Guerrilla Warfare in the Arta Region (Epirus-Greece) During World War II. The Local Dimensions of Occupation and Civil War

Guerrilla Warfare in the Arta Region (Epirus-Greece) During World War II. The Local Dimensions of Occupation and Civil War

Dr. Vangelis Tzoukas

Adjunct lecturer, Hellenic Open University

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2024.8110073

Received: 30 October 2024; Accepted: 07 November 2024; Published: 03 December 2024

ABSTRACT

In this paper we examine the role of history and geography in the “Greek entanglement” of the 1940s and in the insurgencies of the period with regards to the development of armed resistance groups in the region of Arta, in Western Greece, during World War II. The Greek “andartiko” i.e. guerrilla movement against the Axis forces (1941-44) was in fact based in a long established tradition of violence, in local and family ties and in certain networks of power (found mostly in the mountainous regions of the country). From this point of view counter-insurgency policies that were adopted by the Germans were based on the assumption that the social base of the insurgents was the typical mountain community (chorio). It was not an easy task fighting andartes under these conditions. The condition of war lasted almost an entire decade and the experience of andartiko and the ensuing civil war between the two main Resistance organizations (EAM-ELAS and EDES) transformed ultimately the region of Arta and Greek society in an unprecedented way. The paper is based on extensive research in the field, in local archives and in books amd articles about the period.

Key words: Greek Resistance, Second World War, Guerrilla warfare, Greek civil war

INTRODUCTION

The local dimensions of the Greek Resistance (1941-44) and the Civil War that followed (1946-49) are at the center of many researchers’ concern, a fact that goes hand in hand with a general reorientation of historiography and of other social sciences towards topics which are not consistent with prior, classic explanatory schemes. Contemporary interdisciplinary research, constantly nourished with new contributions, affirms the ever-renewed interest in the 1940s. Thus, hopes are born for a more comprehensive understanding of an era for which we, the younger scholars, are called to reassemble the exceptionally complex mosaic (Avgeridis 2017: 8-46). In the above context, this essay will consider the civil conflicts between the main Resistance organizations in a part of Greece (more precisely, in the Árta region of Epirus) during the period of Italian and German Occupation (1941-44).

Epirus covers the northwestern part of the Greek territory, extending from the Pindus Mountains in the east to the Ionian Sea in the west, and from the Amvrakikós gulf in the south to a still debated northern borderline. This 9,165 square kilometer area is administratively divided into four prefectures; Árta, Préveza, Thesprotía, and Ioánnina. Epirus constitutes Greece’s most mountainous region, its inhabitants’ primary occupations having always been agriculture and stockbreeding. Since ancient times Epirotes have been considered skilful stockbreeders.
After the National Revolution (Greek War of Independence) of 1821, Epirus was placed outside the Greek state’s frontiers. In spite of the fact that the initial settlement of the borders included the region of Árta in the newly established kingdom, this inclusion was not really achieved until 1881. In the meantime, a number of revolts against the Ottoman rule had taken place, the most significant of which was that of 1854. Nevertheless, the establishment of the Greek-Ottoman borders alongside the Árakhthos River and the division in two parts of Arta prefecture was short-lived. The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 led to the incorporation of Epirus into the nation-state. The Ottoman surrender of the most important town of the region, Ioánnina, on 21 February 1913, constitutes a focal point for the recognition of Greek dominance. Greek penetration further into the questionable regions of the so-called North Epirus-South Albania (where there was a significant Greek minority) had gone against the great powers’ diplomatic manoeuvers. As the latter aimed at the foundation of an independent Albanian state, they considered North Epirus’s inclusion in the new state expedient.

Epirus was placed at the center of general attention in the winter of 1940-1941, when the Greek army confronted the Italian one successfully. In this case, the local population’s support of the Greek fighting forces was vital. The event was followed by the Occupation period (1941-1944) and the Civil War (1946-1949).

In the 1940s, Epirus became an important war battlefield. This period’s events signified radical changes in Epirus’s-and generally in Greece’s-social, economic, and political fields (Shepherd-Tzoukas 2013: 96-112). Taking into consideration a number of factors, we will endeavor to put forward, in a nutshell, some of our observations on the dynamics of the civil conflict in the region of Árta (namely, the southeastern part of Epirus).

To begin with, we maintain that the conflict under discussion builds upon specific constituents, the most important of which are the following:

The absence of an ethnic dimension. It is well known that the eastern part of the Árta district had been incorporated into the Greek nation-state in 1881, whereas the western part (namely, beyond the Árakhthos River) had been included in Greece only after the Balkan wars. The district consists almost entirely of Greek-speaking villages, with the exception of some Vlach-speaking communities (such as Sirráko, Kalarrítes, and Matsúki) on the borders of Árta, Tríkala, and Ioánnina prefectures. However, for the period we are concerned with, such divisions as those observed, for example, in The sprotía with the issue of Albanian-speaking Muslim Chams (Krapsitis 1986: 15-74) , did not exist in the Árta district. Consequently, right from the beginning, the Resistance movement in this region appears to have differentiated characteristics from those of an opposition between ethnic groups, in the form the latter had been expressed mainly in Northern Greece–a typical such example is the dispute between the Turkish-speaking Refugees and ELAS in the prefecture of Macedonia (Hajianastasiou 2000:315-326, Marantzidis 2001:161-207).

The existence of a significant tradition of “rebellion” and “uprising”, successively nurtured by the revolutions of the nineteenth century, the participation of irregular troops in the Balkan wars, and the formation of groups of monarchists during the period of the so-called Ethnikos Dihasmos (National Schism) (Karatzenis 1974:63-102, Foss 1978:35). We refer both to a long-standing familiarization of the mountainous population with the use of violence for “national-liberation” purposes, and to the presence of particular individuals who played an important part in the events of the 1940s. From this viewpoint one may discern, interestingly enough, the reemergence of chieftains (oplarhighí) / local leaders, some of whom had also been engaged in the events of the period of 1912-1913. By the term “chieftains”, we imply people with great influence in their villages, and even in the neighboring communities, who, making use of the kinship networks and the profound value of locality, established armed groups. The word “chieftain”, on the one hand points to the nineteenth century rebellions against the Turks, and on the other hand it evokes the Balkan wars, when the semi-irregular armed forces of the so-called Mixed Epirote Troops (Mikto Ipeirotiko Stratevma) had sided with the Greek regular army during the battles-the heads of those semi-irregular forces were called chieftains or captains (kapetánii). The chieftains of the 1941-1944 period, negotiating with the representatives of a Resistance organization-in our case, mostly EDES-organized troops of a voluntary character. Furthermore, these were troops which could not easily be relocated. Typical cases were those of Ghrigoris Kossivákis from Meghalókhari, a man with great influence in the southeastern part of the Árta prefecture, descendant of a family with a strong tradition in politics, and Spíros Karambínas or Kaloníkis from Klidhí, who had fought in the Balkan wars (Ioannou 1961: 15-20). Meghalókhari is located at the massif of Radhovízio. It is a big village (kefalokhóri) in which the Kossivákis kin network had prevailed since the nineteenth century. On the contrary, Klidhí is a smaller village of the region which sided overtly with Zérvas, and the leading figure of which was Karambínas (Koutsoukalis1985b: 186-187). Both Kossivákis and Karambínas went along with general Zérvas in the same period–in September 1942-thus significantly strengthening the EDES guerrillas. Despite the fact that both of them represented an agent of a “traditional” authority whereby the ideal of “honor” was firmly and emphatically kept, their treatment by the general triggered diverse reactions on their part. Due to the circumstances, Karambínas would remain loyal to Zérvas until the end organizing, along with Klidhí villagers, one of the most militant groups of EDES. On the contrary, Kossivákis, following his conviction by an EDES court-martial about a controversial case, would adhere to ELAS along with his whole family network, and in 1944 he would contribute crucially to reinforcing the ELAS guerrillas (by founding Karaiskákis Battalion).

A political dimension which lay in a general labeling of the region as a “venizelist” constituency. Since we hold that understanding the mid-war political affairs constitutes a prerequisite for a reliable research, we attach great importance to the events taking place in the electoral field. Therefore, from the election results one may deduce that the majority of the population of Árta was favorably disposed towards the venizelist (anti-monarchist) candidates; in the last ante-war elections of 1936 venizelist parties appear slightly strengthened in the common election precinct of the Préveza and Árta prefectures. More precisely, in the counties of Tzumérka and Árta (which is compatible with the present prefecture) the Liberalist Party together with the Agrarian Democratic Party reached a percentage in the order of 46%, whereas the Popular Party along with the General Popular Radical Party achieved a percentage in the range of 44.2%. An issue worth mentioning here, is the exceptionally limited stir caused by the KKE (Greek Communist Party)–it only pulls together 1.37%–(Nikolakopoulos 1988: 109-119). The venizelist parties’ leading position would decisively influence the conscription of villagers to the Resistance organizations, in spite of the differentiation among venizelist cadres during the Occupation (many of whom supported EDES, thus siding anyway with Zérvas, who was a venizelist veteran. Others were involved in EAM). One may discern a kind of linear continuity with the previous period from the fact that the most renowned and distinguished cadres of the Resistance were formerly part of the venizelist camp. However, at this point we have to be particularly careful; by those remarks we are in no case disregarding the situation stemming from the Occupation period, namely the ruptures and discontinuities between the great political formations of the mid-war period. At this point, we confine ourselves to formulating a working hypothesis as far as the region of Árta is concerned: EAM unlike the rest of the country was not the sole medium through which the villagers expressed their conviction that the Resistance was also aiming for post-liberation social change. During the initial period of the Resistance dynamics of this kind could furthermore be conveyed through a “venizelist-breeding” mechanism such as the one EDES activated in the region, which clearly bore references to an anti-monarchist political tradition. Zérvas’s declaration of “martial law” against the “traitorous state” of Athens, in December 1942, constituted an aspect of the above process. Moreover, the general’s reference to the postwar dominance of socialism and the organization’s declaration of the radical changes it was going to initiate in the future confirm our aforementioned hypothesis (Ziangos 1978b: 101-102, Kotzioulas 1974: 31-42). In this way, both organizations furnished the farmer-shepherd strata with an ability to express their demands, at least until the outbreak of the civil conflicts, in 1943.

The presence of a great number of Greek army officers in the region who, one way or another, viewed April’s 1941 defeat by the German forces as a traumatic experience. In Árta the above officers had formed, from the autumn of 1941, an organization under the name ELLÁS-ELEFTHERÍA (Maltezos 1987: 38-45, Koutsoukalis 1985a: 151-153, Simentzis: 23-24). The organization, which professed the continuation of the war of 1940, functioned, above all, as a singular army cadres’ union without any clear political references. The founding officers’ ambitions were great; the aim was to turn the organization into a national one. In this context, officers from Ioánnina and Préveza also joined ELLÁS-ELEFTHERÍA. However, the organization broke up rather early (in March 1942), before taking any action against the occupying forces. Although it had not developed any armed cells, ELLÁS-ELEFTHERÍA yet functioned in favor of the presence of ELAS and EDES in the region. The majority of the officers who had taken part in it, entered those two organizations which started making their presence noticeable in the autumn of 1942.

The division of the area into two economic zones (plains / mountains), each allowing for clearly diverse economic activities. The plains offered themselves for farming, especially for grain, citrus, and tobacco crops. On the contrary, in mountainous communities, stockbreeding, small-scale farming, and other economic activities such as building (the Mastorokhória of Tzumérka) were predominant. The division of the prefecture in two parts until 1913 had serious repercussions for the course of the agrarian question. On the one hand, in the eastern regions, after battles which had been strenuous and pioneering for the Greek farmers, the situation had one way or another been taken care of. On the other hand, in the regions which had been incorporated into Greece after 1913, the problem remained intense and was partly dealt with after the venizelist expropriations. For some lands (such as the so-called Khanópulos plain in the northwestern part of Árta), the issue of redistribution remained unresolved during the years 1941-1944, which had as a consequence the organizations formulating propositions for postwar farming reforms (Maltezos 1987: 162-166). As far as the period of Resistance is concerned, the abilities of the mountainous villages to financially sustain the EDES and the ELAS guerrillas became extremely limited. The plains, where both of those two organizations’ committees functioned (without the presence of armed troops), undertook to partly assist the Resistance. However, since this assistance was from a certain point onwards limited, the repercussions for the guerrillas were quite significant. As far as EAM was concerned, this meant, among others, dependence on near Thessaly where financial abilities were infinitely greater, and the leftist movement had grown on completely different grounds. Another dimension concerns the different role the town possessed, and its relations to the countryside. Árta had always been one of Epirus’s important commercial centers. The Occupation period led to a redistribution of roles within the context of the newly established situation, a most characteristic example being the appropriation of Jewish property (Jewish numbered, before the war, 384 persons), after their persecution and transport to Auschwitz (Ziangos 1978a: 122). Even though daily life was hard to cope with, the fact remained that never did the town confront the great lack of food supplies that arose in the countryside (mainly after a great number of mountainous villages had been set on fire by the occupational troops, in 1943). On the contrary, the villagers came, more than once, to the difficult position of adopting survival practices inconceivable for prewar conditions.

The association of the mountainous, stockbreeding populations with banditry, is a well-known phenomenon which dates back centuries. The Greek mountainous regions, like those in the rest of the Balkans, were preferential field for the activities of bandits already from the period of Ottoman conquest. To confront outlaws of this kind-the Klephts, the central Ottoman administration mobilized the so-called Armatoloi or Armatoles, armed men that came mostly from the same bands. In the period of Greek Revolution of 1821-1829, that led to the formation of the modern Greek nation-state, these armed men (Klephts and Armatoles) constituted the basic military forces of the rebels. The romantic Greek historiography of the 19th century considered them as national heroes. Until the first decades of the twentieth century the phenomenon of banditry continued to flourish in the Greek territory despite various efforts of the state to suppress it. The relationship between bandits and the state was, however, complicated. Many times, following much-debated negotiations, bandits were used in various irredentist movements against the forces of the Ottoman Empire. They were also used by politicians to terrorize the population in periods of elections against their political opponents. Finally, some of them were incorporated into the army or the police, and even named officers. All these factors are crucial in order to understand the complicated relations between bandits and state mechanisms, that sometimes led to international intervention. Ιn the outskirts of Αrta prefecture there were regions such as Ksirovúni (north of Árta) where the last gangs of the countryside’s bandits took to. The rest of the massifs, such as Tzumérka and Radhovízi, exhibited a considerable banditry tradition as well. At this point, it would be best to distinguish between two types of banditry which coexisted in these regions in the early part of the twentieth century. The first form of banditry involved mainly cattle-stealing phenomena-a practice which was usually encountered in the pastoral precincts (Damianakos 1987: 87, Herzfeld 1985: 3-50). A given feature of the mountainous populations’ social organization was the status of the family as an institution whose existence was negotiated beyond its limits, a fact which was closely related to the distinctive character cattle-stealing was giving to particular factions. The networks established exclusively on the grounds of kinship constituted, in that sense, a field for the practice of banditry, usually beyond the community’s limits. In addition to this kind of activity of the bandits, the division mountainous / semi-mountainous area has to be considered here. By and large orienting their activities towards the more “modest-peace loving” communities, the bandits kept advocating their independent action while representing a constant threat to the farmers and the semi-nomadic stockbreeders. The incorporation of some regions into the Greek nation-state after the Balkan Wars did not completely alter the situation. The communities maintained for themselves the label of “bandit-breeders”, thus resulting in their inhabitants’ gradually acquiring the identity of “cattle-thieves”.
The second form of banditry covered a broader profile, approximating the classic case of the previous century’s outlaws. The Rentzéi group, an armed gang, infamous throughout Greece, was typical as far as the identification of this particular area with banditry phenomena of this kind is concerned. During mid-war, Ksirovúni served as a refuge for a bulk of bandit gangs, among which, apart from Rentzéi, one could find many of the village’s big names (Stávros Stávru, Karapános, Tsóngas, Tsáïmos, Kondoyiórghos), as well as persecuted ones from Ksirómero of neighbouring Etoloakarnanía. Incidents such as the mobilization of a political mechanism, based on the request for amnesty from the state, as well as the legalization of the “bandit-guerrillas” through dealings with the parties’ politicians became part of the context of this form of banditry. Moreover, the captains by and large used mechanisms of “alternative social structures”, such as spiritual kinship (kumbariá), for political expediency.

The late mid-war period was characterised by an attempt to incorporate communities into the Greek nation-state, and by their response to it. In the course of the decade after Rentzéi’s extermination (1930-1940), an involvement of bandit gangs in strifes was reported. At this juncture, the dominating element was a framework of persecution which involved “alliances” / “conflicts” among families, as well as a reappearance of the, be it rudimentary, state institutions. Within this context, the clans of the stockbreeders set against each other, as the absence of Rentzéi’s “protective network” led ex-collaborators to conflicts.

During the Metaxas dictatorship (1936-1941), the state’s attempt to contain banditry was considered to a great extent successful. However, the structural components remained the same. The great family incorporations remained dominant in the lives of the villagers and dictated the limits within which behaviors were judged as permissible or not. Political networks still existed, to the extent that the system of patronage shifted from the local patrons of the parties to the civil servants appointed by the dictatorship (Kitroeff 1993: 63-84). Additionally, the mountainous communities of Ksirovúni, unlike the others, continued to be completely dominated by the shepherd-bandit clans (even though Rentzéi retreated from the limelight). Banditry emerged also in the regions of Radhovízio-Tzumérka, without, however, spreading to the extent they did in the areas to the west of the Árakhthos River.

In conclusion, the bandits’ activities during the period between 1913-1940 depicted the local communities’ resistance against the structures “of the Greek” and against their incorporation in the state (Damianakos 1997: 145-146). Furthermore, those activities bequeathed the following period with disputes and rivalries among family networks, within the exceptionally powerful framework of the connection of the guerrilla warfare to traditional banditry (Antoniou 2000: 197-204). The groups of bandits, by embracing banditry practices, epitomized a model of conflict management utterly different from the one anticipated “from above”-namely, from the requirements of any given Resistance organization’s command-(Kotaridis 2000: 6-9).

The period of Resistance

The appearance of the first guerrilla groups in Árta went hand in hand with the presence of general Napoleon Zérvas in Radhovízio massif (in the southeastern part of Árta prefecture). Zervas was a retired venizelist officer, known for his involvement in various pre-war military coups. He was born in Arta and had strong family ties in the region. In September 1941 he became the leading figure of the Resistance organization EDES (Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Sindesmos-National Democratic Greek League), which started as a group consisted of anti-monarchist center-left (and even socialist) members (Tzoukas 2017). After his stay, from July 1942, in the bordering regions of Váltos, he relocated his headquarters to the village of Meghalókhari, in September 1942. In the following month, the first conflicts between EDES guerrillas and the Italian forces in the mountains of Radhovízio and Ghávrovo broke out. Zervas’s first guerillas were villagers from the region, mobilized on the basis of locality and kinship values (Tzoukas 2013). Most of them were practically incorporated into the organization when they participated in the Harling enterprise, in November of the same year (Marinos 1994: 47-140). On the other side the Italians of the 37th Modena Division were not prepared for this kind of conflict and they were reluctant in operating in a region totally unknown to them. Nevertheless they did not hesitate to burn villages and destroy private properties (especially in the Radhovizio Area in February 1943). At the same time they avoided mass executions set against the civilian population of the region. Their main forces remained in Arta, thus securing control of the town and its’ outskirts.
During this period, there was not any action by organized forces of ELAS (Ellinikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos-Greek Popular Liberation Army) in the region, despite the spread of EAM (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo-National Liberation Front), in the form of local commissions. However, the same seems to apply to the rest of Epirus as well. EAM was a leftist organization which was founded in Athens in 1941 and was strongly depended on the KKE. In the region of Préveza, many regular officers had joined EAM, which, by the way, enjoyed the support of the town’s local elite (Dousias 1987: 57-58). But the first organized, armed group, which constituted the basis of the later 24th ELAS Regiment, was formed after the officers had adhered to Zérvas, an incident followed by the incorporation of armed men into the EOEA (Greek National Guerrilla Groups-EDES). Ioánnina was also singled out for its support towards EAM. Two ELAS regiments became active later on in the Ioánnina prefecture: the 15th (which had its headquarters in Poghónio region, in the northwestern part of the prefecture), and the 85th (in the region of Métsovo-Zaghória, in the eastern part of the prefecture). The first organizational cores of EDES at Ioánnina–namely, the Commission of the National Struggle, presided by Athanasios Triandafíllou–took up action in the spring of 1943. Thus, an intense competition towards EAM’s local commissions gradually built up, which, at the conjuncture of the last year of the Occupation, assumed the form of an intensive polemic, mainly disseminated through the press.

To begin with, we should remark that the first to be activated in Árta, were indisputably the EDES guerrillas (a fact which, in any case, even leftist memoir writers admit). In spite of the agreement that Zérvas had made with the EAM of Árta on 10 October 1942, for the subordination of armed forces under the general, ELAS groups delayed making a substantial appearance. The first such group was set up on 2 December 1942 with Gherásimos Maltézos or Tzumerkiótis, a regular officer, at its head. At the end of the same month, a second group of guerrillas emerged under the command of Fánis Tsákas or Tzavéllas, lieutenant of the Gendarmerie (Maltezos 1987: 94-95, Tsakas1982: 37-40, Koutsoukalis 1985a: 242-246).

On the other hand, there was a considerable spreading of the EDES guerrillas after Zérvas had returned from Ghorghopótamos-Operation Harling. In the following months, from December 1942 until the summer of 1943, the general, supported by the British Military Mission, had the chance to reorganize EDES’s troops, under the name EOEA. Following this reorganization, EEA (Epitropes Ethnikou Agona-National Struggle Committees) were established in towns as well as in communities and functioned in correspondence with the EAM local committees. At the 1943 juncture (namely, up to October when the civil conflict broke out), both organizations’ committees coexisted in the villages.

At this point, we will venture to make a distinction between leadership and base, as we hold that, at the level of the mere guerrillas and for the period we are discussing, the roles could very well have been reversed. As far as the political personnel is concerned, we witness in Árta as well, that the provincial “intellectual elite” sailed together with EAM, although the difference between Árta and other regions of Greece was that in the former there was also a non-EAM organization which did not bear the characteristics of the later formed by the Germans and the “Quisling” government of Athens Security Battalions, for example (Margaritis 2001: 51-58). An important part of the town’s intellectuals sided with the organization, while literate people invariably participated in KKE’s committees. Indicative is the report that the composition of Árta’s second party commission included two law students, two engineers, two civil servants, a journalist, a professional, and an agronomist (Koutsoukalis 1985a: 155). As for Zérvas’s organization, it tended to win over the local leaders (e.g. the community head officers, the “propertied” civilians, etc.). In the town of Árta, lawyers, notaries, etc. constituted the National Struggle Committee. Moreover, EDES was supported by the Metropolite of Árta, local head of the Orthodox Church, with whom the general kept personal contact. In the communities’ committees one could find priests, doctors, teachers, civil servants, and prosperous stockbreeders. Finally, the organization appeared to have had significant influence over officers and chieftains. A second observation to be made concerns the dynamics of the latter’s integration: most of those won over by Zérvas’ organization, before joining EDES, were initially in the EAM front–a typical such case was that of the subsequently fanatic anticommunist chieftain, Kostas Vóïdharos (Zaousis 1996a: 71-72). This individual-based structure of the organization dictated that the assignment of roles and the allocation of responsibilities were made directly by Zérvas himself. This allowed for great flexibility in regrouping the local committees in case the armed troops would temporarily retreat.

The Civil Conflict between ELAS and EDES (1943-1944)

The battles conducted from October 1943 to February 1944 in Tzumérka region, which was the bone of contention for both ELAS and EDES, are labeled in the dominant postwar historiography as the “first round” of KKE’s attempt to seize power (Smith 1997: 85-100, Farakos 2000: 151-183, Hondros 1983: 171-187). Tzumérka had an enormous geo-strategic significance for both organizations. For ELAS, their seizure would signify the unification of the area with Thessaly, and the establishment of an exceptionally robust bridgehead in the Epirus region. On the other hand, for EDES, which was deprived of “mainland affiliations”, abandoning Tzumérka would automatically imply the organization’s confinement to Western Epirus (something which, indeed, happened in 1944). The situation at local level seemed negative for ELAS. In spite of the latter’s efforts to put together an effective troop of local guerrillas, EDES’s dominance was incontestable, which was proved when considering the vast number of villagers that joined the EOEAs (Filos 2000: 287-315).

What really happened was that, beyond the political dimension in the central plane (namely, the civil conflict between two resistance organizations in the context of occupation by foreign armies) as this was perceived in Athens, Cairo or London, the clash banished the very last chances for a solid and unified Resistance and served as a catalyst for the settlement of hostility among the local populations. Moreover, October’s civil conflict yielded dramatic consequences for the inhabitants of the regions held by the guerrillas, since German troops’ mopping-up operations had penetrated the ELAS-EDES battles. The results were large-scale and widespread destruction: mountain villages were burnt down–a characteristic example being the setting on fire of the big village of Vurgharéli (where EDES’s Tzumérka regiment had its headquarters)–and civilians, after abandoning their homes, took refuge in the forests and mountain tops. The German Army, and especially the notorious 1st Mountain Division Εdelweiss, commanded by General von Stettner, did not act like the Italians (Mazower 2000: 156-166, Meyer 2009). Having seized control in Epirus during the summer of 1943 the Germans launched mass-scale operations against the Resistance organizations in two phases. The German Army was at the time aware of the military situation in Epirus and wanted to secure the region against any attempt by Allied forces to invade. It was of vital importance for the Germans to avoid an Italian surrender to the guerrillas and to suppress the Resistance movement be it nationalist (EDES) or communist (ELAS). In order to do so General Hubert Lanz was appointed commander of the 22st Army Corps (which was stationed in Ioannina). The German Army was determined to act in brutality against a population that was not considered in fact of “Arian blood”. The results of these operations were disastrous for the locals. Hundreds of innocent civilians were brutally executed in their villages, their livestock was confiscated, and their properties were destroyed. The most notorious of this acts took place in the Kommeno village, near the town of Arta (Mazower 1994: 217-227, Meyer 2009: 294-333). 317 civilians, mostly children and elderly people were murdered in the morning of 16th August 1943 by soldiers of the Edelweiss Division. It was undoubtedly a war crime given the fact that the village was peaceful and had abstained from any form of guerrilla activity. The tragedy of its inhabitants was that they were forced by both EDES and ELAS to supply the Resistance with various products (milk, wheat, corn etc). An ambush in late September 1943 by EDES guerrillas on Josef Salminger, a devoted Nazi Colonel, led to his death. The Germans were infuriated and General Lanz ordered mass reprisals (Meyer 2009) at a time when the first conflicts between ELAS and EDES started to take place.

In a nutshell, the initial outcome of the clash, as far as the local 3/40 Regiment of ELAS was concerned, was negative, since the regiment broke up in the first few days of the battle. Nevertheless in a short time ELAS was reinforced and managed to secure it’s place in the region. The situation was complicated by simultaneous German operations that led to the temporary destruction of guerrila infrastructure (Meyer 2009). Zervas was forced to withdraw it’s forces and appealed to the British for help. His counterattack on January 1944 was only partially succesfull. ELAS’s ability to repulse EDES and defend its positions in the second round (after 4 January 1944) was due to the support of other regions’–such as Thessaly’s and Macedonia’s-troops. Thus, the mountainous region of Árta came under the ELAS’s groups’ control. The conflict had, therefore, negative consequences for EDES as well, since its troops were obliged to desert Tzumérka. Moreover Zervas was obliged to a temporary gentleman’s agreement with the Germans to abstain from any form of fighting against them and to provide information about the common political opponent-EAM.

As a result of the conflicts, the Árta prefecture was clearly divided in two distinct entities: on the one hand there was EAM’s Eleftheri Ellada (Free Greece), which, after Pláka’s agreement (28-29 February 1944), included the eastern part of the prefecture (namely, Zérvas’s ex-strongholds) and the western region beyond the Árakhthos River, and on the other hand there was EDES’s EOE (Elefthera Oreini Ellas-Free Mountainous Greece). In EDES’s region, the guerrillas were reorganized by means of the so-called “militarization”–namely, by transforming the guerrilla groups into organized troops which gave the impression of a regular army (Ioannou 1999: 31-35). In the EAM region, the local ELAS guerrillas were also reorganized, and an attempt to introduce the institutions which were valid for the rest of the EAM territory was made (Kotzioulas 1980: 15-39). While most of the time, until the summer of 1944, was spent, on both sides, on preparations for the aftermath of the Germans’ retreat, there was a mutual pursuit to take over the region’s center-the town of Árta. At the end of September 1944, EDES’s troops entered the town, an act legitimatized by the Caserta agreement that followed.

The postliberation period

In the period from October 1944 to December 1944, Árta was therefore controlled by EDES. The December battle, significant in every aspect, indicated the escalation of the civil conflict in the region. It was a battle of exceptional vehemence where the opponent was now confronted as the absolute enemy, a bloodbath for both sides, though mainly for ELAS. In this clash, which lasted two days (22-23 December), both organizations drew up troops to fight against each other. Árta was defended by EDES’s Ninth division, along with the first Brigade, in total 1,700 strong. The first Brigade included the Sixth Infantry Regiment, the troops of Váltos (under Hútas command) and Klidhí (Karambínas’s troop), as well as the Vóïdharos Battalion (National Resistance Archives 1998b: 115-116,168-170). The battle was, for the most part, conducted on the Peránthi crest (namely, on the hillock beyond which the town is built). EDES’s initial successes were followed by ELAS’s counterattack, which the former found impossible to deal with effectively. The outcome of the battle forced EDES’s troops to proceed to Préveza initially, and shortly after to Corfu. Amongst casualties, were ELAS men, recruited in the summer of 1944 for the reorganized 3/40 Regiment, as well as EDES guerrillas, most of them coming from the region’s mountain villages.

When Zérvas’s forces retreated to Corfu, the region of Árta, as the whole of Epirus, came under total EAM control. EDES guerrillas were followed by civilians, who eventually took to Corfu as well. The reverberations of the events were spread through the numerous Epirus’s EAM newspapers, which celebrated having “chased away Zervas’s fascist clique”. What is more, Gherásimos Avgherópulos and Ilías Karrás-Iraklís, ELAS’s Eighth Division’s military commander and its captain respectively, visited the town of Árta. In an open assembly (like the ones in Ioánnina and Préveza), the firm belief in the “ultimate victory” of the popular movement, after having forced out “Zervocracy”, was conveyed. In the local level EAM domination was associated with the executions of EDES political cadres in the town of Árta on the charge of treachery (Koutsoukalis 1998: 9-10, Georgiadis 1980: 98-99, Kossyvakis 2001: 380-381). These executions generated extremely negative impressions among the people of the wider area. At the same time, it is worth mentioning the mission of the local Karaiskákis Battalion in the bordering region of Lákka, at Súli, a fact that had a direct impact on the executions of the Koliodhimitréi faction–an independent EDES formation (Tzoukas 2000: 343-357).

After the Várkiza agreement (February 1945), the situation was reversed. The consequences of the Civil War (1946-49) that followed were destructive, first and foremost for the mountainous regions. In the rest of Epirus as well, the socio-economic conditions for the next few decades were utterly disappointing. As far as political accession was concerned, the prevalence of the anti-communist camp was interpreted as a total domination of the right-wing parties over the following years. A quite deep rupture was created by 1940s events, and this is amply manifested through the villagers’ narrations of an “era filled with blood”.

NOTES

1. The northern frontier of Epirus was a rather controversial issue, the settlement of which was the source of successive troubles in Greek-Albanian relations.
2. Τhe population of Epirus, in the years of the Ottoman rule, consisted of Greek-speaking, Turkish-speaking, Vlakh-speaking peoples, and Jewish. The latter were living in the urban centers of the region (such as Ioánnina). There was also a notable presence of Albanian-speaking people (the so-called Chams) in what today is Thesprotía.
3. Useful observations on the issue of national/ethnic are provided by Lekkas (1996:139-161) and Gounaris, Mikhailidis and Angelopoulos (Gounaris, Mikhailidis and Angelopoulos 1997:11-25).
4. Andonopoulos gives a record of the chieftains of EDES in Epirus (1964:28-32).
5. For Ghrigoris Kossivákis, we have to specify that even if he was not formally bestowed with the title of chieftain by Zérvas, nevertheless his actions conveyed how substantive his role was in the reinforcement of EDES. However, his son, Nikifóros, was more actively involved in the armed resistance (Kossyvakis 1961:68-72, Kossyvakis 2001:55-150, Stergiopoulos 1968:74).
6. The support of those communities in EDES guerrillas was confirmed when, in the winter of 1943, the former were burnt down by the Italian troops (Marinos 2000:22-25).
7. Translation of the Albanian word “besa”, which is also used in Greece to indicate a strong commitment of a person-traditionally, of a man-to his word of honor and to maintaining an honorable, according to the given model, profile for him and his family/closest kin.
8. Karaiskákis Battalion, with a potentiality of 500 men, was constituted in January 1944 and was incorporated into the 3/40 Árta ELAS Regiment, with Ghrigoris Kossivákis as its initial commander. The vast majority of its members were young men from the areas of Radhovízio and Tzumérka (Koutsoukalis 1985b: 200-207, Sarafis 1961:364-365).
9. In any case, it has to be mentioned that the venizelist influence appeared to be greater in the other prefectures of Epirus, a fact that echoed the inclusion of a big part of the Árta district (1881) in the so-called Old Greece-where the anti-venizelist used to be more influential–(Mavrogordatos 1983:277-278).
10. At this point, let us remind readers of the presence of old monarchists in the bosom of ELAS. A characteristic example of a study which does not take into consideration the breaches of the Occupation period is Alkis Rigos’ opinion that the reason that Chams were forced out of their land by EDES guerrillas, was the latter’s “left-venizelist” political convictions during Mid-war (Rigos 1988:210-213).
11. Indicative of the reorientation of EDES’s policy after October’s civil conflict, was its recognition, in March 1944, by the prewar political parties (Ioannou n.d.:15-16).
12. Typical cases of members of ELLÁS-ELEFTHERÍA who adhered to EDES were Stilianos Hútas, a chieftain from Váltos (Houtas 1961:55-57), and the officer Christos Papadhátos-who operated in the region of Lákka, at Súli–(Papadatos 1991:42-47).
13. As far as the political dimension was concerned, villages in the plains such as Ághios Spirídhonas and Anéza were renowned for their strong support towards EAM. In some other communities, there was a balance in what concerned the assistance towards the organization.
14. This group was responsible for the bloody plundering of Pétra in Préveza region. In the summer of 1926, Rentzéi did this plundering, which formed the swan song of a series of impressive acts of Greek countryside bandits-like the Dílesi massacre at the end of the nineteenth century–(Karatzenis 1991:115). On facets of this form of banditry in the Mediterranean basin see Sant Cassia (1993:79-112).
15. Oral testimonies by L. Tsákas, and P. Andhréu.
16. The Greek term kumbariá literally denotes two types of spiritual kinship. The first is what Michael Herzfeld has called “wedding / marriage sponsorship” (1985:148,209), which also includes being the best man at one’s wedding. The second type refers to the kinship ties resulting from being a godfather / godmother of one’s child. Forming a kumbariá has been a widespread Greek politicians’ practice, in order, among others, to gain political prestige and accumulate votes (Nitsiakos 1990:121-130).
17. Scholars have approached the patron-client relationship from quite different angles (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984:77-81, Mouzelis 1977:115-150).
18. The populations of the border regions which had not been integrated into the Greek state before the Balkan Wars, used to refer to the Greek state as “the Greek”, as opposed to “the Turkish”.
19. Sfaltos provides us with numerical data about the manning of the Árta ELAS (1997:115-119).
20. There is a plethora of reports from both sides on the friendly relations among the guerrillas. This did not in any case indicate an absence of reticence towards each other. A typical incident took place at Vurgharéli in August 1943 between EDES and EAM cadres, when the former sang songs against the latter (National Resistance Archives 1998a:70-71).
21. More data are provided by IAYE (Historical Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), file 1944/1.4.
22. Useful information on that matter can be found in ASKI (Archives of Contemporary Social History), file 3237 of 30 December 1944.
23. Data also obtained by ASKI (Archives of Contemporary Social History), file of 12 January 1945.

REFERENCES CITED

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1. Archives of Contemporary Social History (ΑΣΚΙ)
2. «Φωνή της Ηπείρου». Αρχεία Σύγχρονης Κοινωνικής Ιστορίας (ΑΣΚΙ), φ.3237 / 30 Δεκεμβρίου 1944.
3. «Φωνή της Ηπείρου». Αρχεία Σύγχρονης Κοινωνικής Ιστορίας (ΑΣΚΙ), φ. 12 Ιανουαρίου 1945.
4. Historical Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ιστορικό Αρχείο Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών)
5. «Καταστροφές σε χωριά της Ηπείρου». Ιστορικό Αρχείο Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών (ΙΑΥΕ), φ.1944/1.4.
6. National Resistance Archives (Αρχεία Εθνικής Αντίστασης)
7. 1998a Αρχεία Εθνικής Αντίστασης, τόμ. Α’. GES / DIS, Athens.
8. 1998b Αρχεία Εθνικής Αντίστασης, τόμ. Β’. GES / DIS, Athens.

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