Repositioning Town Unions as the Fourth-Tier of Government in South East Nigeria; Lessons from Covid-19

Repositioning Town Unions as the Fourth-Tier of Government in South East Nigeria; Lessons from Covid-19

Bethrand Chekwube Nwangwu

Georg-August-Universitat, Göttingen, Germany

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2024.8110251

Received: 09 November 2024; Accepted: 20 November 2024; Published: 23 December 2024

ABSTRACT

There has been identified gaps in governance between the rural dwellers and the government in Nigeria especially as it relates intervention and development programmes. Although practicing a federal system of government which has three tiers – Federal, state and local governments, the gap of service delivery to the rural indigenes has kept widening due to corruption, nepotism, structural inefficiencies and partisanship. The incidence of Covid-19 in 2020 further exposed this gap because intervention programs to the rural indigenes either did not get to them or were not effectively managed due to the structure and format of the distribution.  This paper examines the potential of repositioning town unions as a functional fourth tier of government in South-East Nigeria, leveraging lessons from their critical roles over the years and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Town unions, traditionally seen as grassroots socio-cultural and developmental organizations, has demonstrated commitment, resource mobilization, planning and execution of community-tailored projects and effective governance capabilities in the communities they represent. They have a history of effective management of rural development, self-funded intervention during crisis, and addressing gaps left by formal governmental structures.  Through an interdisciplinary approach, including qualitative analysis of government pandemic-era interventions and stakeholder engagements, and identifying the gaps of governance, the study highlights how these unions can facilitate quality healthcare delivery, distribute palliatives, and promote community-centred development. The paper argues that institutionalizing town unions within Nigeria’s governance framework in the Southeast of Nigeria could enhance localized decision-making, bolster rural development, and improve crisis response mechanisms. The paper explores and identifies challenges such as politicization and limited regulatory oversight faced by already existing government frameworks that will be corrected by the emergence of town unions as the credible alternative.  By contextualizing the lessons from COVID-19, the study offers a blueprint for sustainable community-driven governance in South-East Nigeria and beyond.

Keywords: Community development, Sustainable development, town unions, Covid-19 intervention.

INTRODUCTION: STATING THE PROBLEMATICS

The global effect of the Covid-19 pandemic triggered different and varying responses from Government, institutions, and agencies all over the world. These responses were mostly to mitigate and cushion the drastic effect of the economic and social downturn that came with the pandemic that kept people at home and shut down most productive activities all over the world. Since people became less productive due to the spread of the virus, many countries of the world must rise to the occasion to offer humanitarian aids and palliative to their people to cushion the effect of the virus. The responses from governments and institutions all over the world was divided into three; the first was preventive measures which includes but not limited to closing of schools, travel restrictions, ban of public gatherings, closing of workplaces and many other measures to mitigate the spread of the virus to more people (Hale et al., 2020). The second response was interventionist in nature – economic and social interventions in form of credit and cash, healthcare subsidy and provision, crisis-evasion techniques, provision of food and other essential commodities as palliatives, funding of research into testing, treatment and production of vaccines. The third and last measures were post-COVID stabilizing measures meant for helping people get back to their normal lives and the boosting of businesses to help the depleted economy of most countries. The extent, pace, and strategy for these intervention during COVID and post-COVID varies from place to place. The global menace forced most countries to close their borders, made people to stay at home while observing social distancing as a way of reducing the spread of the virus. Most of the countries of the world had home-grown solution to reduce the spread of the virus while some other countries adopted the practices of other countries and the global standard practices from WHO, UNICEF and the inter-governmental health agencies.

A report from the United States of America indicates that the response was mostly decentralized, the national government handling economy and fiscal response, funding of research and policy frameworks for the use of medications and technology transfer (Bergquist et al., 2020). The sub-national governments were responsible for the containment, testing and administration of vaccines; the county joined in tracking, identification, and isolation of cases, and subsequently aligning with the state for treatment of infected people (Bergquist et al., 2020). The response in the US was characterized by division of power and responsibilities between the federal government and the state government as with most countries of the world that practice a federal system of government like Brazil, Canada, Belgium and many others. Most countries with a federalist system of government adopted a heterogenous approach to containing, treating, and giving care to people, a strategy that helped states, counties, and districts to adopt tailor made solution appropriate for the local context. The strategies however heterogenous are guided by a common goal which is containment and providing care for the people, this is achieved by adopting measures and procedures that are judged as global standard. The OECD highlights four major goals which all strategies are to be built around: (i) ensuring that the vulnerable have access to diagnostics and treatment, (ii) rapid response to outbreaks occasioned by increased health systems delivery; (iii) Increasing the availability of data and digital solution to improve surveillance and care giving; (iv) investing in research and accelerated production of diagnostics, vaccines, and treatment (OECD, 2020).The synergy between the tiers of government albeit heterogenous is geared at containment and treatment of the affected populace (ECDC, 2020).

In Nigeria, for some reasons the synergy between the central government vested with the responsibility of handling the Covid-19 crisis and the most vulnerable of the populace did not materialize to the expected outcome in i, ii, and iii of the OECD strategies above. One of the reasons is that there is less data and established parameters for determining the vulnerable (Eranga, 2020). Strategy (iv) of the OECD above has remained elusive, albeit not within the context of this paper. Records show that the immediate priorities (3 to 6 months) of Nigeria to manage the Covid-19 outbreak as coordinated by the Federal Ministry of Health and the National Centre for Disease Control and Prevention are (i) The continual improvement of testing capacity, (ii) strengthening of community engagement to enable proper circulation of information relating to social distancing, wearing of masks and other international best practices (World Bank, 2020); (iii) planning for the purchase and distribution of Covid-19 test kits and vaccine (World Bank, 2020a). The near-term priorities (6 to 15 months) are highlighted as (i) delivering essential healthcare services through the primary healthcare facilities, (ii) effective communication through the primary healthcare facilities to avoid disruption to service delivery; (iii) improving life and health insurance coverage for the vulnerable people (World Bank, 2020a). All these strategies are geared towards the grassroot at the community level because the Primary healthcare facilities are domiciled in and within communities. The most vulnerable who were most hit economically by the Covid-19 outbreak are domiciled in places where government intervention did not materialize properly. There are myriads of reasons for this, but this paper highlights the gap in governance as one of the banes of development and intervention activities to the most vulnerable using the South-East of Nigeria as a case study. Furthermore, the paper identifies that adopting town unions as the fourth tier of government will bridge the gap between the government and the people.

Nigeria’s Fiscal Response during and Post-Covid-19

Policy responses to the containment of COVID-19 and the post-COVID sustenance strategy differs widely across countries, this is mostly affected by fiscal strength individual countries, rate of spread, individual government’s assessment of the situation and politics. Most countries in Central Asia followed a more localized and target approach (OECD, 2020). This also has been the case for many African countries, some developed local tailored strategies aligned to their need and peculiarities while some other adopted the prevalent standard of the first world countries not minding the fiscal inadequacy when compared with some of the OECD countries. Nigeria as one of the countries affected by the scourge of the coronavirus had a fair number of challenges during and after the pandemic. The World Bank projected that the COVID outbreak will affect the economies of most countries, but Nigeria will be hit twice as much (World Bank, 2020a). This is notwithstanding that the corona virus infection in Nigeria was not very significant when compared with the infection rate of other countries, ranking 86^th in the infection rate (Worldometers Live Update, 2020). This view is supported by the fact that economic activities in Nigeria shrunk by 6% in the second quarter of 2020 and 3.1% in the third quarter of 2020 due to the shocks of the COVID outbreak and the subsequent containment complexities and the global shock in oil price (World Bank, 2020a). Nigeria quite handled the initial outbreak of the virus by enforcing travel restrictions to countries designated as ‘red zone’ while accepting flights from other designated countries. One cannot say emphatically that there was travel restrictions through the land border since the borders are notoriously porous for illegal smuggling of commodities and foreigners.

The difficulty in tackling the menace of the virus and cushioning the effect is far more complicated for three major reasons: (i) allocation and mismanagement of resources designated as stimulus to cushion the effect of the pandemic. Nigeria as most countries distributed stimulus packages to individuals and businesses to halt the free falling of businesses due to the pandemic (Snyder, 2020). Many developed countries of the world estimated the stimulus by the percentage of their GDP with Japan leading with 42%, Slovenia 25%, Germany 20%; United States of America with a total fiscal response which is the highest worldwide standing at nearly $4 trillion equals 18% of their total GDP. The pre-COVID health budget of Nigeria stands at NGN44.4billion representing approximately 8% of the entire budget and less than African Union benchmark of 15% (Amanze et al., 2020). This budget was further reduced by 42.5% when the baggage of COVID hit the already drafted budget, whereas recurrent expenditures of government officials gulped approximately 40% of the whole budget (Folorunsho, Punch Newspaper, 2020). Nigeria proposed a fiscal stimulus package of $1.4billion, a paltry 0.3% of Nigeria’s $448.12 GDP (Agunyai and Ojakorotu, 2022; Fitch Ratings, 2019) as compared to South Africa’s 10% (Strategic Comments, 2020). Furthermore, a report sourced from the CBN indicates that 107 Nigerian and international companies, and rich individuals donated a total of NGN25.8 billion including the NGN2.0 billion donated by the apex bank as COVID-19 relief package (Benson, 2020). Other private sector coalitions and international donor agencies donated hundreds of millions of dollars to the Nigerian government to cushion the effect of the pandemic and all of these were handed over to the Central Bank of Nigeria to disturb on behalf of the Federal Government through the Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development (Obiezu, 2020).

The second factor is the gap between the government and the people, with so much power residing with the federal government creating a very wide gap between the centre and the most vulnerable of the society. The Federal ministry saddled with the responsibility of sharing and allocating palliatives does not have counterparts in the state, local governments, and the towns to ensure effective distribution channels for accountability and wider reach. (iii) The third factor is lack of credible data. The crux of this paper hinges mostly on factor (ii) and partly on (iii) as outlined above.

The World Bank COVID-19 report states:

Before COVID-19, about 40 percent of Nigerians were living below the national poverty line, and millions more were vulnerable to falling into poverty. Simulations suggest that the crisis could push more than 10 million Nigerians below the poverty line unless adequate mitigation measures are implemented…. While technological innovations can improve the effectiveness of social protection programs and enhance their ability to reach poor and vulnerable households, the government must establish a fiscally sustainable social protection system that integrates the disparate programs implemented at the federal, state, and local levels (World Bank, 2020a).

According to the above, approximately 82.9 million people were living in poverty and with a forecasted increase to 90 million people in 2022. With the outbreak of the pandemic in 2019-2020, the number is set to increase by 45.2% in 2022 taking the toll to a total of 100.9 million people living below the national poverty line which is 1$ per day (World Bank, 2020a). The social security programs geared at taking care of the most vulnerable in the society have been able to capture and enrol only 1.6% of the targeted Nigerians therefore making the Social Security Programs quite deficit (World Bank, 2020b). Between March and July 2020, only 4.9% of households have received any COVID related assistance in form of cash from the government and another 3.6% received assistance in kind (non-food). Food assistance is reported to have been received by 23% of the entire Nigerian population although most of the transfer goes to non-poor households who are affiliated to the politicians and political parties (World Bank, 2020a). The reach has been very low because most of the flagship programs for reaching the most vulnerable in the society like the National Social Investment Program (NSIP) and the National Social Safety Net Projects (NSSNP) domiciled under the Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development has been ridden with humongous corruption and nepotism (Sanni, 2020).

The Nigerian Governance Model in Perspective

Nigeria practices a federal system of government, a system of government given its classical formulation by Australian theorist Kenneth Wheare. The 1963 Federal Government identifies the principle of federalism as the method of dividing powers so that national and subnational government are each within a sphere, co-existing, independent, and functional (Wheare, 1963). This infers decentralization through devolution of powers to the federating units (Omotso and Abe, 2014). The implication of a decentralized federal system is that power is shared among the tiers of the federating and in the case of Nigeria as practiced today is between the three tiers of government – the federal government, the state government and the local government. However, Odukoya and Ashiru (2007) argues that the defined tier of government as the case of Nigeria does not mean that federalism has taken place. Proper federalism for them should be able to guarantee the preservation of autonomy and the right to self-rule without necessarily foreclosing the possibility of shared rule (Odukoya and Ashiru, 2007). However, this has not been the case with the federalism practiced in Nigeria because there is over-centralization in the central government leading to inefficiency. This centralization of power manifests itself in the politics and administration of the country, in resource distribution and allocation of the scarce resources (Omotso and Abe, 2014). The federalism practiced in Nigeria reflects more as a unitary government than a federal government. This excessive centralism and statism especially in developing countries leads to excess vulnerability and heightened inefficiencies (Peil, 1976). The excessive concentration of power in the centre has ultimately created a crisis of government, created lack of synergy between the tiers of government and an attendant gross inefficiency in tackling the need of the people.

The inability of the government to establish a fiscally sustainable social system that will permeate all the tiers of the government especially to the rural area where the most vulnerable in the society are residing has led to imbalances in the distribution of resources and the allocation of social services including health and other services. This is because of the concentration of resources and power in the centre, which has led the competition for the control of the central power to be vicious and corrupt (Suberu, 2005). The power tussle usually produces self-serving, greedy and ethnically motivated leaders who keep widening the gap of nationalism by allocating undue advantage to oneself and friends while neglecting the most vulnerable of the society.

The reality of hoarding and looting of the resources of the people by leaders in the National level and middlemen to the detriment of people in the rural area has always been there – the governors, federal lawmakers and the local government chairman hijack most of the dividends of democracy coming to the rural population and share it among themselves, their family and friends and their political party members. This has been the case because the design, implementation and monitoring of these policies and programs are done without the involvement and participation of the poor and most vulnerable in the society (Rasheed, 1996). The channel of allocation of resources in most cases end up in the hands of those who are not actually in need of it (World Bank, 2020b). The climax of this malfeasance was blown over during the COVID and post-COVID era where palliatives meant for the most vulnerable in the society; those who were majorly affected by the dwindling and harsh economic realities were either looted, hoarded (Agbedo et al., 2020), sold, or given to the political party affiliates (Olawoyin, 2021) who are not necessarily the target recipients of the palliatives (Chima, 2020).  In a particularly upsetting report, some of the palliatives were hoarded, repackaged then resold or used for other purposes (Adedamola, 2024). The scarce resources necessitated by the fact that Nigeria spends the lowest on social protection than every other low-middle income country projected at 0.3% of the GDP (World Bank, 2020a) ends up not reaching the target group.

One of the primary reasons for the corruption, nepotism, abuse of power and especially for the ineffectiveness of the social programs is the centralization of the power in the centre under the federal government. It is important to devolve more powers to the local government which is closer to the people especially in a multicultural and multireligious country like Nigeria to allay the fear of oppression and domination by the majority groups (Omotso and Abe, 2014).  The importance of rural and community centred development beckons for a strategy to decentralize governance and push it more to the grassroot through the Local government. This can be done by channelling more resources to the local governments and arguably a fourth tier of government managed by the towns and communities in the rural areas. The over concentration of resources in the central government has reduced the federalism into an elitist entity that is more interested in sharing the oil revenues as against being proactive and rising to the developmental challenges of the rural economy.

Contextualizing the Problematics; A Look at the Igbo Governance Paradigm

Ala-Igbo loosely translated as Igboland in the region known as Eastern Nigeria today are the 5 Igbo speaking states of Nigeria which are Anambra, Imo, Abia, Enugu and Ebonyi. Initially, the region known presently as the Eastern region included states that stretched through Rivers, Cross River, Delta and a host of other communities and towns in the present-day Edo state and Benue state. With the creation of more states in 1976, many towns of Igbo origin were integrated into other states. For the sake of this paper, the southeastern part of Nigeria to be considered is the five states that make up the Igbo states in the present-day Nigeria. In this paper, Ala-Igbo, Igboland and Southeastern Nigeria will be used interchangeably. The egalitarian nature of Igbos propels them to be community centred, having town unions as the drivers of rural development from time immemorial (Amadi and Olewe, 2023). Communities in Igboland are known for their self-help efforts towards providing and maintaining basic infrastructural facilities for the development of the community. One of the reasons for this is due to the rough relationship between the Igbos and Nigeria pre- and post-independence (Chinweuba and Ezeugwu, 2017). The self-help approach to community development across Igboland is of considerable antiquity and has been an innate practice of the people over the years. This trend is very old and was proliferated by the advent of colonialism which introduced Warrant Chief System (WCS) and imposed more roles on custodians of this system (Achebe, 1983). Self-help in the Igbo society is a result of their communal spirit and the healthy competition that existed among them. Often, they compete with other communities in matters of amenities and the quality of development that has come to stay in their communities. Consequently, communities often gather to send brilliant students abroad to give him the opportunity of studying to further develop the community.

Scholars have shown that the Igbo people are the progenitors of the unions that cater for the welfare of their communities. These institutions were established by the communities conscious of the need for ordered and peaceful society (Nwachukwu and Okoreaffia, 2021). These unions were established prominently to cater for the welfare of their members. The care for their members later metamorphosed into the care for the community (Atuonwu, 2021). It is therefore worthy of note to state that communal development arose out of the love and genuine care that individuals have for their wellbeing that later translated into the community. A Town union is an organisation that is founded by citizens of a particular community to spearhead socioeconomic development of the community. To achieve its goal, town unions collaborate with traditional administration, all levels of government, and in some instances non-governmental organisations (Iwuala, 2013). Town unions in southeastern Nigeria are grassroots organisations that are an important cog in the socio political and economic life of the Igbo people. Members of a town or village traditionally make up the town union and serve as the representatives of the community’s interests (Amadi and Olewe, 2023). Town unions originated as informal assemblies aimed at improving communal living, development projects and social welfare, of members both within and sometimes outside, of their hometowns. As time went on, they became more formal organisations that steer local governance, development, and conflict resolution (Amadi and Olewe, 2023).

The executive body of town unions commonly consists of a president, secretary, treasurer and other officials elected by the community. They work with a collective sense of responsibility, with a strong sense that all members’ voices should count towards decision making processes (Iwuala, 2013). With contributions being made by their members both financially and in kind, these unions fund projects and initiatives aimed at the betterment of the community. For example, town unions are usually the responsible bodies for the construction and maintenance of local roads, as well as schools and markets, and the provision of clean water and electricity (Amadi and Olewe, 2023).

Furthermore, as civil society started emerging in Nigeria, people began to organize themselves. The Igbo people are essentially egalitarian and republican in nature; as such they do not have the centralized power in any monarch or king in their early years. However, notable individuals like the popular Onyeama from Eke town in Udi of Enugu state Nigeria even formed cabinet and council members for easy and smooth administration of his local community and its environ (Nwachukwu and Okoreaffia, 2021). This aligns with the fact that the Igbo people had already formed pattern of organization before the colonial masters arrived. The activities of these rulers were very prominent with the arrival of the colonial masters and their introduction of the indirect rule system in 1916.  Hence, the union became a channel and avenue through which the colonial masters communicate to the indigenous people (Nwachukwu and Okoreaffia, 2021). Subsequently, the town unions became avenues through which government policies are made known to the people. They were to connect their communities with the colonial government to enjoy the modernization that comes with it.

Ethnic and communal improvement associations were formed as a strategy for engaging more collectively in the struggle for limited social and economic resources and facilities of the townships (Ejitu, 2017). As the years passed by, various communities started organizing themselves and forming their various town unions. They were responsible for the organization of the people and even engaged in various forms of competition to better the lives of their communities. Achebe (1983) noted that with their evolution, traditional ruler and town unions became means of competition for all kinds of social and political achievements within the local communities. Such social achievements include the provision of electricity, pipe-borne water, good roads, hospitals, etc., in the local communities in collaboration with the government. They were rightly the means through which modern amenities get to different towns and communities in Igbo land.

There is no scholarly evidence to show that the first branch of the unions was formed in the communities they represent, however they were formed by members of the community in diaspora.  A publication in 1964 by the Igbo State Union had shown that during the 1920s, the Igbos residing outside their homeland originally formed family unions which later metamorphosed into village, town and district unions. This later developed into an organization known as the Igbo Federated Union (IFU) (Oke, 2021). They were responsible for the welfare of their members and later extended to their various communities. Ejitu (2017) further relates that Igbo Federation Union (IFU), and Igbo State Union (ISU) were formed in 1936 and 1948 respectively as the national umbrella of different town unions and traditional institutions in Igbo land. This was the foundation of town union in the Eastern Nigeria. Years later, various communities seeing the benefits that accrue from this organization started developing their various unions in their towns. Almost all the towns in Igbo land have their unions. This has been proliferated because the town unions have become a visible and legitimate instrument for self-help, community development and local governance in post-colonial Nigeria (Nwachukwu and Okoreaffia, 2021). This model of rural development has worked for the Igboland for years with or without government presence.

Interrogating the Existing Alternatives: Autonomous Communities and Community Government Councils

Autonomous communities are the community-based leadership automatically headed by the traditional ruler of the community. Every community or town with a traditional stool have a king or ruler with a staff of office enthroned as the leader of community. One significant reason for the failure of autonomous communities to be prioritized as the fourth tier of government is their excessive proliferation, often motivated by political interests rather than the need for effective governance. For states like Imo state in Nigeria, the number of autonomous communities rose from 303 in 1999 to over 750 by 2014 (Francis, et al., 2018). As a result of this rapid multiplication, there have been fragmentation of governance and conflicts on control of leadership, which is often seen in various (sometimes violent) contentions for the traditional rulership (Ezeship) (Onyema, 2016). Autonomous community leaders are increasingly fixated with disputes over their legitimacy than on community development. Renown political figures have adopted the practise of creating new communities to gain more power at the expense of good governance and development outcomes (Onyema 2016, Francis, et al. 2018). Additionally, these divisions have engendered many internal conflicts that tear the social fabric while destroying the well-established traditional unity of these communities. However, as argued by local historians and scholars, including Professor Adiele Afigbo in Afigbo (2005), the fragmentation of historical kingdoms to these smaller units destroys the previously existing cultural cohesion in Igbo land. The government promises funding and development projects to these communities in return but without sustainable results: these communities lack effective governance and as such underdeveloped (Amadi and Olewe, 2023).

In addition, many communities have been overly politicised and the choice of a traditional ruler as well as a councillor is often determined by political allegiance and not merit or communal consensus (Aniche and Falola, 2020). This weakens them as legitimate governments in their abilities to govern. For instance, during his tenure, Governor Rochas Okorocha of Imo State introduced the Community Governing Councils (CGC) which replaced town unions with councillors appointed by the government, however there was widespread discontent with the move (Mgbachi et al., 2020). The CGC was regarded by many communities as political instrument to legitimise programmes rather than a sincere attempt to promote grassroots development (Iwuala, 2013; Mgbachi et al., 2020). In some instances, communities did not consent for the CGC to keep the town running and kept following traditional town unions. The deep root of the cultural preference for town unions as more genuine articulators of the interest of the people over the ‘externally imposed’ and ‘politically influenced guises like the CGC’ (Iwuala, 2013) is reflected by how this resistance has played out across the country.

Furthermore, the appointment of councillors sometimes leads to the lack of accountability and withering away of the participatory democratic values that characterise Igbo governance (Aniche and Falola, 2020). In contrast, town unions are more grounded in the community and their leaders have emerged through consensus and a tradition of collective decision making thus making the leadership more legitimate and more trusted publicly (Iwuala 2013). Also, the administrative inefficiency of the autonomous community system poses another problem for sustainable development. For instance, according to studies, projects started by the leadership of autonomous community councillors like rural roads, water supply and markets do not receive proper maintenance, and communities find themselves in worse condition than it was before (Nkwocha, et al., 2016; Amadi and Olewe, 2023). Financial constraints as well as the lack of long-term planning cause these leaders to not follow up on development projects. According to studies on rural development in South-eastern Nigeria, politically driven initiatives tend to collapse because of poor coordination and conflicting interests between state appointed leaders and the communities they claim to represent (Nkwocha et al., 2016). Autonomous community governance through the top-down approach alienates the people and is ineffective in utilising local resources.

Communal participation in Igbo traditional system of governance is deeply rooted in earning leadership by merit and willingness to contribute towards the welfare of the people (Okoro, 2023). However, independent communities most frequently disturb these old traditions, using appointments from outside that do not reflect the will of the people (Eze, 2016; Hart, 2023). This creates a disconnect between the leaders and the community as the people will always prefer the leaders that emerge from their own ranks as is the case with town unions (Iwuala, 2013). It means that the democratic ethos of Igbo society is more attuned to town unions, which is known for making decisions by prudent considerations and high level of social capital. They also possess features like communal responsibility and accountability which make them more fit for local governance (Iwuala, 2013). Furthermore, the proliferation of autonomous communities has diluted the authority and cultural legitimacy of traditional rulers, many of whom now preside over communities with little historical or cultural coherence (Francis, et al., 2018). The weakening of traditional institutions then weakens their capacity to govern or mobilise the community for development projects.

Autonomous communities, despite their name, often lack true autonomy due to their reliance on state governments for financial and administrative support (Fatile and Ejalonibu, 2015). To make matters worse, government appointed councils like the CGC only serve to entrench this dependence, while cutting autonomous communities from their ability to take charge of their own development (Mbah et al., 2020). However, town unions have always been owned and funded locally through compulsory contributions, leading to a high degree of autonomy that enables them to engage in and execute development projects without much interference from outsiders (Udu and Onwe, 2016). The ownership of the development process by the locals has been central to the successes of town unions in facilitating rural development across Igboland.

The Town Unions as the Credible Alternative

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed significant weaknesses in the distribution of government relief in Nigeria, particularly in the south-eastern regions with different cases of looting and hoarding of relief materials and palliatives (Yemisi and Idris, 2022). Communities across Nigeria were severely affected during the COVID lockdowns because of how palliatives meant to mitigate the economic effect of the pandemic were handled (Abraham et al., 2024). There were reports of widespread looting of palliative warehouses, malabsorption of relief supplies, and corruption, perpetrated by the state and local officials responsible for carrying relief goods to the vulnerable citizens (Aluko, 2020; Yemisi and Idris, 2022; Abraham et al., 2024). This breakdown in the palliative system vividly demonstrates the critical flaws in the current governance structures at the grassroots level. Town unions, in this context, are highly viable as the fourth tier of government, to provide a more effective and culturally adapted system for the management of local resources and governance. Given their deep tether to these communities and their history of organising and executing local projects of development, they are best suited to ensure equitable distribution of government aid at the grass root level.

At the height of the COVID pandemic, instances of how the state and local governments were unable to manage relief efforts were seen (Aluko, 2020). Several reports emerged of political figures hoarding or looting palliatives from warehouses (Aluko, 2020; Matazu, 2020; Obiezu, 2020). Even the Nigerian Governors’ Forum (NGF) was harshly criticised for allegedly withholding food and other essential items that were to be immediately given out to poor communities (Aluko, 2020). Furthermore, looters robbed storage facilities in states like Lagos, Kwara and Plateau, in protesting the delay in distribution, while the NGF claimed that some governors were reserving supplies for a potential second wave of the pandemic (Matazu, 2020). But this explanation failed to address the immediate suffering caused by the lack of timely distribution (Aluko, 2020). Compounding the matter, as it were, accusations of political bias in distribution of palliatives (in the Southeast, otherwise known as the Igbo land) were made (Opejobi, 2020). According to the Indigenous people of Biafra (IPOB), there seemed to be systematic favouritism in the federal government’s allocation of relief: the southeast got the least compared to northern regions, (Opejobi, 2020). This discrepancy evidenced the regional inequity and inefficient governance model being operated currently (Opejobi, 2020). Their failures demonstrate the need for a more localised and transparent system that would be better managed in town unions.

 Town unions have a long history of serving as the backbone of local governance in Igbo land (Oke, 2021). They are deeply connected to the communities they serve and often their leaders are chosen through communal consensus, which means a much higher level of accountability and transparency. However, this is contrary to state appointed councillors and leaders who may put more weight on political patronage than community needs (Oke, 2021). Had town unions been in charge during the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in Igbo land, it is likely that the distribution of palliatives would have been more effective. As locally embedded organizations, town unions are better positioned to understand the specific needs of their communities and to mobilize resources efficiently (Oke, 2021). Historically, they have been able to organise themselves in designing self-help initiatives, such as road construction, market building and water supply projects (Okoreaffia and Obiakor, 2015). The success of these initiatives demonstrates the capacity of town unions to manage resources in a way that is both sustainable and directly responsive to the needs of the people.

In states like Enugu and Anambra, town unions have played crucial roles in community development projects by pooling local resources and ensuring that development is tailored to the community’s needs (Amali and Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2023). The participatory approach used by these town unions ensures that all community members are in one way or the other, involved in the decision-making process. This helps ensure that projects are not just sustainable, but they are also reflecting the local priorities (Oke, 2021). This bottom-up governance model is precisely what is needed to address the kind of inefficiencies observed during the COVID-19 relief efforts. Part of the reasons for the inefficiencies is related to data, the inability for the government to have accurate data of the most vulnerable people in the local communities. The World Bank highlights that most social nets being touted by the government are limited in scope, not well grounded, and the social protection programs covers merely a tiny fraction of the target population (World Bank, 2020a). The difficulty relating to data and access to the target population of intervention programmes can easily be sorted by town union because the unions are closer to the people, equipped with more data of the people up to and beyond the nuclear family level.

Another major reasons why town unions are a perfect fit for the fourth tier of government is their inherent accountability. Unlike state-appointed officials, who may be more accountable to political sponsors than to the people, town union leaders are directly accountable to their communities (Oke, 2021; Aniche and Falola, 2020). Their legitimacy is derived from the people they serve, not from political appointments. This direct accountability makes it less likely that resources intended for community development or crisis relief would be mismanaged or looted (Oke, 2021). During the COVID-19 pandemic, town unions could have provided a more trustworthy mechanism for distributing relief materials. Their local knowledge and established communication networks would have enabled a more equitable and efficient distribution process, avoiding the chaos and corruption that characterized the government’s efforts (Oke, 2021). Additionally, since town unions are composed of community members who live in the areas they serve, they would be more motivated to ensure that relief materials reach those most in need, as opposed to hoarding supplies for political or personal gain (Oke, 2021).

CONCLUSION

The proposal to establish town unions as the fourth tier of government in Igboland offers a more sustainable and culturally fitting governance model compared to autonomous communities and councillors, particularly in Southeast Nigeria. Despite the growing inefficiency of local governance through autonomous community leaders and councillors, town unions have long played a very central role in Igbo socio political structure. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the gap between the government and local communities, particularly in rural areas where state and local governments often lack the capacity or willingness to meet the needs of the population. Town unions, by contrast, are embedded within and for the communities and can serve as a crucial bridge between the people and the government. If established as the fourth tier of government, town unions could play a vital role in not only distributing relief materials but also in implementing other government programs. The basic education structures, primary healthcare centres are within towns and communities, the town unions will be in better positions to make sure that these government structures are run properly and efficiently since the direct beneficiaries are members and stakeholders of the town union. Their strong local presence and organizational capacity would ensure that development projects and government initiatives are executed effectively and transparently. In times of crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, town unions would be the first responders, ensuring that the most vulnerable members of the community receive timely assistance.

Town unions have a long history of successful self-help projects and provides better leadership for rural development. This is exemplified in communities with town unions that have led the development agenda where such projects as road rehabilitation and market construction have been more sustainable because these town unions are directly answerable to the people and better able to mobilise local resources and labour – they know who is best at a job than others. The use of town unions to foster government developmental and intervention programs will put a stop to nepotism, favouritism and will proliferate the use of home-grown solutions to tackle problems.  Town unions, through being participatory in development, can translate development projects tailored to the needs of the community rather than the political agenda of other external actors. The government will be involved through monitoring and supervision of projects to make sure the standards are maintained. Government intervention programs such as during the covid-19 will be better he handled by town unions in partnership with the ministries and agencies responsible for such intervention. The partnership will be mutually beneficial to both the government and the town individuals who are direct recipients of the projects. While the town union implements and executes, the government will monitor and evaluate.

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