Securitization, Exploitation and Temporization of Afghan Immigrants and Refugees in Iran

Securitization, Exploitation and Temporization of Afghan Immigrants and Refugees in Iran

Ahmad Qasemy

Independent Researcher and Alumnus of the OSCE Academy

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2024.8120083

Received: 27 October 2024; Accepted: 12 November 2024; Published: 03 January 2025

ABSTRACT

This paper is about the securitization process of Afghan immigrants and refugees in Iran. The paper argues that the Islamic Republic of Iran has securitized Afghan immigrants after the Taliban came to power due to security, economic and socio-political problems. The paper applies securitization theory by both Copenhagen and Paris schools. Document analysis and desk research are the primary research methods of this paper. This study found out that the Islamic Republic of Iran has (de)securitized Afghan refugees by both discursive (speech acts) and securitizing practices.

Keywords: Afghan Immigrants, Securitization, Islamic Republic of Iran, Refugees, Securitizing Practices

INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan is one of the countries with the highest number of immigrants in the world.[[1]] The decades of war, economic hardship, unemployment, extremism, and environmental problems have forced people to leave their country.[[2]] Iran and Pakistan are the two appealing destinations for Afghan immigrants because of the collective memories, language similarity, and cross-border ties.[[3]] Iran had welcomed Afghan immigrants through an open-door policy and provided them with shelter, food, jobs, and other basic social services during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[[4]] However, The welcoming policy has been changed based on the Iran’s national interest and political purposes.

Considering the recent developments in Iran, the country has become one of the most anti-immigrant and anti-refugee states for Afghan immigrants and refugees. Although the two nations have shared historical ties, linguistic connections, and common culture, Iran’s systematic exclusionary immigration policies against Afghan immigrants imposing restrictions on fundamental rights such as education, healthcare, food, employment, and other social services along with mass deportations and the portrayal of immigrants as a security threat have turned Afghan refugees into a perceived security issue.

While it comes to the immigrants and security concerns, the Iranian government has adopted a multifaceted approach towards Afghan immigrants, evolving from an initial open-door policy during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to increasingly restrictive measures following the rise of the Taliban, what we call “securitization of Afghan immigrants and refugees.” Well, this shift reflects Iran’s socio-political interests, economic motivations, ideological considerations, and geopolitical strategies of Iran’s government, which has influenced its policies toward Afghan immigrants.

As the situation continues to change, it is important to study the implication of these policies on Afghan immigrants and Iran’s national security. Therefore, this research tries to address the following question: How do Iran’s immigration policies towards Afghan immigrants reflect the broader themes of securitization, exploitation, and temporization of immigrants, and what are the implications for the Afghan immigrant community in Iran? By exploring this question, the research shed light on the complexities of Afghan immigration in Iran, including the social dynamics, economic exploitation, and security concerns.

Theoretical Framework

In order to study the securitization process, in this paper a joint approach by the two schools of securitization theory-the Copenhagen School and the Paris School were employed. The Copenhagen School, led by Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, posits a two-stage process: first, framing an issue as an existential threat, followed by persuading the audience to recognize it as such.[[5]] The success of this process relies on the audience’s acceptance of the securitizing actor’s narrative. The Copenhagen School emphasizes on the discursive approach of securitization by which the audience is convinced and agreed to adopt policies to tackle security problem.[[6]] In contrast, the Paris School, represented by Balzacq and Bigo, critiques this view as overly simplistic. Balzacq argues that securitization involves a set of contextual practices where the audience’s disposition and power dynamics shape interactions.[[7]] While speech acts can transform an issue into a security problem, they do not encompass broader practices such as profiling and risk assessment the Paris School focus more on non-discursive securitizing practices in the securitization process which offer a detailed understanding of the role of securitizing actor, audience, context, and the interaction among them.[[8]]

Additionally, the Paris School emphasizes three factors that influence the outcomes of securitizing practices: the audience’s acceptance of the security narrative, the securitizing actor’s ability to effectively claim a threat[[9]], and the contextual factors that can empower or undermine the securitizing actor.[[10]] The paper argues that the securitization of the Afghan immigrants and refugees in Iran has been done by employing both speech acts and securitizing practices.

According to Balzacq, securitization is “an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investigating the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately in this context to block its development”.[[11]]

In accordance to this definition, the securitization has five elements, the securitizing actor such as governments, media, or civil society identifies an issue as a threat. The referent object is the entity perceived to be under existential threat, deserving of protection.[[12]] The referent subject includes entities like refugees that pose a threat[[13]], while the audience comprises those like the public or politicians who validate the perceived threat[[14]]. Finally, policy refers to the implementation of exceptional measures to address the threat.[[15]]

Research Method

The qualitative research method has been used in this paper. Document analysis and desk research are the two main research methods employed in this study. The research is based on secondary data, and the data has been collected from open sources such as news, media, online website, official documents, and the existence literatures.

Influx of Afghan immigrants to Iran and the multifaced policies of Iran’s government

Iran is one of the biggest hosting countries for Afghan immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.[[16]] Currently the country hosts about 4 million Afghan migrants based on the UNHCR reports[[17]]; the Islamic Republic of Iran and the media has claimed different numbers 5- 8 million Afghan refugees living in Iran, though. During the past decades, various factors contributed to the displacement of the Afghan population, mainly war, insecurity, political, social, economic, and environmental problems, which caused Afghan people to leave their country for Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and European countries.[[18]] In fact, cultural similarity, linguistic connection, ethnic and religious tie, and geographical location have turned Iran into a country where Afghan people seek asylum, security, jobs, education, and a peaceful life during crises in their home country.[[19]]

Iran government has adopted multifaceted policy towards Afghan immigrants, starting with the first immigration crisis triggered with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1970s and continuing until the withdrawal of the US’s forces from Afghanistan and the return of the Taliban to power. These responses can be defined as open doors policy or welcoming immigrants and refugees to the arresting, deportation, and, expulsion of Afghan immigrants by the Iranian government.[[20]] The implementation of flexible or harsh policies towards Afghan immigrants at different periods of time has been driven by Iran’s socio-political interests, economic motivations, ideological considerations, and geopolitical strategies. Iran’s government welcomed Afghan immigrants by the open door policy as the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, housed them in different cities, and provided them with education, employment, housing, food, fuel, health care, and even investment opportunities.[[21]] A positive discourse has been shaped around the refugees and migrants by Ruhollah Khomeini (the supreme leader), who emphasized more on the Islamic obligation of Muslim citizens to support and feed Muslims coming from Afghanistan.[[22]] This welcoming policy was followed by a systematic effort to extend influence over the Afghan Shitte ethnic group, the Hazara, who make up around 20 percent of the country’s population.

 The Iranian government supported Shia Mujahidin in the war against the Soviet Union in response to Saudi Arabia, which supported Sunni Mujahidin in Afghanistan[[23]]. A juncture points where Iran’s government started to intervene in the domestic issue of Afghanistan by supporting Shia Mujahidin during the war against the Soviet and Afghan civil wars from 1979-1995. During this period, a proxy group called the  Fatemiyoun Division was made by the Ayatullah followers, which were engaged in war against the Soviet Union, the Iraq-Iran war, and then in civil war in Afghanistan.[[24]] By the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the death of Ayatullah, the new administration adopted a new immigrantion policy towards Afghan migrants.[[25]] Since the country was in post-war time and the regime focused more on rebuilding cities, opining the privatization and market economy along with the state’s economy led to open borders for immigrants serving as cheap labours in 1990.[[26]] However, Iran’s government changed her flexible immigration policy because of social and economic issues and established a Tripartite Commission comprising Afghanistan, Iran, and UNHCR in 1992.[[27]] It was the beginning of posing restrictions and depriving immigrants of subsidized education, health care, and other social services, which caused the return of 1.4 million Afghans back to Afghanistan.[[28]]

The second phase of mass displacement of Afghan people took place after the Taliban came to power in 1995. Due to the mass execution of Shia minorities in Mazar-Sharif, Iran welcomed the refugees and immigrants from Afghanistan.[[29]] After the US’s invasion, the second repatriation agreement took place among Afghanistan, Iran, and UNHCR.[[30]] Accordingly, many people returned to Afghanistan. However, with the establishment of the Islamic State of Khurasan (IS-K) in Afghanistan and increased numbers of attacks on civilians, people started to immigrate to Iran. During 2015, the Fatemiyoun Division deployed to Syria and Iraq to fight for the interests of Iran.[[31]] After the Taliban came to power in August 2021, more than one million immigrants travelled to Iran to seek asylum.[[32]]

Considering the past and present, the state’s policies towards Afghan migrants in Iran have three main aspects: the temporization of Afghan immigrants and refugees, the exploitation, and the securitization of Afghan migrants and refuges. To begin with temporization policies, the Islamic Republic of Iran has established an exclusive system of immigration in which legally and politicly Afghan immigrants are being deprived of enjoying permanent residency or citizenship.[[33]] Even though Afghan immigrants have been living in Iran for more than three decades and there are the second and third generation of migrants, Iran’s government has not granted them permanent residency or citizenship.[[34]] Interestingly, the Iranian government has treated Afghan immigrants more like as Mehman , a guest  who is living in Iran for a short period, and due to certain reasons, while the time comes, they must leave the country. Afghan migrants legally are not allowed to work in high-ranking, prestigious, superior, or appealing jobs in Iran, except in harsh and inferior positions.[[35]] They are not allowed to live in particular cities. Afghan children with Iranian mothers were not entitled to Iranian citizenship. Even education and school for Afghan children are not possible or difficult to continue. Anti-immigrant bureaucracy in governmental agencies represents exclusionary policy and lack of an integratory approach towards immigrants. On the one hand, immigrants are required to have different registration codes for using transportation, education, health services, jobs, rent, SIM cards, communication, and living services. On the other hand, there are no official agencies to grant these codes and register immigrants and refugees.

The second aspect of Iran’s immigration policy is the exploitation of Afghan immigrants in Iran. In fact, Afghan immigrants are leaving their country just to survive from insecurity and unemployment. The market economy and capitalist system of Iran benefit from the cheap labors of Afghan immigrants.[[36]] Afghan immigrants had played a significant role in rebuilding the post-war country.[[37]] They have been mostly working on constructing buildings, the state’s infrastructure, roads, streets, and bridges. The limited integration policy and the exclusionary system put them in a weak position against the employers. There are plenty of cases where employers denied the employees’ salaries, misbehaving, and even threatening them to deportation and surrendering them to the police in order to steal their salary. The exploitation policy also covers how the governmenthas has instrumentalized Afghan immigrants and refugees for political and military purposes. Iran’s government has been using citizenship and permanent residency as a motive for hiring Afghan immigrants, especially the Hazara ethnic minority, as proxy soldiers to the Middle East.[[38]] More than 10000 Afghan citizens had been killed and injured in Iran’s proxy war in Iraq and Syria.[[39]] Thus, the beneficiaries of the exploiting Afghan immigrants are both state and market economy.

The last cycle of Iran’s immigrant policy involves the securitization of Afghan immigrants, which is the main purpose of this research. Therefore, in the next section, first we explain how the immigrants threaten the security of Iran. In the next step, we discuss the process of securitization by Iranian government.

The security implication of Afghan immigrants in Iran

In fact, all international immigrants and refugees add a new dimension to the host state’s national security and have the potential to pose political, socio-economic, and environmental security concerns to the host state.[[40]]In the case of Iran, located between South Asia and the Middle East, surrounding with poor and unstable neighbours along with security tension with countries like the United States, Israel, and their alliances, in addition, the country’s proxy groups in the Middle East have contributed to establish a complicated security culture for this country. What contributes more to this culture is the economic hardship, national unrest, and organized crimes such as drug trafficking or human trafficking.[[41]] However, immigrants are usually victimized by government strategic discourses to control public opinion and mislead them from reality.

Four decades of war in Afghanistan have led to negative consequences for its neighborhoods, particularly Iran. Since Iran and Afghanistan have shared strategic economic interest, historical tie, and similarity in language and culture, the influx of Afghan migrants in times of crisis to Iran is not the only issue. The war led to an unstable country where various extremist groups emerged, which Iran has perceived them as threats to its national security. Among these groups, the Islamic State of Khurasan (ISK), Jaish al-Adl, and the Taliban were three movements that Iran and its proxies sought to combat or eliminate.[[42]] The ISK first emerged in the southern part of Afghanistan and committed the most brutal terrorist attacks, particularly targeting Shia ethnic groups in different parts of Afghanistan.[[43]] During the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, due to insecurity and weak central control over the territory, IS-K grew stronger and became more organized in the country.[[44]] By US withdrawal and the return of the Taliban, this group was able to insurgent members from other countries and organized their cross-border terroristic attacks in Iran, Russia, Pakistan, and other countries.[[45]] Although the Taliban and Iran have established close cooperation for countering ISK in Afghanistan[[46]], the group actively operated several terrorist attacks in both countries.

The first attack, in October 2022, killed 15 people in Iran which the Islamic State (IS) group has claimed responsibility, and two Afghan men has been executed by hanging.[[47]]Also, a shrine in the city of Shiraz was hit by a militant attack in August 2023, and Iranians swiftly voiced concerns about the country’s security measures.[[48]] Although IS has not claimed responsibility, the government pointed out it would be a retaliation of IS-K for hanging members of them.[[49]] The shooting, in which four people were killed, was the second attack on the Shah Cheragh shrine in the Fars province in less than a year. These are not the only examples; back in 2017, IS attacked the Parliament and the shrine of Khomeni, which caused many deaths. In 2023, Spanish citizens were targeted in Bamian provinces of Afghanistan by ISK, which killed three Spanish and three Afghans.[[50]]Additionally, the terrorist attacks in Moscow city of Russia, were also claimed by the ISK, which shows the cross-border operations of the ISK.[[51]]

In fact, Iran also perceived the Taliban as both ideological and security threats. Since the Afghan-Soviet war, Iran has actively intervened in the war by supporting Shia Mujahidin against the Soviets and competing with Saudi Arabia and the USA’s support of Sunni Mujahidin.[[52]] The strategic goal of Iran’s involvement in Afghanistan was establishing Shiite hegemony in the region. the support of Iran, along with the proxy groups backed by Saudi Arabia and the USA, contributed significantly to the escalation of conflict in Afghanistan, ultimately leading to a full-fledged civil war in 1989.[[53]] After the Taliban came to power, anti-Shiite discourses among extremist groups contributed to the massacres of the Hazara ethnic group in Mazar-e-Sharif and other parts of Afghanistan.[[54]] Additionally, the tension between Iran and Taliban intensified after killing 9 Iranians, 8 diplomates and 1 journalist,  who were working in the consulate of Iran in Mazar-e-Sharif.[[55]] During the first Taliban regime, Iran provided support to the northern alliance led by Ahmad Shah Massoud in order to overthrow the Taliban regime.[[56]] The hegemonic discourse among the Iran’s population portrays the Taliban as extremist groups who have been denying Shia followers and fought against the people and government of Afghanistan. Thus, an old enemy is difficult to become a close friend; however, the enemy of the enemy can be a partner for cooperation to counter ISK out of the soil of Iran.

Organized crimes were also a product of war and insecurity in Afghanistan.[[57]] The emergence of organized crimes have rooted in the corrupted systems that enjoyed the benefit of them. The criminals have had cross-border networks in  Afghanistan’s neighborhood. Drug trafficking and human trafficking were two organized crimes, which both countries, Afghanistan and Iran, suffered from.[[58]] Well, it should be clear that for most of the Afghan migrants, Iran is a connector to immigrate to European countries. A strong network of human trafficking has been established in these two countries from both Afghans and Iranians who are committing robbery, kidnapping, child exploitation, abusing women, and forcing labor.[[59]] On the other hand, drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Iran has been a social-political problem for the Islamic republic of Iran. The report indicated that almost 60 percent of drugs from Afghanistan are trafficked to Iran annually.[[60]] Both countries have millions of active drug addicts who are unable to contribute positively to the societies.

The recent Iran’s geopolitical development in the Middle East threatens the very national security of the country. The Iran’s first retaliation attack on Israel with both drones and missiles from its own soil alerted all the security forces and securitized domestic policy. The death of Iran’s President and Foreign Minister on May 19th, 2024, in a helicopter crash after Iran’s retaliation attack on Israel and the assassination of the political leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniye, in the most secure place of the Islamic Republic raised the security concerns and indicated the gap and leak of the national security policy.[[61]] In addition, Iran’s second retaliation on Israel with almost two hundred ballistic missiles put the country’s security as a top priority for all agencies. Therefore, Iran’s power projection and direct rivalry with Israel have shaped the immigrant’s policy and the securitization process as well.

The Securitization Processes

The policies, actions, and restrictive measures of the Iranian government towards Afghan immigrants and refugees represent a significant case of securitization. The referent objects in this case are Iran’s national security, economic security, and socio-political problems. Afghan immigrants and refugees are the referent subjects. The securitizing actors include the former minister of foreign affairs, the minister of interior, prominent members of the parliament, and other politicians and elites. The audience consists of public opinion and legislators. In this case, this study found out that securitizing actors employed both speech acts and non-discursive measures to construct a security threat around the Afghan immigrants to convince the audience that Afghan immigrants and refugees are security threats. Additionally, a variety of security practices and extraordinary measures have been taken to counter the threats from immigrants. In the next sections, the process of securitization will be explained in details.

Speech acts

The framing issue as a security threat through political discourse is one of the elements of the securitization theory; therefore, to securitize an issue, it should be first framed as a security problem by the security actors.[[62]] What makes it more clear to the audience is the speech acts by which a political issue turns to a security problem.[[63]] In the case of Afghan immigrants, the government of Iran has constructed a security problem around the Afghan immigrants after the first triliteral agreement, describing them as illegal immigrants, aliens, and criminals through the official speech of the political elites, official documents, and legal acts. However, after the Taliban came to power and the changes in the political leadership of Iran, Afghan immigrants have been portrayed as real security problems.

 The official statements of the former minister of foreign affairs and the political elites on the parliament and different ministries provide an authentic reference to the threatening character of the Afghan immigrants. The former minister of foreign affairs, Amir Hossein Abdollahian, in the Global Migration Council said that “Frequent unlawful military interventions and other interferences by outside powers in our vicinity have caused pandemic instability, insecurity, and underdevelopment that in turn have led to the influx of refugees across the region… this is an unprecedented challenge as our public infrastructure in healthcare, basic education, employment, energy, and water sectors is under immense pressure due to the huge number of refugees. The plight of Afghan refugees could not be resolved without their return to their home country.”[[64]]

At the same time, the Deputy Governor of Tehran, Mahdi Babolhavaeji, warned about the “threatening” presence of undocumented Afghan immigrants in the province, stating, “[…] In dealing with illegal residents, we are like our youth who took up arms and went to war, becoming martyrs[…]”[[65]]

Following the second Shah Cheragh attack, prominent Member of Parliament Nouri Qazaljeh described the influx of Afghan immigrants over the past two years as both a security and economic threat.[[66]] Sara Fallahi, another well-known member of parliament, has described Afghan migrants as a ticking time bomb and accused them of terrorism and insecurity.[[67]]Additionally, Ahmad Vahidi, Iran’s Interior Minister, has said that “[…] We have previously announced, and we now reiterate, that Afghan refugees without legal documentation must return to their own country and contribute to its development […]”.[[68]]

Additionally, minister of interior, Momeni, justified the remarks by stating that “[…]Iran cannot handle this volume of migration… A lot of job opportunities are being taken away[…]”.[[69]] These linguistic rhetoric forms the basis of the security discourses, which legitimizes the government’s decision to adopt and implement restrictive practices and regulatory policies.

In summary, the above statements of key political elites have constructed an image of threats from Afghan immigrants and referred to them as a serious concern in the security discourse of Iran. Constructing an image of threat demands urgent actions to tackle the threats. Furthermore, these linguistic expressions serve to legitimize securitizing practices and justify the implementation of extraordinary policies that the government may adopt to neutralize the perceived threats.

Securitizing practices

According to securitization theory, speech acts are performative; thus, their performances can be measured by locating non-discursive securitizing practices.[[70]] This section focuses on the two non-discursive pragmatic securitizing practices: institutional configurations and policy regulations. In Iran, the revolutionary Guard, ministry of interior, ministry of defense, The Bureau of Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs (BAFIA) and ministry of intelligence are responsible for deportation, expulsion, and arresting Afghan immigrants, which indicates the securitization issue and the urgent actions by the security agencies. The Iranian government has invested €3 billion to construct a border wall on its border with Afghanistan and securitized its border to avoid immigrants and refugees entering Iranian territory.[[71]] Additionally, the Iranian government has already placed landmines along its border with Pakistan and Afghanistan, allegedly to prevent Afghan refugees from crossing into the country.[[72]] Media reports indicate that vehicles carrying Afghan refugees have struck these landmines on two occasions, leading to fatalities and injuries among Afghan citizens.[[73]] The Iranian forces are illegally arresting Afghan immigrants and refugees, using forces, and beating and dehumanizing immigrants during the deportation. Expulsion is a part of police misbehavior towards immigrants. A recent incident involved the arrest of Mahdi, followed by the release of a video showing a police officer kneeling on his neck, which quickly drew comparisons to the death of George Floyd in the US. The video sparked widespread reactions from Afghan people.[[74]]On the other hand, Iran does not have immigration law to grant the immigrants and refugees what they are entitled to.[[75]] The general policies of Iran towards the immigrants and refugees are non-acceptance, deportation, and expulsion which are governed by decree rather than law.[[76]] Although Iran is a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which set out the rights of refugees and the legal obligations of states to protect them, Iran has not adopted its immigration system in accordance with the provisions of the convention.[[77]] The lack of legal ground for immigrants in Iran and the implementation of deportation and expulsion policies narrate the securitization of migrants. As mentioned before, based on the current legal and political system in Iran, even if a person has lived for decades in Iran, he or she will not be granted citizenship or an Iranian passport. In addition to that, the immigrants have to live only in a few cities, and they are not allowed to change their location. Health care, jobs, education, and even food have been limited to those who have the different registration cards. These types of restrictive routinization of practices through regulatory and capacity tools help visualize Afghan immigrants and refugees as a menace to the state and view them in security terms.

Audience

Public opinion is marked by their silence on the restrictive policies of the Iranian government against the Afghan refugees, as no major protests have been reported against these policies. Interestingly, two years before, the women, life and freedom movement were an advocate of Afghan children’s rights in Iran, which was oriented in the famous song of Baray Kodakan Afghani.[[78]] However, currently social media is full of anti-immigrants and Afghanophobiahashtagssuchas#SayNoToAfghans,#IranIsForIranians, #RefugeesNotWelcome, #AfghanThreat, #ProtectIran, and #KeepAfghans Out. The concept of otherness and self has been developing in the social and political discourses of Iranian society. Sanctions and inflation have led to economic hardship since the anti-immigrant movement always frames the immigrants as a real and serious problem, which increases unemployment, insecurity, and adversaries in Iran. Media have played a crucial role, as regulatory instruments, in constructing threat images of the Afghan immigrants and refugees by regularly framing the news from a security lens. Thus, the public cognition is usually influenced by the framing approach; how the information is presented, especially from informal sources such as social media, plays a critical role in the judgment of the audience.[[79]] Scholars have already illustrated that the language of security plays an extremely powerful role in separating those who are worthy of protection and those who are not, those who are like ‘us’ and those who are not, those who threaten ‘us’ and those who do not, lives that matter and those that do not.[[80]]

CONCLUSION

The securitization of Afghan immigrants in Iran has significant implications for both the Iranian state and the Afghan migrant community in Iran. As this research demonstrates, the evolving policies and narratives surrounding Afghan immigrants have shifted from humanitarian considerations to security-centric approaches, often characterized by exclusion and deportation. The Iranian government’s policies have been shaped by a complex interplay of national security, economic pressures, and geopolitical dynamics, which have resulted in misbehaviors, arrests, and high socio-political pressures on Afghan immigrants. These policies not only affect the socio-economic conditions of Afghan migrants but also perpetuate a cycle of marginalization and vulnerability.

Addressing the challenges faced by Afghan immigrants in Iran requires a deep understanding of the underlying factors driving securitization. Policymakers must balance security concerns with the need for compassion and human rights, creating an environment that recognizes the contributions of Afghan migrants while ensuring their protection and dignity. Further research and advocacy are essential in bringing attention to these issues and promoting policies that support the integration and well-being of Afghan immigrants in Iran, ultimately paving the way for a more inclusive and equitable society.

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