An Analysis and Prognosis on the Challenges and Prospects in the Exercise of Executive Powers under the Nigerian and British Constitutions

An Analysis and Prognosis on the Challenges and Prospects in the Exercise of Executive Powers under the Nigerian and British Constitutions

U. E. Okolocha., U. D. Nwoko

University of Abuja, FCT Nigeria

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.908000358

Received: 06 August 2025; Accepted: 14 August 2025; Published: 11 September 2025

ABSTRACT

This paper amalyzes the challenges inherent in the exercise of executive powers under the Nigerian and British constitutions, and prognosticates the future prospects. While both countries share historical ties rooted in colonialism, their extant constitutional structures differ fundamentally—Nigeria operates a rigid, written presidential constitution, while the United Kingdom follows an unwritten, constitutional monarchy within a supreme parliamentary framework. The study explores how these structural differences shape the scope and application of executive authority in both jurisdictions. In Nigeria, executive power is centralised in the office of the President, often raising concerns about over-concentration of power, abuse of discretion, and weak institutional checks. Conversely, in the UK, executive power is diffused between the Monarch, Prime Minister, and Cabinet, operating under the conventions and principles of parliamentary sovereignty and responsible government. The paper identifies prospects such as democratic accountability, judicial oversight, and evolving conventions, while also addressing challenges including constitutional ambiguity in the UK and institutional inefficiencies in Nigeria. The findings underscore the importance of constitutional balance in the exercise of executive authority for sustainable governance.  The study argues for and recommends constitutional reforms for stronger institutional mechanisms in both systems to promote transparency, accountability, and democratic consolidation.

Keywords: Executive powers, constitutional framework, Nigeria, United Kingdom, governance challenges.

INTRODUCTION

The executive arm of government plays a pivotal role in the governance and administration of any ancient and modern state, serving as the engine room for policy formulation, implementation, and day-to-day administration. The extent, nature, and limitations of executive power are, however, fundamentally shaped by the constitutional framework of a country. Nigeria and the United Kingdom provide two distinct paradigms for understanding executive authority—one rooted in a written presidential constitution, the other in an unwritten parliamentary system shaped by centuries of evolving conventions.

In Nigeria, the 1999 Constitution vests executive powers in the President as both Head of State and Head of Government, combining ceremonial and functional leadership in one individual, who is also the commander – in -chief of the armed forces[1]. This centralisation of power raises significant questions about accountability, separation of powers, and potential overreach. Conversely, the United Kingdom operates under a constitutional monarchy where executive powers are formally vested in the Crown but are exercised by the Prime Minister and Cabinet in accordance with constitutional conventions and the principle of responsible government.[2] The UK’s uncodified constitution relies heavily on conventions, statutes, judicial decisions, and authoritative texts, offering flexibility but also creating ambiguity in defining the scope and limits of executive power.[3] It also impinges on the doctrine of separation of powers as propounded by French Jurist,  Baron Charles de Secondant Montesquieu[4]

Despite their divergent systems, both countries confront similar challenges in the practical exercise of executive powers, such as democratic accountability, judicial oversight, and the abuse of discretionary authority. However, the prospects for reform and the strengthening of executive institutions differ based on each country’s legal traditions and political culture. This paper, therefore, seeks to comparatively analyse the exercise of executive powers under both constitutions, highlighting their strengths, weaknesses, and the implications for good governance and constitutionalism.

Challenges in the Exercise of Executive Powers under the Nigerian Constitution

Abuse of Power and Legal Processes

The exercise of executive powers in Nigeria’s constitutional democracy has been fraught with so many challenges, chiefly because the processes are abused either to attain certain calculated outcomes or to perpetuate the interest of the political wielders of executive powers, unlike other constitutional democracies around the world. There have been debates from some quarters that the reason for this can be attributed to the fact that Nigeria’s democracy is young when compared to the British constitutional democracy. There are also arguments from some quarters that the 1999 Nigerian constitution has armed the executive organ of government with enormous powers that cannot reasonably be exercised without friction with legal processes and ultimately abuse of such powers. The Constitution provides that the President’s powers shall – [i] extend to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution; [ii]all laws made by the National Assembly; and [iii]all matters with respect to which the National Assembly has, for the time being, power to make laws[5].

There is therefore no denying the fact that the present day executive branch of government is enormously powerful. In the fashion of a behemoth, the exercise of the executive power is felt across the length and breadth of a nation’s political landscape[6]. To say the least, the exercise of executive powers in Nigeria can best be described as a service to the political elites and their interest. Constitutional democracy is heralded today as the best system of government because of its many qualities. Worthy of note is the aspect that hands over power to the people through an election. This is her greatest strength[7]. The abuse of power in Nigeria has not only affected the executive arm of the government, but in exercising and wielding the executive powers, the executive has festered the abuse of process to the judicial and legislative arms of the government, thereby making it almost impossible to hold the executive solely accountable. A unique product of the separation of powers is that it is known to generate consistent tensions amongst the different branches of government particularly the Executive and Legislature, in some sort of supremacy battle which is a resident characteristic of many stable democracies[8].

The constitution provides that the President or Governor may exercise this power by himself or through person or persons appointed by him to perform these functions on his behalf. The President, for example, has the backing of the constitution to exercise powers of appointments, which powers may be subject to approval by the Senate or may be exercisable upon the recommendation of such appointee by some other body or agency saddled with the responsibility to do so. However, it has been noticed that instead of complying with the principle of federal character that is enshrined in the 1999 constitution, the executive officers that are empowered by the constitution to do so, have always made appointments on the basis of ethnic or political alignments.  The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria states thus:

the composition of the government of federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies[9].

This principle has suffered diverse infractions in the hands of different Presidents, in varying degrees. The Federal character principle was borne out of the need to ensure evenness in spreading government appointments to promote inclusive representation, and a sense of belonging, so as to ensure national stability, solidarity and prosperity. The underlying philosophy of the federal character principle is providing equality of access in public service representation, to curb dominance by one or a few sections. To that effect, a former head of state, late General Sani Abacha established the Federal Character Commission for the effective implementation of the policy in Nigeria[10]. Despite these efforts, there are factors that make this imbalance to persist that the commission cannot handle. For example, the commission cannot determine who the next president would be the commission cannot determine the number of people who get admission into tertiary institutions; the commission cannot determine the spread of the professionals (doctors, architects, lawyers, engineers etc.) in different geopolitical zones of the country, etc[11]. It is submitted that the political elites are visibly circumventing and subverting this constitutional process to enthrone prebendalism ideologies and thereby serve ethnic or class interest in the process. To this, Osifeso stated:

Nigeria political elites, the traditional heirs of our societies, show no inclination to fostering national integration, and national identity in the country, they are always in “the business of elevating their ethnic group over and above the national interest, and they exploited these factors in their bid to capture power at the federal level. As a result, the mobility of power dynamics, ability to adjust was deliberately frozen in the interest of power elites…, the competitive struggle was manipulated by these political elites without permitting the shearing of political power by all the social political forces of the society…the North, for instance, was hell bent on retaining political control of the centre as this, in their permutation, was the only way of counterbalancing southern monopoly of bureaucratic and economic power in the country[12].

The operations of this provision of the constitution and its contrast implementation has been blamed on its non-justiciability, for which no state actor may be brought to account. In some quarters, it has been alluded that the 1999 Constitution is a military document[13] that was made by the military for the military, and not of the people. Hence, the call from some other quarters for new constitution that reflects the wishes and aspirations of the ordinary Nigerian.

Exercise of Executive Powers Subject to Legislative Approval or Oversight

The Constitution amply provides for legislative oversight of executive activities. Specifically, it provides inter alia that –

…each House of the National Assembly shall have power…to direct

Or cause to be directed an investigation into –

• any matter or thing with respect to which it has power to make law; and
• the conduct of any person, authority, ministry or government department charged or intended to be charged, with the duty or responsibility for –

1. executing or administering laws execute by the National Assembly; and
2. disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be appropriated by the National Assembly.

In reality however, even this power of oversight and investigation has been eroded by the executive, leaving the investigators at the mercy and control of those to be investigated. This has rendered perfunctory the principles of separation of powers and the institution of checks and balances.

According to Ihemeje, one does not have to look too deep into political practices in Nigeria for one to see that the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances have been over the years, mal-applied, perverted and as a matter of fact, abused in the Nigerian political reality[14]. Similarly, there seems to be a misconception of the roles and functions of the organs which have been applied at the expense of the populace:

Executive-legislative conflict is a state of partial or absolute incompatibility where an arm is in constant confrontation with the other. It is manifested through a situation in which the legislature is opposed to the executive and vice versa in the area of public policy, and their view of good governance. These conflicts could be as a result of each organ performing its constitutional duties. It could, sometimes, be ascribed to personality clash between the heads of the organs[15]

The situation is worse where different parties control both organs of government. Here, instead of engaging each other constructively, the objective is to pull down the other with an eye at electoral ascendancy. However, where both same party controls both organs, rather apply the fine principles of separation of powers and checks and balances, parliament has in practice turned out to be what is popularly called “rubber stamp legislature”. The safe balance is for the national interest to override all other interests in the consideration and actions of operators of government.

Challenges of Immunity Clause in Nigeria

The immunity clause is provided for in section 308 of the Constitution as follows:

(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, but subject to subsection (2) of this section –[16] (a) no civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against a person to whom this section applies during his period of office;[17] (b) a person to whom this section applies shall not be arrested or imprisoned during that period either in pursuance of the process of any court or otherwise; and[18] (c) no process of any court requiring or compelling the appearance of a person to whom this section applies, shall be applied for or issued:[19] Provided that in ascertaining whether any period of limitation has expired for the purposes of any proceedings against a person to whom this section applies, no account shall be taken of his period of office.

(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to civil proceedings against a person to whom this section applies in his official capacity or to civil or criminal proceedings in which such a person is only a nominal party.[20]

(3) This section applies to a person holding the office of President or Vice-President, Governor or Deputy Governor; and the reference in this section to “period of office” is a reference to the period during which the person holding such office is required to perform the functions of the office.[21]

The veracity of this provision of the 1999 constitution has been tested on many occasions in Nigeria’s political history. The Constitution[22] seems to suggest that even when the civil or criminal case is already initiated against persons to whom this section applies, upon their assumption of office, the proceeding should be halted during the pendency of their term of office. It is, however, unclear whether or not the statute of limitation can apply in this case.

Section 308 (3) specifically provides that this provision of the law applies to persons holding offices of the executive arm of government at the federal and at state levels. Whereas  the provision of this section of the constitution is to protect the political office holders concerned from frivolous court cases, it has been exploited by politicians to commit crime while in office.  There have been several authoritative answers that Nigerian courts have provided on the subject of immunity clause in Nigeria. The moral posture of the today’s political office holders has led to calls from some quarters for the abolition of section 308 of the constitution. Ukah and Ngwuoke say that:

We are of the opinion that the immunity clause enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution does not rest on any ideals of equality, fairness and justice. In fact, from the pragmatist point of view, the President, Vice President, Governors and their Deputies are sacred cows in the Nigerian polity, as their immunity subsists both during their tenure in office and afterwards in respect of anything done while in office. Without equivocation, this wide latitude of immunity is a temptation for even the most sanctimonious of people given the high level of societal decadence. No person should be made above the law without exception, including the head of State; otherwise, the rule of man rather than the rule of law shall prevail to the detriment of society/[23]

It is worthy of note that the constitutional attempt to shield political office holders from offences they committed before their ascension to the exalted office defy every notion of morality and justice. A typical example is the case in point is Fawehinmi v. I.G.P.[24] where Chief Gani Fawehinmi sought an order of mandamus against the Inspector General of Police at the Federal High Court to compel him to investigate the allegations of crime against Bola Ahmed Tinubu, the then Governor of Lagos state. The trial court dismissed the originating summons, and Chief Gani appealed to the Court of Appeal which held, inter alia that –

Under section 4 of the Police Act, the police have a duty to detect crime. Implicit in that duty is the duty to investigate complaints on the commission of crimes, and that does not hold or protect the persons covered under section 308(3) from the police investigation. But what section 308(1)b) of the 1999 Constitution means is that a person to whom the section applies shall not for any reason whatsoever be arrested or imprisoned in pursuance of the process of a court, tribunal or any other body which under the law has the power to issue a process which may result in a person concerned to be arrested or imprisoned.[25]

It has become common practice that the application of immunity clause in our legal jurisprudence has been counter-productive. After the expiration of the term of office, it has proven so difficult to successfully secure the prosecution of persons to whom section 308 of the Constitution refers. Some of them would have purportedly enriched themselves such that they can viciously engage the state in robust legal battle. In spite of everything, the immunity under Section 308 of the 1999 Constitution is well-meant. The President, or as the case may be, a governor, is not suitably placed to afford or engage in the luxury of time defending lawsuits, whether frivolous or meritorious, while in active duty as governor or president.[26] The greatest challenge posed by immunity clause in Nigeria is not in the implications but in the implementations.

It is also important to note that the executives protected from being sued can however sue while[27]and be investigated[28]. Also, cases that may have been instituted if not withdrawn may have to wait until the expiration of their term(s) of office[29].

Challenges in the Exercise of Executive Powers under the British Constitution

Like the presidential system in Nigeria, the parliamentary system of government in the United Kingdom has its own share of challenges with regards the exercise of executive powers. It should be borne in mind that unlike the system in Nigeria, executive powers in the United Kingdom are shared between the Crown, the Prime Minister and the Ministers[30]. This simply means the diffusion of executive powers between and amongst three authorities, viz: the Crown, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. In reality however, some of these powers are exercised by the King-in-Council.

Identification of the Scope of Executive Powers under the British Constitution

One of the greatest challenges that exists in the exercise of executive powers in the United Kingdom is the identification of executive powers in the various legislations that create executive powers[31]. As a result of the nature of Britain’s constitutional tradition, the scope of executive powers is not clearly defined. What they have is a rough approximation to the scope of executive powers in other legal systems that can only be discovered after carefully scrutinizing the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements. One of the adverse effects of this is that it will be difficult for members of the public ascertain when a member of the executive oversteps in his exercise of powers. Although this fosters cabinet collective responsibility – rooted in the concept of Responsible Government – accountability is difficult as the lines are blurred. There is also the additional issue of tracing executive powers to individual legislations some of which deal with diverse issues.

In Nigeria, executive powers are created by the constitution, and are easy to identify. When there is executive rascality and overreach in the exercise of executive powers, it is easier to point out by members of the public than it can apply under the parliamentary system.

Stability in Government

Another challenge of the exercise of executive powers under the British constitution is government stability[32]. Because of the unstable nature of the parliamentary system of government, the exercise of executive powers and policies is unstable, as a change of government can affect policy directives at any given time. This is not the same under a presidential system of government, where the tenure of the heads of the executive arm is constitutionally guaranteed, except in the event of demise, impeachment, or incapacity. This allows the head of the executive arm of government to follow through with his policies throughout his tenure of office.

Executive Dominance over Parliament

Another challenge of the exercise of executive powers under the constitution of the United Kingdom is the fear of the executive dominance over the legislature. In theory, the government is responsible to Parliament. An outsider might say the executive is responsible to (and therefore also subordinate to) the legislature. In practice, however, it has been suggested that the United Kingdom actually has a system of “elective dictatorship[33]. Under the parliamentary system of government, the Prime Minister is the head of the executive arm and can exercise overbearing influence on the legislative arm of government. This is because the Prime Minister must always represent the largest group of parliamentarians[34]. Unlike in Nigeria in 2014, where the number of legislature in the opposition outnumbered the number of legislatures in the then ruling PDP.

Exercise of Prerogative Powers

Another area of weakness in the constitution of the United Kingdom is in the area of exercise of prerogative powers. The prerogative is “the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the crown”[35], covering (especially) the conduct of foreign relations, the granting of honours and making of appointments to public offices, the summoning and dissolution of Parliament and the waging of war. As the prerogative is residual, prerogative powers are much more nebulous than statutory powers. Prerogative powers are exercised on the advice of ministers[36], which the Monarch must follow even if the advice overrides his or her personal preferences[37]. A system as this will create manifest absurdity, as the crown may not exercise its freewill to weigh the benefits of the minster’s advice against national interest. In Bagehot’s famous phrase, “a Republic has insinuated itself beneath the folds of a Monarchy”[38], as prerogative powers are exercised by the Monarch in name only.

Unlike Nigeria, the frequent conflicts between the Executive and Legislative arm of the government is not very common in the parliamentary system of government that applies in the United Kingdom. This is because, the executive and legislative arm of the government do not enjoy absolute independence from each other. Hence, approval of executive proposals will not suffer the same faith as in a Presidential system of government like Nigeria.

Despite the challenges and weaknesses of the executive arm of government in the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom has navigated the huddles of effective and transparent leadership better than Nigeria. Cases of abuse of executive powers and other attenuating vices that are manifestly prominent under the presidential system that applies to Nigeria are uncommon.

Prospects in the Exercise of Executive Powers under the Nigerian Constitution

Proposed Reforms and National Attitudinal Change

It is stated that the demons responsible for our failures are not in our law but in those who implement them. Nigeria is a state that has adopted constitutional democracy. The word democracy was derived from the Greek words demos—meaning people and kratein—meaning to rule[39]. Democracy simply is a political system in which the people of a country rule through any form of government they choose to establish. The greatest challenge to Nigeria’s democracy and the exercise of executive powers is in the people that operate the extant laws that regulate the exercise of executive powers.

Under constitutional powers, persons acting within executive powers, with the right political will, can effect limited but ostensible social transformations that are laudable within the social and political space, in Nigeria. Prospectively, Nigeria must get the process of leadership selection and election right, before every other thing takes its natural cause. Democracies, the world over, thrive on credible, free, fair, and periodic elections. For us to objectively assess prospects of the exercise of executive powers in Nigeria, there is a need for us to take a closer look at the general behaviour of an average Nigerian politician and the general public towards reformative change. It is no exaggeration to state that Nigeria and Nigerians have been provided countless opportunities to address the myriads of challenges that Nigeria grapples with (including in the exercise of executive powers), yet all these attempts seem to have failed to yield the desired result. Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, Nigeria has been furnished with sufficient reports that are capable of effecting the desired social and political changes that are needed in a constitutional democracy.

For example, in 2005, President Olusegun Obasanjo created the National Political Reform Conference with the aim of reviewing the federal structure of Nigeria, resource control, devolution of power to federating units, amongst others[40]. The Conferences produced reports, which were never acted upon. Also, after the 2007 general election, the then winner of the presidential election, President Umaru Musa Yar’adua, admitted that the process that brought him to power was flawed and full of irregularities, which prompted him to setup a 22-member committee, led by retired Justice Muhamadu Uwais, to look into electoral reforms and make recommendations to the then President on the areas of reform in our electoral laws.

After nationwide consultations, 1466 memoranda were submitted for deliberation[41]. One of the most profound recommendations made by the committee was in the area of appointment of the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). They recommended for Constitutional amendments that would insulate the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) from the political influences of the executive arm of government in terms of its composition and funding. The power to appoint INEC board was to be transferred from the president to the National Judicial Council (NJC) while its funding was to be a first line charge on the Consolidated Revenue of the Federation[42]. This recommendation was made to address the overbearing influence the President exercises in the appointment of the Chairman and Commissioners of the electoral body, which might ultimately operate to compel some sort of (emotional) allegiance on the part of the head of the electoral body. This recommendation was applauded by many Nigerians..

However, the Yar’adua led administration that commissioned the committee did not implement the recommendations of the committee, before he died, neither did his predecessor, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. It may be argued that this aspect of the recommendations requires constitutional alteration, but evidently, there was no executive bill to the national assembly for the purpose of necessary alterations. This lack of political will was also reflected in some other recommendations of the committee that require simple policy implementation by the Federal Executive Council.

In the same vein, the Jonathan administration set up the Stephen Orasanye Committee for the purpose of restructuring and rationalizing the Federal Government’s agencies, parastatals, and commissions[43]. The committee came up with far reaching recommendation that, if implemented, would have changed the power dynamics at the federal level, in Nigeria. The key proposals of the committee include[44]:

• The reduction of statutory agencies from 263 to 161. This would involve the abolition of 38 agencies, the merger of 52, and the reversion of 14 to departments in ministries.
• The abolition of some controversial agencies, such as the Federal Character Commission, the Fiscal Responsibility Commission, and the National Poverty Eradication Programme.
• The rejection of some recommendations related to the National Youth Service Scheme, such as the extension of the service year to 18 months and the introduction of a compulsory military training component.
• The changes in the status of some agencies, such as the Federal Civil Service Commission, the Code of Conduct Tribunal, and the National Human Rights Commission, to make them more independent and accountable,

Besides the benefits listed in the report, the implementation of this report would have gone a long way in addressing some of the challenges of the executive powers. For instance, the appointive powers of the president would have been drastically minimised. This would have also provided the President opportunity to exercise most effective supervision over his appointees.

The President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration also convened a national conference on 17^th March, 2014[45]. Following a plenary session that lasted for weeks, the Conference was broken into 20 committees that included devolution of power, among others. One of the recommendations made by the conference is in favour of devolution of more powers to the states and local governments, creation of state police, among others. Most of these recommendations were never legislated upon, and the aspects of them that required simple implementation and executive orders were never implemented.

Constitutional Supremacy

Constitutional democracy in Nigeria has endured countless challenges that have led to numerous constitutional amendments, of which much academic inks have been spilled in the quest to unravel the unusual characters of those around the corridors of power in Nigeria. The degree of purported disregard for constitutional provisions by the executive arm of government has led to the question by the opposition: when will Nigeria be saved? Despite the express constitutional provision establishing the administration of local government councils by democratically elected functionaries[46], the various State Governors have brazenly administered the Councils by caretaker committees or sole administrators appointed by them, against the constitutional provision. Despite court judgements, this illegality has persevered without compunction across political parties and political actors. Describing the challenges to good governance in Nigeria, Odo[47] noted:

The quest for democracy and good governance has been a major pre-occupation of the Nigerian state since her independence in 1960. This aspiration has remained elusive due to many challenges, which have continued to undermine the democratization process in the country. These challenges include failure of leadership; corruption; Boko Haram insurgency; insincerity of purpose; lack of political will; lack of proper vision by the political leadership; lack of accountability in governance; amongst others. Failure of Leadership: Since Nigeria’s political independence in 1960, the country has not had the opportunity of being governed by a willing and ready leader but those that can at best be described as “accidental leaders”. These are leaders whom the mantle of leadership fell on them by default not minding their capacity, experience and in most cases, they were neither prepared nor expectant of such huge responsibility. This has been one of the reasons for the country’s failures resulting from visionless policies. Thus, the 2015 election offers Nigerians a good opportunity to vote wisely for a leader who out of personal conviction and preparedness is offering his or herself to serve rather than someone who will get there before beginning to plan. This underscores the fact that most of our developmental challenges are rooted in lack of sound, visionary and result-oriented leadership.

The 2015 general election which was full of hope and expectation has come and gone in Nigeria without fulfilling the expected demands of the majority of Nigerians who heavily relied on his unproven mantra of change. Unfortunately, these expectations were cut short. President Muhammadu Buhari led Federal government was plagued with executive rascality; from skewed appointments to the controversial removal of the Chief Justice of the Federation from office. Also, another form of rascality that the government of President Muhammadu Buhari was accused of was selective compliance to court rulings and judgments. This was visible in the cases of Nnamdi Kalu and El-zazaki, the leaders of the proscribed Indigenous people of Biafra (IPOB) and the Islamic Shiite movement, respectively. Despite the court granting them bail, the Federal government led by President Muhammadu Buhari refused to comply with the court rulings on their bail applications. More than ever before, the need for adherence to constitutional processes in governance has become increasingly important in Nigeria and Africa, as it is the only hope of attaining the political and social developmental needs of the populace. To this, Ssekandi[48] noted:

The urgency for reform of the political structures to instil good governance in Africa cannot be underestimated because the number of countries in conflict situations and those, which have experienced violent changes of Government in Africa, is staggering. At the dawn of this millennium, much of sub-Saharan Africa is devoured by warfare. Currently almost two-thirds of its countries are embattled and paralyzed.

To most Nigerians on the street, the prospect of a constitutional democracy, is increasingly becoming elusive by the day. The brazen display of arrogance by political and electoral officers have left many in despair. However, to attain the desired change in Nigeria’s constitutional democracy, the following steps must necessarily be taken:

1. The government (Executive, Legislature and Judiciary) must, as a matter of urgency make policies, legislations and judgements to strengthen democratic institutions like political parties, the National Assembly; the Judiciary; the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC); Civil Society; anti-graft agencies such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC); and/or create other institutional framework that support the system to run without undue political interferences. These institutions must be allowed to operate freely and effectively to ensure the growth and sustenance of constitutional democracy in Nigeria.
2. The executive arm of government must demonstrate unwavering commitment in adherence to the constitutional provisions, at all times. This will go a long in strengthening constitutional democracy in the fabrics of the nation.
3. Modes of appointment of the electoral officers and judicial officers must be made to be free from the executive arm of government, as the status quo has operated to conduce some sort of allegiance on the part of the appointees toward the appointer. This is the defect that the recommendation of Justice Uwais committee on political reform seeks to cure.
4. The provision of the immunity clause for the Executive arm of government should be reviewed, by amending them to make them accountable to the electorate while in office. The provision of the immunity clause in Nigeria of today, does not address our existential realities. The claim that it was provided to shield heads of the executive arm from frivolous litigations, may have some merit, at least in principle, as Nigeria is not a highly litigious state. More so, political office holders who do not enjoy the privileges of immunity are not frequent in courts, except when they are on the wrong side of the power wielders. The answer lies in some attenuation of the current immunity provisions.
5. We must keep reinforcing the position that political offices should be made less “attractive” or “lucrative” not to entice money conscious politicians and encourage those who are genuinely concerned about rendering service to seek offices.
6. Elections and electoral processes must be sanitized in a manner that ensures that the will of the people prevails at all times. When people can determine who leads them through the ballot, sanity will be restored in the governance process, and it will be easier to hold the government to account.

Prospects in the Exercise of Executive Powers under the British Constitution

Under the British parliamentary system, executive powers are constitutionally shared between the Prime Minister, the Crown, and the Ministers. While some specific, transcendental powers and functions like the appointment of the leader of government, declaration of war, and many more, vests in the crown, the de facto running of the running of the machineries of government, is led by the Prime Minister, with the Ministers heading the various departments. Although the United Kingdom has endured its own fair share of political crisis and democratic structural instability over the years, they have been able to develop a system of government that works for all.

Reform in the Administration of Executive Powers

There have been calls from some quarters for some sort of reform in the administration and exercise of executive powers in the United Kingdom, particularly, as they relate to prerogative powers, largely exercisable by the crown. These calls and proposals have been swiftly responded to. Through the governance of Britain programme, the Government made commitments to surrender or limit numerous powers that it considered should not, in a modern democracy, be exercised exclusively by the executive. Some of these commitments are already in force, being piloted or executed by other responsible bodies,[49] specifically:

1. The government’s commitment, in the Governance of Britain Green Paper, to make no alterations to the final list of names recommended by the Main Honours Committee, was implemented with immediate effect.
2. a number of senior public appointments have been the subject of pre-appointment scrutiny by the relevant Parliamentary Select Committee and a list of 60 suitable appointments has been agreed upon with the Liaison Committee.
3. Even in the ecclesiastical realm, the General Synod of the Church of England agreed in February 2008 to forward to the Prime Minister only a single nomination for diocesan bishoprics in future and to discuss further with the Government additional changes in relation to other Church appointments.

The Role of the Judiciary in Checking the Excesses of the Executive Arm

The United Kingdom has systems that hold the executive accountable for their action and omissions while in office. There are two leading perspectives on the British constitution[50]. According to Daly –

One is primarily characterised by legal accountability. It emphasizes the role of courts in imposing constraints of law and due process on those in the political branches of government. A competing perspective is characterised by political accountability, which relies on individual interests and the public good being safeguarded by robust debate within the political process. On this view, constitutional principles, including fundamental rights, are protected by the proper operation of political institutions and public debates[51].

The Case of Prorogations illustrates, first, the role British Judges’ play in policing the boundaries of political power and, second, the importance in the British Constitution, of the relationship between ministers and Parliament. In short, it is a microcosm of the relationship between the principal players in the UK’s constitutional order[52]. In this case, on the advice of Boris Johnson, whom she had appointed as Prime Minister on 24 July 2019, Queen Elizabeth II signed an Order in Council in late August of the same year proroguing Parliament from a point between 9 September and 12 September 2019 until 14 October 2019. A political storm immediately erupted in the United Kingdom and three court challenges were launched or accelerated in response. These culminated in the decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in R (Miller) v Prime Minister[53], or the Case of Prorogations[54]. The judgement was a clear demonstration of judicial independence from the executive arm of government, which is a valuable lesson for the operators of the systemin Nigeria.

Post Brexit

There have been uncertainties and inconsistencies in the government of United Kingdom after Britain’s exit from the European Union. There have been several changes of Prime Ministers. This situation has left many to wonder what the future holds for the United Kingdom without the European Union. This discuss will be considered with prospects of executive powers in perspective. Brexit ushers in new constitutional procedures for the UK. This is partly because the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020[55] introduced new categories of law for a post-Brexit Britain. Its purpose is not (in contrast to any Withdrawal Agreement[56] agreed with Brussels) to decide the terms of Brexit, but to provide structures and mechanisms to prepare the UK legal system for Brexit[57]. The European Union Withdrawal Act (EUWA), provided for Human Right issues, Diplomatic Relations with the European Union countries, Policies on Finance and many more. In a few years to come, it is expected that the United Kingdom will still be grappling with policy summersault as it tries to adjust to the challenges that were occasioned by its withdrawal from the European Union. The exercise of Executive powers under the United Kingdom will seek to address the issues that have been dominant post-withdrawal from the European Union.  Because of the complex nature of the EUWA, the United Kingdom is expected to experience some tootling changes. However, given their years of experience in constitutional democracy, these challenges are not insurmountable. From the tenure of Rishi Sunak as the prime Minister of the United Kingdom, United Kingdom witnessed some level of stability in the exercise of executive powers. It is expected that the stability will continue, mutatis mutandis.

Infographic depiction of Royal Prerogative in the United Kingdom and Executive Immunity in Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

The exercise of executive powers under the Nigerian and British constitutions reflects the divergent constitutional foundations and political traditions of both countries. Nigeria, with its codified presidential constitution, adopts a system where executive powers are centralised in the office of the President, distinct from the legislature and judiciary. In contrast, the United Kingdom operates a largely uncodified parliamentary system in which executive powers are fused with the legislature and exercised in the name of the Crown by the Prime Minister and Cabinet. These structural differences produce varying implications for democratic accountability, constitutional checks, and the risk of executive overreach.

In Nigeria, the prospects for efficient executive governance lie in strengthening institutional independence, deepening constitutionalism, and reinforcing the doctrine of separation of powers together with the firm practice of checks and balances. However, the challenges remain significant—ranging from the politicisation of public institutions and weak legislative oversight, to issues of emergency powers and disregard for judicial pronouncements. The rigidity of the Nigerian Constitution, while providing clarity, can also hinder adaptability in responding to emerging governance demands.

On the other hand, the British constitutional framework offers the benefit of flexibility and political responsiveness, largely guided by conventions and evolving practices. Nevertheless, this flexibility presents its own challenges, such as ambiguity in the scope of executive authority, over-reliance on political norms rather than enforceable legal standards, and the potential erosion of checks and balances when conventions are disregarded or manipulated.

Despite these challenges, both systems possess inherent strengths that can be harnessed to improve governance. In Nigeria, reforms aimed at enhancing transparency, judicial independence, and the rule of law are essential to curbing executive excesses. In the UK, codification of key conventions and greater parliamentary scrutiny of executive decisions could bolster democratic legitimacy. Comparative insights between the two systems demonstrate that the effectiveness of executive power depends not only on constitutional structure but also on political will, institutional integrity, and a culture of accountability.

Thus, the exercise of executive power in both Nigeria and the United Kingdom is at crossroads, presenting opportunities for reform and democratic consolidation. Understanding their respective prospects and challenges offers valuable guidance for improving governance, protecting fundamental rights, and ensuring that executive authority serves the public interest within the bounds of constitutional order.

REFERENCES

Books

1. Bogdanor V., The New British Constitution (Hart Publishing 2009) 57
2. Dicey A. V., Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th edn, Macmillan 1959) 424
3. Elliott M. and Thomas R., Public Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2020) 35–37

Journal Articles

1. Basiru,A.S. M L A Salawu, and Arogundade,M.A. ‘Jonathan’s Constitutional Conference in Nigeria: A Reflection and a Radical Critique’ (2016) Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences
2. Bassey R, et al, ‘An Examination of Causes and Consequences of Conflict Between Legislature and Executive in Cross River State, Nigeria’ (2013) Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
3. Danasabe,A.J. ‘Power and the Abuse of Political Power in Nigeria: an Assessment’ (2018) 6(5&6) Nasarawa Journal of Political Science
4. Ihemeje, C.C.G, Ahma Z.B and Jawan, J.A. ‘Factors Influencing the Executive and Legislative Conflict in Nigeria Political Development’ (2016) 21(8) IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science 21
5. Inmpey, J.C.,‘Federal Character Vs. Executive Autocracy: The Rape of True Federalism in Nigeria from 2015–2022’ (2022) 4(1) Journal of General Studies (ESUT) 22
6. Langa P.N., ‘The Separation of Powers in the South African Constitution’ (2006) South African Journal on Human Rights 2-9
7. Odo,L.U. ‘Democracy and Good Governance in Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects’ (2015) 15(3) Global Journal of Human-Social Science: F Political Science
8. Okparaku, O ‘Executive Lawlessness and Implications for the Rule of Law in Nigeria’ (2020) 5(1) International Journal of Scientific Research in Humanities Legal Studies and International Relations 145
9. Okeke, et al, ‘The Implications of Immunity Clause and the Pollution of Excellency for Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria’ (2019) 3(11) International Journal of Academic Management Science Research 18
10. Osezua E., ‘The Role of Security in Credible Elections and Sustainance of Democracy in Nigeria’ (2018) Journal of Public Administration, Finance and Law
11. Simon,O.O.,Samuel O. and Oyorurashida A, ‘Federal Character Principle and the Challenges of National Integration in Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis of Some Federal Appointments Under Jonathan and Buhari’s Administrations’ (2016) Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 18(5)
12. Ukoh, F.N. and Ngwoke, R.A ‘Immunity Clause under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria: A Dire Need for Reform’ (2021) 14(2) Journal of Politics and Law 48

Online Sources

1. Daly, P ‘Executive Power in the United Kingdom’ (2021) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3906218
2. Russell and Gover, Legislation at Westminster: Parliamentary Actors and Influence in the Making of British Laws (2018)
3. Electoral Reform Committee, Uwais Report on Electoral Reform (December 2008) https://nairamerics.com/wp-content/uploads/12/01/Uwais-Report-on-Electoral-Reform.pdf accessed 20 October 2024
4. Okoro, C. and Mabadeje, E, Revisiting Justice Uwais’s Electoral Reform Report – CLEEN Foundation (23 September 2018) https://cleen.org accessed 4 November 2024
5. M A Aliyu, ‘Orasanye Report: What You Should Know’ (27 February 2024) https://www.okay.ng/orasanye-report-what-you-should-know.pdf accessed 5 November 2024
6. 2014 National Conference, Nigeria’ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_National_Conference,_Nigeria accessed 15 November 2024
7. B Osifeso, ‘The Principle of Federal Character in Nigeria: Implication for Federal Stability’ (2011) https://nigeriaworld.com/articles/2011/apr/043.html
8. F M Ssekandi, ‘Good Governance: The Way Forward’ (10 February 2017) http://www.jurisafrica.org/docs/articles/Good_Governance2.doc accessed 15 November 2024
9. Ministry of Justice (UK), Review of the Executive Royal Prerogative Powers: Final Report, p10
10. Paul Daly, ‘Executive Power in the United Kingdom’ https://ssrn.com/abstract=3906218 accessed 8 November 2024

Constitiutions And Statutes

1. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered)
2. The English Constitution (1867)
3. The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020
4. House of Lords Constitution Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, HL 69 2017–19 (29 January 2018)

Reports/Others

1. Mr Asquith’s Minute to King George V, December 1910
2. Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Brexit and the Future of the United Kingdom,
3. Ministry of Justice (UK), Review of the Executive Royal Prerogative Powers: Final Report, p10

FOOTNOTE

[1] S.5(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, hereinafter simply referred to the 1999 Constitution; the Constitution or as CFRN 1999.

[2] A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th edn, Macmillan 1959) 424.

[3] V. Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Hart Publishing 2009) 57.

[4] C. D. Montesquieu, De L’esprit des Lois (The Spirit of Laws), Rev. Edn, (translated by Thomas Nugent) NY Colonial Press, 1899, Bk II, pp 151 – 162.

[5] S.5(1)(b) of the 1999 Constitution.

[6] Okey Okparaku, ‘Executive Lawlessness and Implications for the Rule of Law in Nigeria’, (July,2020) Vol. 5, No. 1, International Journal of Scientific Research in Humanities Legal Studies and International Relations , P145.

[7] A.J. Danasabe, ‘Power and the Abuse of Political Power in Nigeria: an Assessment’(April, 2018). Vil.6, number 5&6, Nasarawa Journal of Political Science, Published by Federal University of Berni Kebbi, Department of political science.

[8] P. N Langa, ‘The Separation of Powers in the South African Constitution’,(2006) South African Journal on Human Rights 2-9, p22. Cited by Olusola  Babatunde Adegbite in his Constitutional Boundaries of Executive Powers and the Impasse over the Appointment of an EFCC Chairman in Nigeria: Critical Comparative Perspectives from the United States Constitution, p11-12.

[9] S. 14(3) of the 1999 Constitution.

[10] Revd Fr Joseph Chibuzo Inmpey: Federal Character Vs. Executive Autocracy: The Rape of True Federalism in Nigeria from 2015 – 2022, Journal of General Studies ESUT, Vol. 4 No. 1, (2022), p22. Available at https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=3ed769863a2f5133JmltdHM9MTczMDA3MzYwMCZpZ3VpZD0yY2Q5OGY5Zi1jMmRhLTYwODktMjVjNC05YmZkYzM0NDYxN2QmaW5zaWQ9NTI3Nw&ptn=3&ver=2&hsh=3&fclid=2cd98f9f-c2da-6089-25c4-9bfdc344617d&psq=abuse+of+federal+character+by+the+Muhamadu+Buhari+regime+pdf&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly9qb2dzZXN1dC5vcmcvd3AtY29udGVudC91cGxvYWRzLzIwMjIvMTAvSk9HUy1WT0wtNC1OTy0xLTE1LTI3LnBkZg&ntb=1. Accessed 28 ocober, 2024

[11] O.O. Simon, O. Samuel, and A.Oyorurashida, ‘Federal Character Principle and ahe Challanges of National Integration in Nigeria: a Comparative Analysis of Some Federal Appointments Under Jonathan and Buhari’s Administrations’,(2016) Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa (Volume 18, No.5, ( 2016)

[12] B.Osifeso, ‘The Principle of Federal Character in Nigeria: Implication for Federal Stability’ (2011), nigeriaworld.com/articles/2011/apr/043.html 34-42. Cited by Rev Fr Joseph, ibid.

[13] This claim has validity as the Constitution was birthed by Decree No. 24 of 1999 to which it was a schedule.

[14] C.C. Ihemeje, Z.B. Godswealth, and J.A. Ahmad, ‘Factors Influencing the Executive and Legislative Conflict in Nigeria Political Development’9August, 2016), IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS) Volume 21, Issue8, Ver. 7 (Aug. 2016), p21. Available at https://www.iosrjournals.org. Accessed 29^th October, 2024.

[15] Bassey , Rapheale e’tal, ‘An Examination of Causes and Consequences of Conflict Between Legislature and Executive in Cross River State, Nigeria’, (2013) Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies . Cited by Olurunsuwa e’tal, in Legislative Executive Conflicts in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Implications for Democracy Consolidation, University of Jos Journal of Political Science. Vol. 5, No.5, (October, 2019).

[16] S.308 (1) of the 1999 Constitution.

[17] S.308 (1)(a), ibid

[18] S.308 (1)(b), ibid

[19] S.308 (1)(c), ibid

[20] S. 308 (2), ibid.

[21] S. 308 (3), ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] F. N. Ukoh & R. A. Ngwoke, ‘Immunity Clause under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria: A Dire Need for Reform’,(2021)Journal of Politics and Law; Vol. 14, No. 2; , p48. Available at: https://www.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v14n2p47. Accessed 30^th October, 2024.

[24] (2002) 7 NWLR Pt. 767.

[25] Supra, 606

[26] Okeke, e’tal, ‘The Implications of Immunity Clause and the Pollution of Excellency for Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria’, International Journal of Academic Management Science Research (IJAMSR), Nov. 2019, Vol. 3 Issue 11,  p.18

[27] See Onabanjo v Concord Press (1981) 2NCLR 349 and Apa Aku v Plateau Publishing (1985) 6 NCLR 338

[28] Gani Fawehinmi v IGP (Supra)

[29] See Rotimi v Mcgregor (1974)NSCC 542; Tinubu v IMB Securities (2001) 16NWLR Pt.740, 670; and Media Technique v Lam Adesina (2004) 44 WRN, 19.

[30] P. Daly: Executive Power in the United Kingdom. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3906218. P4. Accessed 8^th November, 2024.

[31] Ibid

[32] Advantages, Disadvantages, and Challenges of Presidential and Parliamentary Regimes – Introduction to Political Science | OpenStax

[33] 7 Russell and Gover, Legislation at Westminster: Parliamentary Actors and Influence in the Making of British Laws 2018. Quoted in Daly, op cit.

[34] Daly, Ibid  p.12.

[35] A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 10th edn, 1959, p424. Quoted in Daly, Ibid p3.

[36] R (Miller) v Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41, [2020] AC 373, [30]: “the power to order the prorogation of Parliament is a prerogative power: that is to say, a power recognised by the common law and exercised by the Crown, in this instance by the sovereign in person, acting on advice, in accordance with modern constitutional practice. It is not suggested in these appeals that Her Majesty was other than obliged by constitutional convention to accept that advice”. Emphasis added.. Quoted in Daly, Ibid.

[37] The part to be played by the Crown…is to act upon the advice of the Ministers who for the time being possess the confidence of the House of Commons, whether that advice does or does not conform to the private and personal judgment of the Sovereign”. (Mr Asquith’s Minute to King George V, December 1910). Quoted in Daly, Ibid

[38] The English Constitution (1867), 44. Quoted in Daly, Ibid

[39] O. Ehiyamen: ‘The Role of Security in Credible Elections and Sustainance of Democracy in Nigeria’,(2018) Journal of Public Administration, Finance and Law, 2018, JORAFE.

[40] A. S. Basiru, M. L.A. Salawu,and M. A. Arogundade, ‘Jonathan’s Constitutional Conference in Nigeria: A Reflection and a Radical Critique. Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences’. 2016. Quoted by Yahaya Shamsu in Constitutional Alteration and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria.

[41] Electoral Reform Committee: December, 2008. <https://nairamerics.com/wp-content/uploads/12/01/Uwais-Report-on-Electoral-Reform.pdf>. accessed on 20/10/24

[42] C. Okoro & E. Mabadeje: CLEEN Foundation, Nigeria Newspaper on Electoral Reforms: Between Amendment Bill and Reforms Committee Report Published on September 23, 2018. Available at:  Revisiting Justice Uwais’s Electoral Reform Report – CLEEN Foundation. Accessed, 4^th Nov., 2024.

[43] M. A. Aliyu: Orasanye Report: ‘What you should know’, Okay.ng.  27^th February, 2024. <https://www.okay.ng/orasanye-report-what-you-should-know.pdf>Accessed 5/11/24.

[44] ibid

[45] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_National_Conference,_Nigeria>accessed on 15/11/24>

[46] S.7(1) of the Constitution.

[47] L. U. Odo: Democracy and Good Governance in Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects, Global Journal of Human-Social Science:  Political Science Volume 15 Issue 3 Version 1, 2015. Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA). Available at: https://globaljournals.org/GJHSS_volume15/1-Democracy-and -good.governance.pdf. Accessed 8^th November, 2024.

[48] F. M. Ssekandi,‘Good governance: The way forward”.  February 10, 2017. <http://www.jurisafrica.org/docs/articles/Good_Governance2.doc> accessed on 15/11/24

[49] Ministry of Justice: Government of Britain, Review of the Executive Royal Prerogative Powers: Final Report. P10

[50] M.Elliott and R. Thomas, Public Law (4^th edn,  Oxford University Press, 2020), p35-37.

[51] Daly (n.28)

[52]  Ibid, p5.

[53] 9 [2019] UKSC 41, [2020] AC 373

[54] The decision is commonly called “Miller 2”, reflecting the fact that the claimant was the same Gina Miller who succeeded in attacking the lawfulness of a previous Brexit-related use of the prerogative (R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5) or “Miller/Cherry” in recognition of the two streams of litigation, English and Scottish, which flowed into the Supreme Court.

[55] The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 is an act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom that makes legal provisions for ratifying the Brexit withdrawal agreement and incorporating it into the domestic law of the United Kingdom.

[56] Per House of Lords Constitution Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, 29 January 2018, HL 69 2017–19, p.3. extracted from: Sionaidh Douglas-Scott: Brexit and the Future of the United Kingdom. P2.

[57] Sionaidh Douglas-Scott: Brexit and the Future of the United Kingdom. P2.

[57] Ibid