Against ‘Security Threats’: Making the Case for a Referent-Centred Security Paradigm

Against ‘Security Threats’: Making the Case for a Referent-Centred Security Paradigm

Philip Attuquayefio

Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, University of Ghana, Legon

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.909000043

Received: 26 August 2025; Accepted: 04 September 2025; Published: 27 September 2025

ABSTRACT

This article interrogates the widespread use of the term “security threat” in scholarly and policy discourse, arguing that it is conceptually flawed and operationally counterproductive. The objective is to demonstrate that threats are not directed at security in the abstract, but rather at specific referent objects, including individuals, communities, states, livelihoods, or ecosystems whose vital core is endangered. By characterizing the framework of protection as the object of protection, the term “security threats” obscures analytical clarity, thereby risking misdirection in policy responses. Methodologically, the paper adopts a critical-conceptual approach informed by constructivist security theory, particularly the Copenhagen School’s notion of securitization. It draws on textual analysis of classical and contemporary security frameworks ranging from Hobbes, Kant, and Morgenthau to Buzan, Wæver, and Kaldor, while also using illustrative case-based reasoning. The results show that the phrase “security threat” is not only vague but also politically problematic, as it bears the potential to shift attention away from those who are actually at risk. To address this, a referent-centred approach that asks the defining questions: security for whom, and from what Is proposed. This approach enables threats to be described with a focus on the people, communities, or systems directly affected. The article concludes that doing away with the term “security threats” in favour of a referent-centred model restores analytical coherence and “grounds interventions” in the lived realities of those most at risk.

Keywords: Security threat, Security Studies, Human security

INTRODUCTION

One of the most ubiquitous terms in the study and practice of security is “security threat”. Its usage often describes trends, actions, phenomena or even persons whose actions are deemed harmful or bearing the potential to harm or undermine the safety or integrity of an entity. Despite its popularity, the term is analytically problematic and conceptually imprecise. Can security itself be threatened? If security is understood as the intervention that protects an entity from a threat, then positioning it (security) as the target of a threat via the use of the term ‘security threat ‘obscures the essential question of what or who is being secured. This paper challenges the logic and implications of the term “security threat” and argues for a fundamental reorientation of security discourse toward a referent object – the individual, group, or entity at risk of a threat.

At first glance, this critique may appear semantic. It is, however, argued that the language of security is never neutral. How threats are framed or understood influences how responsibilities are defined, resources are allocated, or extraordinary measures justified. When policy documents, news media, and scholarly literature refer to ‘threats to security’, they often leave unexamined or at the least take the spotlight off what is actually under threat. Is it the state, persons within the state or the natural environment? The failure to specify the referent object of security weakens analytical clarity and creates room for the securitization of vague or abstract interests, thereby enabling coercive practices that may undermine, rather than protect, the vital core of human beings or other referent objects of security.

This challenge is not merely theoretical. Consider the treatment of terrorism as a “security threat.” In many strategic frameworks, the phrase is invoked to justify military preparedness or surveillance rather than investments in addressing the inequalities, exclusion and the livelihood challenges quite often identified as central to the structural causes of violent extremism and terrorism across communities in Africa and other affected regions (UNDP 2017, 2023). Similarly, during the COVID-19 pandemic, several states invoked “threats to national security” to justify emergency powers, and in many cases at the expense of civil liberties or economic rights (Lundgren et al., 2020; Global South Observatory/IDEA, 2021). These examples illustrate how treating security itself as the referent object distorts the nature of threats and misdirects policy responses.

This article offers a conceptual alternative in the form of a referent-centred security paradigm. This approach advocates that threats should be articulated with reference to the object of protection be it an individual, a community, a natural resource, or a societal institution with a clearly defined vital core. The concept of human security, therefore, provides a good starting point for this paradigm shift by refocusing threats on the wants, survival and dignity of people and thereby moving the analytical gaze away from abstract security architectures to the lives and needs of the actual referent objects including people.

To challenge the presumptions underlying the terminology “security threat” and offer a referent-centred substitute, this study employs a critical-conceptual methodology. The method reveals the discursive and practical ramifications of poor conceptualization by combining textual analysis, policy review, and case-based reasoning. The analysis draws on two categories of sources. As a first step, the paper conducts textual analysis of classical and contemporary theoretical texts in security and other related studies, including those from Hobbes, Kant, and Morgenthau to Buzan, Wæver, and Kaldor, to trace how threats have historically been linked to different referent objects and how this has shaped the trajectory of security thinking. In addition, the study draws on case-based illustrations to demonstrate the practical implications of vague “security threat” discourse. Empirical examples include Africa’s responses to terrorism and violent extremism in the Lake Chad Basin, the securitization of COVID-19 in global and African contexts, and climate-related insecurity in the Sahel.

The analysis is informed by constructivist security theory, particularly the Copenhagen School’s notion of securitization, which highlights the relevance of language in the determination of security realities. In this sense, the study not only critiques but also deconstructs the phrase “security threat” by examining its discursive effects and contrasting them with referent-centred alternatives. Comparative illustrations from climate change, pandemics, and food insecurity further demonstrate how different framings can either obscure or illuminate the actual referent object(s) at risk.

Ultimately, the paper argues that moving away from the term “security threat” is not a matter of linguistic tidiness, but of strategic necessity. In a world where global risks overlap, the importance of conceptual clarity in security discourse has never been greater. Accurate security language can reduce securitization of non-military domains, prevent policy overreach, and promote interventions that are more sensitive and therefore meaningful to the rights and needs of the impacted referent objects.

Reviewing the Evolution of Security Thinking

Since the classical era, political and international thought has been influenced by the connection between threats and security. Early Realists linked security to survival of man and the state, Structural theorists emphasized systemic limitations, and more recent perspectives place more emphasis on people and communities. Together, these perspectives clarify the relationship between threats, the referent objects they target or affect, and the security arrangements established to protect them.

Of the earliest reflections on security, Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan  first published in 1651 was undoubtedly influential as it situated security at the very heart of human existence and political order. In his account of the pre-political condition depicted as the State of Nature, Hobbes famously establishes that life without a common authority is defined by insecurity as individuals are exposed to the constant threat of violent death, making existence “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 1996: 61). The absence of security is therefore not caused by the state, but by the vulnerability of people to one another. Hobbes identifies three principal sources of threat in this pre-political condition namely competition, diffidence, and the pursuit of glory (Hobbes, 1996:60). Crucially, these threats are directed at individuals, who are the referent objects of security.

To escape this condition, Hobbes notes that individuals rationally enter into a social contract collectively renouncing and transferring their rights to a Leviathan – an intervening mechanism designed to absorb and neutralize threats. As later commentators emphasize, the Leviathan is not the object of threat but the guarantor of peace (Paris 2006, Olsson and Jarstad 2011). Consequently, the notion of “threats to security” which may be perceived as threats to the Leviathan is not consistent with Hobbesian thought. On the contrary, Hobbes’ thesis reinforces the notion that threats are to referent objects and not the protective arrangements.

Hobbes’s focus on the individual contrasts with Immanuel Kant’s normative project in Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch first published in 1795. In Kant’s reflections, the referent object broadens to include both sovereign states and the international order and security is best understood as the absence of threats to autonomy and to stable peace (Kant, 1991:93–95). His “Preliminary Articles” identify specific practices such as secret treaties, standing armies, or financing wars through debt, that destabilize trust and thus function as threats to sovereignty and order (Kant, 1991:93–99). Here, the threat is twofold and directed at two referent objects – states and at the fragile fabric of international trust (Hurrell, 1990). Kant’s solution, the security arrangement to insulate the referent objects against the threat, lies in the creation of a “league of peace”, a cooperative federation that secures states without coercion (Kant, 1991:102-105, Doyle, 1983).

Hans Morgenthau returns to the realist tradition by grounding security in national interest. In Politics Among Nations first published in 1948 (Morgenthau, 1948), it is inarguably deductible that three elements of the vital core of nation states are political independence, territorial integrity, and survival within the balance of power (Morgenthau, 2006). In Morgenthau’s view, the threat comes from other states -through capabilities, hostile intentions, or shifts in power that jeopardize sovereignty. Morgenthau’s framework identifies the state, rather than individuals, as the core referent object, with security functioning as the protective arrangement. This includes alliances, deterrence, and balance-of-power statecraft, which serve to shield the state from external threats (Morgenthau, 1946, 2006). The shift from Hobbes to Morgenthau thus represents a decisive reorientation: from the individual to the state as referent object.

This statist logic is taken further in Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism, particularly in Man, the State, and War (Waltz,1959) and subsequently Theory of International Politics (Waltz,1979). In these two instructive texts, Waltz identifies the anarchic structure of the international system as the decisive source of insecurity, compelling states to prioritize survival above all else (Waltz, 1959:232-238; 1979:91). Security thus becomes the primary goal, and threats are directed squarely at the state as referent object. Waltz’s concept of the security dilemma captures how efforts to increase security often generate countervailing threats, as rivals interpret armament or alliances as hostile (Waltz, 1979:102-107). Security, in this sense, is the arrangement through which states protect themselves via internal and external balancing (Waltz, 1979:118-123). While Stephen Walt later refined this into balance-of-threat theory, Waltz’s core insight remains – threats are not to “security” in the abstract but to the state’s survival in an anarchic world (Walt, 1987).

Departing from realism’s fixation on power and survival, Robert Keohane shifts the focus to cooperation under anarchy. In After Hegemony (1984), he argues that the real threat is systemic: the breakdown of trust and cooperation in interdependent systems. Unlike Waltz, who sees states as solitary referent objects, Keohane highlights the cooperative order itself as the key referent object (Keohane, 1984: 67-69). Institutions mitigate these systemic threats by reducing transaction costs, monitoring compliance, and stabilizing expectations (Keohane, 1984:85-92; Keohane & Nye, 1977: 24-29), Security here is not just the balance of power but the institutional framework that enables interdependence to endure. The analytical move is significant: while Hobbes, Morgenthau, and Waltz see threats to people or states, Keohane sees threats to the durability of cooperative arrangements.

Building on this institutional logic, Emmanuel Adler introduces a constructivist turn by conceptualizing security as institutionalized trust within security communities. Unlike Keohane, who emphasizes formal institutions, Adler stresses the socialization of norms and identities. Security emerges as states internalize norms of peaceful conflict resolution, gradually making War unthinkable (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 30-33). Institutions, such as the OSCE, do not merely facilitate cooperation; they actively produce it by reshaping perceptions and building shared identities (Adler,1997:249-252). The referent object here is the community of states, with security understood as the outcome of institutional practices that neutralize threats through trust. Linking back to Kant, Adler represents a modern, constructivist elaboration of how peace can be institutionalized beyond coercion.

Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver radicalize this discursive turn by introducing securitization theory. In Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998), they argue that security is not an objective state but a speech act: an issue becomes security only when framed as an existential threat to a referent object and accepted by an audience (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 23-25). Once securitized, the threat is directed at the referent object be it the state, society, or environment, while security is the arrangement invoked to protect it. This makes the relationship inter-subjective: threat plus securitizing move plus audience acceptance results in security. Wæver (1995) underscores this point “it is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one” (p. 55). The analytical payoff is that security is always relational, and the referent object is never given but constructed through political discourse.

The human-centred implications of this are made explicit in Mary Kaldor’s theory of new wars, which identifies civilians as the primary referent objects of threat. In New and Old Wars (2012), she argues that contemporary conflicts are characterized less by territorial conquest than by strategies of population control. Violence is deliberately directed against civilians through intimidation, displacement, and identity-based violence (Kaldor, 2012:8-12). Security is thus interpreted shielding populations from predatory violence rather than defending borders. Threats are therefore to people’s rather than “security”.

Kaldor’s human-centeredness is deepened by Caroline Thomas, who critiques the Western, state-centric view of security. Thomas’ In Search of Security (1987), makes the claimthat the greatest threats in the Global South are structural: poverty, inequality, environmental degradation, and weak governance (Thomas, 1987:1-6). Later, she highlights how globalization produces new insecurities through trade liberalization, financial instability, and widening inequality (Thomas, 2000:161-163). The referent object in her work is the vulnerable individual and community, while security is the framework of equitable development and social justice that shields them from systemic threats. Thomas thus pushes the field towards a holistic, people-centred definition of security, consistent with the human security paradigm.

The foregoing review points to the fact that classically, threats are considered as aimed at referent object(s) rather than at “security” itself, thus questioning the validity of the term “security threat” or “threat to security”. However, there are two counterfactual ways in which the phrase security threat has gained currency. Both illustrate how the language of security can be stretched beyond its logical core, and both highlight the conceptual risks of such usage. The first counterfactual arises when security is defined in terms of sovereignty, borders, and the so-called “vital core” of the state. Hans Morgenthau, for example, identifies national security with the protection of the state’s vital interests, namely its political independence, territorial integrity, and survival within the balance of power (Morgenthau, 2006: 80-82). In this framing, one can speak of “threats to national security” because the referent object, that is, the state’s vital core, is rhetorically collapsed into the concept of security itself. This formulation helped fuel the widespread construction of phrases such as security threat or national security threat in policy and strategic discourse. However, this usage is problematic. It conflates security as a framework of protection with the referent object that is being protected. More significantly, it entrenches a statist and militarized conception of security, marginalizing human-centered understandings and legitimizing coercive, “hard security” measures in the name of defending an abstract “security” rather than people (Buzan, 1991:16-18).

The second counterfactual appears when security is redefined as a condition – the absence of threat. Barry Buzan makes this explicit in People, States and Fear, noting that “security can be understood as the pursuit of freedom from threat” and therefore as a condition in which survival is not at risk (Buzan, 1991:18). From this perspective, one could logically describe a “threat to security” as any development that undermines this condition of peace and safety. The language is possible, but the meaning shifts. What is threatened is not security in the abstract, but the lived condition of security experienced by individuals and communities. Thus, while one might colloquially describe a famine, epidemic, or violent conflict as “threats to security,” what is actually threatened are the people whose security condition has been eroded.

Together, these counterfactuals show why the phrase security threat has persisted in political and policy usage, but they also underscore its conceptual pitfalls. In both cases, the language obscures the proper relationship: threats are always to referent objects – whether states, communities, or individuals – while security is the arrangement or condition that shields them from harm. In the absence of such clarity, the concept risks being stretched in ways that normalize coercive measures and obscure the human dimensions of insecurity.

By contrast, a third factor appears in the policy phrase “international peace and security” as found in the UN Charter (1945) and the 2015 United Nations High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report. This formulation follows the Kantian logic outlined earlier, treating peace and order as the referent object to be protected rather than “security” itself. The Charter makes this explicit by mandating collective action against “threats to the peace” (Art. 1(1)) and by empowering the Security Council to determine any “threat to the peace” (Art. 39). Here, the threat is in what is endangered namely peace/order, rather than in “security.” The HIPPO report reinforces this orientation, framing UN peace operations around conflict prevention, civilian protection, and sustaining peace, thereby again privileging peace/order as the object at risk. In this sense, these documents align with the trajectory of “threats to a referent object” and thus do not counter the paper’s claim that threats are not directed at “security” per se. Even so, the nuances in usage and their policy and practical implications warrant deeper reflection on the architecture of security, its core concepts, and the consequences of disregarding them.

The Architecture of Security: Concepts and Components

To effectively critique the concept of “security threat,” it is imperative to first clarify the definition of “security.” In its most basic sense, security means that a referent object is safe from harm, danger, or existential risk. It is not the end itself, but a means to protect something else from things that would hurt it or compromise its state. This distinction is foundational, but often neglected in conventional discourse, where “security” is invoked as though it were both a subject and object, an actor and a goal.

The referent object – that which is to be secured – is the conceptual anchor in most serious theories of security. In conventional security frameworks, the referent object is generally the state, whose sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political order are presumed to be endangered by external military aggression. This comprehension was pivotal to realist ideology during the Cold War period, wherein power and state survival prevailed in the security assessment (Waltz, 1979; Morgenthau, 2006). But as the world changed, especially after the Cold War, new schools of thought began to contest the notion of the state’s status as the only point of reference- the default referent object.

The human security framework was one of the most important challenges to the state-centric model. Introduced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its 1994 Human Development Report, human security redefined the referent object as the individual, emphasizing “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” as central to security (UNDP, 1994). It called attention to economic deprivation, environmental degradation, health pandemics, and political repression as equally valid and in some cases more urgent threats than inter-state war. In this framework, security becomes meaningful only when it protects the vital core of individuals and communities notably, their physical survival, dignity, and fundamental freedoms (Alkire, 2003).

Adding further depth, the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, introduced the concept of securitization offering clarity on how security issues are constructed through discourse. According to this view, it is not the objective presence of a threat that matters, but whether an issue is presented as an existential threat to a referent object and accepted as such by a relevant audience (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). This framework reinforces the point that threats must be tied to something that is threatened such as  people, the state, the environment, or some other entity with a tangible or symbolic vital core and not to “security” itself.

Importantly, security is not itself a referent object. It has no independent “vital core” to defend. It is an arrangement of norms, policies, institutions, and practices deployed in defense of something else. It is therefore a framework of protection. To say, then, that “security is under threat” is conceptually incoherent. It either means that the arrangements for providing security are no longer functioning (in which case the real concern is the referent object they were meant to protect), or it conflates means with ends in a way that obscures what is truly at stake.

This distinction matters profoundly for both analysis and policy. The crucial question of whose security and from what is frequently overlooked when analysts or policymakers invoke an ambiguous “threat to security.” They run the risk of viewing security as a self-justifying necessity that can be pursued without responsibility or a clear understanding of its beneficiaries. Without explicitly identifying or addressing the actual referent object or the particular threat it faces, this ambiguity allows a wide range of actors, including governments, militaries, and corporations, to mobilize extraordinary measures in the name of “security” (Balzacq, 2011).

Therefore, the triadic relationship-manifesting through the threat, the referent object and the protective mechanism-is the foundation of the security architecture. It is, at best, imprecise and, at worst, deceptive to conceptualize security without mentioning all three. This structure is collapsed into confusion by the term “security threat”, which suggests that security is the referent object. A more precise and responsible discourse requires us to ask: what is the threat, what or who is it threatening, and how is that object to be secured?

Recognizing this architecture is not a matter of theoretical pedantry. It is an ethical and strategic necessity in a world where threats to health, climate, livelihood, and identity are increasingly complex and interwoven. It is only by correctly identifying the referent object that security arrangements can be made fit for purpose.

The Problem with The Term “Security Threat”

The term “security threat” is conceptually misleading and may therefore be operationally counterproductive. This is despite its wide use in academic and policy circles. Although it appears as colloquially relevant shorthand for what is considered dangerous, examined closely, it confuses different components of the security equation by hiding the actual object at risk. This can promote reactions that might not be in line with the threat’s actual nature.

The primary flaw lies in its semantic imprecision. As outlined in the previous section, security is not a referent object, but a condition or arrangement aimed at preserving the integrity or continuity of something else. To speak of a “security threat” implies that security itself is being threatened. But this   begs the question: what would it mean to threaten security itself? If security is the means of protection, then it cannot simultaneously be the object needing protection. It lacks a vital core. One can speak meaningfully of a threat to a person, a community, or a state, but not to an abstract arrangement like “security.” Thus, the phrase is ontologically incoherent as it confuses the tool with the target.

This confusion has discursive consequences. By displacing the referent object, “security threat” often becomes a rhetorical device to justify exceptional measures without clear accountability. As Giorgio Agamben (2005) warns, when security becomes a free-floating justification, states are empowered to suspend normal legal and moral limits in the name of abstract threats. The result is a drift toward securitization without scrutiny where the invocation of threat need not be tied to specific harms, people, or consequences, but merely to a nebulous idea of “security” under siege.

Such ambiguity also encourages institutional overreach. When governments treat threats as directed at the security apparatus itself be they intelligence agencies, defense infrastructure, or national policy doctrines, the protection of those systems tend to be prioritized over the populations they ostensibly serve. This was made clear, for instance, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, when threats to national security” prompted the establishment of extensive surveillance programs and increased counterterrorism authority, frequently at the expense of civil liberties and with little success in tackling the underlying causes of violent extremism (Zedner, 2009). In this way, the phrase “security threat” can justify measures that put the preservation of institutional power ahead of the safety of marginalized communities.

Additionally, the language restricts the clarity of analysis. The development of focused and appropriate responses is hampered by the failure to identify the threat. Consider climate change as an example. Describing it as a “security threat” has helped elevate its political salience, but without specifying what is threatened be they coastal communities, food systems, or migration flows, it risks prompting militarized or reactive strategies rather than sustainable, human-centered solutions (Barnett & Adger, 2007). A threat to agricultural livelihoods in the Sahel demands very different responses from a threat to urban water infrastructure in coastal West Africa, yet both may be subsumed under the catch-all of “climate security threat.”

Even in public health, the language of security has at times obscured the human implications of crisis. During the COVID-19 pandemic, several governments declared the virus a “security threat” and deployed military assets to enforce lockdowns. While decisive action was required, framing the virus as a threat to security rather than a threat to public health shifted the emphasis away from equitable health care access, availability of health infrastructure, social protection, and community engagement among other arguably more effective responses (Elbe, 2011).

The consequences of this abstraction can also be observed across other domains. In the Lake Chad Basin, for instance, Nigerian and regional strategies have frequently labelled Boko Haram a “security threat,” justifying large-scale military deployments. Although necessary for counter-insurgency operations, this framing has, for many years, contributed to militarization, sidelining investments in community resilience, education, and livelihoods-precisely the very insecurities that often fuel recruitment (UNDP, 2017; ICG, 2016).  Climate change in the Sahel provides a further example. Frequently described in global discourse as a “security threat,” climate change is thus presented as an abstract danger rather than as a lived reality. What is actually at risk are the livelihoods of pastoralists, farmers, and fisherfolk whose survival depends on rainfall patterns and access to natural resources (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Okpara et al., 2015). These cases point to a conceptual flaw in the way security is framed. A flaw that carries real risks of producing detrimental interventions, distorting resource allocation, and misdirecting priorities.

Reframing Threats: The Centrality of the Referent Object

Reorienting our understanding of threat in relation to the referent object, that is the actual person, community, system, or entity whose vital core is endangered is necessary to overcome the analytical and ethical limitations of the term “security threat.” This reorientation is a practical necessity rather than merely a theoretical correction. It compels security analysts, policymakers, and institutions to ask the fundamental questions too often obscured by generalized threat discourse: Who is at risk? What is being threatened? What makes this object worth securing?

A referent-centred framing of security demands specificity and precision. For instance, rather than speaking of “climate security threats,” a referent-centred approach would describe threats to agrarian livelihoods in the Sahel, threats to food systems in coastal West Africa, or threats to water access in arid regions of the Horn. This language brings clarity to what is endangered and thereby allows for the design of security responses that are targeted, appropriate, and sustainable. Research has established that people who depend on rain-fed agriculture are more susceptible to unpredictable climate patterns, which can worsen tensions over natural resources between communities and weaken household resilience (Rigaud et al., 2018). Labelling this a “security threat” in the abstract risks justifying a militarized response; defining it as a threat to livelihood security reframes the solution space around development, adaptation, and economic support.

The same logic applies in public health. During the Ebola outbreak in West Africa (2014- 2016), the initial framing of the crisis in securitized terms especially in the U.S. and European media obscured the real referent object: vulnerable communities with limited access to health services, trust in government, or basic sanitation. Eventually, a more human-centred approach surfaced. This placed the spotlight on community involvement, health system resilience, and local capacity-building (Moon et al., 2015). It is worth stating, however, that this shift occurred only after it became clear that vague allusions to “national security” or “global health security” did not accurately reflect the lived realities of those who were most affected.

Reframing also challenges institutional blind spots. In traditional security frameworks, especially in global North institutions, the referent object is often the state or its governing structures. But in contexts where state institutions are weak, predatory, or absent, it makes little sense to privilege the protection of state power over the lives of communities. In fact, in some fragile or conflict-affected settings, the state may itself be a source of insecurity. In such contexts, as scholars like Paris (2001) and Duffield (2007) have noted, it becomes critical to center the security of people, not the institutions that claim to govern them.

The logic of referent object-centred security also helps resolve policy mismatches. For instance, violent extremist groups in the Sahel region of Africa are commonly referred to as “security threats” by international actors. Despite their obvious danger, the growth and mushrooming of these groups is known to be influenced by unresolved grievances, socioeconomic marginalization, and environmental degradation (International Crisis Group, 2020). When responses center on the preservation of state security architecture, rather than the alleviation of human insecurity in vulnerable regions, the results are often counterproductive. A referent-focused approach would direct resources toward improving basic services, inclusive governance, and local conflict mediation—measures that respond to the lived threats communities actually face.

By requiring actors to clearly identify whose security is being prioritized and why, the referent-centred lens further helps to clarify norms. This is especially important in situations where “security” has been used to stifle dissent or restrict rights. For example, in some authoritarian regimes, “threats to national security” have been used to justify the criminalization of journalists, activists, or opposition figures. A referent-centred discourse would require these governments to specify the object of protection and demonstrate how the alleged threat undermines its vital core – claims that would likely not withstand scrutiny.

Ultimately, placing the referent object at the center of threat analysis restores both ethical and strategic coherence to security discourse. It does not mean that all referent objects are equal, nor that states have no role. Rather, it means that security cannot be meaningfully pursued without answering the basic question: Security for whom, and from what? This naming discipline allows for a more proportionate and morally sound response while maintaining the focus on what is actually at risk. It also reinforces accountability by making clear whose security is being invoked and for what purpose.

Human Security and the Turn Toward a Referential Paradigm

Perhaps the most logical expression of a referent-centered security approach can be found in the Human Security Framework. Human security, which was created in reaction to the shortcomings of conventional, state-centric models, moves the analytical focus from border protection to individual protection. As defined in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report, human security is people-centred, multidimensional, and preventive, emphasizing freedom from fear and freedom from want as its core objectives (UNDP, 1994). This framework not only aligns with the idea that security arrangements should be judged by their capacity to protect referent objects; it also broadens our understanding of what those referent objects can be—health, livelihoods, identity, food, environment, and more.

Human security corrects one of the most persistent conceptual flaws in conventional discourse: the presumption that threats to state institutions are threats to people, and vice versa. In many African contexts, this assumption simply does not hold. For example, the militarized response to Boko Haram in Nigeria has often focused on protecting state institutions and securing territory. Yet for local populations in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States, the existential threats are not just militant attacks but the collapse of education, access to food, internal displacement, and state abandonment (International Crisis Group, 2016). Human security reframes the conversation by asking: what are the actual sources of vulnerability in people’s lives, and how can policy address them?

This logic also applies in environmental and climate contexts. In the Lake Chad Basin, environmental degradation and shrinking water resources have often been described in securitized language sometimes referred to as “climate security threats.” But human security thinking encourages a more nuanced view: it highlights how the threat is not to security itself, but to the fishing, farming, and pastoralist livelihoods of millions of people in the region. In doing so, it shifts the focus toward sustainable livelihoods, environmental governance, and equitable resource access, rather than reactive militarization (Okpara et al., 2015).

Crucially, human security also has normative force. It insists that the purpose of security is not the defense of abstract constructs, but the preservation of dignity and well-being. This principle helps expose and challenge instances where the rhetoric of “security threat” is used to justify state overreach or repression. For instance, in Uganda and Ethiopia, vague references to threats to “national security” have been invoked to clamp down on civil society actors and journalists, diverting attention from the actual insecurities experienced by people including rising food prices, political exclusion, or access to healthcare (HRW, 2021).

From a policy standpoint, the human security approach enables more integrated responses. It highlights the interdependence of the frequently compartmentalized fields of health, the environment, food, education, and governance. This is crucial in African contexts, where complex and overlapping vulnerabilities often lead to insecurity rather than a single cause. Although implementation is still uneven, these links are increasingly acknowledged by the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Union’s Agenda 2063, which places a strong emphasis on people-driven development (African Union, 2015).

Moreover, several African regional economic communities (RECs) are slowly adapting human security principles. In contrast to the conventional terminology of “threats to peace and stability,” the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has found meaning in climate-related security frameworks that specifically link livelihood security, migration, and conflict prevention (IGAD, 2021). ECOWAS, on the other hand, has not yet completely incorporated human security into its institutional framework, illustrating the persistent discrepancy between theory and reality throughout the continent.

All things considered, the human security paradigm offers a referent-centred security model, the theoretical foundation as well as the useful mechanisms. It challenges the reimagination of security not as a function of state power, but as the capacity of people and communities to live free from fear, want, and indignity. It challenges us to identify what is truly at risk, to create interventions that target actual vulnerabilities, and to make sure that the language of security benefits rather than confuses the people it is intended to safeguard.

Policy and Normative Implications

Moving from the language of “security threats” to a referent-centered model is not merely a theoretical correction. It has concrete consequences for how security policy is developed, implemented, and justified. Language shapes not only analysis but action. The way threats are framed determines what is prioritized, who is protected, how resources are allocated, and which voices are heard. A referent-centered security paradigm, grounded in human security principles, therefore urges the move away from vague or abstract formulations in favor of clarity, precision, and moral responsibility.

At the policy level, the referent object model requires institutions, whether states, regional bodies, or international organizations to be explicit about whose security is at stake. When policies frame terrorism or climate change as blanket “security threats” without specifying affected populations or sectors, responses tend to default to coercive, centralized, or militarized solutions. In contrast, identifying pastoralist communities in northern Kenya, or flood-vulnerable urban settlements in Freetown, as the referent object compels policymakers to tailor responses that are preventive, context-specific, and likely to yield longer-term resilience (de Coning & Peter, 2019).

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa, for instance, has started incorporating referent-centred ideas into its regional plans. The human and ecological aspects of climate-induced insecurity are highlighted in its 2021-2025 Climate Resilience and Security Strategy, which calls for cross-sectoral cooperation between early warning systems, migration authorities, and environmental ministries (IGAD, 2021). In contrast to more general formulations like “climate threats to regional security,” which frequently lack clear operational response pathways, this level of specificity and inter-sectoral coherence is present.

Similarly, the African Union’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) has recognized the importance of capturing threats to livelihoods and governance not just armed conflict, as precursors to crisis. However, implementation lags due to capacity gaps and political sensitivities around naming specific referent objects (Aning & Atuobi, 2009). A referent-centered approach would require AU organs like the Peace and Security Council (PSC) to integrate non-military indicators into their threat assessments such as food insecurity, gender-based violence, or climate vulnerability, and to act upon them as legitimate security concerns.

Institutionally, adopting this model also implies the need for language audits and framework reviews. Many national and regional security strategies still use the language of “security threats” without clarifying whose security is involved. For example, Nigeria’s 2019 National Security Strategy mentions “threats to national security” from terrorism, cybercrime, and climate change but provides limited elaboration on which groups or sectors are most vulnerable or how response mechanisms are calibrated accordingly (Nigerian Office of the National Security Adviser, 2019). Without such clarity, strategies risk remaining aspirational or misaligned with lived realities on the ground.

At the normative level, a referent-centered model may contribute substantially to reinforcing democratic accountability. Particularly in parts of Africa where social contracts are flailing, if policymakers are mandated to specify whose security they are safeguarding and how they are doing so, they can be held to higher standards of transparency, inclusion, and legitimacy. This is particularly essential in contexts where political authorities have operationalized the invocation of “security threats” to justify curtailments or suppressions of human rights. As Bigo and Tsoukala (2008) argue, the vagueness of “threat to security” enables practices of exceptionalism within internal policy circles. This may often manifest in states operating outside the bounds of normal legality, often targeting perceived enemies of the regime rather than actual sources of harm. Conversely, when the referent object is clear such as, the security of school 5children in the face of armed raids in northern Nigeria, or of healthcare workers during a pandemic, it becomes much harder to manipulate the security narrative for political gain. The moral clarity of naming referent objects enhances public trust, sharpens institutional focus, and protects against securitization creep.

Adopting a referent-centered security approach also requires institutional humility. It demands that security actors, especially state agencies and international donors, recognize that they are not always the central protagonists. Communities often possess their own definitions of threat and protection. Participatory vulnerability assessments, community-led early warning systems, and local mediation platforms become essential tools in crafting policies that reflect the insecurities people actually face.

Finally, this paradigm has implications for training and education. Security professionals must be trained to think critically about the referent object. Without this, institutions risk perpetuating securitized solutions to fundamentally non-security problems. For instance, deploying police to manage climate-induced protests over water shortages may temporarily restore order, but it does little to resolve the underlying threat to water access or to the livelihoods it supports.

In essence, the referent-centred model being proposed encourages disciplined security thinking. It discourages lazy generalizations, forces precision, and empowers actors to respond to threats in ways that are proportional, appropriate, and ethical. It does not deny that real and serious threats exist but argues that any discussion of “security” must first answer the question: security for whom, from what, and by what means?

CONCLUSION

Operationalizing a Referent-Centred Security Paradigm

The term “security threat” has been popular in both scholarly and policy conversations, yet as this study has shown, its application is conceptually flawed and operationally counterproductive. By treating security itself as an object of protection, the term obscures the relationship between threat, referent object, and protective mechanism. This misidentification produces real-world consequences manifesting as misdirected policy responses, securitization of non-military challenges, and erosion of democratic accountability. Ultimately, this affects who gets protected, how threats are prioritized, and what kinds of interventions are legitimized.

Security is not a vulnerable entity in need of protection. It is a framework, a system, an arrangement deployed to defend something else, be it the state, individuals, communities, ecosystems, or institutions. Empirical examples across Africa from the Lake Chad Basin to northern Nigeria to the post-Ebola health crises show that when responses are shaped around referent-centered frameworks, they are more likely to address root causes, build resilience, and gain public trust (Okpara et al., 2015; Moon et al., 2015; International Crisis Group, 2016). In contrast, where the term “security threat” has dominated discourse without clear reference to the object at risk, the outcomes have often been counterproductive: militarized interventions that displace rather than resolve insecurities, the repression of dissent in the name of national stability, or the neglect of socio-economic vulnerabilities masked under the guise of “security.”

Operationalizing a referent-centred security paradigm requires deliberate steps across theory, policy, and practice. To begin with, analytical frameworks must explicitly identify the referent object whether individuals, communities, ecosystems, or institutions, before labelling any issue a security concern. This principle can be built into national security strategies, obliging policymakers to state whose security is at stake.

Equally important is the adaptation of early warning and risk assessment systems such as the AU’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and ECOWARN. Such systems must move beyond ambiguous threats to “national security” or “state interests” and instead identify tangible referent objects whether they be communities facing food insecurity, women at risk of gender-based violence, or frontline health workers in fragile health systems. When early warning reflects the real insecurities communities face, it becomes more meaningful and effective. IGAD’s Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC) offers a good example in this regard as it provides forecasts and risk analyses on drought, floods, and food security. By showing how shifts in rainfall or temperature affect farmers, herders, and households, ICPAC illustrates how early warning can move beyond conflict triggers to speak directly to the human dimensions of risk.

Another priority is strengthening policy accountability mechanisms so that governments and regional organizations must justify interventions in terms of specific referent objects. For example, instead of citing “climate security threats,” decision-makers would need to clarify whether pastoralist livelihoods, urban water systems, or coastal settlements are endangered, and calibrate responses accordingly.

The shift also calls for training and education for security practitioners. Integrating referent-centred approaches into the curricula of military colleges, diplomatic training institutes, and peacebuilding programmes would equip analysts, policymakers, and officers to recognize the dangers of vague securitized language and design proportionate, people-centred responses.

Finally, this paradigm strengthens democratic and normative accountability. By requesting clarity about whose security is being invoked, it is harder for authorities to misuse the language of “security threat” to suppress dissent or entrench power. Normatively, this establishes security as a public good that must be anchored in transparency, inclusion, and responsiveness. It encourages accountability by demanding that the invocation of the language of security by policymakers be marked by clarity about whom they serve

In an age of overlapping crises from climate instability and pandemics to violent extremism and fragile governance, conceptual clarity is not a luxury but a necessity. Doing away with the term “security threats” in favour of a referent-centred model restores analytical coherence and “grounds interventions” in the lived realities of those most at risk.

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