Nuclear Disarmament and the Erosion of Deterrence Effectiveness Case Study: Ukraine

Nuclear Disarmament and the Erosion of Deterrence Effectiveness Case Study: Ukraine

Edmond Chick

Graduate Program of International Studies, Old Dominion University

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.906000255

Received: 29 May 2025; Accepted: 06 June 2025; Published: 10 July 2025

ABSTRACT

The invasion of Ukraine demonstrates an interesting security paradox between nuclear disarmament norms, territorial integrity and deterrence in a self-help unpredictable international environment. Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons under the Budapest Memorandum in order to receive security guarantees resulting in brutal betrayal by nuclear armed Russia. The research investigates how Russia maintains an effective nuclear deterrence capability against other nuclear powers in the region through threats despite challenges on the battlefield. Through the combination of military resistance, strategic partnerships and robust combat methods, Ukraine has established an unmatched ability to deter a nuclear-armed enemy – Russia. This research ponders on nuclear coercion, deterrence and responsibility theory to analyze the double deterrence dynamic effects in real battleground scenario. The research investigates how Russian nuclear threats have transformed global power dynamics to demonstrate the effectiveness of nuclear capabilities as an essential deterrence strategy for protection against foreign threats. The case of Ukraine also demonstrates how a non-nuclear state can weaken nuclear deterrence capabilities by challenging its effectiveness thus, showing the limited effects in regard to nuclear coercion. The paper reveals that Russia’s deterrence strategies demonstrates a dynamic strategic advantage of its nuclear weapons in navigating complex international security environment. Meanwhile Ukraine’s defiance demonstrates a new approach to deterrence theory that questions the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in modern warfare. The research suggests an immediate review of nuclear proliferation norms and the duties of nuclear nations to maintain global security stability.

Keywords: Nuclear disarmament, erosion, deterrence effectiveness

INTRODUCTION

During and after the cold war, nuclear deterrence became an important security instrument in enhancing global stability and peace amongst superpowers. The acquisition of nuclear weapons plays a decisive role in defining global politics. This is the first time in European history that nuclear weapons have become a central point of debate (Luce, 2022). The outbreak of the war Ukraine created a serious insecurity problem in Europe as Russia the most power nuclear armed state in the world threatens to use tactical nuclear weapons against Kyiv. This therefore creates a possibility of escalation resulting in a nuclear war threatening global security. Some scholars even predicted an outbreak of a nuclear war seems very likely after Russia repeated warning about using nuclear weapon to obliterate Ukraine’s western donated military arsenals (Nelson & Montgomery 2022).

This paper makes two solid arguments. The existence of nuclear weapons provides an enormous deterrence capabilities and strategic advantage to nuclear armed state such as Russia against Ukraine on the battlefield. As the war rages on in Ukraine, analysists argue that Russia might resort to nuclear weapon strikes in an attempt to achieve its goals in Eastern Ukraine. It is evidence Ukraine will not be exempted from being annihilated by nuclear weapons in case of stiff resistance against stalled Russian attacks as Putin repeatedly warned (Woodward, 2023). Secondly, scholars argue that nuclear weapons are too destructive to be used thus political leaders are more cautious which explains why Ukraine has been able to demonstrate an effective and fierce conventional resistance against nuclear armed Russian (Wilson, 2013).

Another group of scholars do agree that the possession of nuclear weapons indubitably enhances the geopolitical tense environment to peace and stability. The nuclear deterrence theory – also known as the nuclear revolution theory (Arceneaux 2023) – posits that the possession of nuclear weapons and the related implicit (or explicit) threat of use of nuclear weapons yields stability, security and peace in world politics (Jervis 1989; Morgan 1977; Waltz 1981). Nuclear weapons become an inevitable factor to guaranty global peace as demonstrated during the cold war period between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Advocates of nuclear deterrence argue that the presence of Russian and Western nuclear weapons have injected a dose of prudence on both sides, both on the Russian and Western side (Bell, 2024). One of the common reasons which resonates with security concerns is the fact that nuclear weapons are an effective tool to navigate national security concerns and project states as important global players.

Research Question

what are the impacts of nuclear deterrence erosion on Ukraine’s security, regional and global stability?

Research Hypothesis

Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament to some extent did not weaken its deterrence capabilities against nuclear armed Russia. At the same time, Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament efforts significantly weakened its deterrence capability against nuclear armed Russia as it continues to lose more of its territories to the Russian army.

Historically, the fact that no major global war has occurred since and after 1945 should not be attributed to the existence of nuclear weapons to maintain an effective security balance but rather, the memories of previous global wars shaped the rational of nuclear actors. Similarly, the fact that no third world war occurred has probably more to do with the memories of the previous world wars, economic welfare, and globalization than with nuclear deterrence (Mueller 1990). At the same time, the security model explains restraint through alliances and extended conventional deterrence. U.S. security guarantees through NATO allies and partners, reduce the need to develop their own nuclear weapons (Sagan, 1996). The signing of the Budapest memorandum 1995 actually preserves Ukraine national security interests which explains why the United States of America and Great Britain has been Kyiv major arms supplier against the Russian invasion since 2022 explaining why more than 60% of Ukrainian territory still under its control.

Deterrence works effectively well when there is clear communication and signals amongst state actors concerned in a given geographical location or region. On the other hand, the risk associated with nuclear deterrence is very high predicting a very dangerous outcome if a false alarm or miscalculation occurs thus, state might not want to tamper with the red button because of territorial interests as with the case of Russia in Ukraine. That said, even if nuclear deterrence can work and sometimes does work, it comes with security risks such as proliferation and the risk of authorized use, authorized use by false alarm, unauthorized and accidental use by both state and non-state actors (Sauer, 2024, pp. 196).

Nuclear Deterrence in Ukraine’s Favor During the War.

Scholars argues that the existence of nuclear deterrence capabilities between Russia and NATO warrant prudence on both sides rather than escalation in Ukraine. As major supporters of Ukraine during the war, Britain and France have provided Ukraine with necessary ammunitions needed to fend off Russian offensive on its territory. In March 2025 the French president Emmanuel Macron offered Europe a nuclear umbrella something which was welcome in the Balkan and Ukraine itself. This increases the chances of retaliation from the French side if the Russia could use nuclear weapons as a mean to annihilate Ukraine. Advocates of nuclear deterrence argue that the presence of Russian and Western nuclear weapons have injected a dose of prudence on both sides, both on the Russian and Western side (Bell 2024; Dreuzy and Gilli 2022; Freedman 2023; Rose 2022). However, Ukraine does not possess nuclear weapons though have partners who could retaliate on its behalf if stroke by Ukraine.

Russian Nuclear Deterrence Rational in Ukraine

Scholars posits, the existence of nuclear by Russia creates some sort of cautiousness and prudent from the West. The collective West only provide Ukraine with lethal arms, humanitarian assistance and intelligence not stationing armed forces nor providing Kyiv with a nuclear umbrella. This therefore implies, the West do not intend to engage in intensive and extensive conflict with Russia over Ukraine nor encourage the Ukrainians to do so with Western ammunitions ((Hesse, 2023). The West would not like to see Russia behave irrationally risking a full scale nuclear blown out. This explains why they have acted more cautiously in providing Ukraine with sophisticated arms which might provoke Russia to escalate the conflict into nuclear Armageddon. There is also a fear amongst Western elites regarding Putin’s successor which might be more radical than him thus, causing more trouble in the geopolitically very tense environment.

Ukraine’s conventional military strategies and quick adaptability to western military hardware has proven more effectively on the battlefield against nuclear deterrence (Freedman, 2023). Nuclear deterrence works best when two states compete against another with nuclear weapons, but it alters the efficacy when one adopts a more strategic and robust approach overwhelming that of a nuclear state. During the early phase of the war in 2022, Ukraine struggles to keep the battle lines in its favor against the Russians, but as soon as Western military weaponries start moving in, this strategically change the outcome of the battle. It puts Ukraine in a more comfortable position as it starts receiving intelligence, military aircraft and other advanced weaponries from its Western backed partners thus making enormous gains against the Russian.

The absence of nuclear escalation in Ukraine demonstrates a restraining effect of nuclear deterrence in navigating complex battlefield situation (Mearsheimer, 2014). He argues, Western nuclear umbrella has provided a resounding deterrence against Russia from expanding the conflict beyond Ukraine (Mearsheimer, 2022). If the balance of power between Russia and NATO was not into play in the region after the cold war, one could easily assume the next victims after Ukraine could be Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania due to their small geographical sizes and strategic location to the black sea. Russia has always used the black sea for security and commercial purposes thus, access to this sea will be a strategic gain to enforce its position against any Western competing power in the region.

Ukraine’s conventional strength and skillful military tactics has optimized its momentum against the Russian invaders. Ukraine received high technological advanced weapons and training from its western backed partners which has change the dimension of deterrence on the battlefield thus, rendering nuclear deterrence ineffective. This refutes the notion of nuclear deterrence as an important factor in defining the outcome of any conflict. Moreover, the Russians have succeeded to kill many civilians than Ukrainian military men who they claimed are their enemies. Ukrainians have adopted a tactful military resilience and skills from the West, and it has drastically defined the dynamism of the conflict in their favor (Freedman, 2023). The scenario in Ukraine just made nuclear deterrence obsolete during conventional confrontations.

Nuclear deterrence restraining effect thus plays a psychological effect in dissuading nuclear conflict between nuclear actors. The mutual assured destruction (MAD) has ensured that both NATO and Russia avoid any direct nuclear confrontation thus, strategic cautious becomes the order of the day (Narang, 2014). France, Britain and United States of America as backers of Ukraine and liberal World thus have a responsibility to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used to attack sovereign state without provocation. Russia on the other hand understands using nuclear weapons in Ukraine might trigger a mutual assured destruction (MAD) retaliation from NATO which would be costly to its national interests. In a more logical sense, Russia will prefer to engage in hostilities with Ukraine through non-conventional nuclear method. Unfortunately, it troops are poorly trained and acholic in some cases hence, this further explains why Ukraine has not capitulated in 3 days as most security analysis expected before the beginning of the conflict in 2022. Nuclear deterrence resilience is contributing effectively to stability by deterring Russia from escalating the conflict into a direct confrontation with NATO indirectly by protecting and enhancing Ukraine’s territorial boundaries (Kroenig, 2022)

The impact of intelligence sharing and sanctions also contributed to changing the situation around in favor of the Ukrainians. Sanctions prohibited most western companies from exporting military soft and hardware to technologies to Russia. The Ukrainian military superiority in logistics, intelligence sharing and economic sanctions has proven more efficient than nuclear deterrence (O’Brien, 2023). If considering the figures published by the World bank and IMF before the beginning of the war in Ukraine and 6 months later, sanctions imposed by the West almost crippled the Russian economy to its knees even the central bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabuilina warned of inflation and interest spikes hurting investment in the country. The sharing of intelligence between the United States of America including other western European allies with Ukraine improved the situation on the battlefield. There were several successful targeted strikes by Ukraine in Russia especially on strategic arms production centers used by the Kremlin to navigate its special military operations in Ukraine.

Nuclear politics in reality has proven some effects on the ground in Ukraine to an extent, the fact the Russians are currently in possession of Ukraine’s biggest nuclear power plants is a strategic concern for Kyiv. It is not clear under which circumstances how the Ukrainians forces gave up these strategic locations during the conflict but as soon they captured most of the villages around these areas, they nuclear power plants easily fell into the Russian zones of influence. These include Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia knowing fully well these nuclear power plants could easily be used by the Russians to deter NATO intervention. The capturing of these nuclear power plants also sends a deterrent message and psychological defeat to Ukraine and its allies to be more prudent when considering attacking Russia. Geo-strategically, Russia position itself in the region to easily annihilate the entire Eastern Europe in case of escalation from NATO. Moreover, Russia already has nuclear weapons stationed in Belarus, Kaliningrad and now Ukraine if only at some point it will be positioned there in the nearest future. This will undoubtedly create an effective deterrence posture regarding any security threat from the region.

The nuclear revolution theory posits that the outbreak of a nuclear war between two nuclear actors will have devastating effects there by making military victory impossible by inhibiting conflict from either side (Jervis, 1989; Waltz, 1990). However, the theory does not demonstrate how persistent it is if such a conflict could last longer and the damage it might inflict on either side creating a possibility of capitulation. Recently, however, scholars have challenged the theory of the nuclear revolution, arguing that it is empirically weak and understates the degree to which competition persists between nuclear states (Bell, 2021; Green, 2020; Lieber & Press, 2020). It is very evident that the Ukrainian situation completely challenges the paradigm and seek a reassessment of nuclear deterrence in the realm of conventional war deterrence.

The legality of the nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Treaty on the Proliferation of nuclear weapons (TPNW) as a deterrence as well as dissuading force between Russia and Ukraine. Both Russia and Ukraine are members of the NPT which prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons and its use. If this treaty is strictly respected, Russia should not attack Ukraine with nuclear weapons because it forbids nuclear and non-nuclear states from attacking one another. This benefits Ukraine’s deterrence if Russia does not violate the law. This will therefore mean Ukraine should rule out any possibility that Russia would attack it with nuclear weapons during the course of the conflict because the law protects it and oblige Russia not to use nuclear weapons against any sovereign state. Moreover, article 2(4) of the UN charter forbids any nation to use force against the territoriality or political entity of other states. Moreover, the United Nations forbids states from using weapons of mass destruction for any purpose – Other types of weaponry which characterizes as weapons of mass destruction include biological and chemical weapons (Nystuen et al., 2014). This norm also protects Ukraine from being annihilated by nuclear weapons because it violates the existing international norm governing states.

International human rights law imposes requirements on the right to life and international humanitarian law imposes requirements on the conduct of hostilities in armed conflicts both of which may be impacted by the threat posed by nuclear weapons to human lives (Yip, 2022). On the other hand, Ukraine and Russia refrained from signing the treaty on the proliferation of nuclear weapons (TPNW) hence, creating complexities in respect to deterrence. Russia could use this as a pretext to easily obliterate Ukraine with nukes knowing fully well a modified version of the NPT it does not have to respect it nor Ukraine. International law protects and regulates the behavior of states when dealing with one another across frontiers. It protects those being attacked and condemn those who violates the rules which this obviously act as legal deterrence in Ukraine’s favor.

The nuclear deterrence theory plays an important role in boosting deterrence. Due to the complexities and unpredictable international environment, it becomes very difficult for smaller states to survive without being attacked by bigger ones. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons become a leverage to those states in possession of them and Russia is not excluded. But deterrence still poses a serious problem especially to nuclear states in possession of them. Hypothetically meaning that both states would be annihilated by nuclear weapons, thus in the national interest to preserve the sovereignty of either state, both would mutually be assured from illogical mass destruction (Awaru, 2022).

The Theoretical Perspective of Nuclear Deterrence

They exist three principal nuclear deterrence theories applicable to the Ukrainian context to understand how deterrence work in a dynamic and complex war environment. These theories are nuclear deterrence theory, nuclear coercion theory and nuclear responsibility theory.

Nuclear Deterrence Theory

Nuclear deterrence theory argues state in possession of nuclear poses a threat to it internally and externally and they must make rational decisions in order to maintain stability and peace.  The nuclear deterrence theory – also known as the nuclear revolution theory (Arceneaux, 2023) – posits that the possession of nuclear weapons and the related implicit (or explicit) threat of use of nuclear weapons yields stability, security and peace in world politics (Jervis, 1989; Morgan, 1977; Waltz, 1981). The assumption is that political decision makers must make rational decisions which must not escalate tension but rather show a lot of restraint when dealing with nuclear weapons. God forbid Putin dares to attack Ukraine with nuclear weapons will result probably trigger a retaliatory response from NATO which might not be a good scenario for Russia. Unsurprisingly, nuclear deterrence and the effects it is supposed to trigger are also the main reasons why states acquire nuclear weapons (Sagan, 1997). According to this theory, three distinctions must be considered (Sauer, 1998). First, nuclear deterrence decision makers are rational actors and understand the threat hence, they must act cautiously. Before Putin decides to use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, he is not sure about the scale the scale of response from NATO. This therefore creates a sense of rationality and restraint from both sides. Secondly, nuclear deterrence theory must take into consideration clear distinction between vital and trivial national interest and of course – the vital ones need to be protected by nuclear deterrence. Though it is quite difficult to distinguish what state considers important or trivial. The problem is that it is not always clear – certainly not to outsiders – what the vital interests of a country in practice are (Weldes, 1999). Thirdly, deterrence should be credible and aimed at a specific threat. The problem is that nobody can tell what is credible, especially with respect to diverse foreign policies and national interests of states. Others, however, are convinced that nuclear weapons – especially strategic ones – are too destructive to be used, and that (certainly democratically elected) leaders are of the same opinion and that, as a result, nuclear weapons will not be used and therefore are not credible as a deterrent (Wilson, 2013). All three conditions – rationality, vital interests at stake, and credibility – should be fulfilled (Sauer, 1998). Critics argue that deterrence have work effectively in maintaining peace and stability especially during the cold war era (Mearsheimer 2001 & Waltz, 1979) and also failed where two nuclear armed state engaged into hostilities – India and Pakistan. In the case of Ukraine, it can be arguably paradoxical considering the fact the region was stable after the dissolution of the Soviet Union till 2022 when Russia attacked it and took the Donbass regions.

Nuclear Responsibility Theory

A second theory that is related but different from nuclear deterrence theory states that nuclear-armed states are (Waltz, 1981; for a different view, see Beardsley and Asal 2009; Bell 2021) or should be (Brixey-Williams and Wheeler 2020) “responsible” states. This theory defines nuclear weapons as an act of responsibility that can only be used for defensive and non-offensive purposes. The theory portrays nuclear weapons deterrence as an act to deter and not to be used against adversaries nor to achieve territorial gains as the case with Russia against Ukraine. Nuclear deterrence should be political purpose solely and not military. The theory also implies that nuclear-armed states will not start major conventional wars, especially not expansionist wars, as this would contravene art.2 of the UN Charter and would be seen as “irresponsible (Sauer, 2024). The only difference with deterrence theory is that nuclear weapons can be used when deterrence fails. Due to the tense geopolitical situation around the globe, nuclear actors must exercise prudence according to the nuclear responsibility theory. Critics argue that theory itself is weak and lacks any substantial checks and balances to ensure nuclear states do not attack non-nuclear ones. Its mirror-image is the theory of nuclear opportunism that argues that nuclear-armed states may feel emboldened to take “irresponsible” decisions like attacking other states, thanks to their nuclear weapons (Bell, 2024). It is expected that after acquiring nuclear weapons North Korea will behave responsibly but not the case. The proponent of this theory will argue that responsible state should make rational decisions and avoid war resulting from nuclear deterrence. Critics will also argue that responsible nuclear armed states should therefore respect the same principle but not the case as seen between Russia against Ukraine and United States of America against Iraq. The war in Ukraine, however, does not match with the nuclear responsibility theory (Arceneaux, 2023). When nuclear armed states attack non-nuclear sovereign entities, it demonstrates an act of irresponsibility.  A nuclear-armed state – Russia, known as a “responsible” nuclear-armed state – cowardly attacked a non-nuclear weapon state (Ukraine) with conventional weapons behind a wall of 6,000 nuclear weapons (Biswas, 2023; Cocksworth, 2022). Critics will also argue that Russian nuclear arsenals did not play a major role in its attack against Ukraine which also undermine the theory of responsibility. Even though nuclear weapons have not been used, Russia used its status as a nuclear power to facilitate the decision to attack Ukraine. That said, the odds are that the fact that Russia did possess nuclear weapons in contrast to Ukraine facilitated the Russian decision to attack (Futter, 2023; McDermott, Pauly, and Slovic,2023). The fact it knows nuclear weapons plays to its advantage; Russia confidently used this opportunity to mastermind its selfish interest in Ukraine. Russian nuclear weapons “potentially enabled Russia’s invasion and conduct of the war in Ukraine (Fink, 2023, pp. 32).

THE THEORY OF NUCLEAR COERCION

The theory of nuclear coercion posits that nuclear armed states are willing to shape the behavior of non-nuclear states without the use of nuclear weapons by requesting something and implicitly threatening to use nuclear weapons if such demands are not granted. Unlike nuclear deterrence theory that seeks to deter, nuclear coercion emphasizes conventional active strategies with the use of force aiming at annihilating the enemy. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has actively voiced a concern against Eastward expansion by NATO however this was ignored (Mearsheimer, 2014). During a NATO summit in Romania 2008, it concluded that Georgia and Ukraine will become members of the alliance provoking a fierce reaction from Moscow.  The latter was a very disappointing outcome for Russia, and arguably the main grievance behind the ongoing war (Mearsheimer, 2014; Sauer 2017). Ukraine after the summit became frustrated considering the fact no deadline was announced in regard to its NATO membership. On the other, Russia got Angry and provoke Georgia leading to the breakaway of its two regions – South Ossetia and Abkhazia from the mother country. In the course of expressing its frustration with NATO expansion, Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine 2013 & 2022 threatening to use nuclear weapons if the situation eventually escalates. On the 16^{th of} June 2023, Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine if provoked it by posing a threat to the territorial integrity of Russia. Many Western analysts believe that this nuclear rhetoric is mainly used by the Kremlin and its local supporters for coercive reasons instead of effectively using nuclear weapons (Applebaum 2022; Giles 2022; T. Snyder 2023). When a nuclear armed states failed to achieve its objective against non-nuclear ones, they often result coercive rhetorics as Russia did repeatedly against Ukraine in 2023 and 2024. When Ukraine was not deterred by Russian aggression, Putin used the coercive threat rhetorics aimed obliterating Ukraine with nuclear weapons in an event its failed to capitulate or accept it demands. Here again, the use of nuclear weapons in the form of coercion failed (Arndt, Horovitz, and Onderco 2023; Futter 2023; Thakur 2022). To conclude, the empirical case of the war in Ukraine supports the literature on the ineffectiveness of nuclear coercion (Dreuzy and Gilli 2022). Nuclear coercion could work in archaic societies where states solely depend on themselves for defense but in a globalized age, it becomes very difficult to effectively materialize.

Problem Statement

The fundamental principle of international security shaping the behavior of states is built on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence assuming that threat resulting from mutual assured destruction (MAD) will discourage act of war against sovereign states (Shelling, 1966). However, in 1994 after signing the Budapest memorandum of 1994 between Russia, United States of America and Britain to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurance, Ukraine’s good faith was challenged by repeated acts of aggression from Russia. These includes the full-scale invasion of February 2022 and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Freedman, 2019; Sarotte, 2021).

Ukraine’s disarmament efforts have been challenged by nuclear armed state Russia undermining international efforts to assured it territorial integrity emboldening by a nuclear aggressor (Mearsheimer 2014). At the same time, this leaves security experts questioning the relevance of nuclear deterrence in addressing traditional conventional wars that fall outside the chassis of nuclear warfare (Narang, 2014; O’Brien, 2023)

This issue is further compounded with two global security implications for Ukraine and the rest of the World. The failure of effective nuclear deterrence risk encouraging global spike in proliferation efforts amongst non-nuclear states considering Ukraine’s successful battle ground strategies to navigate the challenges resisting a nuclear armed state Russia. This might alter the balance of power and destabilize regional security arrangements (Kroenig, 2015). On the other hand, the false promise of disarmament continues to emerge amongst non-nuclear states risking a potential spiking proliferation as the global community continues to witness the erosion of nuclear deterrence during conventional conflict. In order to address this issue requires an exquisite understanding whether nuclear deterrence still remain effective or irrelevant in the current geopolitical landscape or security paradigm needed to be enforced in to protect vulnerable non-nuclear states such as Ukraine (Sarotte, 2023).

The absence of nuclear deterrence in Ukraine

A lot of questions remain to be answered if Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament was a good or bad option regarding its territorial integrity. Some security experts will argue if Ukraine did not give up its nuclear weapons it would not have been attacked by nuclear armed Russia. Some observers point out that if Ukraine had kept the Soviet nuclear weapons that were stationed on Ukraine’s territory in the beginning of the 1990s, which it did not, this war would not have happened (Umland, 2022). While others are of the opinion that it would have been difficult for Ukraine to exist side by side Russia if she did not agree to completely disarm its nuclear arsenals. However, but scenarios are extremely difficult to check as lesson shave been drawn elsewhere with nuclear states going to war with one another – Pakistan and India. This argument is impossible to check (as it is counterfactual) but is in all likelihood incorrect (Larison. 2023). The first argument is that Ukraine did not have the components and the money to continue keeping nuclear weapons on its territory after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It could not even pay it debts not to talk of funding a nuclear program. Moreover, it would have been difficult for Russia to even accept a nuclear state to be so closed to its doors knowing fully well the risk it entails and of course independence just like the other Soviet Union would not have happen. Ukraine did not possess these components. Secondly, in case that Ukraine had not agreed to give the weapons back to Russia, the odds are that Russia would have already invaded Ukraine in the 1990s (Evangelista, 39–40).

The war in Ukraine produced has produced a mix message in respect to nuclear deterrence as both camps advocates and opponents claimed it does.  the war in Ukraine does not teach us much about nuclear deterrence theory (Gibbons and Herzog 2023, 9; Ingram 2022), although both camps – advocates and opponents – claim that it does. The deterrence situation in Ukraine is no frills to the international community. The aggressor will always feel pressured through military and economic pressure by raising the cost, but this often ends up with getting what they want. For example, (Bell, 2024, pp. 4) posits that “what we are observing in the war in Ukraine is run-of-the-mill, straightforward, basic, plain-vanilla deterrence. This has raised eyebrow in the European Union as Poland recently requested the United States of America to station nuclear arsenal on its territory aiming to deter any potential aggressor especially Russia. As a result, unsurprisingly, many Polish politicians and commentators are now in favor of becoming a host nation for US tactical nuclear weapons (Borger, 2022), and two former generals in Europe recommend the EU to get a nuclear deterrent of its own because of this war (Lanxade et al, 2023). The delicate situation in Ukraine still keeps reminding the global security community about the efficiency of deterrence. Some opponents of deterrence will argue Russia has not achieved as a nuclear armed state against a non-nuclear armed state Ukraine. Opponents of nuclear weapons in contrast conclude that the war in Ukraine shows again that nuclear deterrence does not work (Johnson, 2022). Unfortunately, it is too early to confirm if the deterrence is working effectively or not. Russia currently occupies a greater portion in Eastern Ukraine and the same time Kyiv has not capitulate as many thought it would have done so thus, difficult to say with certainty if deterrence is effective or not.

The legal implications of nuclear deterrence

 The United Nations charter, international humanitarian law, and convention on biological and chemical weapons all condemn the use of nuclear weapons for whatsoever reason.  The detonation of both nuclear bombs had not only brought the complete annihilation of both cities, but including the indiscriminate annihilation by the hundred thousand of the Japanese people who resided in those regions, notwithstanding the following months of nuclear radiation and the generational implications that come with it (Mecklin, 2023). There is no doubt when Syria used chemical weapons in 2013 the international community reacted strongly against such a move. Some states use such weapons to enhance their deterrence in a complicated and self-surviving environment where bigger states antagonist smaller to achieve their interest. Whatever, the case, it does not refute the fact these weapons are banned by law and should not be used under any circumstances. Other types of weaponry which characterizes as weapons of mass destruction include biological and chemical weapons (Nystuen et al., 2014). Bio-chemical weapons remain one of the most controversial issues occupying the international community as states still find such weapons useful in respect to deterrence, past historical precedence like United States of America and Japan in 1945, economic as well as social reasons. As a matter of fact, many nations still possess nuclear weapons to this day such as China, North Korea, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia (Prawitz & Leonard, 2024).

The most established treaties regarding the governing of nuclear deterrence are the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and the Treaty on the proliferation of nuclear weapons (TPNW). The two landmark treaties play an important role in governing nuclear related activities in respect to states’ sovereignty.  The controversiality surrounding these treaties stems from the fact that there are no enforceable mechanisms on states creating serious issues to the global security community. States can join the treaties and at times play within the rules and get what they want just like the case of Iran, Syria, North Korea, Libya and Iraq all played with the rules and get away without any stringent sanctions or coercion exerted from these institutions governing nuclear weapons. Most of the established treaties and agreements regarding the threat of nuclear weapons are non-binding or have the enforceability to whom those violate (Nagari & Gunadi, 2024). The most critical question here lies also in the hands of nuclear armed states who have repeatedly violated the rules of the game just as Russia for instance though it did not use nuclear weapon, but responsible nuclear actors do not invade other sovereign states. Russia transferred nuclear weapons to Belarus contrary to the NPT what actions were taken? The treaty on the proliferation of nuclear weapon (TPNW) also spell another controversy to the international community as most of the top 5 nuclear armed states refused to sign the treaty including Russia. According to article 1 of the NPT it clearly stated; all contracting members must abstain within their diplomatic relations from ensuing the threat to use of force against the defined territory or sovereignty of any State, or in any other methods which contradict with the basic principles of the United Nations and the UN Charter, that under the collective purpose is to establish and maintain international peace and security (Nagaria & Gunadi, 2024). Article 1 of this treaty strictly forbid states from transferring nuclear material or technology to another. It is worth arguing that due to the loopholes of international norms, it has created the possibility to escape sanctions and violate the same existing rules. The enactment of weak nuclear international norm enforcement mechanisms has also created a precarious condition bring the World bringing the World close to a “Nuclear tipping point”. In other words, in ways both fast and slow, we may very soon be approaching a nuclear “tipping point,” where many countries may decide to acquire nuclear arsenals on short notice, thereby triggering a proliferation epidemic (Campbell, 2004 et al. pp 4). The theoretical perspective, nuclear weapons proliferation norms has always been a success tool in reducing global instability especially with the nuclear nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) despite the short comings. In the case with Russia, this treaty has not significantly changed its behavior as seen in Ukraine. It may not have used nuclear weapons maybe waiting for the right moment to do so and not necessarily prevented by rules not to launch a nuclear war.

Political discourse between Russia and the West on deterrence in Ukraine

After a lot of intelligence briefings in the United States of America and other western capitals about potential Russian military attack on Ukraine, the 24^th of February 2022 finally confirmed this information to be true as Putin orders invasion of Ukraine. 25^th of February 2022 leaders of NATO Member States meet to discuss Russia’s attack on Ukraine; additional deployments to the alliance’s eastern flank are announced (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2022). On the 27^th of February 2022 President Putin orders Russia’s military to put the country’s nuclear deterrence forces on high alert in response to “aggressive statements” by NATO countries (House of common library, 2022). 23^rd of March 2022 Russia warns NATO of dire consequences if it were to agree to send some peacekeeping forces into Ukraine (House of common library, 2022). 25^th of March 2022 the US national security adviser Jake. S announced NATO evaluating a counter robust measure in case of Russia attack on the alliance. 25^th of April Finland and Sweden announced plan to submit a join application joining NATO alliance.

The boosting of the alliance eastern front has been one of the counter deterrence strategies against the Russian invasion of Ukraine in case of any attempt to use a nuclear weapon. Russia on the other hand has not necessarily make any incremental advances into Ukraine which could trigger the use of nuclear weapons in case of stiff resistance from the Ukrainians. This help keep both NATO and Russia checked without using a nuclear weapon. NATO has increased its military presence in the eastern part of the Alliance as a direct result of Russia’s behavior, which reflects a pattern of aggressive actions against its neighbors and the wider transatlantic community, Russia is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area (NATO, 2022).

NATO Contributing Nation Groups to Battle Ground at the Eastern Flank

Source: NATO website, accessed 18^th April 2025

The map above demonstrates NATO multinational task group deployed to enhance alliance deterrence in the Eastern front since the outbreak of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This task group reinforce existing deterrence capacities and ready to deter any Russian aggression on the eastern flank. Critically, it also acts as a deterrence mechanism ready to act in case of nuclear weapons being used in Ukraine by the Russians. This helps maintain an effective deterrence against the Russia who have used the nuclear rhetoric several times and maybe this was the reason why they have not launched a nuclear attack against Ukraine from the beginning. Russian escalation triggered a large-scale conventional NATO attack on Russia’s forces in Ukraine, as many analysts expect it would, Moscow could just use nuclear weapons again (Sauer, 2024). I think the Russian have adopted a “bit and blow” strategy in Ukraine aimed at avoiding a quick response from the NATO alliance that might provoke an escalation. According to many nuclear experts, sometimes referring to the Russian doctrine of escalate-to-deescalate (Sokov, 2022), the scenario that Russia uses a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine is not unrealistic, especially in case Russia is pushed out of Ukraine (Adamsky 2023; Bunn 2023; Giovannini 2022; Lieberand Press 2023; Ryan 2023; Sauer 2023; Ven Bruusgaard 2023)

The grey areas on the left shows NATO presence in these countries that are part of the alliance system and ready to defend its core principles. Of course, being a defensive security alliance, it will only act if article 5 of its principles is violated, which has not been the case for the time being. Recently many European leaders belonging to the alliance have voiced their support of stationing troops in Ukraine on bilateral basis this include France, United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It is still not clear if these troops would be deployed under any peace keeping mission in Ukraine and how they will be considered by the Russians in an event of a nuclear escalation. However, Russia has said they would be considered as a legitimate target if they put boots on the ground in Ukraine. This come back to the question, they fact nobody has actually entered officially with boots on the ground to provide any kind of assistance to the security of the Ukrainians, is the Russian deterrence rhetoric effective? to a certain extent yes and no. The question remains open pending to see what concrete strategy would be jointly adopted by Western Europe to deter the Russians from their moves in the days ahead by allowing troops on the ground. The Russians have not made any major battleground gains steadily in Ukraine not because they cannot use the nuclear option but rather, they also weight in a counter response from NATO which might trigger the worse deterrent reaction. The goal is not so much of making a difference on the battlefield, but to create a psychological shock-effect in Ukraine and even more the West, comparable to the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Sauer, 2024).

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY APPROACH.

The methodology adopted was purely qualitative utilizing a comprehensive case study method to evaluate deterrence mechanisms and intricacies of the various stakeholders in the Russo – Ukrainian conflict. In this regard, a thematic approach of primary and secondary sources was explored dwelling greater emphasis placed on interpreting trajectories related to nuclear and non-nuclear conventional deterrence policies. This includes reviewing scholarly articles on deterrence theory, national security archives, diplomatic agreements, treaties/conventions and historical discourses were thoroughly analyzed to gauge the findings of the study to be valid. Moreover, apart from declassified security documents, official statements from public officials in Ukraine, Russia and NATO reflecting deterrence decisions were also assessed. Furthermore, it was also necessary to analyze thesis and dissertations at Old Dominion University Perry library. A historical evolution assessment between Russia and post-soviet states were equally examined by comparing deterrence strategies from those who are now part of NATO and Ukraine. The differences and similarities in deterrence policies also resonate strongly with the findings explaining why some state act vividly and others show more restraint in enhancing their security interests.

Justification of Methodology Adopted

A qualitative methodology approach prioritizes in depth analysis, historical perspectives and theoretical framework to disseminate the interplay between deterrence in Ukraine during the war with Russia and its failed disarmament promised in 1994. By examining security identities, processes and narratives, this study aims to provide a comprehensive conclusion on why disarmament failed to deliver peace and stability in Ukraine while the effectiveness of nuclear weapons deterrence seems to be overstated in the context of non-nuclear conventional armed conflict scenario.

Findings of the Study

Ineffective security guarantees and policing without enforcement

The Budapest memorandum signed between Ukraine, Russia, Britain and the United States of America in 1994 which provided security assurance to Ukraine in exchange for disarmament proved to be flawed or ineffective. This agreement lacks veritable enforcement authority and mechanisms to sanction violators explaining why Russia as one of the main signatories of the agreement has not been held accountable for violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine. This trust became visible when Russia illegally annexed Crimea 2014 and invaded Ukraine 2022 violating the trust in the agreement (Trenin, 2022; Freedman, 2019).

The limits of nuclear deterrence in regional conflicts

As an effective instrument in maintaining regional and global stability, especially during the cold and post-cold war era, nuclear deterrence has always been seen as an effective tool in preventing as well as diffusing regional wars. Russia threat of escalating the tension into a full scale nuclear has failed to materialize its intended objective. Rather, this threat has unit the global community in condemning the invasion and reinforce NATO support to Ukraine (Kimball, 2017; O’Brien, 2022). The map below clearly show what nuclear armed Russia could achieve since 2022 relatively small to the expectations of most security analysists if Ukraine did not receive Western military support.

See diagram below:

Russia’s Little Gains on the Field After 1000 Days of the Conflict

The map was accessed on the 14^th 2025 BBC website.

The map shows a relatively small and patchy pieces of land gained from Ukraine by a nuclear supper power Russia does not seems justify the effect of deterrence in regional conflict.

Ukraine’s robust and steadfast asymmetric strategies.

Ukraine’s robust and resilience conventional battle warfare strategies couple with intelligence sharing with its Western allies changed Russia dominance despite its large nuclear capabilities. This only add more frustration to Russia’s deterrence and demonstrate non-nuclear capabilities in effectively countering a nuclear armed state (Freedman, 2019; Ritchie, 2023). Ukraine’s counter deterrence posture has played a significant role in scaling down Russia’s counter offensives, thus explaining why the entire country has not yet been captured.

The significance of robust international support

Ukraine has enjoyed massive Western military aid support such as drones, tanks, fighter jets, landmines, intelligence sharing, military training and economic which still keeps the battle lines alive without collapsing. While on the other hand, Russia is experiencing enormous international pressure in the form of sanctions has restricted the sale of western military hard and software to its military. This has affected Russia deterrence capabilities thus, in some cases has not created any major break especially in Kyiv the capital city of Ukraine. This also highlights the importance of collective security in improving deterrence posture of a non-nuclear state under severe attacks by a nuclear state (Kimball, 2017; Harris, 2023).

See diagram below:

CURRENT BATTLEFIELD RESISTANCE AREAS UNDERMINING DETERRENCE ARMED RUSSIA CAPABILITIES.

Map was accessed on BBC website on April 2025.

The implications for global disarmament efforts

The false promise of security guarantees to protect Ukraine’s territorial integrity may erode the trust placed on global disarmament institutions. Other states may be reluctant to disarm fearing that such agreement would not be respected by nuclear armed state considering the tense and unpredictable realist international environment characterized by anarchy and difficult to deter hostilities or attacks (Sokov, 2017; Berger, 2023). States will use every mechanism at their disposal to enhance their national security interest and this includes the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This becomes very likely if existing international norms are not being respected especially when nuclear armed states begin to attack non-nuclear ones.

The exaggerated perception of nuclear deterrence in modern day conflict

Russia nuclear muscles or rhetorics did not dissuade Ukraine and its Western backed allies from arming it against the Russian aggression. This may imply nuclear deterrence in practical does have some limits in maneuvering complex conventional modern-day strategies including non-nuclear ones (Trenin, 2022; Shetty & Renova, 2023). This creates a real problem to nuclear deterrence Russia in navigating complex asymmetric battlefield strategies by Ukraine.

Russia still maintains an overwhelming strategic deterrence capability in the conflict

The world is dominated by power states with the ability to shape the behavior of smaller states if necessary. The invasion of Ukraine is not different from great power politics as it is evident Ukraine has lost part of its territory to a nuclear power. Russia currently occupies the Eastern Donbass regions of Ukraine and part of it already integrated to the mainland creating security concerns amongst Ukrainians. Ukraine also lost its two powerful nuclear plants in Chernobyl and Zaporizhia giving Russia enough deterrence leverage in the conflict (Johnson, 2023). Russia currently occupies between 20% – 25% percent of Ukrainian territory which only add more deterrence leverage to the already existing nuclear weapons in its mainland. See diagram below:

Areas currently occupied by Russian forces in the Eastern part of Ukraine

Accessed 14 April 2025

The nuclear messaging rhetoric

Russia has issued 27 threats of using nuclear weapons if its national interest seems to be threatened Ukraine or NATO. It has reminded NATO of its nuclear capabilities and also convey the message to NATO about its intended seriousness of using nuclear to annihilate anyone who poses a threat to it (Anderson, 2023). This becomes an effective deterrence thereby reinforcing Russia’s strategic influence.

Russia also re-strategizes its military doctrine

Facing numerous challenges on the battleground as a result of its outdated conventional tactics compared to western trained Ukrainian military men with modern combat skills. This reminds Russia to continue relying on its nuclear deterrence as the most effective strategy to optimize or supplement its conventional capabilities (Wilson, 2023).

RECOMMENDATION

Strengthen security assurance for nuclear disarming states

It is very frustrating and disappointing that states give away their main source of security deterrence and later they are attacked by those who promise to assure their security. To improve upon this, legally binding agreements and a standing police force to monitor as well as intervening in situations where territorial sovereignty have been violated due to the good faith of these states in improving global security through disarmament. The absence of enforcement mechanisms creates problems providing security guarantee for states (Santana, 2009; Bell, 2024)

Reforming international security agencies

The United Nations Security Council veto rights should be reform to adapt to the reality of an unpredictable security environment which states find themselves in a self-help situation (Weiss & Thakur, 2010). States who violate the territorial integrity of others could immediately lose their voting rights as a working. The UN security council could also adopt legal, and security framework based on “one for all” meaning the option of other states intervening militarily on behalf victims should be on the table as a fundamental principle in safeguarding the territorial integrity of every sovereign states. Empowering regional security organizations such as the Organization for security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to have an active role in intervening directly with troops during time of crisis (Gheciu, 2016).

Creation of a more inclusive regional security institution irrespective of values or identities

Institutions enhance cooperation at the same time play a diplomatic role in diffusing regional tensions. When institutions are more inclusive there is dialogue and enforce all kinds of cooperation ranging from economic, political and military (Adler & Barnett, 1998). Maybe if Russia was actually given the chance to become a NATO member in the 2000s it would not have attacked Ukraine today the same thing with the European Union. However, there is no evidence to justify such a claim but there is a likelihood this could have been avoided.

Promote nuclear enrichment for domestic purposes

This could send a warning message to think twice for countries wishing to attack others already using enriched uranium for domestic purposes. It might pose a proliferation risk but not when there is stringent inspection by AIEA. This could produce a deterrent effect as enriched uranium could easily be converted into nuclear weapons if the aggressors understand the implications, then fear could prevent such an attack.

CONCLUSION

The situation in Ukraine demonstrates a complex connection between nuclear disarmament and deterrence systems in navigating complex international security environment. Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons under the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 to receive security guarantees which proved ineffective when nuclear armed Russia attacked it. The inability of nuclear deterrence to work effectively in conventional scenarios demonstrates a challenge in the sphere of deterrence. The Ukrainian situation also shows that international agreements lack sufficient enforcement capacity when they are not backed by strong coercive political and legal tools.

Ukraine proved its ability to resist aggression through conventional military operations backed by international alliances even when facing a nuclear threat. The case presents evidence against the conventional view that nuclear deterrence stands as the primary solution to conflicts because adaptable strategies, strong alliances and unified international support can effectively defend sovereignty as well as enhancing stability. The global disarmament frameworks require a re-evaluation of enforceable security measures, stronger international cooperation and innovative deterrence methods that go beyond nuclear capabilities. A thorough evaluation of current systems remains essential for establishing an equitable and secure international security framework. At the same time, the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence still plays in Russia’s favor as no nuclear armed state has officially engaged in hostilities against Moscow. A complex situation as Russia deterrence does not seems to gain the momentum on the battlefield but proved effective against external threats by derailing its victory and breaking down Ukrainian defense deterrence on the battleground creating a no absolute win on both sides. The existence of Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategies has significantly play to its advantage while Ukraine is more vulnerable to Russian asymmetric nuclear strength.

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