Social Movement and Economic Reforms in Africa; A Study of Kenya and Nigeria

Social Movement and Economic Reforms in Africa; A Study of Kenya and Nigeria

Shom Shoon Favour, Mercy Erdoo Fiase Ph. D, Igah Sunday

Benue state University, Makurdi, Nigeria

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.9010099

Received: 17 December 2024; Revised: 31 December 2024; Accepted: 03 January 2025; Published: 04 February 2025

ABSTRACT

The surge of extensive protests that have taken place across Africa since 2020 is concerning and centers on demands for improved socioeconomic conditions, elections, and human rights abuses. This indicates that lingering issues and persistent challenges are fueling these demonstrations, particularly as it was estimated that 577 protests occurred in West Africa alone in 2020. Thus, the study was conducted to analyze social movements and economic reforms in Africa, focusing on Kenya and Nigeria. The paper utilizes the relative deprivation theory and made use of both quantitative and qualitative data. Utilizing data acquired from primary and secondary sources, the research revealed that the protests in Kenya stemmed from the dissatisfaction among citizens regarding the economic situation and the government’s perceived disregard for their struggles, which has been escalating for years. Triggered by contentious proposed tax increases, the movement expanded into a broader campaign for enhanced governmental accountability. Some individuals are calling for the resignation of the entire government. The protests against poor governance can be linked to the implementation of economic reforms, particularly the elimination of fuel subsidies and the devaluation of the Naira following the removal of its peg to the US dollar under President Bola Tinubu, which aimed to liberalize the Nigerian economy and draw in foreign investment. Additionally, the protests in Kenya and Nigeria exhibited a violent aspect, with recent mass demonstrations culminating in chaos. The findings also indicated that the social movement had significant effects on the socio-political and economic advancement of both nations. Numerous lives were lost during the protests. Properties valued in millions of naira were damaged across the two countries. The study further indicated that the Kenyan government’s response was praiseworthy, as it acquiesced to the public’s demands by announcing the withdrawal of the finance bill. In contrast, the Nigerian government’s reaction to the protests on August 1st was rapid, with security forces deployed in significant numbers throughout various cities. Consequently, the government, as indicated in the President’s address, did not yield to any of the protesters’ demands. The paper suggests that the Nigerian and Kenyan governments should establish social safety nets and welfare initiatives for their citizens to provide immediate assistance to the most vulnerable groups, ensuring their access to fundamental necessities, thereby reducing occurrences of social movements that lead to the destruction of lives and property, which hinders socioeconomic development.

Keywords: Social Movement, Economic Reforms, Protest, Socio-economic development, Kenya and Nigeria

INTRODUCTION

Africa, like many other developing regions, faces numerous threats and challenges that impact the wellbeing and survival of its citizens. These challenges include poverty, high unemployment rates, violence, resource scarcity, lack of opportunities, marginalization, and the violation and repression of fundamental rights and freedoms. Although military regimes have been replaced by democratic frameworks, the voices of marginalized individuals continue to be stifled; often, there is an absence of effective channels for these individuals to voice their concerns. The anticipated benefits of democracy have not been realized by those who required them the most. Under such circumstances, social movements have emerged as an essential means for people to express their views, aspirations for society, grievances, and to robustly demand changes to their circumstances (Shigetomi, 2009).

Over the past year, social movements throughout Africa have attracted considerable attention. Ethiopia has experienced widespread protests in its Oromia and Amhara regions regarding issues of political exclusion, gaining international visibility after an Ethiopian athlete at the Olympic Games in Brazil made a gesture (wrists crossed above his head) that has become emblematic of the protests (Okhai, 2024). Similarly, South Africa has seen extensive and ongoing student protests at institutions nationwide over tuition fees and calls to ‘decolonize’ universities, leading to significant disruptions in the academic calendar and damage to property (Chimobi, 2024).

Additionally, fiercely contested electoral processes have triggered protests in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gabon, and Uganda. Even nations like Chad, Angola, and Zimbabwe, which typically experience few protests due to strict control over public expression, witnessed substantial civil unrest (Chimobi, 2024). These events echo similar widespread anti-government protests in countries such as Burundi, Senegal, and Burkina Faso in previous years. In fact, statistics indicate that popular protests in Africa have risen markedly since the mid-2000s, peaking in recent years and affecting the entire continent (Couharde and Mouhoud, 2020).

The recent surge of large-scale protests across Africa since 2020 exhibits common patterns, primarily driven by young people advocating for improved socio-economic conditions, electoral justice, and human rights. This prevalence indicates persistent, unresolved issues that fuel these demonstrations, especially considering that an estimated 577 protests occurred in West Africa alone in 2020 Couharde and Mouhoud, 2020). The recently organized social movement across Africa suggests that many young Africans feel alienated from their governments, questioning the actions of officials when they see no tangible benefits despite substantial funding announced regularly in national media for various initiatives. Furthermore, there exists a gap between the aspirations of the youth and the approaches of political leadership, as Africa has the youngest demographic globally, with 60% of the population under 25, while the average age of its presidents is 62 (Chimobi, 2024). Many of these leaders often implement policies that evoke considerable frustration among citizens, reflecting their inability to engage with the needs and challenges faced by the youth.

The disconnect between the government and the populace is evident in the protests in Kenya, which started over proposed tax hikes but morphed into a wider movement demanding more accountable governance and the president’s resignation. Similar sentiments emerged in Nigeria, where protests initially aimed at ending poor governance evolved into calls for President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s resignation by the second and third days. The economic crisis and deteriorating living standards contribute to the recent wave of protests across Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa. According to a 2023 report by Maplecroft, 16 of the 20 countries most vulnerable on its Food Security Index (FSI)—a measure of food supply stability, accessibility, and availability—are situated in Africa (Maplecroft, 2023).

Moreover, the continent witnessed the steepest increase in risk on the index over the last two years, suggesting the likelihood of food-related protests and civil unrest among citizens. On one front, African governments face pressure to implement reforms through various policies, including recommendations from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as prerequisites for funding or World Bank loans. Those under considerable debt who are unable to provide adequate infrastructure and opportunities for their populations have also entered discussions about debt restructuring. Some decided to float their national currencies, eliminate fuel subsidies, or raise indirect taxes and other revenue-generating methods. However, these reform measures have intensified the hardship faced by their citizens, particularly among the unemployed youth, who average over 20% in unemployment rates across Africa, with some nations reporting rates as high as 80% (Ohhai, 2024).

Many citizens contend that the root of economic troubles lies in the unresponsiveness of past or present governments, poor management of national resources, and an absence of vision from their leaders. They further question the justification for raising taxes in the face of widespread poverty, while government officials and political elites continue to thrive at the nation’s expense. It is within the context of these challenges that this study investigates social movements and economic reforms in Africa, focusing on Kenya and Nigeria. The paper aims to identify the causes behind the rise of social movements in Kenya and Nigeria, analyse trends and patterns of these movements in both countries, evaluate the implications of social movements, and assess government responses to the grievances of the masses.

CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

Social Movement

Social movement can be described as a loosely structured yet persistent initiative aimed at achieving a social objective, generally focused on either initiating or preventing alterations in societal frameworks or values. While social movements can vary in scale, they fundamentally consist of collective efforts (Chimobi, 2024). This means they emerge from the somewhat spontaneous gathering of individuals whose connections are not governed by established regulations and protocols but who simply possess a shared perspective on society. Social movements are characterized as networks of informal exchanges among a variety of individuals, groups, and/or organizations involved in political or cultural disputes, based on common collective identities (Tumo and Onyejiuba, 2024).

A social movement represents a loosely coordinated initiative by a broad group of individuals to achieve a specific objective, often of a social or political nature. This can be aimed at enacting social change or opposing or reversing one (Mohammed, Ahmed and Adedeji, 2020). It constitutes a form of collective action and may involve individuals, organizations, or a combination of both. Social movements are referred to as “organizational frameworks and strategies that can enable marginalized groups to pose effective challenges and resist more powerful or privileged elites. They symbolize a mechanism for social change originating from within nations (Kyle, 2018). Conversely, certain social movements do not seek to create a more equal society but rather to sustain or enhance existing power dynamics. For instance, some scholars categorize fascism as a social movement (Ohhai, 2024).

Social movements are comprised of large groups of individuals who harbor shared ambitions. They represent a type of political collective formed around perceived grievances against a specific authority. Typically, they are critical of the State, those in power, and the broader political elite controlling the State. Solidarity is fostered around issues such as religious fundamentalism, security, land rights, gender equality, environmental concerns, injustice, corruption, and child abuse (Omotosho, 2020). Whether formal or informal, many social movements do not intend to resort to violence but prefer peaceful methods like protests, demonstrations, petitions, and dialogues to communicate their messages to the relevant parties. However, some movements may turn to violence as a strategy when the authorities in question employ oppressive or violent tactics to suppress or eliminate them. While some social movements fade away over time, others evolve into political parties and even establish governments. Relevant examples include the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the South West African Peoples’ Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia. Ultimately, social movements function as pressure or interest groups (Ozili and Arun, 2023).

Social movements act as agents of change in the contemporary world marked by egregious injustices and human cruelty. Social transformations are primarily driven by the functions of social and mass movements. Change can occur progressively or dramatically, as evidenced by various revolutions in modern society. Thus, a social movement signifies a collective of individuals acting with a degree of continuity to either promote or resist transformation in their community or social group (Salua and Iniobong, 2024). Similarly, social movements embody collective efforts aimed at instigating change within certain social institutions or establishing a wholly new social framework. They may also represent a collectively articulated demand for change in specific areas or aspects of the social order (Ovaga and Okechukwu, 2022). Hence, social movements are catalysts that drive gradual or radical change within an existing political framework. They respond to the structural violence and characteristics of negative peace present in modern capitalist states. Social movements should be viewed as launch pads for mobilizing individuals towards necessary actions to facilitate social change. Their defining features include: permanence, group awareness, goal specificity, and a critical disposition (Oru, 2024).

Economic Reforms

Economic reforms entail intentional alterations made to a nation’s economic strategies and frameworks, aimed at enhancing economic efficiency and stability. Such reforms may encompass modifications in taxation, removal of restrictions, trade policies, and social welfare systems, which hold particular significance for nations shifting from a centrally controlled economy to a market-driven one (Omotosho, 2020). The success of economic reforms frequently plays a pivotal role in boosting growth, drawing foreign investments, and tackling systemic issues encountered by developing markets. Economic reforms are crucial for emerging economies as they endeavor to assimilate into the global marketplace and heighten competitiveness.

Effective economic reforms can result in a surge in foreign direct investment, as investors seek secure and appealing business climates (Saleh, 2024). These reforms often encounter pushback from various stakeholders who may fear losing their advantages or influence, making political determination essential for execution. The effects of economic reforms may take time to become evident, with initial repercussions sometimes including rising unemployment or social turmoil. Comprehensive economic reforms commonly require complementary social policies to mitigate adverse impacts on at-risk populations during the transition (Saleh, 2024).

Economic reforms are critical for the progress of emerging markets by boosting efficiency and competitiveness within the economy. By adopting changes such as deregulation and enhanced tax frameworks, nations can cultivate a more conducive environment for business activities. This, in turn, attracts foreign investment and encourages domestic entrepreneurship, ultimately leading to job creation and improved living conditions (Sweeney, 2020). Economic reforms refer to the modifications instigated in the economy aiming to deregulate and address the prevailing economic issues within the country. In India, economic reforms were initiated in 1991, with the rollout of the New Economic Policy. These reforms can be classified into Stabilization Reforms: These are short-term actions designed to rectify imbalances in the balance of payments and control inflation. Structural Reforms: These represent long-term strategies that aim to enhance the efficiency of the economic framework. These reforms can further be divided into liberalization, privatization, and globalization (Idisu, 2024).

SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN NIGERIA

Activism is certainly not a novel concept for Nigerians. Prior to 1960, social demonstrations were widespread. Activists addressed social challenges such as colonialism, slavery, rising costs of living, unemployment, and corruption. These demonstrations manifested in various mediums like print, radio, music, and, naturally, on the streets. For example, during the colonial period, a local publication, Iwe Irohin (1859 – 1867), which initially aimed to foster a reading culture among Nigerians, ultimately became a fervent opponent of the slave trade. The British Colonial Office’s response was predictable; they admonished the newspaper for advocating indigenous causes (Stears Business, 2020). Nevertheless, the publication achieved notable successes. Iwe Irohin’s journalism served as a potent tool in the struggle to liberate the Egba people from the authority of the Dahomey Kingdom, a significant player in the slave trade alongside the British. Thus, as early as the 19th century, Iwe Irohin exemplified the transformative capacity of citizen-led protests, particularly through journalism.

Decades later, during the 1929 Aba Women’s Riots (as labeled by the British), we observed ‘sitting’ as a prominent protest strategy. The women demonstrators would perform dances and sing regarding their grievances outside the residences of warrant chiefs and Native court officials. In certain instances, they even went as far as coating the properties with mud (Oshinnaike, 2020). These protests heavily depended on the determination of the Aba women, their understanding of cultural practices, and a commitment to non-violence, at least on the women’s part. These riots were not fruitless, and they are commemorated as significant events of women-led protests in the nation. They resulted in important victories against the British government, including the reduction of taxes and the resignation of several local puppets appointed by colonial authorities.

Notably, Iwe Irohin and the Aba Women’s Riots are recognized as efficient and nonviolent forms of protest. In the case of Aba, however, the police tragically killed over 50 women despite their peaceful methods. Yet, what these two events illustrated is that non-violent protesters garner greater sympathy from the public because they do not inflict the collateral damage associated with the violent protests witnessed throughout Nigeria’s history (Stears Business, 2020).

In 1966, the military undertook actions that culminated in Nigeria’s first coup d’état. This violent uprising resulted in the deaths of regional leaders such as Tafawa Balewa, Ahmadu Bello, and Festus Okotie-Eboh. The justification for this protest was the belief that military leaders would be more effective in governing the newly independent nation. Regrettably, coups begat other coups, and peace was rapidly cast aside. From 1966 to 1999, Nigeria underwent numerous coups. However, the original premise to cleanse the country of individuals, both high and low, who sought bribes and demanded a 10% cut seemed to fade away. Other forms of protests include labor union demonstrations, student union protests, and the most recent being the EndSARS movement (Oshinnaike, 2020).

SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN KENYA

Kenya’s political journey is characterized by extensive social movements originating from the colonial era and persisting through independence. In the face of police crackdowns, Kenyans demonstrated against political killings and authoritarianism during the administrations of the nation’s inaugural president, Jomo Kenyatta, and his successor, Daniel Moi. A constitutional amendment in 1982 saw Moi establish Kenya as a one-party state, escalating political strife. That same year, Kenyans rallied in Nairobi in support of a failed coup against Moi as opposition figures and civil society campaigned for a return to a multiparty system (Abdul, 2024).

Nationwide demonstrations took place in 1990. This unrest, along with pressure from civil society, religious organizations, and Western donors, compelled Moi to permit multiparty politics in 1991 (Adekunle and Oseni, 2021). In 1992, mothers of political detainees undertook an 11-month hunger strike in Nairobi to press for the release of their sons. Protests over presidential results in 2007 resulted in a brutal crackdown, claiming over 1,100 lives, several of whom were killed extrajudicially by law enforcement. Odinga contested Mwai Kibaki’s victory (Adekunle and Oseni, 2021).

Protests and summary executions also occurred after the presidential election results were declared in 2013 and 2017. Protests hold significant importance. They can pressure governments or authoritative bodies to respond to public interests and injustice (Esajere, 2024). Through protests, a government can be compelled to tackle issues of service delivery, corruption, labor disputes, extrajudicial killings, education concerns, and to reject dictatorial practices. In certain nations like Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, protests led to the downfall of regimes.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA

Representativeness: Social movements are typically viewed as a form of representative democracy, reflecting public desires more effectively than conventional human rights organizations. Guy Aho Tete Benissan, the Regional Coordinator of REPAOC (Network of West African Non-Governmental Organizations), notes that social movements garner substantial support due to their ability to advocate for citizens’ needs and interests. For instance, many social movements are inclusive and welcome diverse demographics, particularly youth, in their campaigns and demonstrations (Adams, 2021).

From responsiveness to proactiveness: Due to their informal nature, social movements can act spontaneously. They react more quickly than organized civil society groups. The movement that ousted former President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso caught most local human rights organizations off guard. In Senegal, the youth-led movements Y’en a Marre (“Enough-is- Enough”) and Movement 23 (“June 23 Movement”) rose to prominence during a turbulent political period in 2011, playing a vital role in thwarting former President Abdoulaye Wade’s attempts to retain power. Meanwhile, long-established and significant Senegalese human rights organizations like Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de home (RADDHO) appeared less active in opposing Wade’s efforts to cling to the presidency. They were not consistently present in protests and lacked the opportunity to demonstrate their influence, leading to a perception of them being reactive rather than proactive (Umeji and Elenya, 2021).

Technologically-based or internet-enhanced activism: The internet now serves as an additional platform for mobilization. With technological advancements come new forms of protest and activism such as tweet-activism and hacktivism. Technology offers social movements the opportunity to develop counter-narratives that contest and resist prevailing ideologies (Parry, Black & Vernon, 2021). Social movements in Africa utilize the internet not just for mobilization, but also for networking, fundraising, and creating global alliances.

Hybrid, flat and flexible: Many African social movements are hybrid, often blending and adapting Western concepts, funding, and activism methods. With technology’s aid, individuals can now self-organize and establish temporary structures to meet the immediate needs of the protests (Couharde and Mouhoud, 2020). Social movements exhibit greater flexibility, are less hierarchical, diverse, evolving, and informal in terms of participation and membership, frequently favoring non-hierarchical organizational methods and unconventional political engagement strategies. They typically comprise various societal segments (occasionally including elements from traditional civil society), as illustrated by the Tahrir Square protests in Egypt on January 25, 2011.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theory of Relative Deprivation, as articulated by Tedd Gurr (1970), was utilized as the analytical framework for this study. The idea of relative deprivation was initially introduced in a series of social-psychological investigations of the United States military published in 1949, titled The American Soldier. At first, the concept addressed individuals who might perceive themselves as lacking certain desirable items in comparison to their own past, another individual, a group, an ideal, or another social category. Nevertheless, over time, relative deprivation has developed into a theoretical perspective that relates to intergroup comparison, which is employed to elucidate social phenomena—specifically, group unrest.

The paper focused on the work of Tedd Gurr (1970) because it primarily examines collective political violence as a result of social unrest. Gurr posits that relative deprivation signifies the perceived gap between individuals’ value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations refer to the goods and living conditions (such as adequate job opportunities, a decent quality of life, fairness and justice, and freedom of expression) that individuals desire and feel entitled to. Conversely, value capabilities denote the goods and living conditions that people currently possess or believe they can achieve. Gurr argues that the larger the gulf between value expectations and value capabilities, coupled with a greater number of individuals experiencing this gap—i.e., the more intense and widespread the relative deprivation and subsequent discontent—the higher the potential for collective violence (Gurr, 1970).

Relative deprivation occurs when citizens feel that the ruling authority is denying them certain rights. This can be categorized as either egoistic or fraternal deprivation. Egoistic deprivation refers to individual deprivation, while fraternal deprivation pertains to group deprivation. Egoistic deprivation arises when individuals compare themselves to one another, whereas fraternal deprivation happens when groups of citizens compare themselves against other groups. This paper focuses primarily on the latter (Gurr, 1970). Central to Gurr’s relative deprivation theory is the assertion that relative deprivation (a social psychological factor) is a fundamental precondition for collective political violence within societies. In his theory, he adopts a psychological approach to clarify how collective dissatisfaction manifests as political violence, utilizing the aggression-frustration mechanism. He posits that the anger stemming from deprivation leads to aggression among individuals. Gurr believes that aggression is inherently linked to frustration among the populace. To him, a heightened level of frustration correlates with increased political instability within a state (Gurr, 1970).

Critics of the relative deprivation theory have argued that it does not adequately explain why some individuals, despite being deprived of rights or resources, refrain from participating in social movements aimed at securing those ends.

The relative deprivation theory serves as the analytical framework for this study. Advocates of the theory assert that frustration becomes normalized in a society when the political and socio-economic benefits available to the populace fall significantly short of their expectations. Such frustration is expressed through violence and conflict. Across Africa, many young individuals feel alienated from their governments, continually questioning the actions of officials due to the absence of tangible benefits, despite the millions of dollars reportedly allocated for various initiatives in the national media. Another significant issue is the gap between the aspirations of the youth and the initiatives of the older leadership, as Africa is the youngest continent globally, with 60% of the population under 25 years of age (Willie, Daniel, and Mboho, 2024). Conversely, Africa’s leaders average 62 years in age. Some of these leaders manage in ways that foster a profound sense of frustration among citizens and frequently implement policies that reflect their disconnection from the needs and challenges faced by the youth (Willie, Daniel, and Mboho, 2024).

The disconnect between government and citizens was highlighted in the Kenyan protests, which started over proposed tax hikes but grew into a wider movement advocating for more accountable governance and calling for the president’s resignation. A similar situation is occurring in Nigeria, where demonstrators initially aimed to address poor governance but later expanded their demands for President Bola Ahmed Tinubu to step down within the first few days of protests. Thus, mass mobilization is perceived as a last resort for expressing grievances, as many protesters feel that government authorities and agencies are neglecting their concerns, while other branches of government appear to favor the ruling elite. This is especially true in nations with imperial presidencies or hegemonic political systems.

This theory is further illustrated by the barriers faced by the youth in engaging with national politics and democratic processes, along with the prevalent belief among Africans that reporting corruption to the government could expose them to retaliation. The theory offers an analytical lens through which to examine the motives behind mass social movements in Africa.

METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

The paper made use of both quantitative and qualitative data, cognizance of the fact that social movements and protests in Nigeria and Kenya were widely reported in print, electronic and social media and a lot of researches have been conducted on those protests, data was collected through documents including government publications, publications by civil society organizations, and international partners. In addition, data was obtained from daily newspapers, magazines, discussion papers, journals and textbooks. Relevant internet sources of electronic media houses, such as international and local television stations notably, BBC, Cable News Network (CNN), Aljazeera, NTA, Channels Television, Television Continental (TVC), Arise TV, among so many others, are also important for data collection. Websites of international and local radio stations that reported extensively on youth protests in Nigeria, and Kenya, especially, #End SARS# and #End Bad Governance# in Nigeria and #Occupy Parliament#, Reject Finance Bill 2024# and #Ruto Must Go# etc. were also imperative, these stations included Voice of America (VOA), British Broadcasting Corporation, (BBC), Radio Nigeria and many other government owned and private Radio stations.  Also, live media interviews of some leaders of the protests were considered for analysis as primary sources of data.

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

The causes of the social movement in Kenya 2024

The most recent protest in Kenya was Anti-tax demonstration, the protests started on 18 June, 2024. Since then, Kenya was engulfed in deadly unrest. Thousands of predominantly young demonstrators, self-identifying as Gen Z, took to the streets — initially to protest the controversial 2024 Finance Bill, and then broadening their aims to demand that the government address inequality, corruption, and elite politics. The 25 June storming of Kenya’s national parliament building in Nairobi was a violent peak of the public outcry, as demonstrators burned vehicles in front of the Supreme Court and set the governor’s office on fire. It also brought to the fore the issue of excessive force in response to the demonstrations, as the Kenyan police fired live bullets to disperse the crowd at the parliament building, killing more than a dozen protesters and injuring hundreds. Rights groups also accused security forces of carrying extrajudicial arrests and enforced disappearances of activists. ACLED data indicate this movement has widespread support, and it has reached more counties in Kenya than past anti-tax protests. Moreover, violence has featured more heavily in the demonstrations both as a factor of new tactics from the demonstrators and the militarized response by police.

Frustration among Kenyans regarding the economic situation and the government’s perceived lack of empathy towards people’s struggles has been simmering for years, but the unexpected public protests took authorities by surprise. President Ruto achieved an improbable victory in a tightly contested election in August 2022, pledging to address the cost-of-living crisis and prioritize “hustlers,” or hardworking, low-income Kenyans, in his policies. Having served as deputy president under President Uhuru Kenyatta, Ruto claimed he had been excluded from decision-making. Upon assuming office, he discovered the state of public finances was dire. Kenya’s national debt is approximately $80 billion, which represents about 75% of its annual economic output, with 65% of annual revenue allocated to debt repayment (Ogot, 2024). The government’s reaction was to eliminate various subsidies established by Kenyatta, particularly fuel subsidies. In 2023, several initiatives to increase revenue followed, including a 5% rise in income tax for the wealthy and a 3% housing levy aimed at funding low income housing, applicable to both employers and employees. Many of these reforms are part of a set of commitments Kenya has made to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Oyugi, 2024).

The National Treasury’s publication in May of additional revenue-enhancing measures for the 2024-2025 fiscal year intensified public discontent. The proposals included considerations for a 16% VAT on bread and the introduction of an “eco tax” on products deemed environmentally harmful, which would have increased costs on items such as sanitary towels, diapers, packaging, plastics, and tires. These suggestions faced severe backlash, despite the government’s insistence that they were necessary for funding public spending. The government’s majority in parliament seemed to assure the passage of these measures. However, an unforeseen source of dissent emerged. Traditionally, opposition leaders have mainly mobilized public support against government policies. This time, though, young Kenyans, seemingly utilizing social media platforms and inspired by grassroots organization without political leaders’ guidance, rallied to voice their dissatisfaction. The hashtag #REJECTFINANCEBILL2024# gained traction over the weekend of June 15, with many advocating for protests to amplify their concerns. On TikTok, numerous videos outlined the detrimental impacts of government policies (Watkins, 2024).

On June 18, just before the second reading of the Finance Bill in parliament, thousands participated in street protests. The movement was initially commended by the public for its peaceful demeanor, contrasting with previous opposition-led protests that had sometimes resulted in riots. Protesters represented diverse ethnic backgrounds and regions, and their articulate, focused demands ignited extensive discussions in national and social media about the economic situation. Despite the significant public opposition to the proposals, the National Assembly voted on June 20 to advance the legislation, with 204 of 349 members casting affirmative votes against 115 dissenting. Many protesters condemned the outcome as a betrayal and called for larger demonstrations on June 25 (Ramage, 2024).

Initiated by controversial tax proposals, the movement evolved into a broader campaign advocating for greater governmental accountability. Some participants are demanding the resignation of the entire government. Starting on June 18, the demonstrations remained predominantly peaceful for a week, but during the afternoon of June 25, the situation escalated into violence. Several demonstrators broke through police barricades and invaded the parliamentary precincts, setting parts of the building on fire, damaging legislators’ offices, and stealing property, including the speaker’s mace. Kenyan police, known for their brutality and facing critical backlash for deploying tear gas and batons on protesters, responded with live rounds. On June 26, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights reported that 39 individuals had lost their lives in the protests since they began (Nyongesa, 2024).

Protesters also initiated a series of street actions that reached a climax on July 7 with a “national vigil” honoring those killed by police. They asserted that while the Finance Bill instigated the protests, the demonstrations were also fueled by broader grievances regarding Kenya’s governance, including sharp criticisms of well-compensated officials in the executive and legislature accused of living in luxury while imposing austerity on the populace (Hyde, Lamb, and Samet, 2022).

Causes of the #END BAD GOVERNANCE PROTEST IN NIGERIA#

The End Bad Governance protests stemmed from Nigeria’s growing economic hardship and hunger, which BBC reporter Simi Jolaoso described as the “worst economic crisis in a generation”, due to record inflation, especially on food prices. Some experts have linked the crisis to the execution of economic reforms, particularly the removal of fuel subsidies and the devaluation of the Naira following the removal of its peg to the US dollar, under president Bola Tinubu designed to liberalise the Nigerian economy and attract foreign investment (Jolaoso, 2024). Various members of the government, including Tinubu himself, had attempted to dissuade protests, with some measures to financially support young people being announced (Jolaoso, 2024). Protests began on 29 July 2024 as demonstrators were seen on the streets displaying placards with messages like “Enough is Enough,” “Stop Anti-Masses Policies,” “We Are Not Slaves In Our Country,” “Hardship Is Unbearable,” and “Fuel Subsidy Must Be Back (Ogunrinde, Folashade, 28 July 2024; Nigeria, News Agency, 27 July 2024; Rapheal, 28 July 2024; saharareporters.com, 2024). In response, the Nigerian Army on 29 July 2024 blocked major roads leading to Abuja, the capital. (dailytrust.com/. 29 July 2024).

Nigeria was at a pivotal moment, this movement highlighted the widespread frustration resulting from economic challenges that threatened the population’s well-being. To fully grasp the extent of these issues, it is vital to explore their origins, impacts, and prospective solutions. Thus, the general causes of the END SARS AND ENDBADGOVERNANCE PROTESTS include:

Corruption: A primary catalyst for the protests is the widespread frustration regarding corruption. Many demonstrators voiced their discontent with the rampant corruption across various levels of government, which they believe undermines public trust and stunts development. Corruption, favoritism, and a lack of transparency have squandered the nation’s wealth, leading to chronic mismanagement of resources across multiple government tiers (Adams, 2021). Corruption is deeply rooted in Nigerian society, affecting everyone from the president to ordinary citizens. The country’s four refineries are not functioning optimally, yet employees continue to receive salaries. Recently, Dangote completed his multi-billion-naira refinery in Lagos. The controversy around fuel pricing regulation highlights significant corruption issues. State governors engage in rampant misappropriation of public funds, leaving citizens mired in poverty. The banking, legal, healthcare, education, and military sectors are not immune. The sense of betrayal and injustice has sparked demands for more transparency, accountability, and systemic reforms to address the underlying causes of widespread corruption in the nation.

Fuel Subsidy Removal: A fuel subsidy refers to a government discount on the market price of fossil fuel, enabling consumers to pay less than the market rate for fuel (Ovaga and Okechukwu, 2022). While subsidies allow consumers to purchase fuel at below-market prices, global debates surrounding them concern their extensive fiscal burden and their impact on citizens’ welfare. The vast scale of fuel provision has led to calls for the elimination of global fossil fuel subsidies so that the funds saved can be used to support the needy and vulnerable populations in developing countries (Couharde and Mouhoud, 2020; Ozili and Ozen, 2023). However, the removal of these subsidies is contentious, with arguments citing that they serve as a form of assistance by making fuel more affordable for the impoverished. Despite such arguments, the administration of President Bola Tinubu took a bold step by lifting the fuel subsidy. Aimed at alleviating fiscal pressure, this decision, however, has escalated living expenses, causing widespread economic distress. The adverse impacts are palpable with elevated poverty levels, increased theft, and soaring prices for goods and services, as a litre of fuel often costs #1300 at most gas stations nationwide .

Poor Infrastructure: The lack of adequate infrastructure encompassing power, transportation, and healthcare has hindered economic advancement and stifled investment opportunities. Nigeria’s public infrastructure is in a critical state, with degradation affecting multiple sectors, including transport, power generation, and healthcare. The nation faces a substantial infrastructure gap, which requires an estimated $100 billion to $150 billion annually over the next decade to close. This deterioration has extensive repercussions, including the stunting of economic growth, worsening poverty levels, and diminishing overall quality of life. This situation is exacerbated by embezzlement and poor management of funds meant for infrastructure development, insufficient maintenance of existing facilities, and inadequate funding for infrastructure projects. Some potential consequences include economic stagnation and decline, which impede growth and development, limited access to essential services, and health risks stemming from inadequate medical facilities and sanitation (Ozili & Obiora, 2023).

High Unemployment Rates: The scarcity of job openings, especially for the youth, has intensified poverty and social unrest. Nigeria’s unemployment rate has varied over the years. Geopoll (2024) indicates that as of the third quarter of 2023, the unemployment rate rose to 5%, up from 4.2% in the preceding period. This figure is projected to climb to 5.3% by quarter end, based on global macroeconomic models and analyst forecasts. Historically, Nigeria’s unemployment rate averaged 4.19% from 1991 to 2023, reaching an all-time high of 6% in the fourth quarter of 2020 and a record low of 3.7% in the fourth quarter of 2013. Specifically, youth unemployment for those aged 15-24 surged to 8.6% from 7.2%. Many graduates in Nigeria roam the streets, struggling to find meaningful employment. Although the government possesses the ability to create jobs, it often shows reluctance in doing so. Employment in Nigeria commonly hinges not on merit but on personal connections within powerful networks, leaving many qualified individuals in poverty due to a lack of recognition for their capabilities. This translates to lost potential income for those unable to find jobs. The number of meaningful job opportunities in the economy is low, and resources meant for job creation are often misallocated.

Trends and Patterns in Social Movements Between Kenya and Nigeria

A notable trend in the recent protests in Kenya and Nigeria is that the protest ended in violence. Some attributed this to poor management by security forces coupled with pent-up anger among the youth, while others argue that criminal elements infiltrated the protests with the intent to incite violence, damage critical infrastructure, or pursue agendas that differ from the protesters’ stated objectives. For instance, the protests in Kenya regarding the finance bill, which commenced on June 18 and remained largely peaceful for a week, erupted into violence early on June 25 when a faction of protesters stormed parliament, setting lawmakers’ offices ablaze. Similarly, the #End Bad Governance protests in Nigeria resulted in the destruction of multiple structures and infrastructure in states like Kano, Gombe, Kaduna, and Jigawa (Kanyinga, 2024).

Incidents of kidnappings, detentions, and police brutality have marred several recent protests. For example, in relation to the Finance Bill protests, Kenya’s National Human Rights Commission reported that over 50 individuals died, with many more arbitrarily detained and

numerous others reported missing. In Nigeria, during the #End Bad Governance protests, police allegedly arrested 104 demonstrators, with many charged with public order violations. Furthermore, during the #End Bad Governance demonstrations, police detained hundreds and used tear gas to scatter the crowd (Nyongesa, 2024). Although reports suggest a significant increase in business disruptions in Africa due to protests, the rising frequency of large-scale demonstrations, regardless of accompanying violence, shows that young Africans are determined to pursue their demands or resolve pressing issues. This situation indicates that unless a pragmatic solution is achieved for collaboration, tensions between African governments and their youth may escalate, considering the vast number of young individuals whose demands frequently diverge from those of older political leaders and their parties. The differing accusations accompanying recent protests in Kenya and Nigeria suggest that future mass demonstrations may take on new forms (Ottaway, 2024).

Implications of Social Movements in Kenya and Nigeria

In Kenya, during the protests, thousands breached parliament and ignited parts of the building. Clashes arose in various communities beyond the capital. Akin (2024) reported a death toll of at least 22 people. He added that police fired more than 700 blanks to control protesters in Githurai, a suburb of Nairobi, overnight. Gunfire footage circulated online. Opposition leader Raila Odinga condemned the killings of protesters and the “brute force” employed by authorities, advocating for dialogue and asserting that Kenya’s constitution was effectively suspended. The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) indicated that 39 individuals had died and 361 sustained injuries related to the nationwide protests, with figures covering the period from June 18 to July 1. They also reported 32 cases of “enforced or involuntary disappearances” and 627 arrests of protesters.

Conversely, in Nigeria, the protest on August 1 had serious implications for the nation’s socio-political and economic landscape. Numerous lives were lost during the tumultuous protests, with properties worth millions of naira destroyed throughout the country. The recent End-Bad-Governance demonstrations in Nigeria were characterized by violence and fatalities. On the first day of protests, August 1, 2024, at least 21 protesters were killed, and over 1,100 arrests were made by the police. While the protests began peacefully nationwide, they escalated into violence following security forces’ attempts to disperse demonstrators. The casualty breakdown reported included: four protesters shot dead in Borno State, four in Niger State, three in Kaduna State, two in Jigawa State, one in Kano State, and one in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja on August 2, 2024 (Esajere, 2024). The actual death count could be higher, as some incidents may not be fully documented or corroborated.

The End-Bad-Governance protests disrupted academic activities (Abdul, 2024). Higher education in Nigeria experienced interruptions during the nationwide ‘End-Bad-Governance’ protests from August 1 to 10, 2024, due to resulting violence that led to casualties and extensive damage to public and private properties. Many educators and students were unable to reach their campuses as state governors-imposed curfews in areas like Kano, Borno, Bauchi, Kaduna, Yobe, Katsina, Plateau, Jigawa, and Zamfara. Reports indicated that Borno State University suspended classes, instructing students to vacate the campus until tensions cooled. Likewise, Lagos State University, the Federal University of Dutse, Bayero University Kano, and Federal University of Oye-Ekiti officially halted academic activities until further notice during the protests. Students, both undergraduate and postgraduate, were instructed to either leave the university campuses immediately or remain calm and law-abiding while ensuring their safety through arrangements set by university management.

The Government’s Responses to Address Mass Discontent

Kenyan Government’s Response

In Kenya, the Ruto administration fluctuated between repression and engagement. On June 20, police deployed tear gas and live rounds to disperse protesters, resulting in two fatalities and numerous injuries. On June 23, Ruto hinted at potential discussions, acknowledging the inspiration from the peaceful, “tribeless” protests and committing to attentive listening to the youth’s concerns. Despite this, several prominent protest organizers were reportedly abducted by unidentified individuals believed to be police. Most were returned within 24 hours following an uproar on social media (Saleh, 2024).

In Nairobi, however, police resorted to their usual methods of responding to unrest, utilizing tear gas and water cannons on unarmed crowds. Mwangi (2024) claimed that politicians had “hired goons to infiltrate” the marchers, attributing the violence around parliament to police and criminal activities. President Ruto pledged a “full, effective, and expeditious response” to what he termed “treasonous events.” The defense minister proclaimed a security emergency and called upon the Kenya Defence Forces to assist police in restoring order. On June 26, the president ultimately retreated, stating he would not endorse the finance bill, explaining that the budget shortfall would instead be managed through cost cutting initiatives, including a hiring freeze and reductions to spending across executive, judicial, and legislative branches (Boniface, 2024).

Nigerian Government’s Response

In Nigeria, the government implemented several measures to deter the protests from occurring, or to prevent violence if they did materialize. These measures included engaging state governors, traditional leaders, and religious figures. Security forces like the Nigerian Army and the State Security Service issued threats, claiming they had identified the financiers behind the protests. The Nigerian government also requested more time and patience to address the economic challenges faced by citizens amid mobilization for demonstrations, following a warning from the police chief against protests (Akin, 2024).

The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) requested the identities of the leaders and organizers of the nationwide #EndBadGovernance protests, asserting that such requests were constitutional, as “the Nigeria Police is responsible for ensuring that any activity, including protests, does not pose a threat to national security.” After a cabinet meeting to discuss the imminent protests, Information Minister Mohammed Idris informed reporters of no need for demonstrations. President Bola Tinubu encouraged citizens to abstain from participating in protests, asserting that the organizers were not acting in the nation’s best interest. “The sponsors of protests do not love our country. They have no love for the nation. They do not understand citizenship. They have alternative passports. They are in different parts of the world, holding virtual meetings,” President Tinubu remarked (Cited in Solomon, 2024, p.8).

To quell the unrest, the Federal Government established centers nationwide for citizens to purchase bags of rice at prices as low as N40,000 (down from their previous range of N70,000–N100,000). However, many Nigerians remained unimpressed by this gesture (Akin, 2024). The Government, as reflected in the President’s statements, did not yield to any of the protesters’ expectations, which are primarily driven by a youthful yet increasingly disenchanted populace. An oversimplified analysis might conclude that the protests were unsuccessful, but such a viewpoint would be both premature and misleading. The focus on hunger and calls for the restoration of fuel subsidies addressed vital issues but were not an end in themselves; they were rather a means to greater objectives. From this standpoint, the protests marked a significant success, albeit not in the most apparent ways.

In a TVC interview with hitherto, Minister of Sports and Youth Development, Sunday Dare on measures of addressing protests among the youths in Nigeria, the former minister emphasized the need for constructive dialogue with the youth in Nigeria; he underscores the strategic role of the youth in National Development. Similarly, Tolulope Adeleru-Balogun in an interview aired by Arise TV on the 4^th Anniversary in commemoration of endsars protests in Nigeria, urged the Nigerian government in fashioning out policies that could accomudate the innovativeness and ingenuity of Nigerian youth (Dare, 2021: Arise News, October, 2024).

FINDINGS

The findings indicated that the underlying reasons for the protests in Kenya stemmed from the growing frustration of the populace, especially the youth regarding the economic conditions and the government’s perceived neglect of citizens’ struggles, a sentiment that has been building for years. Sparked by contentious proposed tax increases, the movement transformed into a broader initiative advocating for more responsible governance in the nation. Some demonstrators demand the complete resignation of the government. The protests against poor governance could be associated with the implementation of economic reforms, particularly the elimination of fuel subsidies and the devaluation of the Naira following the removal of its peg to the US dollar, under President Bola Tinubu, aimed at liberalizing the Nigerian economy and encouraging foreign investment.

Moreover, the protest patterns observed in Kenya and Nigeria reveal a decentralized leadership structure among the protestors, making it challenging for the government to engage with the recent demonstrators who continue to add to their demands daily. Additionally, although ruling parties often accuse protestors of being backed by foreign agents or rival political groups, some participants in the 2024 mass protests have also branded the leaders of the pre-2020 protests as “government supporters” and “political opportunists” due to their perceived silence or involvement with the current administrations. Another trend is that the recent large-scale protests have frequently escalated into violence.

The consequences of the social movement in Kenya included the burning of a parliament building and the reported deaths of at least 22 individuals, as police discharged over 700 blank rounds to disperse protestors in the Githurai suburb of Nairobi overnight. Records from the KNCHR show that 39 individuals died and 361 were injured in connection with the protests nationwide. The protest on August 1 had significant repercussions on Nigeria’s sociopolitical and economic landscape. Numerous lives were lost during the failed protest, and properties worth millions of Naira were demolished across the nation. The latest End-Bad-Governance protests in Nigeria were characterized by violence and fatalities. On the first day of protests, August 1, 2024, no fewer than 21 protestors were killed, and over 1,100 were apprehended by the police. The actual number of fatalities could be higher, as some reports may not have been recorded or validated.

The findings further revealed that in Kenya, law enforcement launched their typical reaction to unrest by deploying tear gas canisters and water cannons against unarmed crowds. Politicians allegedly employed “hired thugs to infiltrate” the demonstrators. President Ruto promised a “complete, effective, and swift response” to what he described as “treasonous acts.” The defense minister proclaimed a security emergency and called for the Kenya Defence Forces to support the police in restoring order. On June 26, the president eventually relented, stating he would not approve the finance bill. In contrast, the government’s response to the protests on August 1 was prompt. Numerous security personnel were deployed across various cities. President Tinubu appealed to Nigerians to halt the protests and engage in dialogue to address their concerns, underscoring the importance of a peaceful resolution to the turmoil. To temper the rising tensions, the Federal Government established centers throughout the country where citizens can purchase bags of rice for as low as N40,000 (compared to the usual price range of N70,000–N100,000). However, as evident from the President’s speech, the government did not acquiesce to any of the protestors’ demands.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The recent large-scale protests in Kenya and Nigeria have highlighted the critical issues facing citizens in these countries and have pressured those in authority to seek solutions and reconsider certain policies that exacerbate the situation. These movements have also highlighted various youth-led initiatives and civil society organizations aimed at educating young people about their rights and promoting good governance. The economic challenges faced by Nigeria and Kenya are significant, but they are not insurmountable. By tackling the root causes and collaborating towards sustainable solutions, both nations can pave the way for a more promising future. It is vital for both countries to direct their frustrations towards constructive actions, nurturing a culture of peace and advancement. The youth, in particular, hold a crucial role in determining their future. Africa must rise to the challenge with wisdom, resilience, and a dedication to positive transformation. Based on the findings, the study suggests the following:

Strengthening Governance and Accountability: Enforcing stricter anti-corruption measures and enhancing transparency in government operations, thereby, ensuring youth inclusiveness in the implementation of development agenda is crucial. This includes holding public officials accountable and ensuring that resources are allocated equitably for an inclusive development of all the segments of the population.

Economic Diversification: Lessening reliance on oil and investing in alternative sectors such as agriculture, technology, and manufacturing can generate direct and indirect job opportunities for the youths and stimulate economic growth.

Social Safety Nets: Developing social safety nets and welfare programs can offer immediate assistance and relief to the most vulnerable populations, such as the aged, handicapped and unemployed youths ensuring they have access to essential needs.

Transparency and Accountability: Nigeria needs to focus on developing infrastructure, ensuring transparency and accountability in funding development projects, especially those that have positive impact on the youths and adopting sustainable maintenance practices.

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