Mission Creep and Conceptual Drift: How ATMIS Conflates Combat and War, Undermining It’s Strategic Effectiveness in Somalia

The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) represents one of the most ambitious contemporary peace support operations, combining elements of peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, and state-building. Despite tactical gains against Al-Shabaab, the mission has struggled to produce sustainable strategic outcomes. This paper argues that ATMIS’s limitations stem from mission creep and conceptual drift, particularly its conflation of combat and war. Drawing on Clausewitzian theory, counterinsurgency scholarship, and peacekeeping literature, the study synthesizes arguments from leading scholars to demonstrate how the erosion of conceptual clarity undermines operational coherence, legitimacy, and long-term effectiveness. By blurring the distinction between combat as a tactical activity and war as a political enterprise, ATMIS has adopted a fragmented approach that prioritizes kinetic engagements over strategic political outcomes. The paper concludes that restoring conceptual clarity and aligning military action with political objectives is essential for the mission’s success.

ATMIS; mission creep; conceptual drift; combat vs war; counterinsurgency; peacekeeping; political strategy; strategic effectiveness

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