Organisational Politics and Performance of the Nigeria Eighth and Ninth National Assemblies

Organisational Politics and Performance of the Nigeria Eighth and Ninth National Assemblies

Peter, Queen Doom¹, Ayogu, Gabriel Igwebuike², Egbara, Edward Amechi³

¹Department of Public Administration Veritas University, Abuja

²Lecturer, Department of Public Administration Veritas University, Abuja

³Department of Public Administration University of Nigeria, Nsukka

DOI: https://doi.org/10.51244/IJRSI.2025.12020001

Received: 06 January 2025; Accepted: 18 January 2025; Published: 26 February 2025

ABSTRACT

This study investigated the effects organizational politics on the performance of Nigeria 8^th and 9^th National Assembly. The study adopted the descriptive survey design, with a population consisting of 4,110 staff of the National Assembly, which included elected, appointed and career staff of both Senate and House of Representatives. The sample size was 365 respondents drawn from the various departments of the National Assembly using multistage sampling technique and the Taro Yamane formula. Furthermore, the instrument for the collection of data for this study was questionnaire. Each of the subscale contains various items that border on each of the three independent variables of the study that constitute the objectives. The instrument was checked for validity and reliability, and a minimum reliability coefficient of 0.75 was obtained using Cronbach’s alpha method reliability index for each category. The instrument was administered to the respondents through direct delivery method by the researcher, and with the help of three research assistants trained by the researcher. The data obtained was analysed using SPSS mean, standard deviation and simple percentages methods. The hypotheses were tested at 0.05% level of significance using the Chi-square Fit of Goodness Test analysis in SPSS. Results from the study revealed that organizational politics had a significant effect on the selection of principal officers, appointment of committee members and affected the law-making and oversight functions of the 8^th and 9^th Assemblies. The study recommended that among others that lawmakers, executive and political parties should be selfless and patriotic in selection of principal officers of the National Assembly.

Keywords: Organisational Politics, Administration, National Assembly, Nigeria.

INTRODUCTION

In modern societies, the place of the legislative arm of government cannot be overemphasized. Legislature is the basis of democratic rule; no legislature, no democracy. It is the legislature that clearly demarcates the boundary between democratic and undemocratic countries (Peter & Peterside, 2019). The legislature avails the people the opportunity to participate in governance. Though, societies have outgrown direct participation of everybody in making laws that affect them, institution of modern legislature affords the people to elect or appoint representatives to legislate on their behalf. The legislature across the globe performs four major functions as lawmaking, representation, oversight and budgeting (Saliu & Bakare, 2020). The legislature makes laws for the good governance of the polity, represents the people’s interests in the government, performs oversight functions on the executive to prevent democratic tyrannical tendencies, and also guards the treasury by appropriating money for the running of government businesses.

In Nigeria, the legislative arm of government is grouped into Legislative Councils, States’ Houses of Assembly and the National Assembly. In line with the country’s federal structure, the legislative councils, legislate for local government areas; states’ houses of assembly for the state governments and National Assembly for the federal government. The National Assembly (NASS) which is the focus of this study is composed of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The House of Representative is made up of 360 members representing the various federal constituencies of the country for effective representation of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious character of the Nigerian state. The Senate has a total of 109 members; made up of three (3) senators from each of the thirty-six (36) states and one (1) senator for the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (S. 47-49). While the House of Representatives is to reflect the diverse people of Nigeria, the Senate is to reflect national unity and national interest.

In line with global practices for legislators, Sections 58 of the 1999 Constitution as amended empowered the NASS to make laws for the country, approve government budget (S. 59), and investigate issues which it has the power to make laws (S. 88) or any person or agency that execute duties concerning issues on which NASS has made laws or anybody or agency handling money on which the National Assembly has made laws. Others are powers to appropriate funds for the president (S. 81 and 83), powers to prescribe salaries and allowances to the President (S. 84), powers to summon evidence (S. 89) and power to remove from office a President who has committed grave infractions (S. 143). It has also the prerogative to approve appointees of the President (S. 147) which is the basis for the screening process. More importantly, the NASS amend the constitution with the co-operation of the States’ Houses of Assembly. National Assembly members pursue the progress and unity of the Federal Republic of Nigeria but more importantly use their positions to advance the interests of their various political parties.

Considering the enormous nature of the functions and powers of the National Assembly, the 1999 Constitution (Amended) put forward structures for its administration. These refer to persons, institutions, units, departments constituted to direct effective and efficient operation of the National Assembly. These include constitution of principal officers, committees and National Assembly Service Commission (NASC). The Principal Officers of the NASS are the members elected/appointed by their colleagues to organize them to achieve their mandates as Nigerian Federal Lawmakers and representatives of both ruling and opposition parties. These include a Offices of the Senate President, Deputy Senate President, Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives (S. 50). Others are Majority Leader and Deputy, Majority Whip and Deputy Whip, Minority Leader and Deputy, and Minority Whip and Deputy. The major requirements for choosing the Principal Officers include personal merit of character, competence and integrity, federal character/zonal representation, freedom of members to elect their presiding officers. It also include national interest, party loyalty, number of seats won by the political parties in the house, ranking of members, balance, equity and fairness, gender and age etc (Olasope, 2019). These elaborate conditions are meant to guarantee freedom of choice by members, promote national unity and to protect the interests of political parties.

Aside the Principal Officers, there are also committees set up to assist the presiding officers in ensuring smooth and impactful legislative business. A committee is made up of two or more legislators appointed by the principal officers to assist in making all-encompassing legislations. In choosing committee members, previous experiences, party affiliations, size of challenges confronting the lawmakers and the country are well-considered. The areas of excellence/specialization of members are given premium as they are expected to bring their experiences to bear in service to the house and the nation. While some committees are statutory (standing committees), others are select/special or adhoc. There is no limit to the number of committees to create. It depends on needs and political interests at a given time.

However, despite the provisions for effective administration of the National Assembly, it has not been able to impress great majority of Nigerians. According to Bakare and Bello (2021), the NASS has never ceased to make negative headlines. The institution now has bad public image among Nigerians. The negative comments towards the National Assembly among Nigerians could stem from wastefulness of the lawmakers. They have alleged persistently refused to disclose to the public their actual earnings. It is alleged that they receive bogus salaries and allowances even at a time Nigerians are living miserly. Despite the huge salaries and allowances, many of the legislators are usually absent during meetings. It is common to see among the few lawmakers present fast asleep on the floor of both Senate and House of Representatives. It is even more unhonourable to see them fight dirty during plenary among themselves. Most time they behave thuggish, stealing and hiding the mace for selfish reasons (Idakwo, 2022). More disheartening is that in a number of instances, they failed to stand with the people and play rubber stamp for the executive arm. Antisocial media bill was nearly passed by the NASS intended to deny Nigerians their freedom of expression. The Academic Union of the Universities was on strike for nearly one year without strong resolutions of the NASS to protect Nigerian students. The result were calls from different quarters for scrapping of the National Assembly or making it single-chamber and part-time.

Scholars and public commentators have tried to suggest the reasons for such poor performance of the National Assembly. Some of the persons that saw themselves in the National Assembly were opportunists (Azu, 2021). There was no preparation for such huge responsibility. Due to political patronage, political godfathers allegedly manipulate political party primaries to dash their stooges tickets to the National Assembly. There is also the allegation of executive and political parties’ interferences (Adibe & Mbaegbu, 2017). The presidency and political parties are alleged to interfere in presiding officers’ elections as well as constitution of committee membership. This foist incapable and weak leaders on NASS making them poor in carrying out oversight functions. From the foregoing, one can suggest that another cause of the poor performance of the National Assembly which has not been picked up significantly for study is organizational politics. This is office/workplace politics different from political parties’ politics that brought the members to both chambers of the National Assembly.

The term politics has been described as a social process characterized by activity involving rivalry and co-operation in the exercise of power culminating in decisions making for a group. It is a part of organizational life because organisations are made up of different interests that need to be aligned. Typically, organisations often have limited resources that must be allocated in some way. Individuals and groups within the organization may disagree about the allocation of these resources. Subsequently, they are inclined to gain those resources for themselves or their interest groups, which ultimately gives rise to organizational politics. organizational politics here connotes the pursuit of individual agendas and self interest in an organization without regard to the resulting effect on the organization’s efforts to achieve its goals. It involves adopting either informal, unofficial or behind-the-scene efforts in order to sell ideas, influence an organization, increase power, or achieve other targeted objectives (Muiruri, 2023). It is consequent upon the allegation of pursuit of individual agendas and self-interest in NASS without regard to the resulting effect on its administration that this study investigated the effect of organizational politics on the administration of Nigeria 8^th and 9^th National Assembly.

Hence, from its inception, the 8^th National Assembly experienced a debilitating leadership crisis following the unexpected emergence of Senator Bukola Saraki as Senate President, against the wishes of the APC leadership, whose desired candidate was outmanoeuvred. The new leadership of the National Assembly spent a considerable amount of time trying to establish its legitimacy and authority, which could have adversely affected its work (YIAGA-CLE, 2019).

Similarly, in 2019, the ruling party allegedly declared the formation of the 9^th Assembly leadership as do or die to prevent the 8^th Assembly experiences with their consequences. The desperation led to the emergence of Senator Ahmed Lawan as Senate President and Honourable Femi Gbajabiamila, Speaker House of Representatives in 2019. Such desperations could hardly go without harsh effects on other areas in the administration of the National Assembly (Krishi & Sule, 2015; Agbakwuru, 2019).

The Legislature performs three broad and important functions in a democracy; law making, representation and oversight, which are essential to the promotion and sustenance of democracy, democratic institutions, good governance and accountability. If these roles are played effectively, the legislature can contribute immensely to the strengthening of state institutions, state capability, accountability and responsive governance (YIAGA-CLE, 2019). In practice, however, many legislatures across the world do not meet these important criteria, as some are mere rubber stamps of executive decisions. This is especially so in emerging democracies, although some developing legislatures make gallant efforts under very difficult circumstances, to represent different interests in society and in the process, hold the executives to account for their actions or inactions. The key issue that seems to hamstrung successful administration of the National Assembly could emanate from politicization of appointment into major structures of the institution designed for its effective administration. The appointments/selections seem to lean more to cabal influences, buying, federal character and party loyalty. The result of appointment/selection based on these conditions is usually recruitment of persons very weak to discharge the objectives of his organization creditably. The appointment of officials with questionable profiles into key positions of the National Assembly may likely affect it administration negatively.

Politicization of the administration of National Assembly could stem from the fact that mandates of the institution have wide effects on the executive, interest groups, political parties, foreign countries etc. This is because various interests compete to dominate the decisions coming from the institution for largely selfish reasons.

Hence, the worry is that the way resources/positions are allocated in the National Assembly would not guarantee effective administration, characterized by people-focused legislation, oversight and representation in the country. For instance, there are allegations that appointment of principal officers, heads and members of committees are based mainly on purchase, representation and favour with less priority on personal merit of character, competence and integrity. Where this is the case, there are chances of filling superior positions with poorly suited persons. Representative politics has become a major factor for appointment of management officials of the National Assembly. These tend to subject qualification to ethnic, tribal, sectional and more worrisomely, religious divides. Despite the fact that federal character and zoning of certain offices and appointments are attempts to manage Nigeria diversity, it is usually abused with other political criteria like favouritism, cabalism, moneybags and political affiliation among others, which manifest in poor administration of the National Assembly. These issues informed the researcher’s interest in examining the effects of organizational politics on the performance of Nigeria 8^th and 9th National Assembly.

The study was guided by the following research questions:

1. How did organizational politics affect the selection of principal officers of Nigeria 8^th and 9^th National Assembly?
2. To what extent did organizational politics affect committee members’ oversight functions of Nigeria 8^th and 9^th National Assembly?
3. To what extent did organizational politics affect law-making in the Nigeria 8^th and 9^th Assembly?

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework adopted for this study is the systems theory as propounded by Miller and Rice (1967) states that organisations should be treated as open systems that transform inputs into outputs within the environments (external and internal) upon which they are dependent. This method of managing performance is important because all the factors that influence performance, including the system and the context, can be taken into account when assessing it. Individual performance is influenced by systems factors as well as person factors (Cardy & Dobbins, 1994). These will include the support they get from the organisation and other factors outside the control of individuals. Jones (1995) proposes that the aim should be to manage context not performance and goes on to explain that in this equation, the role of management focuses on clear, coherent support for employees by providing information about organisation goals, resources, technology, structure, and policy, thus creating a context that has multiplicative impact on the employees, their individual attributes (competency to perform), and their work effort (willingness to perform).

An organisational system is composed of the people who do the work but far more than that. It also includes the organisation s methods, structure, support, materials, equipment, customers, work culture, internal and external environments (such as markets, the community, governments), and the interaction of these components. Each part of the system has its own purpose but at the same time is dependent on the other parts.

Hence, we consider its major principles very applicable to our study. The basic assumption of interdependency of key stakeholders by the theory explains the performance of the National Assembly and the politics therewith. In both houses of the National Assembly, there lawmakers representing particular constituencies. There are as well the civil servants (NASC) appointed to serve in the NASS bureaucracy and appointed aides to the lawmakers. These individuals represent some definite interests which they seek to project and protect in the course of their assignments in the National Assembly.

In serving in the National Assembly, the system or context under which the lawmakers, NASC and the lawmakers’ aides operate determine their level of performance, not really their individual values. The division of the lawmakers into ruling and opposition members in the NASS context affect roles’ performance depending on the side each belong. For the lawmakers, there are the standing orders and the NASC the Act establishing it.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The design that was adopted for this study is descriptive survey design. The population of this study consisted of 4,110 staff of the National Assembly, which included elected, appointed and career staff of both Senate and House of Representatives. The details of the population of the study are as follows:

Table 1. Distribution of population for the study per houses of the National Assembly

S/N	National Assembly	Elected Staff	Appointed Staff	Career Staff	Total Staff
1	Senate	109	1090	353	1552
2	House of Representatives	360	1750	448	2558
	Grand Sub Total	469	2840	801	4110

Source: Directorates of Research and Information (Senate and House of Representatives), 2023.

A sample size obtained was 365 using the Taro Yamane formula. Data collected were presented using tables and charts. These tables showed the frequency and percentages of responses from the questionnaire respondents. With these tables, it was very easy to see the data of the opinion of respondents at a glance and conclusions were easily drawn. Research questions were answered with mean and standard deviation in SPSS. Since the instrument is in the pattern of a modified four-Likert scale weighted 4, 3, 2, and 1. Therefore, a criterion Mean of 2.50 was adopted in decision-making. That is 4+3+2+1= 10/4 = 2.50. Hence, all items with mean scores up to 2.50 and above were classified as high acceptance while those whose Mean scores are below 2.50 were classified as low acceptance. Chi-square goodness of fit test was used to test the hypotheses at a 0.05 level of significance.

Data Presentation and Analysis

Research Question 1: How did organizational politics affect the selection of principal officers of Nigeria 8^th and 9^th National Assemblies?

Descriptives

Descriptives Variables=Po1 Po2 Po3 Po4 Po5 Po6 Po7 Po8 /Statistics=Mean Stddev Range Min Max.

Descriptive Statistics
	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
PO1	365	3	1	4	3.08	1.095
PO2	365	3	1	4	3.20	1.064
PO3	365	3	1	4	3.14	1.026
PO4	365	3	1	4	3.14	.912
PO5	365	3	1	4	3.08	1.095
PO6	365	3	1	4	2.28	1.177
PO7	365	3	1	4	2.73	.966
PO8	365	3	1	4	2.13	.829
Valid N (listwise)	365

Grand: 2.85           1.02

An analysis of research question one on the opinions of the respondents on the effects of organizational political in the selection of principal officers (PO) of the National Assembly in the 8^th and 9^th Assemblies showed that item PO1 has a mean value 3.08 and standard deviation of 1.10, item PO2 has a mean value of 3.20 and standard deviation of 1.06, item PO3 has a mean value of 3.14 and standard deviation of 1.03. In the same way, item PO4 has a mean value of 3.14 and standard deviation of 0.91, item PO5 has a mean value of 3.08 and standard deviation of 1.10, item PO6 has a mean value of 2.28 and standard deviation of 1.18, item PO7 has a mean value of 2.73 and standard deviation of 0.97 and item PO8 has a mean value of 2.13 and standard deviation of 0.83.

The details of the responses further indicated that a grand mean of 2.85 is above the scale mean of 2.50. This therefore showed that the respondents agreed that there is a significant relationship between organizational politics and selection of principal officers of the National Assembly in the 8^th and 9^th Assemblies.

In line with the findings of this study, Krishi and Sule (2015) observed that in forming the NASS leadership of the 8^th Assembly, both Senate President Bukola Saraki and Speaker of the House Yakubu Dogara emerged against the wish and directive of their party, APC which prefers Senator Ahmad Lawan and Femi Gbajabiamila to occupy the two top positions respectively. But Saraki and Dogara defied APC to emerge. At first, the APC described Saraki and Dogara’s emergence as “unacceptable” but the party later recognized them.

While the other lawmakers loyal to the executive were attending a meeting convened on the instance of the APC to direct its members on who to vote for in NASS elections, the opposition PDP formed alliance with some APC members not satisfied with the choice of the ruling party. With the alliance, a quorum of the lawmakers was formed and candidates emerged against the wishes of the ruling party. The outcome of the election pitted the legislature against the executive all through the life of that Assembly.

In similar vein, the current research findings agreed with the findings of Agbakwuru (2019) who noted that selection was declared a do or die affair by the APC-Led government in the 9^th National Assembly. He reported that in dinner with President Buhari and newly elected National lawmakers on the platform of APC that the president regretted the relationship between the 8^th Assembly and the Executive and pleaded with them to toe not their part. He frowned at what he described as deliberate and persistent delay in passing the nation’s annual budget by the national assembly and challenged the in-coming 9th national assembly to do things differently from the outgoing 8th senate so as to enable his administration achieve its target of transforming the nation. “What happened in the last senate and so on is regrettable because I still feel it shouldn’t take seven months to pass a budget”. In his remarks at the dinner, National Chairman of APC, Comrade Adams Oshiomhole boasted that the party would not share any of the leadership positions especially, the position of presiding officers with the opposition Peoples Democratic Party, PDP, as was the case in the eight Senate where the position of the Deputy Senate President was taken by the opposition.

The implication of such a “passionate appeal” from an Executive President and boast from the National Chairman of the ruling part in Nigeria is that the government is ready to do just anything. Hence, opposition could be intimidated, members in the parliament coerced and money moved in to lobby and buy members into voting against capacity, merit and competency. In this case puppets who dance to the executive are imposed on the lawmakers.

Similarly, Aborisade (2019) observed that in an attempt to ensure that APC candidates dominated the leadership of the 9^th Assembly, Governors of the All Progressive Congress stormed the National Assembly complex to witness the election of presiding officers. They were led by the Chairman of the Nigerian Governors Forum, Kayode Fayemi. Others in the entourage included the Governors of Kwara, Plateau, Kebbi Osun, Kano, Katsina, and Nasarawa among others.

The implication of their presence is that lawmakers from their states would be forced to vote according to directives. These moves were largely against the Standing Orders and the 1999 Constitution which empowered the lawmakers to independently choose their leadership. In this process of the bigger politicians, governors invading the principal officers’ selection process, merit, competence and capacity could be dashed.

Furthermore, the systems theory adopted for the study supported this finding. In this case, the selection of the principal officers and indeed the administration of the National Assembly, it is interdependent on multiple actors in the context of the National Assembly. They consider factors that favor and protect their interests within and outside the National Assembly in the choice of principal officers. The players included presidency, state government, ministries departments and agencies, private sector and even outside the country which play important roles to ensure people who occupy these positions will protect their interests. This could be the reason why in most cases, the National Assembly under the care of these principal officers enacted unpopular laws and renege on their oversight functions of the National Assembly when issues affecting the masses come up.

Research Question 2: To what extent did organizational politics affect committee members’ oversight functions of Nigeria 8^th and 9^th National Assembly?

Descriptives

Descriptives Variables=Ac1 Ac2 Ac3 Ac4 Ac5 Ac6 Ac7  /Statistics=Mean Stddev Range Min Max.

Descriptive Statistics
	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
AC1	365	3	1	4	1.95	1.182
AC2	365	3	1	4	2.76	.928
AC3	365	3	1	4	3.21	.980
AC4	365	3	1	4	3.21	.980
AC5	365	3	1	4	2.41	1.170
AC6	365	3	1	4	2.94	1.119
AC7	365	3	1	4	2.08	1.157
Valid N (listwise)	365

Grand: 2.65          1.07

The second research finding showed that organizational politics had a significant effect on the committee members’ oversight functions of the National Assembly in the 8^th and 9^th Assemblies. The majority of staff (appointees) strongly agree that heads of both chambers of the National Assembly appointed mainly those who supported their elections in the 8^th and 9^th Assemblies. This was supported by the fact that grand mean (X) score of 2.65 is greater than the criterion Mean (X) of 2.50. It was indicated that ability to buy/pay heavily, settlement of big politicians, federal character and zoning as well as influences/lobbying of heads of ministries, departments and agencies determined opportunity to be appointed into committees of the National Assembly in the 8^th and 9^th Assemblies. The respondents agreed to four out of the seven items in this category. The hypothesis that followed agreed that organizational politics had a significant effect on the appointment of committee members of the National Assembly in the 8^th and 9^th Assemblies.

Consequently, the politicization of the committee member choice and activities affected their core mandates of oversights. Committees are created to mirror government ministries and departments in the executive which they oversee. They do this by deploying a number of instruments including oversight visits, public and investigative hearings, interactive sessions, questions, referrals and public petitions. Thus, committees have been termed the engine rooms of the legislature (YIAGA-CLE, 2019).

Number of meetings held and oversight functions taken by selected committees of the 8^th National Assembly

Table 4.3.2.1: Oversight Activities of the Senate Committee on Appropriation (2015-2019)

Oversight Mechanism	Legislative Year
	2015/2016	2016/2017	2017/2018	2018/Mar 2019
Meetings	12	36	21	9
Oversight Visits	0	0	0	0
Public Hearings	1	1	1	1
Investigative Hearings	0	0	0	0
Bill referrals	1	1	1	1
Other referrals	0	0	0	0
Screening of government nominees	0	0	0	0
Interactive sessions with MDAs	1	1	1	1
Questions	0	0	0	0
Public Petitions	0	0	0	0

Source: Sessional reports of the committee as cited by YIAGA-CLE, 2019

From the table, the committee had a total of 78 meetings for the whole four years. There was no oversight visit of any kind. Public hearing was held once per year, 4 in four years. There was no record of Investigative Hearing; Bill referrals were four (4); no other referrals, no Screening of government nominees; four (4) Interactive sessions with MDAs; zero questions and zero public petitions. The general implication is that there were poor outcomes from the oversight functions. The politics that resulted from the composition of the principal officers and committee membership resulted in unfriendly non cordial relationship between the committee and other institutions it ought to oversight.

Table 4.3.2.1.1: Oversight Activities of the Senate Committee on Appropriation (2019 Apr/2023)

Oversight Mechanism	Legislative Year
	2019/2020	2020/2021	2021/2022	2022/Mar 2023
Meetings	50	76	40	16
Oversight Visits	5	9	4	3
Public Hearings	9	13	10	7
Investigative Hearings	5	2	6	3
Bill referrals	7	1	4	2
Other referrals	0	0	0	0
Screening of government nominees	23	8	5	2
Interactive sessions with MDAs	4	3	5	1
Questions	0	0	0	0
Public Petitions	0	2	0	1

Source: As compiled by the research

However, in the 9^th Senate, the politics in the leadership favoured the ruling party. The confrontational relationship of the 8^th Assembly assuaged. The committee improved significantly in number of meetings, oversight visits, public hearing and other functions. 182 meetings of the committee were held for instance. There was more understanding among members and respect from institutions being oversighted. The 9^th Assembly Appropriation committees successfully reverted the yearly budget cycle to January-December as against June-May yearly cycle it was previously.

Table 4.3.2.3: Oversight Activities of the House Committee on Public Petitions (2015-2019)

Oversight Mechanism	Legislative Year
	2015/2016	2016/2017	2017/2018	2018/Mar 2019
Meetings	3	1	1	2
Oversight Visits	0	1	1	0
Public Hearings	0	0	0	0
Investigative Hearings	25	27	32	25
Bill referrals	0	0	0	0
Other referrals	0	0	0	0
Interactive sessions with MDAs	2	0	1	1
Public Petitions	73	83	1000+	155

Source: Sessional reports of the House of Representatives committee, 2015-2019

Because of the pro-masses stand of the 8^th National Assembly, many Investigative Haring Sessions were organized to checkmate the Executives and the Presidency. The pro-masses also engendered trust in the people who turned in public petitions against government agencies (1000+) in 2021/2022.

Table 4.3.2.3.1: Oversight Activities of the House Committee on Public Petitions (2019-2023)

Oversight Mechanism	Legislative Year
	2019/2020	2020/2021	2021/2022	2022/Mar 2023
Meetings	9	4	5	3
Oversight Visits	3	2	2	1
Public Hearings	1	1	1	1
Investigative Hearings	4	13	20	7
Bill referrals	1	1	1	1
Other referrals	0	0	0	0
Interactive sessions with MDAs	5	1	2	0
Public Petitions	0	6	54	9

Source: As compiled by the researcher

In addition, the finding of the current research is related to Krishi (2019) has a report of how the Senate President and Speaker House of Representatives strategize to ensure that only those who supported their elections were appointed into Grade A or juicy committees as chairmen and members in the 9^th Assembly. Some of the lawmakers, it was learnt, have resorted to following both Senate President Ahmad Lawan and Speaker Femi Gbajabiamila to wherever they go in order not to be forgotten. It was gathered that some of the lawmakers have moved to a popular Abuja hotel where they carry out their scheming on how to realize their ambitions for both principal officers’ positions and committees’ chairmanship.

Some of the Grade A committees in both chambers include appropriation, finance, welfare (Senate/House) services, petroleum (upstream and downstream), power, works, housing, defense, army, navy, air force and education (basic and tertiary). Others are interior, foreign affairs, procurement, maritime, pensions, housing, works, police affairs, FCT, customs and excise, justice, judiciary (federal and FCT), privatization and commercialization, water resources, health, public accounts, agriculture, aids, loans and debts management, anti-corruption, Diaspora, commerce, climate change, among many others.

The Krishi (2019) also observed that the presiding officers, specifically the Senate President and the Speaker, usually reward those that worked for their emergence with such juicy committees. The immediate past Senate President Bukola Saraki and ex-speaker Yakubu Dogara both rewarded their loyalists, especially members of the PDP, with juicy committees. Dogara, for example, gave over 40 committees to the PDP, more than half of which were juicy.

In the same manner, systems theory adopted for the study supported this finding. The monetization of committee membership, settlements for big politicians, federal character/zoning and lobby by heads of MDAs is a strategy to further exclude those who are in the majority that cannot foot the bills. This leads to a situation where different forces use National Assembly to further their grips on the National Assembly administration and the country at large.

Research Question 3: To what extent does organizational politics affect law-making functions of the 8^th and 9th Assembly?

Descriptives

Descriptives Variables=Lm1 Lm2 Lm3 Lm4 Lm5 Lm6  /Statistics=Mean Stddev Range Min Max.

Descriptive Statistics
	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
LM1	365	3	1	4	2.23	.984
LM2	365	3	1	4	2.41	1.104
LM3	365	3	1	4	2.58	1.073
LM4	365	3	1	4	2.87	.981
LM5	365	3	1	4	2.85	.990
LM6	365	3	1	4	2.90	.951
Valid N (listwise)	365

Grand: 2.64         1.01

Furthermore, an analysis of research question three on the views of the respondents on the effects of organizational political on law-making functions of the 8^th and 9th Assemblies showed that item LM1 has a mean value 2.23 and standard deviation of 0.98, item LM2 has a mean value of 2.41 and standard deviation of 1.10, item LM3 has a mean value of 2.58 and standard deviation of 1.07. In the same way, item LM4 has a mean value of 2.87and standard deviation of 0.98, item LM5 has a mean value of 2.85 and standard deviation of 0.99 and item LM6 has a mean value of 2.90 and standard deviation of 0.95.

The details of the responses further indicated that a grand mean of 2.64 is above the scale mean of 2.50. This therefore showed that the respondents agreed that there is a significant relationship between organizational politics and law-making functions of the 8^th and 9th Assemblies.

Organisational politics and Law-making Functions of the 8^th and 9^th National Assembly

Legislation performance	8th National Assembly	9th National Assembly
Bills Introduced	2166	3673
Bills Passed	515	1512
Bills Withdrawn	15	21
Bills Negatived	33	10
Bills Assented	80	175
Bills Declined Assent	53	3

Source: As compiled by the researcher, 2024

From the table, the study observed that organizational politics played in the formation of the principal officers as well as the committees affected the quality and quantity of laws made within the two Assemblies. The cat-rat relationship that existed in almost the entire life of the 8^th Assembly saw reduced number of bills introduced (2166), passed (515) and assented (80). The laws passed by the 8^th Assembly were largely ignored by the executive (presidency) out of suspicion. This was even as stakeholders considered the 8^th Assembly bills as more people-friendly as it scrutinized executive proposal adequately both at committees and plenary.

On the other hand, the 9^th Assembly churned out more bills than the 8^th Assembly. Most of the bills passed by the Assembly were assented than the 8^th Assembly. Executive requests no matter how controversial were approved. These included loan requests, construction of rail lines to Niger Republic etc. In terms of assented bills, 9^th Assembly had 175 as against 80 recorded in the 8^th Assembly. The bills declined assent in the 8^th Assembly were 53 while only 3 in the 9^th Assembly.

Furthermore, the organizational politics also affected the time taken to pass the bills in both Assemblies. Table below indicated the periods for passage of bills in days, number of bills and their overall percentage.

Bills Passed by the 8th Assembly/Actual & Percentage Distribution of Gestation Periods

PERIODS FOR PASSAGE OF BILLS (DAYS)	NO. OF BILLS	% OVER TOTAL
1-50	47	9.1
51-100	14	2.7
101-150	12	2.3
151-200	80	15.5
201-250	41	7.9
251-300	23	4.5
301-350	27	5.2
351+	271	52.6

Source: YIAGA-CLE, 2019

Although a bill should, averagely, take less than six months to pass, our data reveals that out of the 515 bills passed in the 8th National Assembly, only 47 (9.1%) were passed within fifty days, while a whopping 271 (52.6%) took over 351 days to pass. Furthermore, 14 Bills were passed within 100 days, 12 within 150 days, 80 within 200 days, 41 within 250 days, 23 within 300 days and 27 within 350 days. Notably, most of the Bills passed within 50 days were either executive bills or, of emergency nature.

But even as it is desirable to ensure timely passage of bills, sometimes passage of bills within a short span of time deprives legislators of sufficient time to examine bills in detail and leaves little scope for robust consultations with stakeholders. It invariably makes the law-making process predisposed to the pressures of government expediency and politics.

Bills Passed by the 9th Assembly/Actual & Percentage Distribution of Gestation Periods

PERIODS FOR PASSAGE OF BILLS (DAYS)	NO. OF BILLS	% OVER TOTAL
1-50	200	24.5
51-100	442	59
101-150	45	4.4
151-200	50	5.1
201-250	32	2.9
251-300	23	1.5
301-350	17	1.4
351+	12	1.2

Source: As compiled by the researcher, 2024

For the 9^th Assembly, bills did not linger so much in the various arms of the Assembly. About 442 bills representing 59% were passed between 51-100 days of introduction and 200 (24.5%) passed between 1-50 days. The quick passed resulted from the politics of harmonious relationship within the Assemblies and between the National Assembly and the Presidency.

Furthermore, the third research finding of the study indicated that organizational politics had a significant effect on the law-making functions of the 8^th and 9^th Assemblies. The majority of staff (appointees) agree that the heads of the chambers of the National Assembly interfered in the choice of laws made by the 8^th and 9^th Assemblies. This was supported by the fact that grand mean (X) score of 2.64 is greater than the criterion Mean (X) of 2.50. It was indicated that merit, capacity and competence hardly determine consultations and deliberations in legislative processes of the National Assembly in the 8^th and 9^th Assemblies. Rather ethno-religious considerations and interest/influence of leadership of the two chambers determined laws made and the gestation periods. 

CONCLUSION

Organizational politics is if poorly utilized in workplaces constitutes a cog in the effective and efficient running of organizations. No organization serves out its genuine purpose when destructive and selfish manipulations of processes are allowed to thrive. It is therefore very important that the problem of organizational politics in the administration of the National Assembly be taken seriously to achieve its core mandates. It is the belief of this study that if the manipulations of selection of principal officers, appointment of committee membership and filling of National Assembly management positions are allowed unchecked, the mandates of peoples’ friendly legislations and oversights functions would remain elusive. It would also leave the National Assembly with negative reputations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

From the findings above, the study recommended that:

1. The lawmakers, executive and political parties should be selfless and patriotic in the selection of principal officers of the National Assembly.
2. The principal officers of the National Assembly should base appointment into its committees on previous experiences, competencies and merit.
3. The citizens and press should be more active in critiquing the excesses of politicians to ensure that the NASS perform optimally.

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