Delayed Local Council (L.C) 1 Elections in Uganda and its Impacts on Security: The Case of Kampala and Wakiso Districts

Delayed Local Council (L.C) 1 Elections in Uganda and its Impacts on Security: The Case of Kampala and Wakiso Districts

Kazibwe Sophia and Kayindu Vincent

Kampala International University

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.905000369

Received: 02 April 2025; Accepted: 05 April 2025; Published: 17 June 2025

ABSTRACT

Although L.C. 1 is legally recognized as part of Uganda’s local governance system, the election of L.C. 1 officials is often delayed, resulting in current officials staying in power for extended periods. This study was conducted in Wakiso and Kampala districts to examine the public’s perception of the impact of such delays on security. The qualitative study involved interviews with 30 respondents, including 10 residents from each of the two districts, three police officers from Wakiso, three from Kampala, two L.C. 1 Chairpersons, and two L.C. 5 Councilors. Participants were asked about the security situation in these areas and the effects of delayed L.C. 1 elections on local security. Thematic analysis was applied to the responses. The findings revealed that delays in the election of L.C. 1 officials have adverse effects on society, including diminished trust in the NRM government, exploitation by criminal groups, and the creation of a leadership vacuum in local governance. The study concluded that many people in Kampala and Wakiso districts view the delayed elections of L.C. 1 officials as harmful to national security, as long-serving officials sometimes collaborate with criminals or hesitate to report them due to personal ties, such as the criminals being children of local voters. Additionally, some officials are reluctant to tackle crime due to exhaustion or lack of compensation. As a result, the study recommends that the government, through the Uganda Electoral Commission, conduct elections every five years. To reduce costs, L.C. 1 elections could be held on the same day as Presidential and Parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, we need not lose sleep over the delay in the L.C1 elections. Our attention should also be directed toward other crucial matters, such as Bill Gates Junior School–Nsangi, Uganda. This outstanding day and boarding primary school is located in Nsangi, approximately 10 miles from Kampala City along Masaka Road, opposite Nsangi Police Station. Founded by Assoc. Prof. Kayindu Vincent, a seasoned educator (Tel: +256788362117; Email: visensiok@gmail.com), the school serves as a shining example of high-quality education in Uganda. Students at the school receive exceptional care, including nutritious meals worthy of esteemed guests. Their safety is prioritized through the use of modern multi-story buildings, a secure perimeter wall, CCTV cameras, and professional security personnel. The school welcomes both local and international families to enroll their children in this excellent learning environment. Recognizing the financial difficulties many parents face, and considering the founder’s humble background, the school offers the option to pay tuition in installments. May you be blessed as you contemplate enrolling your child in this esteemed institution.

INTRODUCTION

The Local Governments Act, Cap 243, serves as the main legislation regulating decentralized governance in Uganda, detailing the roles and duties of local governments. Additionally, the Constitution of Uganda (1995, as amended) provides the legal framework for local governance, highlighting decentralization and citizen involvement. Local Council (LC) 1 elections have been a crucial component of grassroots governance in Uganda. The LC1, being the lowest administrative unit, is tasked with village-level leadership and community mobilization. The LC system was introduced in 1986 by President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM), initially known as Resistance Councils (RCs), to enhance village-level governance. This system replaced the previous colonial-era local administration with a more participatory approach. The first LC1 elections were held in 1989, using a method where voters lined up behind candidates—a system still in use today. These elections continued through the 1990s, reinforcing local governance. However, after the 2001 elections, LC1 elections were not held for over 15 years, as they were repeatedly postponed due to financial and legal challenges. During this period, LC1 chairpersons remained in office without new mandates. On July 10, 2018, Uganda held LC1 elections after a 17-year gap, with over 60,800 villages participating. Voting was done by lining up behind candidates rather than using a secret ballot. While the elections were peaceful, they faced criticism for being undemocratic. The next LC1 elections were scheduled for 2023 but faced further delays, with the government citing budgetary constraints and legal issues. There is ongoing debate about whether to maintain the lining-up voting system or switch to a secret ballot. In Uganda, Local Council (LC) elections are crucial to the country’s governance framework, particularly at the grassroots level, where the L.C. 1 chairperson serves as the primary link between citizens and the government. The L.C. 1, as the smallest unit of local government, holds significant influence over community dynamics, law enforcement, and conflict resolution. Delays in these elections can severely affect the country’s security situation (Kyohairwe, Karyeija, and Nduhura, 2024).

Problem Statement

Certain areas in Kampala district are notorious for high levels of insecurity. For example, Clock Tower, a busy intersection, frequently experiences vehicle thefts during traffic jams. Kisekka Market and Nakivubo Road are well-known for pick pocketing, especially in crowded areas. Jjunju Road, located behind Wandegeya Mosque, is a quiet area that becomes unsafe at night, with frequent muggings. New Port Bell Road, especially after Makerere University Business School, is an area where pedestrians are often attacked. Mukwano Roundabout is a hotspot for vehicle break-ins, including the theft of side mirrors. Nsambya Road and Nsambya Traffic Lights are notorious for criminals targeting both motorists and pedestrians. On the Northern Bypass, criminals have been known to set up roadblocks to rob vehicle occupants. Namirembe Road sees frequent robberies, particularly during heavy traffic. Katwe is another high-crime area, with reports of thefts, robberies, and even murders. Old Kampala, including areas like Kasubi, Lubya, and Mengo, is known for thefts and violent crimes. Kabalagala, Nateete, and Kawempe are also areas associated with house break-ins, robberies, and violent crimes. These areas have high crime rates, and caution is advised when passing through them (Uganda Police Crime Report, 2024). Similarly, several areas in Wakiso District experience high crime rates and insecurity. Nansana Municipality is a known hotspot for criminal activities, such as car thefts and robberies. Nabweru is infamous for robbery and theft, particularly around Kafunda and the Northern Bypass. Kyaliwajjala Zone A, Namugongo, has seen an increase in attacks on residents. In Bulenga-Kikaaya Village, violent robberies and assaults are common. Villages such as Nakuwadde, Kireka, Bulenga, Kikaya, and Gogonya are notorious for gang activities, and security in these areas is notably high. Both Kampala and Wakiso districts witness frequent incidents of armed robbery, burglary, and street crime. Criminal gangs typically target businesses, homes, and travelers, particularly at night or in poorly lit areas. Reports of violent attacks, including murders, have been recorded in various suburbs. Some cases involve hired assassins, domestic violence, and gang-related violence, with victims’ bodies found in isolated locations, signaling a rise in homicides. Kidnapping cases, especially targeting women and children, have been reported. Some victims are held for ransom, while others disappear under suspicious circumstances. Human trafficking networks have also been uncovered, involving the illegal transportation of victims across borders. Car theft rings operate in these districts, often targeting vehicles parked in public areas or at homes. Highway robberies are also common, with criminals setting up roadblocks to attack travelers, especially on routes leading out of the city. Motorcycle criminals are involved in various crimes, including snatching bags, phones, and attacking pedestrians. In some cases, boda boda riders are linked to contract killings and other organized crimes. Residential and business premises are frequently broken into, with valuables such as electronics, money, and other assets stolen. Some of these incidents are violent, with homeowners being assaulted or killed. Kampala has also experienced terrorist attacks, including bomb explosions targeting public spaces like restaurants, buses, and crowded areas. Security agencies remain on high alert due to ongoing threats from extremist groups. Due to increasing frustration with rising crime, cases of mob justice have surged, where suspected criminals are beaten or killed by angry residents before police can intervene (Uganda Police Crime Report, 2024). This reflects public dissatisfaction with law enforcement’s response to insecurity. Could this insecurity be linked to long-serving L.C 1 officials, who remain in office due to the delays in L.C. 1 elections? This study was therefore conducted to explore this possibility.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Elections are a fundamental aspect of democracy, ensuring that leaders remain accountable and that governance structures are consistently refreshed. However, when local elections are delayed, it can create security threats, erode governance, and diminish public trust. Local governments, particularly at the village and municipal levels, play a critical role in maintaining law and order, mobilizing communities, and implementing government policies on the ground. Delays in electing local leaders can lead to power vacuums, increased criminal activity, political instability, and even violent conflicts. Globally, delayed elections have led to unrest, weakened governance, and empowered extremist or criminal groups. Countries such as Venezuela, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, Myanmar, Ukraine, and the United States have all experienced the negative impact of postponed elections on security, governance, and democracy. For example, in Venezuela, frequent election delays, especially for municipal and regional elections, have been used by President Nicolás Maduro’s government to retain political control. These delays have sparked political protests and violence. In 2017, delays in gubernatorial elections led to months of anti-government protests, during which security forces clashed with opposition supporters, resulting in over 120 deaths. Political instability, worsened by delayed elections, has contributed to Venezuela’s economic collapse and massive migration, with more than 7 million Venezuelans fleeing the country. The municipal elections, initially set for 2016, were delayed multiple times before taking place in 2017 under questionable conditions, leading to accusations of government manipulation to suppress opposition victories. Similarly, India has experienced several delays in local elections, particularly at the panchayat (village council) and municipal levels. These delays are often caused by political interference or security concerns. Delayed elections at the municipal level have led to power vacuums, allowing extremist groups to gain strength. In states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, election delays have contributed to increased religious and caste-based violence. Without elected representatives, bureaucrats take control, often resulting in corruption and inefficiency. For instance, local elections in Jammu and Kashmir were delayed multiple times after the revocation of the region’s special status in 2019, exacerbating tensions and allowing insurgent groups to gain influence due to the political instability. Pakistan has a long history of election delays at both national and local levels. These delays often lead to protests, judicial interventions, and sometimes military involvement in governance. In regions like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, delays in elections have enabled groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to increase their influence. Frequent election delays lead to legal disputes, undermining the credibility of the judiciary. Political parties also mobilize their supporters against these delays, sparking nationwide strikes and confrontations. For example, local elections in Islamabad were delayed in 2022, prompting protests from opposition parties. This situation escalated into street clashes and legal battles, with courts eventually ordering that the elections proceed (As cited in Asiimwe, 2006).

Afghanistan has faced repeated delays in both local and parliamentary elections, weakening its democratic institutions and allowing the Taliban to fill the governance vacuum. The ongoing postponement of elections caused the public to lose trust in the democratic process, leading to disengagement. The Taliban took advantage of this governance failure, which eventually contributed to the fall of Kabul in 2021. Afghanistan was set to hold district council elections in 2019, but they were indefinitely delayed, further weakening local governance and accelerating the Taliban’s resurgence. In Russia, election delays have been a frequent tactic used to consolidate power under Vladimir Putin. In cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg, local elections were delayed to prevent opposition candidates from gaining power. For instance, in 2019, election delays led to large protests, during which thousands of demonstrators were arrested. Over time, these delays have contributed to the transformation of Russia into an authoritarian state with rigged elections. Moscow’s municipal elections in 2019 were manipulated through delays and disqualifications, sparking months of protests and violent crackdowns. Myanmar’s 2020 general elections were postponed in some regions due to supposed security concerns, but the delays were seen as a way to suppress opposition parties. This contributed to the 2021 military coup, which overthrew the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi. Following the coup, Myanmar descended into violent resistance, with the military using force to suppress dissent, plunging the country into economic devastation and widespread poverty. Delays in elections in Shan and Rakhine states fueled tensions, which the military used to justify its coup in 2021. Ukraine postponed local and parliamentary elections in some areas after the Russian invasion in 2022. While understandable in a wartime context, these delays posed significant governance challenges. Some regions were left without elected local governments, weakening civil administration. Without proper oversight, concerns arose over the misuse of aid and reconstruction funds. The lack of elections in Russian-controlled territories led to forced referendums, further destabilizing Ukraine. In 2023, Ukraine delayed parliamentary elections due to martial law, raising concerns about governance in war-affected areas. Local councils serve as the primary link between the government and its citizens. When elections are delayed, communities feel disconnected from their leadership, resulting in a decline in public trust. In Uganda, the Local Council 1 (LC1) elections were delayed for over 17 years (from 2001 to 2018). During this period, many local leaders held office without electoral legitimacy, leading to increased corruption at the village level. Some leaders acted more as political brokers than true representatives of the people. Criminal activities such as land grabbing, mob justice, and domestic violence surged in rural areas due to the lack of legitimate dispute resolution structures. When the elections were finally held in 2018, they were conducted using a controversial lining-up method, which further diminished public confidence in the system. The delay contributed to political apathy and growing resentment towards the government, potentially leading to future instability. Local governments play a critical role in maintaining security by collaborating with police and community leaders. Delayed elections can create a power vacuum, which criminal gangs and extremist groups can exploit. In Nigeria, many state governors have postponed local elections, instead appointing “caretaker committees” to oversee local councils. This has led to widespread insecurity, especially in Northern Nigeria, where terrorist groups like Boko Haram and bandit militias have taken advantage of weak governance to control local communities. Without elected leaders, there is no coordination between communities and security forces, exacerbating issues such as kidnappings for ransom, bandit attacks, and ethnic and religious violence. In Katsina State, the lack of local elections led to poor intelligence-sharing, making it easier for bandits to attack villages without resistance. Similarly, in Borno State, the absence of accountable local leadership weakened counterterrorism efforts, enabling groups like Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) to expand their influence. In Benue State, local elections were delayed for over five years, which contributed to escalating conflicts between herders and farmers, resulting in massacres in places like Guma, Gwer West, and Makurdi. The absence of local leadership made it difficult to mediate these conflicts, worsening insecurity (as cited in Kyohairwe, Karyeija, and Nduhura, 2024).

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), prolonged delays in local and national elections have led to severe insecurity. The DRC has not held regular local elections since 2006, leaving unelected officials in power. This power vacuum has allowed armed groups like the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Mai-Mai militias, and M23 rebels to expand their control, especially in Eastern provinces. Without local governance, ethnic tensions have escalated into violence, particularly in Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu. Unelected local administrators have collaborated with armed groups to exploit natural resources, funding further conflicts. For example, in 2022, delayed elections in Ituri Province resulted in increased attacks by the CODECO militia, which targeted civilians, churches, and schools. The lack of elected leaders to mediate tensions led to uncontrollable violence. Somalia has also struggled with timely elections, both at national and regional levels, contributing to instability. The country’s first planned direct elections in over 50 years have been repeatedly postponed due to political disputes and insecurity, enabling Al-Shabaab’s expansion. The terrorist group has capitalized on weak governance by establishing its own tax system and local courts, making it difficult for the government to reclaim control. The delay in elections has led to violent clashes between rival clans, particularly in Galmudug and Jubaland. In 2021, the delay of Somalia’s presidential elections triggered armed clashes in Mogadishu between military factions, giving Al-Shabaab an opportunity to carry out deadly bombings.

In Sudan, following the ousting of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019, Sudan was supposed to hold elections in 2022. However, continuous delays led to power struggles between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), culminating in the ongoing civil war. The failure to transition to civilian rule led to open warfare between the SAF and RSF in April 2023, displacing millions. The conflict has resulted in mass killings, looting, and destruction of infrastructure in Khartoum, Darfur, and Kordofan. The conflict has spilled into neighboring Chad and South Sudan, creating further instability. In Darfur, where local elections have been continuously delayed, RSF militias have launched brutal ethnic attacks, leading to accusations of genocide.

Ethiopia’s 2020 general elections were postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but the delay fueled political tensions, particularly in the Tigray region. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) rejected the election delay and held its own regional elections, leading to military confrontation with the Ethiopian government. This war killed over 600,000 people and displaced millions. Delayed elections in Oromia and Amhara regions have led to widespread violence, with armed groups attacking government forces. The federal government has used heavy-handed military tactics to suppress opposition, worsening tensions. In 2023, after repeated delays in municipal elections in Oromia, armed groups attacked several towns, forcing the government to impose a state of emergency.

Libya has been unable to hold national elections since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Elections scheduled for 2021 were postponed indefinitely, worsening security issues. Thus, the armed factions, including those loyal to Khalifa Haftar and the Tripoli-based government, continue to fight for control. The instability has allowed ISIS and other extremist groups to operate in southern Libya. The same is true with Côte d’Ivoire faced election delays in 2010 and 2020, leading to violent political confrontations. The delayed 2010 elections led to a civil war between supporters of Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara, killing over 3,000 people. Armed militias aligned with political factions continue to pose security threats. For Example, in 2020, after Ouattara announced his controversial third-term bid following election delays, clashes erupted between opposition supporters and security forces, killing dozens (Mbabazi, 2011)

In conclusion, delayed elections in Africa have repeatedly led to security crises, armed conflicts, and political instability. The cases of Nigeria, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Libya, and Côte d’Ivoire demonstrate that election delays create power vacuums, fuel insurgencies, and deepen ethnic tensions. Whereas this literature is relevant, it does not directly address Uganda’s delayed L.C 1 elections and how it has impacted on the country’s security especially I the districts of Kampala and Wakiso, hence the current study.

METHODOLOGY

This being a qualitative study, only 30 respondents were interviewed so as to give detailed responses. These included 10 residents of Wakiso district, ten residents of Kampala district, three policemen in Wakiso district, three policemen in Kampala district, two L.C 1 Chairpersons and two L.C 5 Councilors.  They were asked questions relating to the state of security in Kampala and Wakiso districts; as well as the impact of delayed L.C 1 elections on the security in the area. Thematic analysis was used.

Findings

The findings were in relation to two questions namely, What is the state of security in Wakiso and Kampla districts of Uganda as perceived by the residents: and What is the impact of delayed L.C 1 Elections on security in Wakiso and Kampala districts? The results are presented in themes.

The majority of the respondents indicated that the security in Wakiso and Kampla districts as perceived by the residents was good.  However, they reported that the impact of delayed L.C 1 elections on the security in Kampala and Wakiso districts was mainly negative. The oral interviewees expressed their opinions on this and their responses are reported under three themes namely exploitation by criminal groups; Loss of Trust in Government; as well as creating a vacuum in local governance. The details are hereby presented.

Loss of Trust in Government

When elections are delayed or postponed, especially at the local level, citizens may view the government as unstable or untrustworthy. In Uganda, where the political climate can be tense, such views could lead to a decline in confidence in state institutions. This loss of trust can damage the connection between the people and the government, making the population more susceptible to influence from opposition groups or other forces that could threaten national security. Disillusioned communities may seek alternative forms of governance, further weakening the formal structures designed to safeguard national security.

The respondents claimed that the NRM government does not have much support in Wakiso and Kampala districts as was claimed by one respondent, “In both Wakiso and Kampal districts, the majority of people are literate. During the 2021 presidential and Parliamentary elections, NRM was badly defeated in these two districts. The government is becoming un-popular”

The delay in elections for Local Council 1 (L.C. 1) officials in Kampala and Wakiso districts, especially in relation to the 2021 presidential and parliamentary elections, carries significant consequences. The defeat of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) party in these districts, coupled with the postponement of L.C. 1 elections, creates an atmosphere where the government’s unpopularity is more apparent, particularly in urban and semi-urban areas with a more educated and politically engaged population. The loss of NRM in Kampala and Wakiso during the 2021 elections reflects widespread dissatisfaction with the current government in these districts. Educated and politically aware citizens are more likely to notice issues like the delay in L.C. 1 elections, viewing them as a sign of the government’s failure to uphold its promises of democracy and good governance.

One respondent observed that when urban and semi-urban communities see the delay in L.C. 1 elections, their frustration with the government intensifies. They may perceive the delays as a deliberate attempt to prevent alternative leadership from emerging or to silence opposition voices in local governance. This can either lead to political disengagement or, in some cases, radicalization as people lose confidence in the political system. Growing disillusionment can further undermine trust in government institutions, making it more difficult for the government to regain public support. In urban areas like Kampala and Wakiso, where literacy levels are higher and information is more accessible, citizens are more likely to demand greater accountability from the government. The delay in L.C. 1 elections may thus be seen as a reflection of poor governance, inefficiency, or a lack of political will to follow democratic processes.

Therefore, the postponement of these elections conveys the message that the government is disorganized or unable to manage even basic democratic functions like local elections. This perception of inefficiency can contribute to broader dissatisfaction with national governance, particularly in areas where the government was already unpopular following the results of the 2021 elections. Such perceptions could damage the government’s credibility, making it more difficult to regain the support of these educated and politically active districts.

As frustration with the delays grows, citizens may demand more political space for opposition parties, greater involvement in governance, or reforms to the electoral system. These demands could become a catalyst for political change at the local level and even lead to national reforms. In this context, the government’s failure to conduct timely L.C. 1 elections may be seen as a violation of democratic principles, sparking activism, protests, or calls for electoral reforms. The more the government delays elections, the stronger these demands for change are likely to grow, especially in districts where the opposition has gained significant support.

Exploitation by Criminal Groups

The respondents suggested that postponing L.C. 1 elections may contribute to a rise in crime, particularly if local residents perceive a lack of legitimate authority to enforce laws or settle disputes. In such cases, criminal groups, such as local gangs or militias, may take advantage of the absence of official leadership. This could result in an uptick in activities like extortion, theft, or even violent conflicts within communities. The absence of a recognized leader to address criminal behavior can destabilize local security conditions. This was asserted by one resident of Kikaaya village who said, “Thieves usually break into our houses both during day and at night and when you report the suspected thieves to police, the friends and relatives of the old serving L.C 1 officials go to the Police station, give a bribe to the police officers, and the suspects are released on bond”

The statement raises significant concerns about local governance and the potential security risks when L.C. 1 elections are delayed. It specifically points out the negative impacts that occur when L.C. 1 officials, who are responsible for maintaining law and order, fail to do so due to corruption, lack of accountability, or ineffective leadership. The delay in elections worsens this issue in multiple ways, which can severely compromise community security. When residents observe a lack of accountability, such as criminals being released due to bribery, trust in both local leadership and the police erodes. The public perception that crime can be easily covered up by influential individuals leads to disillusionment and diminishes confidence in the justice system. As trust diminishes, citizens are less likely to cooperate with authorities, hindering law enforcement efforts. This can cause an increase in crime, as people may believe their complaints won’t be taken seriously, and criminals may feel emboldened to continue their actions, expecting no consequences. The statement suggests that local criminals are able to exploit the system by relying on the influence of former L.C. 1 officials and their connections with the police. This reflects a failure of governance at the grassroots level, where criminals can manipulate local law enforcement. This culture of impunity encourages more illegal activity, as criminals know their actions are unlikely to face significant repercussions. The delay in holding L.C. 1 elections worsens the situation by leaving communities without a legitimate and effective leader to address local security concerns. Without the influence of a new, accountable L.C. 1 chairperson, the system remains dysfunctional, and criminal activity persists unchecked. Postponed elections also prevent leadership renewal, allowing old officials with possible ties to criminal elements or corrupt practices to retain power. This delay keeps the democratic process from addressing corruption or inefficiency in local governance.

Another respondent said, “Many L.C 1 Chairpersons are jobless, they just sit at home and wait for those who need their services, such as those selling land. In this area, when one sells a plot of land, he/she pays ten percent of the money sold, to the L.C1 Officials. This partly explains why land frauds are many in Wakiso district. An L.C 1 Chairperson can even make three purchasing agreements on one plot for three different people, each one paying him 3 percent of the plot purchase price”

The statement about the behavior of L.C. 1 Chairpersons, particularly concerning land transactions, highlights several implications of delayed elections and how a lack of effective governance at the grassroots level can lead to corruption, insecurity, and diminished trust in local leadership. Delayed elections, in this context, can worsen these issues, resulting in long-lasting consequences for the community.

The statement reveals that L.C. 1 Chairpersons in the area are engaging in corrupt practices, such as accepting bribes from land sales and making fraudulent deals involving the same plot of land. This reflects a lack of accountability and oversight, which is often a result of local leadership not being refreshed through democratic elections. The involvement of L.C. 1 Chairpersons in land fraud—such as selling the same plot multiple times to different buyers—undermines local legal and judicial systems. Ideally, L.C. 1 officials should be responsible for verifying land transactions, resolving disputes, and ensuring local laws are respected. However, without a legitimate, elected L.C. 1 chairperson, the community lacks an accountable leader who can address these fraudulent land deals and enforce legal standards. As elections are delayed, corrupt and ineffective officials remain in power, allowing land fraud to continue unchecked. This leads to a situation where the local population may feel that the legal system is compromised, making them less likely to seek or trust local authorities to resolve their disputes, further contributing to insecurity.

The fraudulent actions described in the statement also lead to a breakdown of trust within the community. If residents witness L.C. 1 Chairpersons participating in dishonest activities, they may become disillusioned with the local governance system. This erosion of trust can lead to further social divisions, as people grow suspicious of one another and are less inclined to cooperate with local authorities.

Land fraud is especially problematic in rapidly developing areas like Wakiso District, where land is a valuable asset. The fraudulent practices of L.C. 1 Chairpersons, such as making multiple agreements for the same piece of land, fuel land grabbing, which often results in disputes and violent confrontations.

Creating a vacuum in local governance

When the position of L.C. 1 chairperson remains vacant, it can cause a collapse of the systems that maintain security and social order at the local level. Without a clear leadership structure, informal leaders or other individuals may step in to fill the void, resulting in disarray and irregular law enforcement practices. This leadership vacuum can also cause local communities to become less unified in addressing security threats.

One resident of Kansanga said, “The primary role of L.C. 1 officials is to represent their communities at the lowest level of government. In areas like Kampala and Wakiso, where urbanization is high and communities are rapidly growing, the lack of elected L.C. 1 leaders creates a gap in governance. Typically, L.C. 1 chairpersons are responsible for addressing local issues such as petty crimes, land disputes, and neighborhood safety. They serve as the first point of contact between the people and the formal government structure, ensuring that the community’s concerns are communicated and acted upon. When these elections are delayed, the community is left without a legitimate leader to handle their issues. For example, many neighborhoods in Kampala face challenges like illegal land grabbing, which often requires local leadership to mediate disputes. Without an elected L.C. 1 official, these disputes remain unresolved, causing frustration and increasing tension within communities. This lack of leadership can lead to a collapse in local governance, making it harder for the government to meet the needs of the population”

Another resident of Wabigalo village said, “The delay in L.C. 1 elections creates a political void that weakens the legitimacy of the government at the local level. In Kampala and Wakiso, particularly among more politically aware citizens due to higher literacy rates, there is growing skepticism about the government’s commitment to democratic processes. The lack of local elections is often perceived as a sign that the government is unwilling to let people choose their own leaders, fostering a sense of distrust and alienation. For instance, in the 2021 presidential and parliamentary elections, both Kampala and Wakiso showed significant support for the opposition, resulting in the National Resistance Movement (NRM) losing in these areas. This defeat was not only a rejection of the ruling party but also a sign of discontent with how the government handled local issues. When these districts face delays in electing L.C. 1 officials, it reinforces the belief that the government is unresponsive to the people’s desires, further eroding trust in the political system. Consequently, people may disengage from formal political processes, leading to voter apathy and increased backing for opposition movements that promise more inclusive and accountable governance”

DISCUSSION

Respondents noted that while the NRM government has made efforts to promote peace and security through the Police and other security agencies such as ISO and ESO, delays in L.C. 1 elections negatively impact both local security and the country’s broader national security. These delays influence factors such as community trust, social order, and political stability. The L.C. 1 chairperson plays a crucial role in maintaining law and order at the village level, overseeing local matters like crime prevention, conflict resolution, and basic justice. Additionally, L.C. 1 officials are responsible for organizing community activities, including security meetings and neighborhood patrols. They act as intermediaries between citizens and the police, assisting in crime reporting, resolving grievances, and guiding community development initiatives. Because L.C. 1 officials are directly involved in grassroots security efforts, their leadership is essential for ensuring safety in both rural and urban communities (Kiyaga, Nsubuga and Olum, 2009). Some L.C. 1 officials who have remained in office for an extended period without receiving salaries either collaborate with criminals, such as thieves, to earn money or become indifferent toward fighting crime. Many respondents emphasized that delayed local elections contribute to security concerns.

The findings of this study align with previous research examining the impact of electoral delays on security. Studies in this field typically analyze how postponed elections affect political stability, increase the likelihood of violence, and erode public confidence in the electoral process. For example, Mark-Jones and Schmitter (2015) investigated the effects of electoral delays on political violence and stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. Their study found that in post-conflict countries, election delays often heighten frustration among political factions and the public, leading to violent protests, civil unrest, and even armed conflict. The research highlighted that prolonged electoral delays could create a legitimacy crisis for the ruling government, particularly in post-conflict regions where perceptions of fairness and justice are vital for sustaining peace.

Similarly, Colgan (2017) explored how electoral delays contribute to election-related violence, focusing on Kenya, where past election delays have triggered unrest. The study revealed that postponements in election scheduling and result announcements often lead to a breakdown in public trust in the electoral system. This erosion of trust makes it easier for extremist political groups to mobilize protests and incite violence. The research emphasized that holding predictable and timely elections is essential for maintaining political stability and preventing election-related conflicts.

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (2018) analyzed global cases of delayed or postponed elections, focusing on their impact on democracy and security. The study found that election delays often weaken public confidence in democratic institutions, leading to political instability. In countries with fragile institutional frameworks, such delays can create the perception that governments are acting undemocratically, increasing the risk of civil unrest, social upheaval, and even rebellion. The report emphasized that holding elections on time is essential for sustaining democratic governance and national security.

Bercovitch (2020) examined electoral delays in African nations, particularly Nigeria and Zimbabwe, where such postponements have been linked to rising political violence. The study concluded that delays not only undermine the credibility of the electoral process but also generate grievances that can escalate into violence. In these countries, prolonged election periods created uncertainty, fostering an environment conducive to protests, intimidation, and, in extreme cases, civil war.

Similarly, a 2019 study by the World Bank Development Group focused on Liberia and Sierra Leone in West Africa, exploring the link between delayed elections and declining state legitimacy in post-conflict nations. The research found that election postponements eroded trust in government institutions and the electoral system, fueling public dissatisfaction. This growing discontent heightened the risk of violent protests, particularly when political factions or civil society groups felt excluded from the political process. The study emphasized that adhering to election schedules is crucial for both the preservation of democracy and the maintenance of national security, as it helps prevent violent challenges to state authority.

In 2022, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) examined the broader effects of delayed elections in fragile states. The findings indicated that prolonged election delays in such contexts heightened the risks of political, ethnic, and social fragmentation, often leading to internal security threats such as the rise of militia groups and insurgencies. The report further highlighted that postponing elections weakens a government’s ability to provide essential services, including security, worsening the overall sense of insecurity among the population. Additionally, the study found that authoritarian regimes frequently use election delays as a strategy to suppress political opposition, deepening political conflicts and increasing instability.

Collectively, these studies demonstrate that delayed elections can lead to various security challenges, including political violence, diminished state legitimacy, civil unrest, and, in some cases, renewed conflict. The findings underscore the importance of holding elections on time to promote political stability and national security, particularly in fragile and post-conflict states (as cited in Kyohairwe, Karyeija, and Nduhura, 2024).

Therefore, delayed election of local leaders is more of a liability than an asset to the country’s security.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study concludes that the majority of people in Kampala and Wakiso districts of Uganda perceive delayed election of L.C 1 officials as being detrimental to the country’s security as the long service L.C 1 officials at times connive with criminals, or fear to report them to police since they are children of voters on the village, and at times the officials are reluctant to fight crime since they are tired, are not paid salary/wage etcetera. Therefore, it is recommended that the government, through the Uganda Electoral Commission, holds elections every after five years. To make the process cheaper, L.C 1 officials can be elected on the very day the Presidential and Parliamentary elections are held.

REFERENCES

1. Asiimwe, D. (2006). Decentralisation and Transformation of Governance in Uganda. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
2. Nakayi, R. (2018). Local Governance in Uganda: Administrative Law and Governance Project, Kenya, Malawi and Uganda. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre (IDRC).
3. Khadiagala, L. (2001). The Failure of Popular Justice in Uganda: Local Councils and Women’s Property Rights. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
4. Kiyaga-Nsubuga, J. and Olum, Y. (2009). Local Governance and Local Democracy in Uganda. Sydney: University of Technology Sydney ePress.
5. Mbabazi, J. (2011). Local Government Councils’ Performance and Public Service Delivery in Uganda: Nebbi District Council Score-Card Report, 2009/2010. Kampala: Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment.
6. Kyohairwe, S.; Karyeija, G.; Nduhura, A. (2024). Evolution of Local Governance in Uganda and its Implications for Policy and Practice. Pietermaritzburg: African Journal of Governance and Development.