracies of the West that the countries themselves made. Examples of such organizations include constitutions, political parties, legislatures, courts, and executive branches. There has been a different kind of expansion of these institutions in the developing world When military dictators or authoritarian governments come to power, they rarely shut down or get rid of such institutions because they aren’t working. Because of this, it is very important to find out what is causing this problem in poor and emerging countries. This article’s goal is to look at how political institutions change when there is a new political order. According to Islam and Nazrul (2003), “the degree of institutional of any democratic structure may be measured by the flexibility, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its institutions and processes (Islam and Nazrul, 2003).” However, most countries that got rid of colonialism couldn’t turn their national independence movements into political parties. After 1947, The Muslim League’s loss of power in Pakistan shows that it couldn’t adapt to its new role to solve countries problems like internal disagreements, people leaving the party, institutional breakdown, and decline within political parties in Bangladesh are also looked at as parts of political parties that have kept them from growing into strong political institutions (Sobhan and R., 2004). Even though there have been a lot of studies of political parties and politics in Bangladesh, they have yet to focus on the country’s weak party institutions and politics based on groups. Both “parties of civil society” and “parties of state” exist in many post-colonial nations. When a military dictatorship comes to power by a coup d’état, some political figures don’t think twice about switching allegiances (IDEA, 2006). Bangladesh got independence in 1971, and soon after that, the country had to set up effective political institutions. AL was the driving force behind the revolution of the Bangladesh (Khan and Abdul Awal, 1989). A split within the Pakistan Muslim League originally formed it (ICISS, 2001). From 1971 to August 1975, Bangladesh was governed by the Awami League (AL) (Ahmed and Nizam, 2001). The League was alone in charge throughout this time period. After Bangladesh was free, the AL, which had led the fight for freedom, was unable to become a political party. The AL leadership often conflated the party with the state and government. The AL also hurt the growth of constitutional government, political representation in the legislature, and strong political opposition (Daily Star, 2005). The AL legislature revised the AL constitution significantly in 1974 (Chowdhury and N, 1980). A presidential one replaced parliamentary government, and the multi-party system was replaced by a single-party (Kochanek and Stanley A, 1998). After the military coup in August 1975 that killed Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, there were a number of coup attempts in Bangladesh, some of which were successful. When General Zia-ur Rahman finally took power, he was eager to prove his own political legitimacy by making a policy agenda (Islam and Nazrul, 2003).

The Applicability of Existing Party Models

Regardless of how small or large, all political parties have certain traits, especially the main ones. They could be a stronger organization if they were free of infighting among their members and reliant on their leadership to keep it together. When in power, the group with the most votes will use government money to help its political goals. Patronage politics has slowly taken the place of appealing to voters’ ideas as the main way to win them over. Even though major political parties have complex organizational structures at both the national and subnational levels, party machinery is usually only turned on when elections are close. Parties usually join forces with well-known loca.l leader. Most of the time, these leaders who have been co-opted move up in the Party faster than long-time, trustworthy members. Even in the AL, which has traditionally had the most grass-roots organizations, this is a growing trend. When the AL was organizing for a Bengali nationalist agenda, it built up a strong base of support among the general public (Daily NayaDiganta, 2006). During the important election campaign of 1970 and the non-cooperation movement in March 1971, the Party’s organizational power was clear (Hye and Hasnat Abdul. 2001). However, the coherence of the party structure diminished when Bangabandhu was imprisoned in Pakistan for the duration of the nine-month Liberation War (Razzaq, A, 1950). The organization fell apart because it had been weakened by the fact that the military had been in charge of the Party for 15 years. At this time, there were two parties, the BNP and the JP, that the government-backed. However, both of these parties were more interested in patronage politics than in building their own infrastructure (Liton and Shakhawat, 2005). Once electoral democracy was restored in 1991, the three main parties focused more on electoral victory at whatever cost than on strengthening their Party from the ground up (IPU, 2005). The two parties are losing organizational strength because of their constant fights with each other, violence within the parties, and reliance on the top leaders to make decisions. Even though the political workers are used to promote party ideas and policies and check on how well-elected party members are doing. Instead, people are often hired to work on political campaigns, stir up trouble on the streets, or collect tolls. There is a lack of, irregularity in, or superficiality in meetings held to elect party office bearers of various ranks. The BNP and the JP don’t have national council meetings at all, but the AL does so on a regular basis. Party council meetings today are all about rituals and have no time for debating or talking about policy. The AL’s early years were marked by vigorous national and international policy discussions at council meetings, notably the historic Party split at the Kagmari council meeting in 1957 (Ahmed and Inam, 2005).

Bangladeshi Party Systems: Themes and Approaches

Upon gaining independence, Bangladesh was initially governed by a single dominating party. It was the Awami League (AL) that won out. After its inception in 1949, the Party quickly became the leading political force among Bengali nationalists (Daily NayaDiganta, 2006). In advocating for Bangla as the official language and complete regional autonomy for East Bengal, the Party was able to win over a large portion of the population (Kochanek and Stanley A, 1998). In 1966, the AL, led by the charismatic Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, introduced a more extreme autonomy plan called the Six principles (Islam and Nazrul, 2003). The AL, which ran on a Bengali nationalist platform, won a landslide in Pakistan’s first free and fair elections in 1970, taking control of both the National Assembly and Provincial Assembly. In 1971, BAL dictatorship that followed independence in 1972, this resounding election mandate legitimized the actions of the AL-led government (IDEA, 2006).

When the first election held in 1973, the BAL secured an overwhelm majority, securing 287 of 300 available seats. Little political resistance existed to the AL. Then the administration adopted a one-party system in early 1975, despite the AL’s overwhelming election victory. Its official name is the Awami League for Democratic Change in Bangladesh (BAKSAL). From 1971 to August 1975, Bangladesh was governed by the Awami League (AL). The League was alone in charge throughout this time period. After Bangladesh was free, the AL, which had led the fight for freedom, was unable to become a political party. The AL leadership often conflated the party with the state and government. The AL also hurt the growth of constitutional government, political representation in the legislature, and strong political opposition (Daily Star, 2005). The AL legislature revised the AL constitution significantly in 1974. The brief attempt with a one-party system failed. When the military took power in November 1975 after the killing of Bangabandhu, they declared a state of emergency they called “Martial Law,” which outlawed public celebrations and political gatherings (Sobhan and R., 2004).

The AL and the BNP have widespread support, putting them in a position to take turns at the helm of government within a robust democratic framework that might eventually lead to peace and stability. The Awami League spearheaded the 1960s East Pakistani autonomy movement and the 1971 Bangladesh independence war. The Party’s coalition was the first administration in the newly independent nation after 1971 (Hosein and Mainul, 2005). In August 1975, a military coup overthrew the Awami League administration. The military dictator General Ziaur Rahman founded the BNP in 1978. For the following fifteen years, military or semi-military leaders ran the nation. In 1991, the military was overthrown, and civilian administration was established. Since then, with the exception of a military-backed temporary administration in 2007-2008, the nation has been controlled by either a BNP-led coalition or an Awami League-led alliance. Since the late 1970s, Haque and A.R. (2011) has analyzed the ideological stance and electoral success of the various political parties in Bangladesh. Despite the fact that the Awami League and the BNP need to work together to create and maintain political stability, the two parties have instead shown hostility against one another and acted in a monopolistic fashion while addressing economic and political matters (Kochanek and Stanley A, 1998).

  Taking such a selfish, counterproductive approach might have serious political repercussions. The Awami League contends that it has the right to rule the nation since it led to war. At the same time, the BNP counters that it has the right to rule because it defends Muslim identity, cultures, tradition as well as the states geographical reliability as well as dominance. Country’s anticompetitive desire toward take supremacy as well as grabs plunderable national resource takes impeded commercial as well as administrative progress, and maximum regrettable element is formation politically aware unpredictability as well as indecision in the short-term sphere of political debate. This political unrest may be seen, at least in part, as an elite struggle for control of key institutions and material resources. On a deeper level, however, this instability symbolizes factors that work against the construction, consolidation, and crystallization of national identity in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious community that is generally accepted by the majority of its members (Ahmed and Nizam, 2001). Since the Islamic revival in the mid-1970s, the dynamics of Bangladeshi politics have changed dramatically (Stern and Fritz, 1997). With the present political crisis beginning in late 2013, members of the governing Awami League and the opposition BNP have taken to the streets and are actively engaging in violence. There seems to be no way out of this impasse.

Overarchingly, the political parties’ monopolistic and hostile stance has eroded the basis of a democratic system, increasing the likelihood of a military takeover in the near future, if not an Islamic revolution like the one that occurred in Iran in the late 1970s. Islam (2015) have brought attention to this problem. This study offers a historical examination of the dynamics of Bangladeshi society and polity, at least since the 1960s, in terms of political mobilization and the construction of national identity to trace the origins of the current political crisis. The historical backdrop of the Islamization of Bangladesh and the subsequent rise of Muslim nationalism is discussed. Despite the post-rationalization of Bangladesh’s independence on the basis of ethnicity, language, culture, and secularism, until the last few months of the independence struggle in 1971, the formation of Bangladesh was neither inevitable nor predicted. This perspective looks back to the tumultuous political discourse of the 1960s and how the question of power transfer after the legislative elections in 1970 escalated into a bloody independence war. Disagreement about how to distribute Pakistan’s growing wealth within the country’s political structure dominated the country’s political landscape in the 1960s. it was clear that the problem might have been handled and Pakistan’s history altered if power had been transferred peacefully to the Awami League, which won legislative elections in 1970. escalated into a bloody independence war. Disagreement about how to distribute Pakistan’s growing wealth within the country’s political structure dominated the country’s political landscape in the 1960s. In the 1970 election, the Awami League sought the establishment of the independent nation of Bangladesh. Through advantage of reflection, it’s clear that the problem might have been handled and Pakistan’s history altered if power had been transferred peacefully to the Awami League, which won legislative elections in 1970. No such thing occurred. Bangladeshis of all walks of life and faiths were forced to pick up guns in reaction to the military’s crackdown on the nation.

The Sociological Approach

Let us now examine the history and track record of our parties’ efforts to advance democracy. To be specific, I’ll be discussing electoral politics. It is likely that Razzaq’s understanding of the competition between political parties in a democracy was influenced by his exposure to the parliamentary system used in the United Kingdom. He recommended that the parties engage in “amicable bickerings” rather than “hostile battles.” He stated that there can’t be that much of a gap between the two sides if “guys would risk their everything” for their beliefs (Razzaq, 1950). It was assumed that Bangladesh would choose a democratic route after its protracted nationalist campaign for independence from Pakistan, which included a fight to create democracy. But after only four years of declaring independence, the nation was ruled by the military for the next fifteen. It was hoped that after Ershad was depose matters which mattes should be more develop. Moreover, throughout the 1990s, we saw consistent elections and power transfers between the two main parties and political coalitions. The AL and the BNP were important players in the 1980s pro-democracy movement. The “amicable bickerings” that Razzaq had anticipated would surface divisions between the two sides never happened. Politicians in the main stream electoral parties were “staking their all” not so much to defend their beliefs in a “winner takes all” political system as they were protecting their political careers and, in some cases, their lives. After elections were the only option left in 1991, the ruling party grew more intolerant of dissent and resorted to a variety of repressive tactics to maintain its grip on power. The opposition party, in turn, adopted the strategies of movement politics, which had gained prominence during the fight against military government in the 1980s. There were several demands from the opposition. The AL and BNP heated rivalry for power has created a climate of constant conflict, fueling widespread bloodshed and trapping the nation in a state of political instability. Eroding party discipline has led to a proliferation of feuds inside political parties, as mentioned in section 2. Because of infighting and a concentration of authority at the top, the organization is now dysfunctional. It would need a supreme head of the party to handle any internal disputes. However, more democratic dispute resolution methods, such as election, discussion, and debate, have been hindered by the reliance on a person. The deterioration of intra-party democracy is another key concern that has received much attention in recentyears. The party heads choose members of all other bodies, a prerogative the councillors have delegated to them. Hasina and Khaleda have remained at their parties’ helm for almost 30 years without serious competition.

     They have never faced any opposition in an election and have been granted the power to choose additional party officials by the governing body. Party secretaries have been replaced across the board. There were competing contenders for the party’s number two post, and various groups supported each of them. These candidates favoured by the party’s leader at the helm were chosen. While party councilstechnically choose members of other major bodies, the party president/chairman instead hand-picked them. The Nomination Process Have been shown that grassroots groups’ choices for candidates tend to win out in the AL. O occasion, the AL disregarded the group of experts chosen by the grassroots committees. But the BNP made zero attempts to get nominations from local bodies. In its place, the party’s National Standing Committee (NSC) organized seven teams to canvass voters and compile names for a slate of candidates in the 2008 parliamentary election.

Policy-setting:• all party constitutions provide for policy review and debate; the party head typically handles critical policy decisions.

• There is a lack of policy debate and discussion among party activists at the grassroots level. They devote much of their time to arranging rallies and holiday events.

Diversity in the workplace: • None of the parties have reached the RPO recommendation of 33 percent women on all committees. In terms of winning percentage, the AL ranks higher than other leagues. Among the AL’s highest decision-making bodies, women make about 25% of the total. When it comes to nominating and electing women to parliament from the general seats, the AL also has a superior track record. Nearly half of the women who are directly elected to parliament are ‘proxy’ women who have inherited seats from their dads or spouses. All parties have a problem with a lack of women in local and regional committees. Religious minorities are underrepresented in all parties’ governing structures. reached the RPO recommendation of 33 percent women on all committees. In terms of winning percentage, the AL ranks higher than other leagues. Among the AL’s highest decision-making bodies, women make about 25% of the directly elected total. When it comes to nominating and electing women to parliament from the general seats, the AL also has a superior track record. Nearly half of the women who are to parliament are ‘proxy’ women who have inherited seats from their dads or spouses. All parties have a problem with a lack of women in local and regional committees. Religious minorities are underrepresented in all parties’ governing structures.

• Businessmen predominate at the highest levels of decision-making in the BNP and the JP. Parties and candidates are required to register their finances to the Electoral Commission (EC) in accordance with the RPO standards, which set a limit on campaign financing. Nonetheless, the reported amounts are far lower than the true costs. As part of the RPO, parties must provide the EC with yearly audited reports detailing party finances.

The Electoral Approach

Three decades after the return of free elections in 1991, we have seen a consolidation of power in the party system and a strengthening of voter partisanship (Kochanek and Stanley A., 1998). Parliamentary elections have been held often, and power has been passed back and forth between the AL and the BNP many times. The FPP voting system allowed for development of a two-party system, as it had elsewhere. In the long run, many of the smaller parties, especially the communist ones, were pushed to the margins and unable to compete successfully in elections. As elections progressed, the proportion of independents in parliament also decreased. Also, the FPP system has led to big differences between how many votes a party gets and how many seats it gets in parliament. The disparity in their parliamentary representation was what decided leading and opposition party. Over time, both big parties started working with minor parties to increase their combined vote total and their chances of winning competitive parliamentary seats. This made it impossible for a third party or electoral alliance to form that could be successful. Four of Bangladesh’s legislative elections (5th, 7th, 8th, and 9th) since 1991 were overseen by NCG. AL and BNP took turns forming the government, with the BNP under Khaleda Zia as prime minister from 1991 to 1996 and again from 2001 to 2006. AL under Sheikh Hasina from 1996 to 2001 and again from 2009 to the present (Islam M.M., 2015). After Ershad was removed from power, the NCG quickly set up the first election, which took place in February 1991 (Stern and Fritz, 1997). As a result of this coalition, the political divide between Islamists (right-wingers) and secularists (left-wingers) in the country has grown even wider. A change of government occurred once again the eighth parliamentary election arranged by non-party caretaker government again. This time, a coalition of four parties led by the BNP won 216 seats in parliament even though they got less than half of the vote. Even though the AL’s popular vote share went from 37% to 40% between the 1996 and 2001 elections, it still only managed to win 62 seats (Liton and Shakhawat, 2005). In the end, the BNP’s approach to forming alliances paid well.The JP faction led by Ershad, the BW party, and ten other parties formed a major alliance. The elections were set to take place in early 2007, but the AL-led opposition staged a campaign of violent public unrest (Islam M.M., 2015). The military ultimately interfered, installing a civilian NCG supported by the armed forces. After a two-year delay, the military-backed NCG finally held the ninth parliamentary election on December 29, 2008 (Islam M.M., 2015). There were 262 victories for the great alliance headed by AL, and they received 57% of the popular vote. The four-party coalition headed by the opposition’s BNP won 34 seats or 38% of the vote. The 15th constitutional amendment, passedin June 2011, did away with the NCG system that had been used to arrange elections in 1996, 2001, and 2008. The administration was able to keep the rioting under control, and the tenth parliamentary elections went on as planned.

Before the elections, the UN tried but failed to find a way for the different political groups to work together (Islam M.M, 2015). The BNP-led coalition ultimately decided not to participate in the next parliamentary elections and used Oborodh (blockade) and hartals to stop them from happening. In response, the government took drastic measures, such as repeatedly and widely imprisoning opposition leaders. The forces led by the BNP didn’t vote in the tenth parliamentary elections, but the government still managed to do it. MPs belong the AL coalition were “elected” majority of parliamentary seats (153) without facing any opposition to contests for the remaining 147 seats were marred by violence and hostility, resulting in low voter turnout (Liton and Shakhawat, 2005). Some members of the JP joined the administration as ministers, and the loyal opposition in parliament was created with their help. On January 12, 2014, the AL alliance took power. The BNP-led opposition has been significantly weakened since the 10th parliamentary elections when the party was wiped out in the chamber and failed to launch a successful uprising against the rumours of disagreements within the BNP over their attitude on participating in the eleventh parliamentary elections, which are expected to occur at the end of 2018 or the beginning of 2019 (Verghese and Ajay, 2019). Nonetheless, the group is still functioning. There are internal feuds inside the AL about who gets nominated for parliamentary seats in the next elections. While Sheikh Hasina is president, the party is unlikely to see an open split. There will be fierce competition between party members in the AL and the BNP for nominations in almost all seats for the upcoming elections. Each side is worried that dissident candidates inside their ranks may hurt the party’s prospects in the next elections. If dissident candidates are able to run for office, it’s clear that the parties’ organizational systems are flawed and lack discipline.

CONCLUSION

Since its independence, socialism, democracy, and Bengali nationalism have dominated Bangladeshi politics. Many still dispute the validity of Bangladeshi citizens, language, and culture. After that, most parties have gotten weaker under army and illiberal democratic rule. This has led to more political instability and religious extremism. Bangladesh have faced lots of political problem. The major problem always made by opposition parties. The main aim of the political fight is to spread the power in the country and its resources. But the chasm is real, and the war is being waged on several fronts.

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