Reverse Brain-Drain Approach to Socio-Economic Development: A Panacea to Japaism in Nigeria

Reverse Brain-Drain Approach to Socio-Economic Development: A Panacea to Japaism in Nigeria

Nwambuko, Temple Chukwukadibia¹, Njoku, Chukwunenye C²., Omiunu, Funmilayo I.³*

¹Department of Public Administration, Federal University Otuoke, Bayelsa State

²Department of Political Science, Alex Ekwueme Federal University, Ndufu Alaike Ikwo, Ebonyi State

³Department of Political Science, Gregory University, Uturu, Abia State

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.908000316

Received: 21 August 2025; Accepted: 29 August 2025; Published: 09 September 2025

ABSTRACT

This study explores the reverse brain drain strategy as a viable solution to the rising trend of JAPAISM; a wave of emigration by skilled and educated Nigerians in pursuit of better opportunities abroad. The persistent outflow of human capital has weakened socio-economic development by depleting talent and undermining the returns on public investment in education. Guided by the push-pull theory of migration, the study employed a qualitative research design and employed data from primary sources (interviews and focus group discussions) and secondary literature. Findings identify unemployment, poor wages, insecurity, corruption, and inadequate infrastructure as the main drivers of migration. Consequences include diminished domestic capacity, loss of tax revenues, and erosion of public trust in political leadership. In response, the study proposes a sequenced framework of policy actions anchored in the Push–Pull model but tailored to Nigeria’s institutional realities.

Keywords: Japaism, Socio-economic Development, Brain Drain, Brain Gain, and Reverse Brain Drain

INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, Nigeria has witnessed a sharp rise in emigration, particularly among young and highly skilled citizens. This trend, popularly known as japaism, derives from the Yoruba word japa, meaning “to flee” or “escape.” It has become a catchphrase among Nigerian youths to describe migration in search of better opportunities abroad (Adetayo, 2023; Sodimu, 2023). What began as individual aspirations has now grown into a collective response to structural failures of the state. Mounting frustrations over unemployment, low wages, insecurity, corruption, weak political institutions, and declining social services have propelled this wave of outward mobility. As a result, Nigeria is experiencing a severe depletion of its human capital, with long-term implications for socio-economic development.

The intensification of japaism is rooted not only in present-day grievances but also in deeper historical and structural challenges. Successive governments have consistently failed to deliver on reforms that promote inclusive governance and institutional accountability. Enduring problems of corruption, political clientelism, and weak leadership have eroded public trust and undermined state legitimacy (Nwambuko et al., 2024). For many educated Nigerians, especially the youth, migration has become less of a choice than a survival strategy; an attempt to secure a future that the domestic context can no longer guarantee (Omonijo, 2011).

International reports confirm that Nigeria has one of the highest rates of skilled emigration in sub-Saharan Africa (Egbejule, 2019; Asemota, 2019). Remittances from the diaspora, estimated at over $23 billion in 2023, provide valuable economic inflows, but the wider developmental impact of mass emigration is negative. The exodus of professionals in key sectors such as healthcare, education, and information technology has created service gaps and reduced productivity. Even more troubling is the reluctance of many emigrants to return, citing lack of confidence in the state’s capacity to address the root causes of their departure (Nwambuko et al., 2022).

Against this backdrop, this study calls for a reorientation of policy that not only mitigates the drivers of emigration but also converts brain drain into brain gain. It adopts the reverse brain drain approach as a framework for national recovery, emphasising how diaspora skills, capital, and networks can be mobilised to support domestic development (Stark & Bloom, 1985; Cyranoski, 2009). Guided by the push–pull theory of migration, the research employs a qualitative design drawing on interviews, focus group discussions, and secondary sources to examine how targeted migration policies and diaspora engagement could contribute to sustainable socio-economic transformation in Nigeria.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Migration studies in developing countries, including Nigeria, are closely linked to debates on brain drain, diaspora, and development. Within this discourse, three strands are particularly relevant to this study: the rise of japaism, the concept of reverse brain drain, and the broader dynamics of migration in Nigeria.

Japaism:

The term japa, a vernacular expression rooted in the Yoruba language, literally means “to escape” or “flee.” In the Nigerian context, the phenomenon popularly referred to as japaism has gained widespread usage to describe the emigration of individuals particularly young, educated, and skilled professionals in pursuit of better life opportunities abroad (Adetayo, 2023; Sodimu, 2023). In this sense, japaism transcends mere physical mobility; it signifies a collective psychological and political reaction to systemic dysfunction within the Nigerian state.

From a developmental perspective, migration is both a consequence and a driver of underdevelopment, especially when it results in large-scale loss of skilled human capital. The brain drain discourse has traditionally emphasised the negative effects of emigration, including the depletion of talent and reduced capacity for national development (Clemens, 2015). More recent scholarship, however, recognises potential benefits, highlighting how remittances, diaspora investments, and knowledge transfers can offset some losses (Stark & Bloom, 1985; Cyranoski, 2009). This has given rise to more balanced perspectives that view migration not only as a challenge but also as a potential resource for development.

Reverse Brain Drain:

Reverse brain drain is defined as the voluntary return or constructive engagement of skilled emigrants with their country of origin, often with the intent to contribute to its socio-economic development. Stark and Bloom (1985) describe it as the strategic re-mobilization of human capital from advanced economies back to developing ones that are showing signs of institutional renewal or economic recovery. This process involves the re-importation of technical expertise, professional experience, transnational networks, and in many cases, foreign capital. Cyranoski (2009) illustrates this with examples of professionals who migrate to study or work abroad and later return home to start enterprises, teach, or participate in policy reforms. The growing relevance of this approach is underscored by countries like India and China, which have actively institutionalized reverse brain drain programs as part of broader national development strategies.

Nevertheless, scholars such as Arp (2014) and Arp, Hutchings & Smith (2013) argue that reverse brain drain is not a spontaneous process. Its success is contingent on deliberate policy frameworks and the creation of conducive socio-political environments. Without these, the potential of diaspora engagement remains untapped. The OECD (2002) also notes that countries seeking to attract returning talents must invest in stable macroeconomic policies, infrastructure, and good governance to create an ecosystem conducive to knowledge circulation. These insights form the theoretical foundation upon which this study anchors its proposition of reverse brain drain as a viable countermeasure to japaism in Nigeria.

Migration Dynamics and the Nigerian Context

Nigeria presents a complex migration profile shaped by both voluntary and forced movements, as well as significant diaspora participation in global labour markets. Despite being Africa’s largest economy and most populous country, Nigeria continues to grapple with unemployment, insecurity, inflation, poor governance, and inadequate public services; all strong “push factors” that encourage emigration (Nwambuko et al., 2023; Nwambuko et al., 2024).

The push–pull framework helps to contextualize these dynamics. According to Ravenstein’s early work and subsequent refinements, migration is driven by adverse conditions at home (push factors) and attractive opportunities abroad (pull factors) (Obi-Ani & Isiani, 2020). In Nigeria’s case, push factors such as corruption, terrorism, weak infrastructure, and unemployment far outweigh any domestic pull factors. Conflict-driven displacement further complicates the picture: Boko Haram insurgency and herder-farmer clashes have displaced over 3.2 million people in the North-East and North-Central regions (Ogbue et al., 2024).

Nigeria also has one of the largest diaspora populations in Africa. An IOM (2024) report estimates that 17 million Nigerians live abroad, with concentrations in North America, Europe, the Middle East, and other African countries (Ekanem, 2024). Many have been forcibly displaced, with 333,411 Nigerians recorded as refugees in neighbouring Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. Significantly, the Nigerian diaspora is highly educated: studies show that Nigerians in the United States and the United Kingdom often attain higher education levels than the national averages in their host countries (World Bank, 2018). This underscores the scale of human capital loss in critical sectors such as health, education, ICT, and engineering (Ogbue et al., 2024).

Migration is not uniform across Nigeria’s geopolitical zones. For instance, the South-South and South-East regions are known for high rates of human trafficking and irregular migration to Europe, while the North-East and North-Central regions face forced displacement caused by Boko Haram insurgency and herder-farmer conflicts (Nwambuko et al., 2024). In the South-West, cities like Lagos and Ibadan serve as both exit and transit points for both legal and irregular migration. A 2018 Pew Research Center survey found that nearly 45% of Nigerian adults expressed a desire to emigrate within five years, a staggering indication of the population’s loss of confidence in the country’s socio-political trajectory. According to UNICEF Migration Profiles, there were 447,411 Nigerians residing abroad in 1990; by June 2020, that number had nearly quadrupled to 1,670,455 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division), or roughly 0.8% of the nation’s total population.

This outward migration has enormous implications for national development. One significant cost is the loss of public investment in education as the state subsidizes tertiary education only for graduates to contribute their expertise to foreign economies. There is also a loss in taxable income, diminishing domestic revenue mobilization. More broadly, emigration has eroded public trust in the political class and deepened the crisis of nationhood, as many Nigerians perceive the state as incapable of securing their welfare (Egbejule, 2019; Asemota, 2019).

Despite these negative trends, the diaspora holds substantial untapped potential. Remittances from Nigerians abroad reached $23 billion in 2023 a sum comparable to the GDP of many African nations (Ekanem, 2024). Diaspora-led interventions have also emerged in health, education, and entrepreneurial sectors. Initiatives such as the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN), supported by the UNDP, exemplify how emigrant professionals can contribute to capacity-building in their home countries (UNDP, 1990; IOM, 2017). Nigerian diaspora summits have also become platforms for engaging overseas citizens in national development dialogues.

Thus, the literature suggests that the reverse brain drain approach is not only timely but imperative. What is required is a systematic framework for incentivizing return migration, facilitating diaspora investments, and institutionalizing diaspora knowledge exchanges in the national development agenda. The next section of this study will examine the methodology and theoretical underpinnings.

METHODOLOGY

This research adopted a qualitative research design, combining elements of ethnographic and field survey methodologies, alongside a historical-analytical approach. The objective was to explore both the structural and lived realities behind Nigeria’s emigration patterns and assess the potential of the reverse brain drain approach as a development strategy. A descriptive-analytical design was employed to enable in-depth exploration of the social, economic, and political dimensions of japaism in Nigeria. The study focused on selected urban centers across Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones, with particular attention to states experiencing high rates of outward migration. These included Lagos (South-West), Enugu (South-East), Bayelsa (South-South), Kano (North-West), Borno (North-East), and Plateau (North-Central). These areas were selected based on documented evidence of migration intensity, patterns of returnees, and access to diaspora networks.

Primary data were collected through in-depth interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) conducted with returnees, potential migrants, community leaders, and migration officers. The interviews were conducted in informal settings to ensure openness and minimize response bias. In some instances, pseudonyms were used to protect participant identities, especially when migration involved irregular channels. Secondary data were drawn from a wide range of institutional reports, academic journals, books, and official statistics. Major sources included the National Population Commission, Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), and international bodies such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), UNHCR, UNDESA, and the World Bank.

Finally, the data collected were analysed using content analysis and thematic categorization. Emerging patterns were grouped according to core variables such as: causes of emigration, impact on socio-economic development, diaspora engagement, and perceptions of return migration. This approach allowed the researchers to interpret narratives not just at face value but also in light of broader policy, economic, and historical contexts. While the chosen design yields rich qualitative evidence, it does not enable precise statistical estimation of economic losses. We acknowledge this limitation and suggest that future research integrate quantitative approaches to complement the present study.

Theoretical Framework and Application:

This study is anchored on the Push–Pull Theory of Migration, originally proposed by Ernest Ravenstein in 1885. Ravenstein’s early formulation was based on empirical observations of migration patterns between rural and urban England. He argued that migration results from a combination of push factors conditions that compel people to leave their place of origin and pull factors conditions that attract them to a destination. Though initially focused on rural-urban migration, this framework has since been adapted to explain international migration flows in the context of global development disparities (Obi-Ani & Isiani, 2020).

The push factors in Nigeria’s case are multifaceted. They include high unemployment rates, underemployment, poor remuneration, rising poverty, insecurity, corruption, policy inconsistency, inadequate infrastructure, and poor access to quality education and healthcare (Nwambuko & Nnaeto, 2023). As noted by Ejechi (2024), even highly educated individuals like Bachelor’s, Master’s, and PhD holders remain unemployed or underutilized, compounding the incentive to emigrate.

On the other hand, the pull factors found in developed countries include the promise of better salaries, political stability, technological advancement, quality education, structured healthcare systems, and the rule of law. These factors create an irresistible allure, particularly among Nigeria’s youth, many of whom are willing to risk dangerous migration routes including desert crossings and sea voyages to reach Europe and North America.

Furthermore, the theory highlights the predictive and policy relevance of understanding migration flows. As Yan and Zhou (2019) assert, human mobility can be forecasted and potentially managed when the underlying push and pull dynamics are adequately addressed. In the Nigerian context, the persistence of adverse push factors, coupled with government inertia, increases the rate of irregular migration. This study therefore applies the Push–Pull Theory to not only explain japaism but also to assess how the reversal of push factors and strategic engagement with the diaspora (pulling them back) through reverse brain drain can be leveraged for national development.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

This section presents and analyses the empirical evidence generated from the study. Data were obtained through in-depth interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), and a review of multiple secondary sources, including migration statistics and policy documents. The tables in this section distil both primary qualitative insights and secondary quantitative information into a structured format for ease of interpretation.

Each table highlights specific dimensions of the migration phenomenon under investigation. Table 1, for instance, outlines the dominant migration patterns across Nigeria’s federal states, synthesised from respondents’ accounts and corroborated by official and independent migration reports. This approach allows the study to triangulate interview narratives with documented patterns, thereby enhancing the reliability and validity of the findings.

The interpretation of the data is anchored on the Push–Pull Theory of Migration, which frames japaism as a response to entrenched socio-economic “push” factors in Nigeria and attractive “pull” factors abroad. The analysis also considers how these patterns intersect with the potential for a reverse brain drain strategy as a developmental intervention.

Table 1: Dominant Migration Patterns According to Federal States

Source: Authors’ compilation based on interviews and multiple secondary sources

Table 1 paints a telling picture of how and why migration patterns differ across Nigeria’s regions. What emerges is not just a map of who leaves and where they go, but a reflection of the distinct realities shaping life in each zone. In the South-East, migration is almost a tradition. The South-South tells a different story. Despite its oil wealth, environmental degradation and job instability push residents to seek stability elsewhere. For some, the oil industry’s boom–bust cycles are no match for the promise of consistent wages and cleaner environments abroad. In the North-East, migration is less about chasing opportunity and more about fleeing danger. Insecurity from insurgency to armed conflicts forces entire communities to move, whether to safer Nigerian cities or across borders into neighbouring countries. The North-West mirrors this mix of economic migration and displacement, with insecurity often being the tipping point.

Meanwhile, the South-West especially Lagos acts as a launchpad. It is where migrants from other states gather resources, connect with travel networks, and begin their journeys out of the country. Across all regions, the pull factors are strikingly similar: stability, security, and opportunity abroad. Yet the push factors; what drives people out are shaped by each region’s unique challenges. It means any reverse brain drain strategy must be locally tailored: peacebuilding in the North-East, entrepreneurship hubs in the South-East, environmental restoration in the South-South, and diaspora business incubation in the South-West.

In short, Table 1 reminds us that migration in Nigeria isn’t a single story. It’s many stories, rooted in place, circumstance, and hope for something better.

Apart from French-speaking countries, Nigerians are the largest group of Africans living abroad, with a presence in North America, Europe, and Asia. Kirwin and Anderson (2018) diagrammatically presented the primary motivations driving migration from four West African countries (Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal) to Europe, expressed as percentages.:

Source: Kirwin and Anderson (2018)

As shown in Figure I, Data reveals that West African migration to Europe is predominantly economically driven, with job opportunities and family financial support being the primary catalysts. Educational opportunities play a secondary role, particularly for Nigerians, while security concerns are relatively minor factors except in Côte d’Ivoire. The “Personal Freedom” and “None Specific Reasons” categories represent minimal percentages across all countries, suggesting most migration decisions are based on clear economic imperatives.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of Nigerian emigrants by destination regions, presented as percentages that total 100%:

Source: United Nations (2015) Trends in International Migrant Stock, 2016. (SWAC/OECD)

Nigerian emigrants demonstrate a truly global migration pattern, with presence across all major world regions. 63% of Nigerian emigrants choose developed regions (Europe + North America), while 37% remain within Africa or migrate to Asia. About one-third (33%) of Nigerian migration stays within the African continent, while two-thirds (67%) represents intercontinental migration. This distribution reflects Nigeria’s position as a major source country for both regional economic migration and international skilled migration, with emigrants seeking opportunities across diverse global destinations (UNDESA, 2017).

To corroborate this information, data from the Migration Policy Institute presents the top 10 countries with the largest Nigerian diaspora population (estimated):

Table 2: Distribution of Nigerian Diaspora Populations by Host Country as at 2024

Source: Migration Policy Institute, (2024)

Table 2 reveals Nigerian diaspora communities spanning multiple continents, with Europe and North America representing the primary destinations for emigration, accounting for over 80% of the top ten destinations. The data indicates a preference for English-speaking nations and economically developed countries, while also showing emerging patterns toward Gulf states and intra-African migration.

The Nigerian Diaspora Commission (NiDCOM) initiated a comprehensive data collection effort through the establishment of its Data Mapping and Registry Portal in 2021, aimed at obtaining precise demographic information about Nigerian nationals residing internationally. The commission reports that citizens from 28 different countries have enrolled in this digital registry system to date. While NiDCOM has not disclosed the aggregate number of individuals who have completed registration on the platform, estimates from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) indicate that the global Nigerian expatriate population reaches approximately 17 million individuals as of 2024.

According to the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI), approximately 17 million Nigerian nationals currently reside across various global destinations. Additional data indicates that roughly 36,000 Nigerian migrants reached European shores via maritime routes. Numerous individuals crossing international boundaries employ unauthorized migration pathways, utilizing perilous corridors including extensive desert crossings and hazardous sea voyages, which have led to substantial fatalities and disappearances.

Statistical records from 2016 demonstrate that 36,000 Nigerians comprised approximately 21 percent of the total 171,299 maritime arrivals to Europe. By March 2017, Nigeria recorded 1,899,830 internally displaced individuals resulting from armed conflicts and environmental catastrophes. During the same period, approximately 200,346 Nigerian nationals sought refuge in adjacent countries, with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger providing asylum status to these displaced populations, as documented by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2019).

The following tabular data presents Nigeria’s net migration statistics spanning from 2021 through 2025, incorporating United Nations demographic forecasts extending to 2100. Net migration represents the aggregate balance of population movement during specified periods, calculated as the difference between total inward migration (immigrants) and outward migration (emigrants) annually, encompassing both Nigerian nationals and foreign nationals within the calculation.

Table 3: Nigeria net migration rate from 2020 to 2025

Source: United Nations projections of 2025

Table 3 shows the net migration rate per 1,000 population, which measures the balance between immigration and emigration relative to Nigeria’s total population.

All values are negative, indicating Nigeria consistently experiences more emigration than immigration The rates show a gradual improvement (becoming less negative): from -0.280 in 2022 to -0.261 in 2025 Annual improvements are small but consistent (2-3% each year) This suggests Nigeria’s net outflow of people is slowly decreasing hence while Nigeria continues to lose more people than it gains, the trend is stabilizing with smaller net losses each year.

Table 4: Nigeria net migration for 2023

This table presents actual numbers of net migrants rather than rates, showing dramatic fluctuations.

2020: Relatively small net loss (-4,824 people)

2021: Massive spike in emigration (-76,364 people) – a 1,483% increase

2022-2023: Stabilized at around -59,996 people annually

The 2021 surge represents the peak of Nigeria’s recent emigration wave

The dramatic 2021 increase likely reflects:

COVID-19 pandemic effects and economic disruption

Increased security challenges (Boko Haram, banditry, farmer-herder conflicts)

Economic hardships driving more Nigerians to seek opportunities abroad

The “Japa” phenomenon (Nigerian slang for emigration)

Table 5: Nigeria refugee statistics for 2023

Source: United Nations projections of 2025

The increase through 2022 likely reflects regional instability (Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis, Chad conflicts, regional terrorism) The 2023 decline might indicate Voluntary repatriation as conditions improve in origin countries, Refugees moving to third countries, Possible changes in recognition/registration processes. It is important to note that Refugee populations encompass individuals who have obtained formal recognition under various international legal frameworks, including the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its subsequent 1967 Protocol, as well as the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention that addresses specific refugee circumstances within Africa. This classification also includes persons acknowledged as refugees according to UNHCR statutory provisions, individuals awarded humanitarian protection status similar to refugee designation, and those receiving temporary protective measures. This definition excludes asylum seekers i.e. individuals who have submitted applications for asylum or refugee recognition but are awaiting determination of their cases, or those currently registered within asylum-seeking processes without final status resolution.

Effects of Japaism on Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria

The phenomenon of japaism has profound consequences for the country’s socio-economic development. Data from interviews and secondary sources confirm that this migration trend has triggered a significant depletion of human capital, especially in critical sectors such as healthcare, education, ICT, and engineering (Nwambuko et al., 2023).

Respondents in Lagos, Enugu, and Kano observed that the departure of doctors, nurses, and lecturers has resulted in understaffed hospitals, diminished teaching quality, and a reduced pool of specialised professionals needed to sustain productivity and innovation (Egbejule, 2019). A major economic implication is the loss of public investment in human resource development. The Nigerian government invests heavily in subsidising tertiary education, but these investments often end up benefiting foreign economies when graduates emigrate to work abroad (Ejechi, 2024). This phenomenon is an example of knowledge capital flight, which is the movement of skills and potential for output from the home economy to recipient nations (Stark & Bloom, 1985).

This study also found evidence of brain waste, where migrants are employed in jobs that fail to match their qualifications and skills (Arp, 2014). While this may reflect labour market barriers abroad, it nonetheless reduces the direct developmental returns on Nigeria’s investment in human capital formation. From a socio-cultural perspective, japaism has been linked to family disintegration and community fragmentation. Prolonged family separations and absentee parenting reported particularly in South-East and South-South communities have socialised younger generations to measure success primarily by migration rather than by domestic achievement (Asemota, 2019).

Another dimension is the dependence on remittances. Although remittances contribute foreign exchange and provide short-term relief for households, over-reliance on them may discourage local economic participation and entrepreneurship, and in some cases, they fuel consumption rather than productive investment (World Bank, 2018; IOM, 2017). This can entrench cycles of dependency, diverting attention from sustainable, home-grown economic solutions.

In summary, japaism is more than an individual pursuit of better opportunities; it is a structural challenge that weakens Nigeria’s institutional capacity, drains its talent base, and alters socio-economic values. As several respondents noted, reversing these effects will require not only stemming the outflow of skilled labour but also implementing credible policies that make return migration both feasible and rewarding.

While the present research highlights the socio-economic effects of japaism through qualitative evidence, it does not attempt to measure economic losses using statistical models. Further studies could address this gap by applying quantitative approaches to assess sectoral and fiscal outcomes.

Reverse Brain Drain Approach to Socio-Economic Development as Panacea to Japaism in Nigeria

Evidence from interviews and FGDs indicate that returnees can significantly contribute to capacity building by applying their enhanced skills in critical sectors such as healthcare, education, ICT, and manufacturing. Many respondents noted that Nigerian professionals abroad often gain access to advanced technology, specialised training, and professional cultures that are not readily available at home. Upon return, these competencies can be adapted to local contexts, thus bridging skill gaps and stimulating innovation (Adetayo, 2023).

Economically, reverse brain drain can stimulate entrepreneurship and job creation. Returnees frequently establish businesses, research institutes, and start-ups that create employment opportunities and introduce new business models. This aligns with findings from the International Organisation for Migration (2017), which emphasises that diaspora-led enterprises often have higher survival rates due to their access to international funding, markets, and partnerships.

In the academic and research sectors, returning scholars can play a vital role in upgrading curricula, improving research quality, and fostering international collaborations. This can lead to a more competitive higher education system and produce graduates better equipped for both domestic and global markets (Clemens, 2015a; Asemota, 2019).

However, for the reverse brain drain model to succeed in Nigeria, structural challenges must be addressed. Many focus group participants expressed concerns about weak institutions, political instability, bureaucratic bottlenecks, and corruption as significant deterrents to return migration. Without credible reforms in governance, infrastructure, and the ease of doing business, returnees may find reintegration difficult, leading to a cycle where they eventually re-emigrate (Meyer & Brown,1999).

Therefore, a viable reverse brain drain strategy for Nigeria must be multi-pronged. It should include:

Policy frameworks that incentivise return migration, such as tax breaks, relocation grants, and fast-track business registration for diaspora returnees.

Institutional reforms to improve transparency, reduce corruption, and strengthen public service delivery.

Diaspora engagement programmes that allow for short-term skill transfer missions, mentorship opportunities, and joint research projects without requiring permanent relocation.

Experiences from other countries demonstrate how structured reverse brain drain programmes can generate tangible outcomes. In India, return migration of IT professionals was facilitated through tax incentives, research parks, and streamlined licensing, helping to establish Bangalore as a global technology hub (Kuznetsov, 2006).

Similarly, China institutionalised policies to attract returnees through the “Thousand Talents Plan,” offering research funding, housing benefits, and preferential business regulations. These measures accelerated innovation in science, technology, and higher education (Zweig & Wang, 2013).

In Africa, Ghana and Kenya experimented with diaspora engagement schemes that combined short-term knowledge transfer missions with permanent relocation incentives. While these programmes highlighted the potential of diaspora networks, weak absorptive capacity and bureaucratic bottlenecks limited their impact (Meyer & Brown, 1999; Black & King, 2004).

To ensure that the anticipated gains are not eroded, it is important to assess the key risks faced by returning professionals and suggest practical ways of addressing them.

Licensing Delays: Lengthy and unclear accreditation processes discourage returnees. Mitigation: introduce fast-track, transparent licensing.

Limited Absorptive Capacity: Some sectors lack funded positions or facilities to take in returnees. Mitigation: create reserved posts and improve infrastructure.

Workplace Adjustment: Differences in organizational culture and poor infrastructure reduce motivation. Mitigation: offer induction and mentoring programmes.

Economic and Policy Instability: Inflation, unstable regulations, and fiscal uncertainty weaken retention. Mitigation: provide time-bound incentives and policy consistency.

Risk of Re-emigration: If frustrations persist, returnees may leave again within a short period. Mitigation: introduce retention bonuses and career development pathways.

These risks underscore the importance of structured policy responses, which are outlined in the recommendations that follow below.

CONCLUSION AND STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE REVERSE BRAIN DRAIN APPROACH

The findings of this study demonstrate that reverse brain drain, if systematically harnessed, can yield measurable economic, fiscal, and sectoral benefits for Nigeria. However, fragmented efforts, regulatory bottlenecks, and weak institutional coordination currently undermine the scale of impact. In order to transform diaspora engagement from an ad-hoc initiative into a sustained development strategy, recommendations must go beyond generic calls for support and instead be structured, time-bound, and measurable.

We therefore propose a sequenced framework of policy actions anchored in the Push–Pull model but tailored to Nigeria’s institutional realities. The framework recognises the dual need for (i) immediate confidence-building measures that demonstrate government commitment and attract skilled returnees, and (ii) medium- to long-term interventions that institutionalise diaspora contributions to productivity, fiscal revenues, and innovation ecosystems.

Establish a National Diaspora Return and Engagement Desk (NDRED) under the joint supervision of the Federal Ministry of Labour & Employment and the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NIDCOM). This should be achieved within the first year and measured by the creation of a functional online diaspora portal and the registration of returnee profiles.

Fast-track professional licensing and accreditation for health workers, teachers, and ICT specialists through respective regulatory councils (MDCN, NMCN, TRCN, CPN). The objective is to reduce processing time to under three months within two years, monitored through digital tracking and returnee satisfaction surveys.

Introduce targeted fiscal incentives such as relocation grants and tax credits for diaspora-led firms. The Ministry of Finance, FIRS, and the Bank of Industry should implement these within 1–3 years, with effectiveness assessed through the number of firms benefiting, jobs created, and tax revenues net of incentives.

Implement sectoral placement programmes to absorb returnees into critical vacancies in health and education, particularly in underserved zones. Ministries of Health and Education, in partnership with state civil service commissions, should deploy returnees within three years, monitored through vacancy fill rates and retention data.

Expand diaspora knowledge transfer missions (short-term visits, remote mentorship, and virtual teaching) coordinated by NIDCOM and TETFund. These should commence immediately and be tracked by the number of missions conducted, institutions reached, and participant feedback.

Develop diaspora investment vehicles such as bonds and innovation funds through the Debt Management Office, SEC Nigeria, and the Ministry of Industry. These should mature within 3–5 years, measured by subscription volumes, projects financed, and jobs supported.

Institutionalise monitoring and evaluation (M&E) through an annual report produced by NDRED and the National Bureau of Statistics. Starting from Year 1, the report should track licensing timelines, retention rates, fiscal impact, and diaspora participation metrics.

Funding and/or Competing interests

The authors did not receive support from any organization for the submitted work. Also, no funding was received to assist with the preparation of this manuscript and neither was funding received for conducting this study. No funds, grants, or other support was received. The authors have no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose. Likewise, the authors have no competing interests to declare that are relevant to the content of this article. All authors certify that they have no affiliations with or involvement in any organization or entity with any financial interest or non-financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript. The authors have no financial or proprietary interests in any material discussed in this article.

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