From Deadlock to Trialogue: A Gravitational Solution to Deep Disagreements in North Macedonia

Authors

Vesel Memedi, PhD

Dituria Foundation Gostivar, 1230 North Macedonia (North Macedonia)

Article Information

DOI: 10.47772/IJRISS.2026.100400538

Subject Category: Social Sciences

Volume/Issue: 10/4 | Page No: 7589-7599

Publication Timeline

Submitted: 2026-04-24

Accepted: 2026-04-29

Published: 2026-05-18

Abstract

This paper challenges Robert Fogelin’s influential “impossibility thesis,” which posits that “Deep Disagreements” are immune to rational resolution. While Fogelin views these deadlocks as terminal logical failures, this study proposes a structural solution by reconstructing argumentative discourse as a trialogue rather than a traditional dyadic exchange. Using the “Law on the Uses of Languages” in North Macedonia as a contemporary case study, the paper illustrates how ethnic identity and state sovereignty function as clashing tectonic plates, creating a strong “hinge” where rational evidence is swallowed by existential attachment. To bridge this gap, the author introduces the concept of the “Great Attractor,” which is an external force possessing sufficient “gravitational force” to pull disputants out of their isolated orbits. The study concludes that resolution is achieved not by forcing one side to surrender its “truth,” but through a rational collapse toward a higher “meta-framework.” By shifting the focus from horizontal persuasion to vertical alignment with a legitimate third party, this paper argues that even the deepest social stalemates can be rationally managed, transforming potential systemic entropy into a shared orbit of survival.

Keywords

Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, Law on the Uses of Languages, Trialogue, Great Attractor

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References

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