The Construction of Syrian Refugees in Two Lebanese Media Campaigns: “If You Love Lebanon, Employ the Lebanese” And “Safe Return to Syria; the Situation in Lebanon is No Longer Tolerable”

The Construction of Syrian Refugees in Two Lebanese Media Campaigns: “If You Love Lebanon, Employ the Lebanese” And “Safe Return to Syria; the Situation in Lebanon is No Longer Tolerable”

Wesam M. A. Ibrahim¹, Mazura Mastura Muhammad^2*, Dalia M. Hamed³, Ardi Gunsuh⁴

¹Applied College, Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University, Saudi Arabia and Faculty of Education, Tanta University, Egypt

²Faculty of Languages and Communication, Universiti Pendidikan Sultan Idris

³Faculty of Education, Tanta University, Egypt

⁴Talent Corporation Malaysia Berhad

*Corresponding Author

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.908000474

Received: 08 August 2025; Accepted: 16 August 2025; Published: 17 September 2025

ABSTRACT

Lebanon, hosting more than one million Syrian refugees since 2011, has witnessed an intensification of media campaigns and political discourse that construct refugees as a threat to national stability. This paper examines the ways in which Syrian refugees are represented in two prominent Lebanese media campaigns: “Safe Return to Syria; the Situation in Lebanon is No Longer Tolerable” and “If You Love Lebanon, Employ the Lebanese.” Drawing on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), National Identity Theory (Smith, 1991, 1992), and van Dijk’s Ideological Square (2006a, 2006b, 2007), alongside the discourse-analytical tools of de Cillia et al. (1999) and Wodak et al. (2009), the study investigates how Lebanese media employ strategies of in-group favoritism, out-group derogation, and national singularity to portray Syrians as unwelcome outsiders. The methodology adopts a critical discourse analysis of campaign posters, television broadcasts, and news reports disseminated between 2018 and 2019. Textual and visual data were collected from online sources and examined for linguistic and semiotic markers of social categorization, identification, and comparison. Findings reveal that Lebanese campaigns consistently depict Syrians as demographic, economic, and cultural burdens, while positioning Lebanese citizens as patriotic victims safeguarding their homeland. Particular emphasis is placed on representations of Syrian refugees as threats to employment, education, public health, and demographic balance. Importantly, the analysis also incorporates counter-discourse from Syrian media and cultural productions, which portray Lebanese elites as racist oppressors and reframe Syrians as resilient contributors and victims of exploitation. This reciprocal pattern of labeling illustrates how polarization is dialogical and mutually reinforcing rather than one-sided. The study concludes that the construction of Syrian refugees in Lebanese media cannot be fully understood without considering the counter-narratives that emerge from Syrian media. By highlighting the interdependence of these discourses, the paper demonstrates how refugee representation is shaped through cycles of mutual victimization and national identity defense, perpetuating enmity and undermining prospects for solidarity.

Keywords: Critical Discourse Analysis, Media Campaign, Lebanese, Syrian Refugees, Social Identity, National Identity

INTRODUCTION

Living and acting in a social system, people produce group-based conduct which has psychological consequences (Tran & Nguyen, 2025). Hence, social psychological theories aim to capture “the socially embedded, situated, shared, social, group-located properties of human beings” (Turner & Reynolds, 2012, p. 400). Recent years have seen a marked revival of interest in groups, with less emphasis on small group interaction and a much greater emphasis on group membership-based self-definition and the resulting group behaviors (Hogg & Terry, 2000). This research addresses polarization as a consequence of certain ideological structures with special reference to the Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

The Syrian war has forced many citizens to leave their homeland and settle in other countries. Since 2011, Syria’s neighbor, Lebanon, has been hosting more than one million Syrian refugees. However, due to harsh economic conditions in Lebanon, Syrian refugees may not be welcome by many Lebanese politicians. These politicians use the Lebanese media, particularly Twitter, to foster an atmosphere of polarization based on nationality or origin and argue that their attitude is an act of patriotism. Gebran Bassil, the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, a member of the Lebanese Parliament and the head of The Free Patriotic Movement, tweeted his opinions about the Syrian refugees and urged all Lebanese to adopt his viewpoints. The following is an illustration of one of Bassil’s tweets which is part of what can be called a campaign against the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

laqad karasna: mafhu:man l’intima:’ina ’alibna:ni: wahuwa fawqa ’ay ’intima: ’a:ẖar wa qulna: ’anahu ji:niy wa huwa ’altafsi:r ’alwahi:d litaša:buhina: wa tamayyuzina: maʿan, litaḥammulina: wa ta’aqlumina: maʿan, limru:natina: wa ṣala:batina: maʿan wa liqudratina: ʿala ’aldamj wa ’al’indima:j maʿan min jihah wa ʿala rafḍ ’annizu:ḥ wa ’aliju:’ maʿan min jihah ’uẖra:

“We have established the concept of our sense of belonging to Lebanon, which is above any other sort of belonging. We said that it was genetic and that is the only explanation for our similarity and distinction from others, for our ability to sustain and accommodate with one another, for our flexibility and strength together, our ability to integrate and be integrated together on one hand, and the refusal to be displaced on the other hand.”

Basil’s party has launched a campaign against the Syrians, claiming that their presence threatens the Lebanese welfare in their homeland. Media discourse functions as a channel from abstract ideologies to practice. This paper is concerned with polarization in the case of Lebanese-Syrian relations as practiced through media discourse. Because discourse has effects on maintaining and changing ideologies, this research conducts a critical analysis seeking to unveil the extent to which Basil and his party’s discursive practices enhance polarization and reflect a sense of cherishing their national identity.

Being an umbrella term used in many academic fields such as sociology, linguistics and psychology, discourse is any form of social interaction through the use of language whether verbal, written or semiotic. Critical discourse analysis considers as its main focus the relation between discursive events and the socio-political atmosphere. Discovering out of sight judgments is a major concern in critical analysis. Media discourse, a branch of critical discourse analysis, refers to forms of discourse that are transmitted via communicative means such as radio, television, printed newspapers or the internet. Since media facilitate mediation between discourse-producers and discourse-recipients, studying media discourse can disclose linguistic practices that are based on certain ideologies.

Media discourse is not neutral or unbiased. It a vehicle for venting ideologies. Every word transmitted by the media is not a spontaneous reflection of a casual situation. On the contrary, media language is thought to be the deliberate articulation of ongoing ideologies. The manner in which people produce language is founded on their ideological beliefs. To understand media discourse is to understand the ideologies possessed by those in charge of that discourse. In this concern, this paper considers discourse uttered through media means as ideologically-based representations that find an outlet through media discourse.

Rooted in social psychology, Social Identity Theory (SIT) emerged in the early 1970s in the work of Henri Tajfel (1978) and Tajfel and John Turner (1979) to explain the dominion of social over individual identity. It also traces intergroup relations and considers in-group favoritism over out-groups as a key condition to achieve positive social identity. This theory suggests that the group a person belongs to is responsible for their group’s self-image. SIT identifies three psychological/mental processes individuals experience to determine their position in society and in-group/out-group divisions. These processes include social categorization, social identification and social comparison. An extension of SIT, Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) also has a social psychological basis. It was developed by John Turner (1985) and Turner and his followers (1987) to describe people’s created mental representations of themselves and others. It illustrates the categorial representation which supports social identities.

van Dijk’s Ideological Square (1998) contrasts positive in-group representation and negative out-group representation. This classification of modes of categorization between Self and Other is obvious in discourse about minorities. van Dijk (2006a, 2006b & 2007) explains fully the relation between discourse and ideology and presents some linguistic tools to help detect and trace ideological representations in discourse. He postulates a general rule: that of in-group favoritism and out-group derogation.

Smith (1991) defines the nation as being any group/population sharing a common history, culture, rights, duties and economy. National identity is the continuation of symbols, goals and values belonging to a certain society (Holtman, 1991 & Gerdes, 1985 as cited in Weller, 1997). It is believed that discourse shapes social order and is shaped by it. Accordingly, features of national identity can be revealed via discourse-analytical tools.

Based on Smith’s explanations of national identity (1991, 1992), the critical discourse analysis framework is applied here to detect and investigate national identity representations in Lebanese media discourse concerning Syrian refugees. This analysis attempts to measure the degree of in-group bias in its representations of social identity which leads to an over-assertion of national identity. de Cillia, Martin and Wodak (1999) present some discourse strategies that promote national identity construction as the strategy of presupposing intra-national sameness, the strategy of emphasizing national singularity and the strategy of positive self-presentation. Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart (2009) present some means of realization which are the most precise linguistic units reflecting national identity. These means include personal reference, spatial reference, temporal reference, metonymy, synecdoche, and personification.

Being an interdisciplinary study, this paper, which draws on both social psychological theories and critical discourse analysis, uses an ideologically-focused discourse analysis to investigate Lebanese Media Discourse concerning Syrian refugees. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978, and Tajfel & John Turner, 1979), van Dijk’s Ideological Square (2006a, 2006b & 2007), National Identity Theory (Smith, 1991, 1992) and its representation in discourse as developed by de Cillia et al. (1999) and Wodak et al. (2009) are the theories according to which the political discourse in the Lebanese media is examined.

In order to evaluate the Lebanese media-political discourse concerning Syrian refugees and decide whether that discourse is a form of racism or an assertion of national identity, we attempt to answer the following research questions:

1. What features identified by Social Identity Theory are present in Lebanese media discourse concerning Syrian refugees?
2. According to National Identity Theory, what representations are traceable in that discourse?
3. As far as van Dijk’s Ideological Square is concerned, what ideologies are expressed by that discourse?
4. What is the best description of that discourse: is it a polarizing discourse or an assertive discourse of national identity?

Theoretical Frameworks

Social Psychology

Psychology is the branch of social science that focuses on studying the way the human mind works and the resulting behavior (Pearce & Packer, 2013). The word “social” is an adjective pertaining to a society, a group of individuals sharing a common territory and interests. Social psychology is the scientific study of “how we feel about, think about, and behave toward the people around us” (Stangor, 2012, p. 10).

In-group bias is a social-psychological term that manifests as in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. The word “bias” implicates that this act is judged as being unfair, but at the same time, however, it satisfies the in-group need for positive self-esteem (Hewstone, Rubin &Willis, 2002).

Social Identity Theory (SIT)

Social Identity Theory (SIT), based on the work of Tajfel (1978) and Tajfel and Turner (1979), is a social-psychological theory that refers to the individual’s definite identity within a certain social group. It hypothesizes that an individual’s image is part and parcel of his social group (Turner & Oakes, 1986). It premises that a person’s identity, his/her self-image, is based on the social groups s/he belongs to. According to Tajfel (1978) and Tajfel and Turner (1979), any individual identity is fundamentally group-dependent. An individual may be a member of several diverse groups such as family, neighbors, schoolmates, friends and the like. Accordingly, each group-type demands a specific behavior. This means that a person’s identity among his family forces certain rules of conduct that are different from that person’s identity among his colleagues.

Any group a member belongs to is referred to as an in-group, while from within an in-group any outsiders are seen as belonging to out-groups. This in-group/out-group dichotomy, which tends to be expressed as Us versus Them, results in the emergence of inter-group behavior which is indicated as the interaction between individuals belonging to a certain group with another group (Sherif, 1966, as cited in Tajfel, 1982). Tajfel (1982) defines a group by internal or external criteria. Internal criteria have to do with group identification through an awareness of membership. External criteria are the labels assigned to certain people such as doctors, family relatives or outsiders. In-group/out-group polarization is the first step towards “discriminatory intergroup effects” (Tajfel, 1982, p. 24). This discrimination is about positive in-group distinctiveness versus negative out-group inability or in-group similarity versus out-group dissimilarity (Tajfel, 1982).

Intergroup behavioral relations depend on group members’ identification of themselves and of other groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In this concern, in-group/out-group relations (intergroup relations) are determined according to social categorization, social identification and social comparison.

Social categorization encompasses the “cognitive tools that segment, classify and order the social environment” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 40). It involves classifying individuals and branding or providing them with self-references such as immigrants, native citizens, black and white. Once these categories are set, individuals undertake the form of social action related to their category. Knowing the category an individual belongs to is the basis for explaining the related behaviors.

Social identification is about defining group members in social terms so that they act and behave within the norms of their identified group. If someone is categorized and identified as being a native citizen, he/she tends to behave in ways that are established by that group. Tajfel (1974) considers “the self” to be the main factor distinguishing social categories/groups. He adds that when some traits are associated with a certain group/category, social identification explains their impact on the self. In other words, the self either identifies with the group sharing its features or it may be distinct from that group. Tajefel (1998) explains that privileged groups tend to defend and keep their positive advantages. As a result, devalued groups search for strategies to improve their social identity such as representing their good features and asserting their positive traits (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012).

Social comparison is about in-group/out-group differentiation. Social identifications are “relational and comparative” as these identifications “define the individual as similar to or different from, as ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than members of other groups” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p.40). This means that an individual’s social identity or self-image is determined by the social category he/she is identified with.

Tajfel & Turner (1979) say that in-group members fight to enhance their self-esteem or their positive self-image. They add that social groups/categories and their related social identities are bestowed with positive or negative values. They also indicate that group evaluation depends on a comparison between the in-group and other ones. It follows that, they indicate, individuals try hard to maintain a positive social identity based on in-group favoritism versus out-group deficiency. This may be one reason for social discrimination as members always try to make their group superior to other groups.

Intergroup comparisons focus on in-group/out-group differences, in-group efficiency, in-group similarity/cohesiveness and out-group flaws. These factors justify in-group biased acts. According to Turner (1975), the relation between in-group and out-group members is a competition to achieve “positive identity” (1975, p.10). In-group bias is an omnipresent trait in relations among groups (Tajfel & Turner, 2004).

The Ideological Square: Self (Positive) & Other (Negative)

Based on van Dijk (2006 a, 2006b & 2007), Table 1 summarizes the nature of ideologically-controlled discourse.

Table 1: Van Dijk’s Ideologically-Controlled Discourse

The underlying ideology can be traced via language that creates linguistic polarization stemming from ideological polarization. Categorization of groups, detailing, comparing and contrasting “our” goodness against “their” badness and using victimization as a strategy showing “their” evil nature versus “our” innocent/suffering citizens are all strategies illustrated by van Dijk for representing and detecting polarization in discourse.

Discourse Tools for Detecting National Identity

National identity is concerned with the simple questions “Who are we? Where do we belong?” (Huntington, 2004, p. 12). The answers to these questions are important at the level of discourse as they help people visualize their nation and their place within it (Anderson, 1991). Hutcheson et al.  (2004) conceptualize national identity as “a constructed and public national self-image based on membership in a political community as well as history, myths, symbols, language, and culture norms commonly held by members of a nation” (2004, p. 28). Gellner (1983) considers that a mere category of persons becomes a nation if they recognize the same culture, certain mutual rights and duties. Smith (1992) provides a framework characterizing the main dimensions of a national identity. These are a shared continuity, a shared memory, and a common destiny. Nations are imagined communities (Anderson, 1991) in which members do not know the majority of their fellows. Yet, they feel convinced that they belong to the same national community. This is due to the fact that the construction of national identity builds on emphasizing a common history and memory.

Discourse is a general way of representing the world (Fairclough, 2003, p. 3). Discourse analysis is “an approach to the analysis of language that looks at patterns of language across texts as well as the social and cultural contexts in which the texts occur” (Paltridge, 2006, p. 2).

The critical approach to discourse focuses on the processes of “argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion … with the aim of reaching a mutual understanding based on a reasoned consensus” (Risse, 2000, p.1-39). According to Fairclough and Wodak (1997) and Wodak (1995, 1996), critical discourse analysis perceives written and spoken discourse as a form of social practice. This means that there is a dialectical relation between discourse and social structure because discourse both constitutes social practice and is constituted by it at the same time. For critical discourse analysis, language use is not only a product of society but also an important force in (re)shaping social practices, both positively and negatively (Bloor and Bloor, 2007, p.12). Through discourse, social actors can constitute identity because discourse has a central role in the construction of social conditions. Burnham et al. (2004, p. 242) state “discourses reproduce the everyday assumptions of society”. Thus, discourse may serve to construct national identity.

There are some strategies, according to de Cillia et al. (1999), that serve to construct national identity. They are summarized as follows:

The Strategy of Presupposing Intra-National Sameness

This is done via the use of the pronoun “we” which takes for granted that there exists a homogenous we-group.

The Strategy of Emphasizing National Singularity

This is a specific dissimilation strategy because uniqueness is nothing but being different to all other elements involved in the comparison.

The Strategy of Positive Self- Presentation

This construct and perpetuates national identity.

These strategies may imply negative-other presentation without an explicit referent. Wodak et al. present some linguistic forms involved in the construction of national identity (2009, p.35). They are the most precise units for detecting national identity construction as they include: personal reference, spatial reference, temporal reference, metonymy, synecdoche and personification. Personal reference refers to personal identification through pronouns and quantifiers. Spatial reference is related to adverbs of place used with persons: “with us, with them” (Wodak et al., 2009, p.33). Temporal reference is everything that suggests a time-frame. Synecdoche “replaces the name of a referent by the name of another referent which belongs to the same field of meaning and which is either semantically wider or semantically narrower” (Wodak et al., 1999, p.43). Metonymy “replaces the name of a referent by the name of an entity which is closely associated with it in either concrete or abstract terms” (Wodak et al., 2009, p.43). Personification gives “meaning to the phenomena of the world in a humanized, anthropomorphized form” (Wodak et al. 2009, p.44).

METHODOLOGY

This research studies Lebanese media discourse in the period starting from 2018. It mainly focuses on two media campaigns sponsored by the Lebanese political party, the Free Patriotic Movement. The campaigns are titled “Safe Return to Syria; the Situation in Lebanon is No Longer Tolerable” and “If You Love Lebanon, Employ the Lebanese”.

Campaign posters, as well as other examples, are investigated manually and analyzed critically according to the analytical framework. The framework includes the tenets of Social Identity Theory, National Identity Theory, van Dijk’s Ideological Square, de Cillia et al.’s strategies (1999) and Wodak et al.’s tools for detecting national identity (2009). This frame of analysis is applied to evaluate the orientation of the Lebanese media discourse towards the Syrian refugees in an attempt to answer the question of whether that discourse is characterized as being a signal of national identity or of polarization.

The data were downloaded from the internet. All data analyzed are accompanied with their online site and date of publication.

Analysis

On April 2018, Al-Jadeed TV, which is a pro-Lebanese channel, broadcasted a song with lyrics satirizing the Syrian refugees. The song, which is titled “Oh my poor Lebanese land flooded by the Syrians”, begins with:

ya: ʿi:n ʿassu:riyyi:n bi ʾarɖi: ʾallibna:niyyahni ḥna şirna: mughtirbi:n wi humma ʾalʾakṯariyyah

“Oh! the Syrians have flooded my poor Lebanese land, now we (the Lebanese) are expatriates and they (the Syrians) have become the majority in Lebanon’’

Mocking the Syrian refugees for having many children and turning the Lebanese into a minority in Lebanon, which is even emphasized since many Lebanese tend to immigrate and leave Lebanon, the song provoked angry reactions. The lyrics classify people into two categories: the Lebanese, referred to as “We”, and the Syrians, referred to as “They”. Using “we” serves the purpose of setting up two social categories and comparing them. The comparison constructs a negative representation of the Syrians, since they are shown as a ravening group consuming the Lebanese people’s rights. This example, which reflects social discrimination, focuses more on negative other-representation rather than positive assertion of national identity.

This song highlighted the explicit tension between the Syrians and the Lebanese, a tension subsequently taking the form of an anti-Lebanese song broadcasted by a TV Syrian channel (https://www.lahamag.com/article/112159):

ya: ʿi:n ʿanna:ziyyi:n biša:šah libna:niyyah ʿam biyġannu: mabsu:ṭi:n bilahjah ʿunṣuriyyah

“Oh the Nazis of the Lebanese channel…they cheerfully sing in a racist tone”

In reaction, this song derogates the Lebanese as it defines them insultingly as being “Nazis” and “racists”. This is a clear negative representation of the Lebanese. The Syrians do not mention anything related to their positive unification. Both Lebanese and Syrians aim at misrepresenting each other. Both lyrics carry polarizing tones based on defaming whoever belongs to the opposing category.

On 5 September 2018, the Lebanese MTV channel attacked the Syrian refugees claiming they were responsible for an increase of the cancer disease in Lebanon (https://www.bbc.com/arabic/trending-45434595). The channel reported on its online site that cancer had been spreading in Lebanon because of two reasons: pollution and the increasing numbers of the Syrian refugees.

ʾalʾawwal huwa altalawwuṯ ʾamma: aṯṯa:ni: huwa takaṯur anna:ziḥi:n assu:riyyi:n

“The first reason is pollution… the second is the Syrian refugees’ reproduction”

When the Syrian refugees are equated with pollution and are held responsible for the spread of cancer, they are entirely defamed. This defamation of “Others” creates a hateful social milieu.

In May 2019, Al-Nahar newspaper reported that Syrian refugees were the cause of road accidents in Lebanon (https://nedaa-sy.com/news/13774):

’inna ’izdiya:d ʿadad ’almuša:h wassayya:ra:t ʿala ’alṭuruk ’alibna:niyyah ẖuṣu:ṣan bisabab ’alʿadad ’alkabi:r lilla:ji’i:n ’assu:riyyi:n ’adda: ’ila: ’izdiya:d ḥawa:diṯ ’assayr fi libna:n

muʿẓamhum (’assu:riyyi:n) muša:h wa’a:tu:n min bi:’ah ri:fiyyah  wa ġiyr muta’aqlimi:n maʿa  ’al’aʿda:d ’alkabi:rah lilsayya:ra:t wala: yaqdiru:na ʿala  ’attaʿa:ti: maʿa ’umu:r miṯla ha:ḏihi:

“The growing number of pedestrians and cars on the Lebanese roads, especially due to the large number of the Syrian refugees, has led to an increase in traffic accidents in Lebanon”

“Most Syrians pedestrians come from a rural environment and are neither adapted to the large numbers of cars nor can they handle such things.”

The examples above do not primarily promote the nation’s unity, but rather highlights the division of the people in Lebanon into two sections: Lebanese and Syrian refugees. The former is the privileged and civilized group. The latter, on the other hand, is presented as unprivileged and uncivilized. Their presence is seen as harmful and unwelcome since it has a negative effect on Lebanon.

These examples uncover aspects of hateful rhetoric against the Syrian refugees in Lebanon since they mainly focus on distorting the other and establishing a form of polarization based on the origins. According to the online site Fanack, the anti-Syrian rhetoric escalated in 2019 (https://fanack.com/refugees/racist-rhetoric-against-syrians-in-lebanon/). This hate speech was triggered by Gebran Bassil, the Lebanese Foreign Minister and head of the Christian Free Patriotic Movement.

Bassil’s party and the Free Patriotic Movement supporters have launched a campaign called “Safe Return to Syria; the Situation in Lebanon is No Longer Tolerable”. They have also launched another campaign against the Syrian labor force titled “If You Love Lebanon, Employ the Lebanese”. These two campaigns were declared on 4^th June 2019 on the official Free Patriotic Movement Facebook account in order to raise awareness against the Syrian workers and demand the return of Syrian refugees to their homeland. Bassil has defended the attitude adopted by his political party saying that each country should give priority to its own people when it comes to job opportunities (https://www.facebook.com/FPMyouth/). Bassil also justifies these anti-Syrian discourses as being a sign of nationalism not racism (https://www.france24.com/ar/20190611):

faʿindama: tuda:fiʿ ʿan ḥaq šaʿbak taku:n waṭaniyyan walaysa ʿunṣuriyyan

“When you defend the rights of your people, you are a patriot, not a racist”

The following section is an analysis of the verbal discourse employed in these campaigns from a social-psychological perspective using the tools of critical discourse analysis.

Example 1

Fig 1 Number of Syrian Refugees (posted on 4^th June 2019)

Example (1) focuses on the increasing number of the Syrian refugees.

hal taʿlam ’anna ʿadad ’alla:ji ’i:n ’assu:riyyi:n fi: libna:n yu šakkil 40% min  tiʿda:d  ’aššaʿb  ’allibna:ni:

surya: ’a:minah lilʿawdah wa libna:n lam yaʿud yaḥtamil

“Do you know that the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon constitutes 40% of the Lebanese population? Safe return to Syria; situation in Lebanon is no longer tolerable”.

It is accompanied by the statement:

libna:n la’ilna: miš liġirna: libna:n ’akbar min ’an yublaʿ  wa  ’aṣġar min ’an nuwaṯṯin fi:hi la:ji’i:n

“Lebanon is ours, not theirs. Lebanon is too big to be swallowed; but too small to have refugees settling in”

Social identity is manifest in Example 1 through the apparent social categorization into two groups: the Syrian refugees vs the Lebanese population; Syria vs Lebanon. Possessive pronouns la’ilna: and liġirna, which are equivalent of “ours” against “theirs”, reflect the two polarized groups. Social identification forces each pole to act according to the best interests of its group. As a result, the Lebanese tend to assume the role of citizens aspiring to live in their homeland without any inconveniences from the supposed Syrian intruders. Because the Syrians are not identified as being part of the original group of Lebanese citizens, the refugees are required to act in accordance with their out-group identity and to leave for Syria where they will find their in-group identity. Social comparison is transparent because numbers are used to compare the Syrians with the Lebanese to deliver the shocking calculation that Syrian refugees vastly outnumber an acceptable rate. This means that the Lebanese cannot enjoy their due rights in their homeland because the Syrians are so many that they take the original citizens’ privileges. The Lebanese are shown to be victims in their own country because the Syrian refugees make life difficult for them. For that reason, the Syrian refugees are represented as being a negative out-group.

Example (2)

Fig. 2 An invocation for Syrian refugees to return home (posted 4^th June 2019)

kirma:l tirjaʿ titʿammar la:zim tirjaʿ ʿala: baladak ṣa:r la:zim   nitḥarrak

surya: ’a:minah lilʿawdah wa libna:n lam yaʿud yaḥtamil

“For your country to prosper again, you must return to your country. We must take measures. Safe return to Syria; situation in Lebanon is no longer tolerable” (4 June 2019).

The use of the Syrian map and flag as well as the possessive in baladak ‘‘your country’’ stresses the belonging of the Syrian refugees to Syria, and, consequently, emphasizes the urgent necessity of their departure from Lebanon. This is further enhanced by the use of the singular second-person direct address in   tirjaʿ ‘‘you [singular] return’’ instead of tirjaʿu:n ‘‘you [plural] return’’. This kind of address, which is directed at every single Syrian, foregrounds the unwelcome presence of Syrians in Lebanon and the Lebanese desire for their departure. Example (2) reestablishes the categorial classification into two social groups: Lebanese and Syrians. Personal pronouns, you vs we, reassert the in-group versus out-group identification. Syrian refugees, the out-group, are demanded to return to their in-group in Syria so that they may fulfil the roles required by their own group. The Lebanese people, being members of the in-group, are even requested to take measures to drive the out-group members out of Lebanon. Comparing the situation in Syria to that in Lebanon disparages the Syrian refugees as it shows them as being egocentric. This comparison helps to victimize the Lebanese people. Negative representation of the Syrian refugees entails positive representation of the Lebanese. Social identity is based on in-group favoritism and this is evident as the Lebanese are shown to be caring for their country’s prosperity that is threatened by the intruders.

Example (3)

Fig. 3 The increasing ratio of Syrian childbirth (Posted 5^th June 2019)

hal taʿlam ’anna ʿadad ’alwila:da:t ’assu:riyyah yawmiyyan fi: libna:n yataẖaṯṯa: binisbah ʿa:liyah ʿadad ’alwila:da:t ’allibna:niyyah

surya: ’a:minah lilʿawdah wa libna:n lam yaʿud yaḥtamil

“Do you know that the number of Syrian births in Lebanon per day greatly exceeds the number of Lebanese births? Safe return to Syria; situation in Lebanon is no longer tolerable”.

The post is accompanied by the statement:

la’annu: badna: libna:n yiḍal libna:ni: wa miniṯmaḥ bizdiha:r baladna: min ẖila:l ’al’ajya:l ’aṣṣa:ʿidah

“Because we want Lebanon to remain for the Lebanese and aspire to the prosperity of our country through the younger generations”.

The Syrian birthrate is a new category introduced to be contrasted with the Lebanese birthrate. The country’s citizens should constitute the majority, and so should their birthrate. In Lebanon, the situation is reversed due to the big number of Syrian refugees. This comparison is likely to evoke a threatening scenario whereby the Syrians, who are perceived as intruders, will continue to increase in number and may someday replace the Lebanese. This interpretation ascribes to the Lebanese a new social responsibility: that of securing Lebanon for future Lebanese generations. The use of the plural first-person in the statement above evokes solidarity among the Lebanese and stresses the need for their in-group unity against the unwelcome out-group members. This polarization is likely to add to the tension between the two groups.

Example (4)

Figure 4 The number of Syrian students in Lebanese Schools (posted 5^th June 2019)

hal taʿlam ’anna ʿadad ’aṯṯulla:b ’assu:riyyi:n filmada:ris ’arrasmiyyah fi: libna:n waṣal ’ila: 240000 ’ay 2/3 min tiʿda:d ’aṯṯulla:b ’allibna:niyyi:n

surya: ’a:minah lilʿawdah wa libna:n lam yaʿud yaḥtamil

“Do you know that the number of Syrian students in public schools in Lebanon has reached 240,000, about two-thirds of the Lebanese students? Safe return to Syria; situation in Lebanon is no longer tolerable”.

Example 4 depicts the burden of the Syrian refugees on the Lebanese educational system, and consequently the financial burden the country has to bear. On comparing these two groups, the in-group Lebanese students vs the out-group Syrian students, the Syrians are confirmed to be the majority. Their predominance threatens the Lebanese students’ rights to have a good education. This creates a further strong motive for the Lebanese not to tolerate the presence of the Syrians in Lebanon.

Example (5)

Figure 5 The Unemployment rate in Lebanon (posted 6^th June 2019)

hal taʿlam ’anna nisbat ’albaṭa:lah fi libna:n ’irtafaʿat min 11% ’ila: 35%

surya: ’a:minah lilʿawdah wa libna:n lam yaʿud yaḥtamil

“Do you know that the unemployment rate in Lebanon has risen from 11% to 35%? Safe return to Syria; situation in Lebanon is no longer tolerable”.

The post is accompanied by the statement:

la’annu: ’alhijrah manna: ẖiya:rna: wa la’annu: bilibna:n badna: nibqa: ništiġil wi niʿammar ’alwaṭan ’illi: miniḥlam fi:h

“Because immigration is not our choice, and, in Lebanon, we want to work and construct the homeland we dream of.”

Unemployment rate is introduced as another motive behind the categorization and polarization of in-group vs out-group. The campaign aims to establish the idea that the Lebanese employees are deprived of their well-deserved chance of a dignified life in Lebanon because the Syrians seize most of the available work opportunities, and possibly at a lower price. This is clearly a strong drive for the Lebanese to refuse the Syrian presence. The accompanying statement employs plural first-person pronouns in ẖiya:rna: ‘‘our choice’’, badna: ‘‘we want’’, nibqa: ‘‘we stay’’, ništiġil ‘‘we work’’, niʿammar ‘‘we develop’’, and miniḥlam ‘‘we dream’’ to reinforce the polarization between a positively illustrated in-group and a negatively portrayed out-group. Again, the discourse signals activate in-group bias and hatred towards the out-group.

Example (6)

Figure 6 Number of the Syrian workers in the Lebanese labor market (posted 6^th June 2019)

hal taʿlam ’anna ʿadad ’alʿumma:l ’assu:riyyi:n fi: su:q  ’alʿamal ’allibna:ni: qad balaġ 960000 ʿa:mil

surya: ’a:minah lilʿawdah wa libna:n lam yaʿud yaḥtamil

“Did you know that the number of Syrian workers in the Lebanese labor market has reached 960,000 workers? Safe return to Syria; situation in Lebanon is no longer tolerable”

The categories introduced in this example are Syrian workers vs Lebanese workers, the former category having grown rapidly to the extent that it is depriving the Lebanese workers from their rightful job opportunities. As a result, the duty of the members of each category is as follows: the Syrians must leave or the Lebanese must eject the Syrians. This comparison between the Syrian workers and the Lebanese workers misrepresents the Syrians and portray them as a rapacious category who abuses the hospitality offered by the Lebanese. This distorted representation of the Syrians justifies the call to the Lebanese to expel the Syrians from Lebanon. The Syrians are also demanded to return to the country where they should be. This post reinforces in-group prejudice and out-group ethnocentrism.

Example (7)

Figure 7 Jobs permitted for foreign workers (posted on 7th June 2019)

hal taʿlam ’anna ’alʿumma:l ’al’aja:nib yaḥiq lahum ’alʿamal faqaṭ fi: waẓa:’if  ’azzira:ʿah ’albina:’ ’attanẓi:fa:t

surya: ’a:minah lilʿawdah wa libna:n lam yaʿud yaḥtamil

‘‘Do you know that foreign workers are entitled to work only in agriculture, building and cleaning? Safe return to Syria; situation in Lebanon is no longer tolerable.”

This post is accompanied by the statement:

la’annu: taṭbi:q qa:nu:n ’alʿamal ṣa:r  ḍaru:rah taḥmi: ’alyad ’alʿa:milah ’allibna:niyyah

“Because the application of the labor law has become a necessity to protect the Lebanese labor force.”

This example reinforces polarization and presents it as the ordinary standard which measures people’s abilities and positions. Racially, workers are said to have Lebanese blood or non-Lebanese (foreign) blood. The first category, which includes workers with Lebanese blood, is favorable. On the other hand, the second category, which includes workers with foreign blood, is unwanted. This comparison assigns each category a relevant task. The Lebanese-blood workers are promising enough to obtain high ranked jobs. The foreign-blood workers are lacking in capabilities so that they may get lower ranking jobs. The accompanying statement establishes the categories of the Lebanese vs Syrian labor forces and clarifies the necessary steps needed to help the Lebanese workers. Such comparison and partiality can be seen as signals of social identity rather than national identity.

Example (8)

Figure 8 Supporting Lebanese workers (posted 8^th June 2019)

’iḥmi: ’alʿa:mil ’allibna:ni: wa ballaġ ʿan ’almuẖa:lif

surya: ’a:minah lilʿawdah wa libna:n lam yaʿud yaḥtamil

“Support the Lebanese worker and report the workers violating the labour law. Safe return to Syria; situation in Lebanon is no longer tolerable”.

The post is accompanied by a statement:

bitḥib libna:n waẓẓaf libna:ni:

“If you love Lebanon, hire the Lebanese”.

The Lebanese political party campaigns urge the Lebanese to stop hiring Syrian workers.

They construct a conditional ‘‘if you love Lebanon, hire Lebanese workers’’, which presupposes that any Lebanese employer who would continue to hire Syrians does not love Lebanon. This can be seen as a call to prevent the Syrian refugees from any opportunity to earn a living to sustain their families. Consequently, the category of Lebanese workers is reconstructed to be the opposite of the category of Syrian workers. Two new categories are introduced: faithful/patriotic Lebanese citizens vs unfaithful/unpatriotic Lebanese citizens. The former category observes the law, abstains from hiring Syrian workers and reports whoever employs a foreigner. The latter does not love their country and transgresses the law by offering jobs to the Syrians.

This attitude is further enhanced, on 8^th June, 2019, when Gebran Bassil, the Lebanese Foreign Minister, tweeted the slogan of the Facebook campaign, which is organized by his party, “If you love Lebanon, employ the Lebanese’’. This tweet confirmed the tendency of Bassil and his party to initiate a widespread community refusal of the presence of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

Example (9)

Figure 9 A statement by the Lebanese Foreign Minister in a conference (8^th June, 2019)

basi:l min mu’tamar ’aṯṯaqah  ’al’iġtira:biyyah mina ’aṯṯabi:ʿi: ’an nuda:fiʿ ʿan ’alʿima:lah ’allibna:niyyah biwajh ’ay ʿima:lah ṯa:niyah la’anna ’allibna:ni: qabla ’alkul

“From the energy conference, Bassil says: It is natural to defend the Lebanese workers against any other workers because Lebanese people are above all (come first)”.

Gebran Bassil, head of the Free Patriotic Movement, defends his and his party’s anti-Syrian campaigns. His defense is based on the argument that his perspective constitutes pure patriotism. Hence, he argues that categorizing people according to their origins is an act of patriotism. The first categories considered are: Lebanese workers vs any other workers (including Syrian refugees). The second categorization divides human beings into two groups: the favored Lebanese people versus non-Lebanese people. The Lebanese people are obliged to perform a certain task if they love Lebanon. That task has to do with rejecting non-Lebanese workers. Comparison reflects the bias towards the in-group of Lebanese against the out-group of non-Lebanese.

The examples above provide evidence of social categorization, identification and comparison and can likely be seen as a kind of polarizing discourse.

Counter-Discourse from Syrian Media

While Lebanese media campaigns depicted Syrian refugees as burdens and intruders, Syrian media outlets and cultural productions responded with counter-discourses that reveal the reciprocal nature of polarization. These counter-discourses not only rejected Lebanese portrayals but also constructed Lebanese political actors in negative terms, thereby reinforcing the cycle of hostility.

One striking example was a satirical Syrian song broadcast in reaction to Al-Jadeed TV’s parody about Syrian refugees. The lyrics referred to Lebanese media figures as “Nazis” and “racists,” turning the accusation of victimhood back onto the Lebanese. This counter-discourse functions as a mirror image of the Lebanese narrative: where Lebanese campaigns categorized Syrians as exploitative outsiders, the Syrian response reclassified the Lebanese as aggressors acting in bad faith. Here, the polarization becomes dialogical, with both sides engaged in mutual derogation rather than dialogue

Beyond cultural productions, Syrian state and pro-regime outlets (e.g., Al-Ikhbariya, SANA) often highlighted how Lebanon had economically benefited from the refugee crisis through international aid and cheap Syrian labor. These narratives reframed Lebanese hostility not as patriotism but as hypocrisy, arguing that Lebanon simultaneously exploited refugees while accusing them of destabilization. By reclaiming agency and portraying Syrians as contributors rather than burdens, this discourse sought to rehabilitate the Syrian in-group image and delegitimize Lebanese claims of victimhood.

Additionally, some Syrian outlets framed Lebanese hostility as evidence of Arab betrayal. This discourse positioned Lebanon as complicit in foreign conspiracies, portraying hostility toward refugees as part of a wider international attempt to pressure the Syrian state. Such framings reinforced Syrian resilience and unity, constructing the refugee community as dignified victims resisting both war and regional ostracization.

Taken together, these counter-discourses reveal that polarization is not unilateral. Instead, both Lebanese and Syrian media engaged in reciprocal acts of labeling, victimization, and delegitimization that reinforced entrenched antagonisms between the two communities.

Theoretical Integration

These counter-discourses can also be connected to the theoretical frameworks underpinning this study. From the perspective of Social Identity Theory, Syrians reasserted themselves as a proud in-group defending dignity against Lebanese derogation. The rejection of Lebanese superiority and the emphasis on Syrian resilience illustrate attempts to maintain a positive group identity under conditions of marginalization. In terms of National Identity Theory, Syrian media narratives highlighted the endurance of the Syrian nation despite displacement, framing Lebanese hostility as an external threat to the continuity of Syrian identity. Finally, applying van Dijk’s Ideological Square, the reciprocal “us versus them” dichotomy becomes apparent: Syrians emphasized their victimhood and contributions, while labeling Lebanese elites as racist oppressors. This analytical lens demonstrates that polarization in the Lebanese-Syrian media sphere is co-constructed through competing acts of self-valorization and other-degradation.

LIMITATIONS OF FINDING

While this study provides important insights into the construction of Syrian refugees in Lebanese media discourse, several limitations should be acknowledged. First, the analysis has concentrated primarily on two campaigns launched by the Free Patriotic Movement: “Safe Return to Syria; the Situation in Lebanon is No Longer Tolerable” and “If You Love Lebanon, Employ the Lebanese.” As such, the findings predominantly reflect the discursive strategies of one political party and its affiliated media outlets. Although the FPM is a major actor in Lebanese politics, its rhetoric may not represent the full spectrum of political and media positions within Lebanon, where competing factions may adopt more moderate, humanitarian, or alternative framings of the refugee issue.

Second, the data analyzed were limited to specific campaign materials, television broadcasts, and news articles from 2018 to 2019. Broader sampling across different time periods, political actors, and media genres could reveal more complex and varied patterns of refugee representation. Furthermore, while the study incorporates some counter-discourse from Syrian media, the analysis is not exhaustive of the wide range of Syrian voices, including those from opposition media, independent journalists, or refugee-led platforms.

Therefore, the extent to which the present findings can be generalized to the entire Lebanese media and political landscape should be treated with caution. The results are best understood as illustrative of polarization strategies employed by a prominent political party rather than a definitive account of all Lebanese discourse on Syrian refugees. Future research should expand the scope of analysis to include multiple political actors, longitudinal data, and comparative perspectives across regional media in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of refugee representation.

CONCLUSION

Social Identity Theory underscores how individuals derive their self-image from their group affiliations, often producing in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. In the Lebanese case, the media campaigns clearly constructed Syrians as the negative out-group whose presence threatened Lebanese national identity. However, this study also demonstrates that the process of polarization is not confined to one direction. Counter-discourses from Syrian media reveal how Syrians repositioned themselves as a dignified in-group, while delegitimizing Lebanese actors as racists and aggressors.

From the perspective of National Identity Theory, both Lebanese and Syrian narratives deployed strategies of national singularity and victimhood. The Lebanese emphasized demographic, economic, and cultural threats, while Syrians highlighted resilience, dignity, and external conspiracies undermining their identity. Both discourses constructed national belonging by accentuating differences and reinforcing boundaries.

Using van Dijk’s Ideological Square, we can see that polarization is reciprocal and dialogical: Lebanese discourse magnified “our” patriotism and “their” burden, while Syrian discourse highlighted “our” resilience and “their” racism. The result is a discursive battleground where both groups simultaneously affirm their own worth and vilify the other.

Therefore, the construction of Syrian refugees in Lebanese media cannot be fully understood without considering the counter-construction in Syrian media. Together, these narratives illustrate how mutual polarization entrenches hostility, diminishes prospects for solidarity, and perpetuates the cycle of exclusion that Syrian refugees face. Recognizing this reciprocal dynamic provides a more complete and nuanced understanding of refugee representation in the region.

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