Electoral Technology in the Democratization Process: A Comparative Analysis of Kenya and Estonia

Electoral Technology in the Democratization Process: A Comparative Analysis of Kenya and Estonia

Shem Ongati Siteki

International Relations, kamkumi ltd

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.907000481

Received: 16 July 2025; Accepted: 21 July 2025; Published: 23 August 2025

ABSTRACT

This paper examines how electoral technology influences democratic outcomes in Kenya and Estonia, revealing divergent trajectories in digitizing electoral systems and their implications for democratization. Estonia stands out as a global exemplar in the integration of digital technologies within governance, particularly through its entrenched system of internet voting. Despite facing multiple security challenges over the years, Estonia has cultivated strong public trust in its e-democracy infrastructure, with internet voting normalized and broadly embraced by citizens. This success is attributable to robust institutional safeguards, a transparent regulatory environment, and sustained civic engagement.

In contrast, Kenya’s experience underscores the complexities and risks associated with deploying electoral technologies in contexts where institutional safeguards are weaker. Despite efforts by the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to enhance efficiency and reduce human error through biometric systems and electronic transmission of results, implementation has often been marred by controversy. Key concerns include third-party control over critical infrastructure, lack of comprehensive system audits, and widespread public skepticism regarding reliability and transparency. These factors have raised legitimate fears of potential manipulation and electoral misconduct, eroding civic trust and impeding democratic consolidation.

The analysis emphasizes that electoral technology is not a neutral or universally progressive force; its democratic potential is contingent upon contextual readiness, institutional integrity, and normative legitimacy. Kenya’s challenges illustrate that without systemic oversight, digital tools may exacerbate existing vulnerabilities. Drawing on Estonia’s success, the paper advocates for context-sensitive reforms and greater regional investment in trustworthy digital electoral frameworks that foster transparency, accountability, and inclusive civic participation.

Keywords: Democratisation, Electoral Technology, E-democracy, Digital Governance, Kenya, Estonia

INTRODUCTION

In the current globalisation setup, Information Communication Technology (ICT) has become the centrepiece in almost all functions as nothing can be implemented with enhanced achievement without its usage. This has necessitated its use in electoral process in numerous countries globally. Additionally, it has been demonstrated to be more effective and unfailing in achieving feasible, reliable and free election than the traditional (or manual) means of voting.

In the recent past, elections in almost every corner of the world are designed to use electoral (electronic) technology. The use of electronic technology (or machine) in election management is known as (e-voting). Various types of electronic technology have been adopted into the electoral exercise by electoral administrator [1]. In this type of election management system (EMS), the electoral process can be accomplished by an electronic digital (computer) equipment. There is no need for human involvement or connection. These electoral processes include voter, party and candidate registration; candidate support signatures verification; production of ballots; electoral logistics; identification of voter; voting in polling units or stations; counting of votes; transmission of results; preliminary and final presentation of results data [1]

Management of elections in few countries have been able to accomplish this degree of mechanisation. Generally, election management body of a country incorporates manual processes and electronic technology to form a hybrid system. This is determined by a wide range of elements which could be considered as peculiar system for any given country.

Globally, electoral democracies are adopting the electronic voting (e-voting) and transmission of results. It is widely known that the adoption of e-voting and transmission system in the management of election is to enhance efficiency and integrity in the administration of electoral process [2]. Electronic voting is a type of voting in which voters are required to use electronic device to make and record their ballot choice [3].

LITERATURE REVIEW

Electoral Processes Digitization: Reviewing the existing theories

The extensive awareness of “going digital” and “reinventing government” in the information era, has quickened the digitization of the electoral processes and the diffusion of ICTs at all levels of the electoral cycle. (Dawes, 2008; NPR, 1993). In the early 1990s, many Western countries, including the U.S., began a governance reform campaign to modify bureaucratic work processes by concentrating on the needs of customers as opposed to the needs of the traditional structures of agencies (Dawes, 2008; Gore, 1993). In 1999, the National Science Foundation (NSF) first conceived the term “digital government” to indicate better government services through ICT innovation (Dawes, 2008). As alot of countries welcomed “electronic government” or “egovernance” – interpreted as the creative use of ICTs to enable public services, citizen engagement in the democratic exercise, and boosting high-quality and cost-effective government administrations – there has been a heightened call for election administrations across the globe to embrace and leverage ICTs to modernise the electoral processes, enhance transparency, and improve voting experiences.

Whilst the slogan “better government for less” has been the basis of e-governance as ICTs decrease the transactional costs of public services and as a result maximize utility, the questions of why or when organisations and citizens embrace or accept ICTs remains considerably unresolved. The digitization of ICTs in elections is rooted in the social and organisational circumstances of each country, and there are both supply and demand aspects that give rise to the adoption of technology. Intellectuals from political science, information science, public administration, and business have offered a cluster of theoretical lenses to explain the situation. The next section reviews some key theories to comprehend the use of ICTs in election administration.

Theoretical Underpinnings

Institutional Intervention Theory

Organisations are living entities and constantly endeavour and grow to survive and adapt to new social and political realities. According to Scott, institutions are social entities that are highly resilient (cited in Shi et al., 2008). The institutional theory content that beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours are notably shaped by network of groups and organisations, and changes in policy choices occur as a result of constant drive for legitimacy (Shi et al., 2008). According to King et al.,

Institutional intervention in IT innovation can be constructed at the intersection of the influence and regulatory powers of institutions and the ideologies of supply push and demand-pull models of innovation (1994, p. 139).

The demand push is triggered by the growing expectancy of transparency, efficiency, and performance from public and private organisations. On the other hand, the supply push is propelled by the level of IT infrastructure in the society, the resultant ICT innovations, and the applications of ICT communication by other public organisations. As organisations compete for resources, they become susceptible to these pressures to adopt regulatory preferences. Research indicates that the regulation of organisations is shaped by three types of pressures: coercive, normative, and mimetic (Scott, 2001).

Technology Acceptance Model (TAM)

Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is one of the most widely used theoretical frameworks to explain user acceptance of ICTs on the demand side. David (1989) first came up with this theory and borrowed psychological “theory of reasoned action” (TRA) to forecast behaviours based on “attitudes” and “subjective norms” (Gupta et al., 2016). TAM predicts the citizens’ use and acceptance of ICTs based on two key constructs – “perceived usefulness” and “perceived ease of use.”  “Perceived usefulness” refers to “..the degree to which a person believes that using a particular system would amplify his or her job performance” (Davis, 1989, p. 320).  “Perceived ease of use” is defined as “the degree to which a person believes that using a particular system would be free of efforts” (Davis, 1989. P.320). TAM theory predicts that both the “usefulness” and the “ease of use” (with less effort) significantly shapes citizens’ attitudes about the adoption of ICTs. These intentions are also accelerated by “subjective norms” (push from the social environment). Today, digital technology has permeated every level of society, and the internet, email apps, and mobile devices have become ubiquitous forms of communication. Because if this new frontier of communication in the networked society and the deep penetration of IT infrastructure, there have been growing demands from voters to digitize the electoral process.

METHODOLOGY

A descriptive-analytical case study approach was applied, using qualitative research methodology. Due to the subjective nature of comparative politics (in this case comparative foreign policy), a qualitative approach to the study is often adopted. Applying a descriptive research technique on a case study, according to Mugenda and Mugenda, provides for a thorough exploration of the issue in a short period of time and on a small scale. They go on to recommend that the best method to get a thorough picture of a situation is to use a qualitative research approach on a case study (Mugenda & Mugenda 1999).

According to (Huddleston et. al, 2022, p151), case study continues to be a very common method within qualitative analyses. Regularly informed by our curiosity in a particular case, this method has the possibility to provide valuable empirical findings over the in-depth analysis of phenomena constrained by space and time. The period of case-specific knowledge, however, is not contradictory with developing wider conceptual and theoretical assumptions. Rather the opposite: Gerring (2017) thinks generalization to be the same objective of case study methods. Similarly, George and Bennett (2005,5) see case study as the ‘detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test explanations that may be generalizable to other events’.

RESULTS

Internet Voting in Estonia

The year 2005 saw the adoption of a countrywide remote voting system. Thus far, the country has witnessed an aggregate of eight internet-enabled voting exercises for local, national and European elections. Citizens of Estonia can vote via a website hosted by the Estonian National Electoral Committee. Entitled voters should use their electronic I.D card, a statutory identification network for every Estonian resident, and a PIN code to connect themselves to enter the system for casting their votes (Heiberg, Parsovs and Willermson 2015).

Effects on Electoral Turnout

A study of the history of Estonia’s voting shows a striking trend: Since its establishment, the digital electoral structure has recorded considerable growth in online votes. In the 2005 local elections, just 9317 residents cast their votes via the internet, consisting of a mere 1.9 percent of total votes collected. But, the measure of internet votes rose almost 15 times in consequent elections, getting to 30.5 percent in the 2015 nationwide elections (Vassil et al, 2016). In 2019, during the Riigikogu elections i-votes represented 43.8 percent of all votes. In the European parliament elections held in May 2019, the share rose to 43.8 percent of all votes. In May 2019 during the European parliament elections, the share increased to 46.7 percent. Ehin etl al. (2022) envisioned that a prolongation of this tendency would result to the bulk of votes cast electronically in the 2023 general elections.

However, a definite ending has still to be drawn on the influence of internet voting on electoral turnout in Estonia. For instance, Treschsel and Vassil (2010), report glaring effects of internet voting that expanded turnout by 2.6 percent in the local elections of 2009. But, Bochsler’s (2010) analysis counterclaims that the expansion in turnout was, actually linked with other political and socioeconomic attributes. Results thus indicated there internet voting didn’t have any effect. However, the anticipated impact of a huge turnout, according to Solvak and Vassil (2017), appears to be a mislaid desire. The key effect of internet voting is not a rise but a balance of turnout at 63 to 64 percent in nationwide elections in Estonia

Effect on Democratic Principles

Other than the significant growth in internet voting, there has been a change in the demographic dispensation of those electronic voters. Treschsel and Vassil (2010) note small but crucial demographic leanings in these pilot i-voting exercises in Estonia. The original interet voters in the country were expected to be ethnic Estonians, university-educated, wealthy and early middle-aged (35-45). Conversely, ethnic Russians, looked less passionate regarding this latest digital technology. But, since the 2015 national elections, such biases have ostensibly vanished. Even computer literacy, which used to be a strong indictor of i-voting, no longer counted. It implied people with poor computer skills were as likely to vote online as their peers who stood out in digital technologies.

Through this outcomes, Slovak and Vasil (2016) concluded that internet voting in Estonia has triumphantly advanced from a small and inventive elite group to reach a large mass of the less advantaged population. By inference, the speedy exercise of i-voting spread within the country leads to comprehensive and equal democratic engagement.

But, various studies inform of a new divide occasioned by the exercise of internet voting in Estonia. More specifically, the Center party, the main left-wing party in the country, allegedly got three to four times fewer votes online than offline in the past three parliamentary elections. Centrist voters appeared less devoted to online voting as compared to their peers from other parties, particularly the liberal reform party. Internet voting in this case, cna distort election results, especially in close elections. As noted by Lust (2015), i-voting exercise in Estonia are becoming more politically biased. Worse still, Kitsing (2011) highlights that the availability of creative platforms for online political participation has yet to absorb the public in the legislative process. Estonians are still reluctant to reveal their opinions regarding new laws in the government portal. Online democratic involvement, thus, remains largely unimproved.

Security risks and government replies

Estonians are not new to the susceptibility of its voting system. In April 2007, just two years after its initial i-voting experiments, the country experienced a major cyberattack that instantaneously overwhelmed the government and key bank and media websites with traffic. Accordingly, bank machines stopped operating, and critical internet infrastructure came to a halt. In the meantime, the complex association between Tallinn and the Kremlin exposes Estonia to potential cyberattacks from Russia. The latest security case happened in 2017 when Infineon, a multinational firm producing the Estonian ID card chip, was reported with a serious security lapse that affected around 800,000 Estonian ID cards and millions of cards used globally.

As opposed to pulling back from this new digital transformation, the Estonian government has opted to maintain the system and endeavoured to become a world leader in internet voting. As well as refining its digital technique for many yeas, the country has additionally included the aim to create a stable voting system as part of its more extreme national campaign to attain the digital transformation of society. For instance, the Estonian Information System Authority (RIA) was set up in 2011 to management of the country’s information systems. This government agency is not only a cybersecurity governor but it is also in charge for the core e-government systems (Fillion, 2020). In 2014, The country also became the first nation globally to set up e-residency, a transnational digital identity that anyone in the world can apply for (Microsoft, 2017). In spite of the cybersecurity worries, online voting remains more ‘sticky’ than regular voting among Estonian residents. Solvak and Vassil (2017) established that around 80 percent of Internet voters will carry on with voting online in the succeeding two elections. In comparability, around 60 percent of conventional voters will continue to vote individually at the polling station.

Institutional Building of Digital Infrastructure

The success of Estonia in implementing – and sustaining internet voting country wide has fascinated the world’s attention to examine its untold blueprint. There seems to be a concurrence that the establishment and successful growth of internet voting ought to be perceived in the context of a broader state-led attempt to create one of the world’s most modern e-governance systems.

The creation of Estonia’s digital state mainly entails an early appropriation and speedy penetration of the internet and computerization. Promptly after reinstituting independence from soviet domination in 1991, the Estonian government took a bold step to take up digital technology. Under the “Tiger Leap program,’ instituted in 1996, every Estonian school was offered a computer classroom and connected to the internet. Computer science was a necessity to elevate the digital awareness of citizens. Likewise business and local governments fostered public private partnerships to make wireless internet accessible in public places for nothing.

Before long public libraries became internet hubs, allowing older people to gain online services (Roonemaa, 2017). Further the government endeavoured to migrate many public services online. In the 2000s, Estonian residents could file taxes, register a business, and claim social benefits remotely through the internet. Many Estonians also welcomed the development of information technologies as a national concern. With the collapse of Communism, Estonian citizens took pride in the establishment of a digital state as a means to determine the country from other post-Communist societies (Kitsing, 2011).

Hence, these leading policies have remarkably enhanced digital capacities, capabilities, and attitudes among Estonia’s residents. Statistics indicate that presently, 79 percent of Estonians are recurrent internet users, exceeding any other East European country (Lust 2018). The portion of households connected to internet in the country has expanded from 37 percent in 2005 to 90 percent in 2020. The spread of mobile broadband is also among the highest internationally, standing at 158 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in 2020 (OECD, 2023). These successes have unquestionably set a firm foundation for the fast spread of internet voting in the country.

Possibly the most important institution developed for the Estonian digital society was the issuance of the national I.D card in 2002. The Estonian ID card is a state-issued identity document that is a must for Estonian and E.U. citizens staying on a permanent basis in Estonia. The digital I.D also replaced many other I.D cards, from bank cards to health insurance cards, and can validate a person’s identity and sign documents online (Alvarez, Hall, and Treschel, 2009). I.D. cards’ capacity to firmly bind digital and physical identities has enabled the Estonian government to completely reimagine and alter public services.

Prior to the introduction of internet voting in 2005, Estonia also endeavoured to initiate broad legal and regulatory institutions that ease the digitization process. It is well known that legislation change can be a slow procedure: alongside the time needed for drafting and editing, it also needs reaching hard – occasionally impractical – political agreements. This is mainly taxing for internet voting. As demonstrated by Ehin et al. (2002), as legislation is usually prescriptive with paper-based approaches in mind, internet voting cannot be simply integrated into prevailing legislation.

The legal structure first developed numerous laws to create and shield digital citizenship in Estonina. For example, the 1999 identity documents Act contains detailed arrangements for digital I.D cards. The 2000 Digital Signatures Act governs the use of legally binding digital signatures. The population register Act and the personal Data protection Act governs the use of data containing information on all citizens and residents of Estonia (Ehin et al., 2002). In 2002, the parliament then passed a number of electoral acts, comprising the Riigikogu Election Act, the local government council Election Act, and the Referendum Act.

These legislations established the likelihood of i-voting in local, national, and European elections and referenda, along with detailed clauses on vote counting, including cancellation of multiple votes. In this context, applying internet voting seemed like natural extension of the current electronic government services.

ICT usage in Kenyan Elections

The promulgation of the constitution marked the introduction of the electoral technology in Kenya’s elections (Sihanya 2017). This came about with the idea of supplementing the human element in the electoral system. The adoption of technology sought to supplement the manual feature that has distinguished the electoral process and operations (Kenyan constitution 2010).

The recommendations made by the Kriegler commission after the PEV that followed after the 2007-2008 Kenyan presidential elections were what led to the incorporation of electoral technology, through the Kenyan constitution [4]

Following the recommendations of the Kriegler Commission, electoral reforms became crucial so as to offer a framework on the use of technology. Parliament through legal (Elections Act 2011) and institutional framework strove to root technology in the electoral management system (Otieno 2017).

In 2010, the independent Electoral and boundaries Commission (IIEBC) which had been created to manage the referendum supervised the pilot test of technology by conducting voter registration using the technology using in eighteen constituencies around the country [5]. This was mainly aimed at examining the effectiveness and accuracy of the technology in registration of voters vis-a-vis the existing manual registration of voters.

The elections Act No. 24 of 2011 was enacted by parliament offering the statutory framework governing elections and in this case the incorporation of technology in the electoral management system (Elections 2011 Act 2011).  The election (General) Regulations 2012 were eventually ratified by the IEBC to offer for the procedural system governing elections as prescribed by the constitution (Constitution 2010) which buttresses the principle of transparent, credible, free, and fair elections. In simpler terms, the technology adopted by the electoral body had to be simple, accurate, verifiable, secure, accountable and transparent.

The IEBC was then granted authority through Section 44 of the election act 2011to adopt that it would see appropriate to utilise inn the electoral management system. The Act did not detail which technology the IEBC would utilise during elections mandating that discretion for IEBC with the assistance of technological experts to choose whichever appropriate for a particular election.

Distinctively, the elections Act did not offer logical legal route to be applied in the adoption of technology in lections. The elections Act 2011 did not anticipate for a situation where the technology malfunctions and therefore failed to prepare a backup in the event this mishap happened.

On its part IEBC delayed publishing the regulations effecting Section 44A leading to the unsureness of how the application of a complimentary system was to be realised. This brought about NASA [6] proceeding to court on claims that IEBC was powerless to make the required preparations to establish the complimentary to electronic results transmission (ERTS) and the electronic voter identification (EVID) system. NASA made three pleas. The first was IEBC offer a clear clarification on whether section 44A of the elections Act 2011 provided for an electronic or mechanical complimentary system. [7]

Second, they asked for an explanation whether the IEBC established the complimentary system sixty days to the election date which was August 8,2017. Thirdly, the IEBC be forced to use electronic voter identification and result transmission exclusively as per provisions of Articles 23 and 47 of the constitution of Kenya 2010. IEBC being the respondent in the case, raised the argument that NASA’s application did not have any merit failing to answer any of the issues raised by NASA substantially. [8]

The election (general) regulations 2012 were geared towards laying out a detailed method of integrating technology in the elections and address the legal spaces that the election Act had missed to rectify. [9] the election (general) regulations 2012 thus intended biometric registration, electronic voting [10] and electronic transmission of results [11]

The IEBC adopted the Biometric voter Registration System (BVRs), electronic voter identification system (EVID) and the results transmission system (RTS) in the 2013 general elections majorly as an autonomous system. Additionally, the IEBC instituted the political party nomination system (PPNS) which was applied in the political party nominations.

It is crucial to indicate that before the 2013 general elections, the wave of becoming technological was growing and the public had the confidence that technology in the elections would warrant free and fair elections and further turn away violence if the same was well employed in the electoral management system [12] Public expectations were greatly hinged on substantial reform to the result management framework of the electoral system.

The IEBC adopted the Biometric Registration (BVR) system in the 2013 elections which essentially comprises of a computer fingerprints scanners and cameras. The BVR machine is used to capture the bio-data of a voter and particularly the finger prints to guarantee originality of a voter and improve transparency in elections. [13] The biometric information of voters was stored in an electronic register supplemented by the principal register. [14] Additionally, the electoral body was needed to certify that an electronic register is placed on its website for access and verification by voters as the would improve public trust and confidence in the electoral system [15]

Despite the placement of BVR in elections, it encountered many challenges. Evident concerns were raised with reference to its procurement and acquisition leading to legal dispute as it was in the case of Okiya Omtatah Okoiti v. Attorney General and Another [16]. The applicant pursued an injunction to have the IEBC barred from acquiring BVR kits from Safrann Morpho based on claims of corruption levelled against the said Safran Morpho. [17]

There were concerns regarding its integrity of the register principally based upon the allegations that the biometric information had ben interfered with. [18] the late registration of voters occasioned by late procurement of BVR kits had serious impact on the registration of voters. As a result, the processes such as inspection and publication of registers were delayed thereby cultivating mistrust, suspicion, contempt and dearth of public confidence in the electoral technology. [19]

The IEBC also established the electronic voter identification system (EVID) in the 2013 presidential elections which essentially includes an electronic poll book which verifies and confers voters electronically as registered by the BVR. [20] there EVID was occasioned by problems as well. To begin with, it was perceived with a lot of mistrust on account that it had information registered by BVR which the public had suspected to be corrupted. Secondly, the EVID machines did not work in many of the polling stations despite expensive investment by the IEBC in them. [21]

The conditions leading to the acquisition of the machines were controversial and heavily contested. [22] The international foundation of electoral system (IFES) has raised worries over the capacity of Face technologies to supply the EVIDS kits and contended that to enable them to continue with the same would negate the public interest. [23] However, the IEBC went ahead to acquire and use the kits. [24]

The challenges surrounding EVID kits were further aggravated by the fact that several polling stations had no electricity. Laptops, cameras, and phones drain their power charge. They were in good condition order on the same and for that reason the IEBC had to revert to manual system of voter identification. [25] It is sufficient to note that the failure by the EVID during 2013 elections depraved the adoption of technology. This was magnified by the distinct issues that the system had been hacked and corrupted thereby deprived of integrity and reliability. [26]

Further, the IEBC distributed the Results Transmission system (RTS) in the 2013 general and presidential elections. Fundamentally, the RTS was purposed to advanced to transmit results from the polling stations to the tallying centres once the electoral results had been counted and tabulated. The goal was to avert electoral malpractices such as tampering of results and ballot stuffing that had characterised earlier elections like the disputed 2007 elections.

Regrettably, the RTS also failed on the day of the election in 2013. [27] It failed to transmit results to the numerous tallying centres and specifically the presidential results to the national tallying centre. This was in addition to the lack of clarity as regards the tabulation of hard copies of the results are concerned. This evidently led to anxiety and tension in the country. [28]

Additionally, servers of the IEBC were reported to have malfunctioned. [29] A few election officials did not have pins to enable them to access the system mainly because to in experience for the task. The results could not be transmitted. Blame game and counter accusations ensued. The IEBC while confronted with the RTS failure fiasco defaulted to the manual system. The election staff chose to use excel spreadsheets instead of the database systems. [30]

This resulted to a lot of mistakes and corrections and some occurrences resulting to the printing of parallel polling forms for the same electoral area. It should be noted that considering the results transmitted electronically were to be deemed provisional, the essence of technology in elections was to guarantee transparency in the electoral management system. This objective was never attained as well. [31]

Following article 138(10) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, a limit period of seven days is given for the declaration of presidential election results. The Elections (general Regulations 2012 laid don the procedure for counting, tallying, transmission, and publication of results including those of presidential results. The results were to be counted and declared at each polling station and sequential tallying at the constituency levels, county level and at the national level [32]

Many of the election staff and mainly the constituency returning officers did not adhere to this regulation. They instead headed to tender physical results of presidential elections to the national tallying centre. [33]

The issues of want of integrity in the electoral technology and failure thereof in 2013 have been vindicated. The issues have been litigated in several judicial forums. The African Centre for Open governance (AFRICOG) in the case of African centre for Open governance (AFRICOG) V Ahmed Issack Hassan & another [34] asserted that the manual reversal after the failure of RTS was undermining the credibility and transparency of the electoral process and sought to have High Court halt the manual tallying and tabulation of results. [35]

Raila Odinga, who was one of the preseidential candidate approached Supreme court in the case of Raila Odinga & Other v. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 3 Others. [36] The petitioner’s asserted that the lection was not free and fair and argued that the collapse of technology during the presidential election process. However, the supreme dismissed the petition on account that the adoption of technology in electoral process did not replace the manual system but complemented it. [37]

The decision of the Supreme court was that the adoption of technology was to improve efficiency in the electoral system but could not guarantee an accountability and credibility of elections. [38] Further they argued that the adoption of technology was principally unconnected to the official results and as such an election could not be annulled because of failed technological devices. [39]

As noted previously, the issue of failure and lack of integrity in the technology adopted by the IEBC in 2013 general elections came to fore in various election petitions. For instance, in the case of Thomas Musau v. IEBC & another, [40] the election petition against election of Matungulu Constituency National Assembly Member was allowed on the ground that there were widespread election malpractices including but not limited to the lack of integrity in the tabulation process of results. [41]

Technology Adopted in 2017 Presidential Elections

In the 2017 general election, the electronic devices in a particular polling station malfunctioned. Several irregularities and illegalities in the election technology were uncovered and brought forward during the presidential petition at the supreme court. [42] While IEBC had noted on a number of times before the 2017 general elections that the electronic system were secure and reliable, that wasn’t correct. This brought to the fore the question on integrity and legitimacy of the electoral technology.

On the global scene, critics of election technology have argued that influential actors seek to fetishize technology and promote the digital fallacy that technology can enhance democracy [43] Over the years there have been widespread fears that electoral technology is unsafe and subject to hacking and manipulation. [47] For example, during the USA elections held on 7th November 2016, there were allegations that the electronic devices and servers had been manipulated by the Russians despite USA being considered the pioneer in ICT [48] Alot of countries and states such as Ireland have held back the adoption of technology because of imminent threats of manipulation and breach of data security. [49]

Whilst technology limits human error, the threats that occur with it can never be underestimated. The events prior and aftermath of 2017 presidential elections vindicate the assertions there is need to relook and examine the legal and institutional work governing the adoption and use of technology in elections. [50] While it is expected that the use of technology enhance public confidence in the electoral system, it failure and manipulation thereof has invoked suspicions and creates mistrust. [51] Technology if not used in the right manner can neither solve any election problem not avert any risk. [52]

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

My analysis of Electoral technology practices in Estonia and Kenya in this paper highlights that digitization of electoral systems often results in various realities in national politics and democracy as whole. Estonia has been exceptionally successful in the realm of electronic government and democracy: it does not just offer citizens the possibility of pan-national internet voting in binding elections. Internet voting has also become normalised and entrenched in the country over the years, which had survived multiple security crises.

Kenya by contrast, falls significantly behind in its use of electoral technology. Despite the efforts of the IEBC in enhancing the use of technology in electoral processes aimed at eliminating human error, improving efficiency, increasing verifiability, the issue of the integrity of the electoral technology has come under sharp focus. The issue of reliability of the technology has been questioned. The operation and functioning of the technology and system servers have been done by third party companies which raises doubts on the integrity of the system.

Without audit and checks on the electoral technology system, there is danger of system manipulation and electoral theft. This scenario affects the transparency of elections and hence derails the process of democratisation. Thus, the country needs to borrow a leaf from Estonia and other countries that have successfully used technology to ensure free, fair, and credible elections.

Notes

1. Electronic Technology: www.aceproject.org
2. The Zambian Observer (2017), “Electronic voting and result transmission systems Key to Efficient Elections management.
3. Section 3: “Key Election Process Categories, Electronic Voting and counting.” openelectiondata.ne
4. Sihanya, Ben (forthcoming 2021) “Electoral Justice in Kenya and Africa under the 2010   Constitution: Implementation, Enforcement, Reversals and Reforms,” op. cit. Cf. Government of Kenya (2008) “The Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections held in Kenya on 27 December 2007,” op. cit. Cf. Ben Sihanya Constitutional Democracy in Kenya and Africa, Sihanya Mentoring & Innovative Lawyering, Nairobi & Siaya.
5. Ben Sihanya (forthcoming 2021) “Presidential and Premier election, Succession and Transition in 2017 and Beyond: Electoral Justice, Popular Sovereignty, Protests, Revolutions, and Succession Debates and Movements,” in Ben Sihanya Constitutional Democracy Regulatory and Administrative Law in Kenya and Africa, Sihanya Mentoring & Innovative Lawyering, Nairobi & Siaya (Chapter 21). Cf. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (2017) “The Evaluation Report for the August 8 2017 General Election and the Fresh Presidential Election held on 26^th October 2017,” at https://www.google.com/url?sa= t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source= web&cd= 1&cad=rja&uact =8&ved= 2ahUKEwjggoG 2mbHiAhUFzIUKHdQCAi0QFjAAegQIABAC&url= https%3A%2F%2 Fwww. cartercenter.org%2Fresources%2Fp
6. National Supper Alliance v. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, PetitionNo. 328 of 2017.
7. Ben Sihanya (forthcoming 2021) “Electoral Justice in Kenya and Africa under the 2010 Constitution: Implementation, Enforcement, Reversals and Reforms,” in Ben Sihanya Constitutional Democracy Regulatory and Administrative Law in Kenya and Africa, Sihanya Mentoring & Innovative Lawyering, Nairobi & Siaya (Chapter 20).
8. John Harrison Kinyanjui v The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 4 Others, Constitutional Petition No. 555 of 2012 In the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi Constitutional and Judicial Review Division (2013) eKLR.
9. Section 60 Elections (General) Regulations 2012. Cf. Ben Sihanya (forthcoming 2021) “Electoral Justice in Kenya and Africa under the 2010 Constitution: Implementation, Enforcement, Reversals and Reforms,” in Ben Sihanya Constitutional Democracy Regulatory and Administrative Law in Kenya and Africa, Sihanya Mentoring & Innovative Lawyering, Nairobi & Siaya (Chapter 20).
10. Section 82 Elections (General) Regulations 2012. Cf. Ben Sihanya (forthcoming 2021) “Electoral Justice in Kenya and Africa under the 2010 Constitution: Implementation, Enforcement, Reversals and Reforms,” in Ben Sihanya Constitutional Democracy Regulatory and Administrative Law in Kenya and Africa, Sihanya Mentoring &
11. Ben Sihanya (forthcoming 2021) “Electoral Justice in Kenya and Africa under the 2010 Constitution: Implementation, Enforcement, Reversals and Reforms,” op. cit. Cf. Vellah Kidogo (2018) “The Adoption of Technology in the Kenyan Electoral Process: Lessons from the 2013 and 2017 Presidential Elections,” at https://www.academia.edu/37884440/Kenya The Adoption of Technology in the Kenyan Electoral Process.doc x (accessed 25/4/2019)
12. Ben Sihanya (forthcoming 2021) “Presidential and Premier election, Succession and Transition in 2017 and Beyond: Electoral Justice, Popular Sovereignty, Protests, Revolutions, and Succession Debates and Movements,” op. cit. Cf. Ole Holtved (2011) “Biometrics in Elections, Georgia: De-duplication or Voter Register and Verification of Voter Identity Using Biometrics,” at https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/biometrics_in_elections_2011_0.pdf (accessed 25/4/2019).
13. Sections 3 and 4 Elections Act 2011. Cf. Ben Sihanya (forthcoming 2021) “Electoral Justice in Kenya and Africa under the 2010 Constitution: Implementation, Enforcement, Reversals and Reforms,” op. cit.
14. Ibid, s 33.
15. Petition 311 of 2012, In the High Court at Nairobi 2012 eKLR.
16. The Carter  Centre (2013) “Observing      Kenya‟s            March  2013    National          Elections,” at (https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/kenya-final-101613.pdf (accessed 26/4/2019).
17. Ben Sihanya (forthcoming 2021) “Presidential and Premier election, Succession and Transition in 2017 and Beyond: Electoral Justice, Popular Sovereignty, Protests, Revolutions, and Succession Debates and Movements,” op. cit.
18. Ben Sihanya (forthcoming 2021) “Electoral Justice in Kenya and Africa under the 2010 Constitution: Implementation, Enforcement, Reversals and Reforms,” op. cit.
19. Joel Barkan, (2013) “Kenya´s 2013 Elections: Technology is not Democracy,” (2013) 24(3) Journal of Democracy 156.
20. Ben Sihanya (2017) “Electoral Justice in Kenya under the 2010 Constitution Implementation, Enforcement, Reversals and Reforms,” op. cit.
21. Ben Sihanya (forthcoming 2021) “Electoral Justice in Kenya and Africa under the 2010 Constitution: Implementation, Enforcement, Reversals and Reforms,” op. cit. Cf. KNCHR (2013) “Elections: Safeguarding Rights, An Account of Hotspots, Elections 2013,” op. cit.
22. Ben Sihanya (forthcoming 2021) “Presidential and Premier election, Succession and Transition in 2017 and Beyond: Electoral Justice, Popular Sovereignty, Protests, Revolutions, and Succession Debates and Movements,” op. cit. Cf. Karen E Ferree, Clark C Gibson and James D. Long (2014) “Voting Behavior and Electoral Irregularities in Kenya´s 2013 Election,” 8(1) Journal of Eastern African Studies 153; Nic Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch and Justin Willis (2014) “Democracy and Its Discontents: Understanding Kenya´s 2013 Elections,” 8(1) Journal of Eastern African Studies.
23. Ben Sihanya (forthcoming 2021) “Electoral Justice in Kenya and Africa under the 2010 Constitution: Implementation, Enforcement, Reversals and Reforms,” op. cit.
24. Ben Sihanya (forthcoming 2021) “Presidential and Premier Election, Succession and Transition in 2017 and Beyond: Electoral Justice, Popular Sovereignty, Protests, Revolutions, and Succession Debates and Movements,” op. cit.
25. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Post Election Evaluation Report on the 4th March 2013 General Elections (October 2013).
26. Petition No. 152 of 2013, In the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi (2013) EKLR. Cf. Ben Sihanya (forthcoming 2021) “Presidential and Premier Election, Succession and Transition in 2017 and Beyond: Electoral Justice, Popular Sovereignty, Protests, Revolutions, and succession Debates and Movements,” op. cit.
27. Petition No.5 of 2013, In the Supreme Court of Kenya at Nairobi (2013) eKLR. Cf. Ben Sihanya (forthcoming 2021) “Presidential and Premier Election, Succession and Transition in 2017 and Beyond: Electoral Justice, Popular Sovereignty, Protests, Revolutions, and Succession Debates and Movements,” op. cit.
28. Ben Sihanya (forthcoming 2021) “Electoral Justice in Kenya and Africa under the 210 Constitution: Implementation, Enforcement, Reversals and Reforms,” op. cit.
29. Petition No.5 of 2013, In the Supreme Court of Kenya at Nairobi (2013) eKLR.
30. HC EP No. 2 of 2013.
31. Ben Sihanya (forthcoming 2021) “Electoral Justice in Kenya and Africa under the 2010 Constitution: Implementation, Enforcement, Reversals and Reforms,” op. cit.
32. Raila Amolo Odinga & another v. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 2 others Presidential Petition No. 1 of 2017, [2017] eKLR.
33. Alan Gelb and Anna Diofasi (2016) Biometric Elections in Poor Countries: Wasteful or a Worthwhile Investment?” Centre for Global Development.
34. Paul Sambo and Patricial Alexander (2018) “Á Scheme of Analysis for eVoting as a Technological InnovationThis System,” 84(2) The Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries 1.
35. European Union Election Observation Mission (2017) “Republic of Kenya General Elections 2017,” at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/625178/EPRS_BRI(2018)625178_EN.pdf (accessed 11/5/2019).
36. Rehema Baguma and Emmanuel Eilu (2015) “Úsing Mobile Phones in Elections in Developing Countries: Opportunities and Challenges,” in A Gamatie (ed), Computer in Research and Development in Africa, Springer Publishers, 251-265.
37. Paul Sambo and Patricia Alexander (2018) “A Scheme of Analysis for eVoting as a Technological Innovation System,” op. cit.
38. See the ratio decindei in Bush v. Gore, 531 US 98 (2000).

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