Between Diffuse and Centralized Review: Assessing the Effectiveness of Constitutional Review in Cameroon and the United States

This article examines the effectiveness of two contrasting models of constitutional review: the centralized (European/Kelsenian) model as practiced in Cameroon and the decentralized (diffuse) model operative in the United States. It situates the analysis within the broader objective of assessing how constitutional systems ensure the supremacy of the constitution and the protection of fundamental rights. The study critically evaluates the extent to which institutional structures, judicial independence, access to constitutional justice, and prevailing political contexts influence the performance of each model.
Adopting a comparative legal methodology and a functionalist theoretical framework, the article goes beyond formal institutional design to interrogate how constitutional review operates in practice. In Cameroon, the centralized model, vested in the Constitutional Council, is examined in light of procedural limitations, restricted access, and concerns regarding institutional autonomy. In contrast, the United States’ diffuse model, which empowers all courts to exercise constitutional review, is assessed for its broader accessibility and entrenched judicial independence, while also acknowledging challenges such as judicial politicization and inconsistencies in jurisprudence.
The article argues that although both models are normatively designed to uphold constitutional supremacy, their effectiveness is determined less by their structural configuration and more by the surrounding institutional and political environment. It concludes that neither model is inherently superior; rather, their success depends on contextual adaptability. Accordingly, the article advocates for a pragmatic and hybridized approach to constitutional review, one that accommodates national realities while strengthening judicial independence, enhancing access to justice, and promoting accountability within constitutional governance frameworks.

Constitutional Review, Centralized and Diffuse Models

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